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ABSTRACT 
A new sense of state responsibility for the global ecosystem has emerged over the last 
three decades. It embraces doctrines such as sustainable development, the 'polluter-
pays' principle, the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity and the common 
heritage of mankind. When coupled with international security and economic 
considerations, the development of these concepts heralds the emergence of a new 
international environmental order and its attendant circle of interdependence which 
binds all states. 
The emergence of shared concerns about humanity's impact on the global environment 
has its roots in a series of environmental crises which have served to confirm the 
planet's vulnerability and underscored the need for joint responsibility towards the 
global ecosystem. However, the acceptance by states of this responsibility has not 
been pervasive as inter-state cooperation from within the traditional framework of 
sovereign independence has always been problematic. But this study argues that 
endorsing the reality of our common ecological bonds means that state political 
boundaries are becoming increasingly insignificant as multilateral environmental 
policies and laws are pursued. This should not be interpreted as an abrogation of the 
rights of sovereign states, per se. Rather, it should confirm the transboundary 
character of environmental issues and the need for rethinking the traditional doctrines 
of sovereignty to emphasise cooperative approaches to dealing with environmental 
issues. 
One area where this has been successfully attempted is the Antarctic, which is now the 
subject of one of the most comprehensive environmental regimes ever established. 
The counterfactual region is the Arctic, where the eight sovereign states have made 
only little progress towards sharing responsibilities for the ecosystem. Case studies of 
these two regions illustrate that in the Antarctic, the existence of a legal regime which 
redefines traditional notions of sovereignty has been instrumental in facilitating a 
substantial environmental management regime. By contrast, the absence of any re-
development of the concept of sovereignty in the Arctic has impeded the progress of a 
comprehensive pan-Arctic regime for environmental management. However, in recent 
times there have been positive indications of a willingness by the Arctic states to 
redefine their traditional sovereign approach to common environmental issues, albeit in 
cautious terms. 
There are obvious fundamental differences between the Arctic and the Antarctic. In 
any case, given the peculiarities of Antarctica one must necessarily be cautious in using 
it as a basis for general assumptions and policies for ecosystem management in other 
areas. This notwithstanding, developments in the Antarctic and the growing trend of 
internationalization of environmental issues in other regions call for transboundary 
approaches similar to the Antarctic experience. The Arctic would seem to be adopting 
this approach. Furthermore, this study argues that the new international environmental 
order requires such an approach to global ecosystem management. 
The work is divided into five chapters which describe the genesis and nature of 
responsibility for the global ecosystem; the geographic and geopolitical architecture of 
the polar regions; the Antarctic as a mature regime; the progression towards an Arctic 
eco-management regime; and concludes with a comparative analysis and lessons of 
experience from the polar case studies. 
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Introduction 
This is a study of the world system of states and their rights and duties with regard to 
the making of international environmental policy and law, with a particular focus on 
the polar regions - the Arctic and the Antarctic. 
The study is both normative and descriptive. It is also multi-disciplinary in the sense 
that a variety of social science disciplines including legal studies, political science, 
international relations theory and policy analysis are employed to help shed light on the 
issues. 
This work investigates the ability of the world society of states to develop a cohesive 
and compatible approach to ecosystem management and protection within the 
prevailing and evolving politico-legal order of state sovereignty. In this context an 
ecosystem is defined as: 
a dynamic complex of plant, animal and micro-organism 
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a 
functional unit) 
The global ecosystem, which includes humans, is composed of a diversity of regional 
ecosystems. Together they are woven into the complex fabric which is the global 
biosphere — that part of the earth which sustains all life. Taking responsibility for 
regional ecosystems is the fundamental step towards integrating respect for the global 
ecosystem in policy and law. 
Responsibility, in the sense it is used here, implies accountability. All states have a 
particular perception of their place in the world order and this place, by virtue of the 
rules of international law, must acknowledge the existence of other states with the 
same rights and obligations as themselves. Such is the general principle of the 
responsibility of states in international law. The notion of responsibility can be 
quantified by analysing the degree to which states adopt certain emerging principles 
and concepts of international environmental law, such as acting in a precautionary 
manner, taking due regard of the possible existence of future generations, promoting 
development which is sustainable, making provision for the distribution of benefits of 
common resources among all states, and the degree to which they can be held 
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accountable for unacceptable environmental degradation. Responsibility may be found 
in the first instance at a regional level and then, because the invasion of the legal 
interests of a neighbouring state may have far wider effects, at a global level. But this 
study argues that responsibility can also be seen as moral duty which may not 
necessarily involve a breach of legal duty, particularly in view of the fact that legal 
rules may only be emerging. 
The most profound acknowledgment to be made is that responsibility for the global 
ecosystem, in a comprehensive and enduring form, is beyond the political, physical 
and financial resources of the world's states, and is therefore likely to prove elusive. 
What is possible, however, is a new kind of regional response and value-system 
which will bring all of the components of regional ecosystems under review when the 
various levels of government decide on matters of policy. Policies can intentionally 
become ecosystem-orientated, not only for the purposes of restoring fragile or 
vulnerable areas, but also in a bid to prevent unacceptable levels of harm from 
occurring in any area within the jurisdiction of affected states. Appropriate regional 
responses may meld together to form a matrix of global responsibility in 
acknowledgment of the common ecological interdependence of the world's states. 
This is because the fate of one state is inextricably linked to the fate of others, 
particularly its trading partners and military allies. 
The point of departure for this study is the fact that political emancipation or individual 
freedom which is an attribute of state sovereignty, is being challenged by a perceived 
need for states to address, in concert, the world's environmental ills.2 These calls for 
unprecedented inter-state cooperation at once both embrace the state and venture 
beyond it. This study does not advocate the dismantling of the state system in some 
kind of altruistic pogrom; on the contrary, it canvasses the thesis that global ecological 
interdependence will require a re-examination of the traditional notions of sovereignty, 
to induce a more fundamental sensitivity to the ecological common good. That 
sensitivity is seen as the first step along the road towards environmental problem-
solving through international cooperation, legitimate and effective law-making and a 
demonstrated measure of accountability to the rest of the world. 
In the context of this study, the traditional approach to the coexistence of sovereign 
states means the cultural, political and economic heterogeneity which characteristically 
underpin the notion of the independent state. 3 This approach has generally implied a 
minimum application of the rules of coexistence between states, as elaborated in the 
Charter of the United Nations. The Charter affirms the sovereign equality and 
integrity of all its Member states in its Article 2.1 and 2.4. 
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The central proposition underlying this study is that such a minimalist approach has 
tended to circumscribe international cooperation in the field of the environment in the 
past. This is not to say that cooperation does not take place, but rather that in 
environmental terms, states are often reluctant to cooperate when it appears that they 
have more to lose and little to gain, particularly economically and in the short-term. 
International security, the global economy and the global environment are the three 
major issues in world politics today (Porter & Brown 1991:2). (It might also be 
argued that international human rights too is a major issue, but this appears to have 
direct links to security, the economy and the environment.) The newest of these three 
issues to rise to prominence is the global environment which, from a position of low 
politics only a decade or two ago, is now fixed high on the political agenda of many 
states, certainly the developed, industrialized ones. While this may demonstrate 
growing recognition that the viability of all states is either directly or indirectly affected 
by the degradation of the biosphere, it does not demonstrate a consensual approach to 
the issue. The addition of the global environment to the world political agenda merely 
completes the circle of complex interdependence between all states. The existence and 
nature of trade agreements between states illustrates this point. Domestic 
environmental conditions and legally binding environmental protection standards will 
'...constitute a significant component of the terms [of trade]...'between 
states because of the potential for artificial trade barriers to be erected through 
subsidized pollution control measures (Gaines 1991:464). In addition, the world's 
money-lenders and aid-givers have the power to make their business deals with 
environmentally-recalcitrant states conditional upon certain environmental 
considerations. Interdependence is also underscored by the fact that transfrontier 
effects of environmental bad-practice can be seen as a breach of an affected state's 
sovereign integrity and hence possibly its security and economic viability. But such 
linkages as these present enormous difficulties when states try to balance their desires 
for security, economic prosperity and environmental harmony: difficulties which no 
state can deal with on its own. 
The regions selected for examination in this study are the Arctic and the Antarctic. 
While it may be argued that these areas of the planet are unique, especially in terms of 
inhospitable climate and relative lack of habitation, there are a number of reasons why 
they are strategically, politically and scientifically significant. 4 Moreover, each offers 
possibilities of contrast in terms of the formation, operation, evolution and 
effectiveness of environmental management regimes. They also offer useful 
illustrations of the nexus between science and politics, since the problems of greatest 
salience to the polar regions - accelerated global climate change for one - require a high 
degree of scientific investigation. Intrinsically, the different approaches to 
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sovereignty displayed by Arctic as opposed to Antarctic states is one justification for 
the selection of these regions as case studies. Furthermore, the choice may be even 
more appropriate considering that some sovereign Arctic states are also major actors in 
the Antarctic and therefore their application of the principles of sovereignty may prove 
to be malleable according to the regional context in which they are applied. 
Philosophical Rationale 
In a world characterised by increasing political and economic interdependence, it is no 
surprise that ecological factors would one day play an enhanced role in future global 
relations. Our common ecological destiny is not a new concept, but until recently 
imperatives to protect the biosphere had largely been subsumed by the desire for peace 
and economic prosperity in a discordant world. A new world order is emerging, and 
some see it as being characterised as much by ecological as by economic or social or 
political interdependence.5 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) 
implied that a new global environmental agenda is emerging and will require states to 
adopt a distinctly new type of diplomacy in their dealings with one another (United 
Nations 1992:Preamble). This poses as serious a challenge to the widely-held 
doctrine of the mutually-respected independence of states as, for example, wars do, in 
this modern time of complex economic and strategic interdependence. 
Another proposition central to this study, which has direct links to the UNCED 
process, is that a symbiotic relationship between the ecosystem and development will 
become a necessary condition for planetary survival. Furthermore, such a relationship 
will require the reshaping of international cooperation so that eco-management regimes 
more closely reflect the environmental, political, legal, economic and social realities 
and challenges faced by the states, both as independent entities and as members of the 
global community, in the 21st century. Planetary rights and obligations will need to 
be fulfilled without prejudice to, or if necessary by redefining sovereign rights, the 
common good and resource security. This is the axis of the work's thesis: that global 
ecological interdependence will require a re-examination of the traditional approach to 
sovereignty. These concepts are further discussed, and their usefulness validated, in 
Chapter 1. 
The study has been undertaken because of a certain belief in the pictures presented to 
us about the state of the planet, some of which are quite alarming. There is little 
current literature written from an anti-environmental perspective but a much larger 
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amount which is pro-environmental. Lewis (1992) considers that the global 
environment faces two profound ideological threats: one, the more serious, comes 
from anti-environmentalists who would have us believe that the ecological crisis is a 
mirage; and another comes from radical environmentalists who would have us tear 
down all liberal democratic constructs and re-invent a better society. 6 This work lies 
somewhere between the two extremes and is based simply on the belief that reality will 
overcome radicalism and that cooperative, integrated management of the world's 
resources is essential for a healthy future. This is not only a personal view, but one 
shared by many environmentalists, the United Nations and policy and law-makers 
throughout the world. This study will show that no matter what the motivating force, 
cooperation between states can only be beneficial. Whether cooperation will be cost-
effective in the sense that the cost of the benefits will be worthwhile, is another issue 
entirely and one not pursued within the scope of this work. 
Research Objective 
The research objective is to identify factors which have enhanced or inhibited the 
capacity of the polar states to plan appropriate environmental policy and to carry it out 
effectively by making environmental law, within the general ambit of their competence 
as states in international law. By identifying such factors it will be possible to 
illustrate the thesis that state coexistence is necessarily undergoing a transformation, 
with more of an emphasis on the common good and less on the inviolability of state 
sovereignty, in the context of the polar regions at least. It is suggested that this 
transformation may not be occurring particularly because states want it that way, but 
rather because ecological interdependence dictates that it should be so. 
The polar regions were selected as suitable subjects for analysis because of the unusual 
way in which each is managed in relation to the other. It is thought that these two 
regions which are traditionally - and sometimes quite inappropriately - seen as 
analogous, are useful because their underlying political factors are, in fact, quite 
dissimilar. The Arctic is the province of eight sovereign states, while the Antarctic is 
in the custody of 42 states with no legally perfected sovereignty, although claims to 
sovereign territory are facts in law. Accordingly, states with an Antarctic interest may 
not be directly affected by bad environmental behaviour occurring in the region or 
originating from elsewhere, and their motivation to negotiate environmental law will be 
quite different from that of the Arctic states. In the north, states and nations are not 
only in conflict over the allocation of resources among competing groups, but they 
may be directly and sometimes quite severely affected by both local and transboundary 
environmental problems (Switzer 1994:322). 
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Finaly, this study seeks to discover if any lessons can be learnt from the 
environmental management of polar regions which might be usefuly applied to other 
areas of the globe. 
Analytical Rationale 
In developing the analytical rationale for this study, it was necessary to decide at the 
outset what the aim of ecosystem management was, and hence what state 
responsibility for the global ecosystem might entail. In other words, it was necessary 
to have a benchmark by which to measure realistic goals of eco-management of the 
polar regions, primarily because individual values vary so greatly. 
History has witnessed the head-on clash between al of the ideological and 
philosophical colours of the environmental spectrum which represent, at one end, the 
radicals and at the other, the ultra-conservatives.7 As a result of their difering values, 
disparate groups have often had dificulties finding common ground on which to begin 
meaningful negotiation about environmental issues. Chapter 1 describes the evolution 
and progression of a new environmental agenda in terms of both social behaviour and 
international law. It ilustrates that there has never been, and likely never wil be, 
consensus on ecosystem values and indeed this is part of the problem of determining 
what is appropriate with regard to polar eco-management. Chapter 1 also shows that, 
in a legal sense, three of the fundamental objectives of eco-management are: 
i) 	 to deal with existing causes of damage to ecosystems; 
to minimize or prevent additional forms of damage; and 
ii) 	 to preserve and use ecosystems rationaly and sustainably. 
These objectives are atempted by states through combinations of regional, national 
and international arangements, including legal sanction. 
Much is now being writen about the global ecosystem and international environmental 
diplomacy.8 However, scant atention is paid to the polar regions. They can be 
perceived as either vast, forbidding wastelands or alternatively as storehouses of great 
riches, but these are simplistic and conflicting portraits of places of great human and 
natural theatre. In the worst case scenario of enhanced global warming, for instance, 
the major impacts may be felt in the polar regions first. Sound management through a 
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balanced and integrated approach to environmental and developmental questions is 
therefore crucial for the polar regions because: 
much of the world's weather is generated in the northern and southern polar 
regions; 
essential sciences are conducted in these natural laboratories and will lead to a 
better understanding of global processes; 
the nature of the polar ecosystems is such that they can provide early warning 
of process changes; 
both are locations where traditional notions of security have been, or are in the 
process of being, re-defined and where Cold War hostilities are being replaced 
by attempts at multilateral scientific, economic and environmental cooperation. 
But do those states with responsibility for the polar regions see their obligations in this 
light? The study attempts to answer this, in addition to raising fundamental questions 
about the role and position of the sovereign state in a world order more concerned than 
ever before with environmental issues. 
In order to carry out this assessment, it is essential to focus not only on the spectrum 
of activities constituting ecosystem management but also to place such factors in the 
broader context of the relationship between state sovereignty and collective action, 
particularly with respect to international environmental regimes. To what degree are 
the polar regions becoming arenas of regional cooperation? Is de facto 
internationalization occurring? To what extent is customary practice or tentative 
experiment giving way to substantive environmental law? What kind of institutional 
arrangements are proposed or in place to give effect to these provisions? In general, 
can it be argued that a new international environmental order, as distinct from a new 
strategic or political order, is emerging? 
The study's methodological approach is to first identify both the basis and nature of 
state responsibility for the global ecosystem in order to construct an analytical template 
for application to the case studies. Three criteria will be used to assess the level of 
responsibility: legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability. Each criterion has clearly-
defined features and when combined with the emerging concepts and principles 
making up the generic notion of responsibility, they provide a solid analytical tool 
which is relative to both the restorative and proactive features of polar environmental 
management. 
The study describes the geographical and geopolitical architecture of the polar regions; 
traces and analyses the evolution of environmental regimes in the Arctic and Antarctic; 
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and places such factors in the broader context of state sovereignty and international 
cooperation. Since it cannot be claimed that the author has expertise in the internal 
relations of polar states, the study is based on the best available official and unofficial 
reports and writings of polar bureaucracies and commentators. 
Thesis Structure 
The multi-disciplinary nature of this work tended to make the information appear 
dissonant at times. Therefore it has been necessary to carefully construct a 
chronological sequence of events which in the first instance is broad-ranging, setting 
the conceptual and analytical paradigms. The study becomes more focussed in its 
presentation of the case studies. Finally the information is treated in general terms as 
the relevance of the thesis emerges. 
Chapter 1 is concerned with identifying evolving paradigms of global ecosystem 
responsibility. It defines the work's parameters by describing the historical 
development of this ethic which has led to the thesis that traditional approaches to 
sovereignty need re-examining. This section describes environmental crises and the 
roles and behavioural responses of key actors. The Chapter proceeds by determining 
that existing limits to state sovereignty imposed by international law, together with 
natural limitations imposed through the complex interdependency between sovereign 
states, has led to attempts to reconsider the notion of sovereignty. The work then 
seeks to establish the appropriate roles and practises of governments in the light of 
new ideas about sovereignty and proposes an analytical template with appropriate 
application to the case studies - the polar regions. 
Chapter 2 continues the contextual paradigm by describing the particular geographical 
and geopolitical idiosyncrasies of the polar regions. It elaborates further on their 
significance in the global context and hence justifies their utility to the study. 
Chapters 3 and 4 contain the descriptive case studies of the Antarctic Treaty System as 
a mature regime, and queries whether the present Arctic situation is that of an 
emerging regime. Both Arctic and Antarctic states have begun to address the issue of 
ecosystem management in a more holistic way than previously. With regard to the 
Antarctic, this is a substantial departure from the desire of some of those same states to 
exploit the non-living resources of the region. For the Arctic states, the current 
cooperative trend heralds a courageous step towards collective problem-solving. The 
Antarctic Treaty Parties have taken innovative measures by constructing an 
environmental protection protocol which is progressively being ratified through State 
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legislatures. There is general optimism that the Protocol will survive the ratification 
process to enter into force. Conversely, the Arctic states still have a long road ahead 
before they reach the same theoretical level of control. This may not even be possible, 
given that the politics of the region are complicated and unpredictable in this early 
stage of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. 
The concluding Chapter 5 makes a comparative analysis of the regions. It seeks to 
answer such questions as: on what basis did the states negotiate a quite 
comprehensive regulation of human activity in the Antarctic territory when they had no 
legally proven sovereignty there? Given that there is an Antarctic ecosystem 
management instrument of law passing through the ratification process, can it be 
concluded that state sovereignty has impeded the progress of transboundary, 
multilateral or global environmental law pertaining to the Arctic, where sovereignty is a 
primary condition and where no such substantive ecosystem management regime 
exists? What implications, if any, can be drawn from the case studies for international 
cooperation, global ecosystem responsibility and the concept of state sovereignty as 
we approach the 21st Century? 
Sources 
The reference sources used for this study include formal government reports; other 
secondary sources such as books, research publications and conference proceedings; 
and some primary materials collected by the author during structured and informal 
interviews in Finland, Norway, Scotland, England, Canada and Australia. 
Limitations 
The principal limitations of the study are that because regime dynamics continue to 
operate, many aspects of Arctic politics remain in transition; similarly in the Antarctic, 
the agenda is by no means complete. It was necessary therefore to establish a cut-off 
date, after which no further information would be sought or included. That date was 
30 April 1995. 
It should also be mentioned here that the author has had substantial problems obtaining 
information from some Arctic countries, particularly from official sources. Many 
contacts made during a northern hemisphere research trip failed to forward promised 
information and subsequent follow-up letters were ignored. 
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In conclusion, this study is cautious about the value of polar experience as a general 
model for the kind of new international strategic, economic, ecological and political 
order prescribed by the UNCED process. Polar experience may however, provide 
valuable insights when assessed against evolving perceptions of nature, changing 
geopolitical circumstances, current environmental concerns and attempts to create 
effective international environmental regimes. At the very least the polar regions are 
interesting areas to study because of the peculiar nature of their problems and the 
unique legal and political solutions employed. 
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1 
Evolving Paradigms of 
Responsibility for the 
Global Ecosystem 
Introduction 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) - 
the most recent international conference with the global ecosystem on its agenda - was 
attended by officials from the majority of the world's states. It was, in fact, the largest 
gathering of world leaders in contemporary history. A concurrent meeting also held in 
Rio de Janeiro, the Global Forum, was attended by thousands of non-governmental 
organization (NGO) representatives. While there was genuine concern displayed by 
some who attended in Rio, others would no doubt have treated the venue as another 
forum for public posturing. Notwithstanding, the unprecedented attendance at these 
two conferences, together with the fact that they were thought necessary in the first 
place, points to some fundamental problems with the existing international political, 
economic, legal and social orders and their nexus to the maintenance of global 
environmental integrity. 
We are confronted daily with statistics regarding the state of the planetary ecosystem: 
degraded air and water quality; artificially-induced climate change and the enhanced 
greenhouse effect; ozone depletion; species extinction; poverty and unsustainable 
population growth; terrestrial degradation by necessity- and profit-driven agricultural 
practices; disease epidemics; and the constant collapse and rebuilding of empires, 
states, economies, institutions and social infrastructure. Debates rage ad infinitum on 
the causes, effects and remedies. In the case of, say, the disappearance of a particular 
species of hunted animal, both the cause and remedy may be obvious. But in other 
cases there are complex linkages to a range of behaviours with cumulative effects and 
'risk spirals9 neither easily recognisable nor easily reversible over a short 
timeframe. Some ecological problems such as airborne and seaborne pollution, ozone 
depletion and deforestation transcend domestic affairs, having transfrontier or global 
implications. In the case of transportable contaminants, they may become not only 
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physically uncontrollable beyond their point of origin, but politically uncontrollable as 
well (Caldwell 1984:224). To complicate matters, there is little consensus either on 
the nature of the problems, their remedies, or whether for that matter, some problems 
actually exist. 
Therefore, despite debates about the accuracy of statistics, and also because of them, 
this study advances the thesis that global ecological interdependence requires a re-
examination of traditional notions of sovereignty in order to promote responsibility for 
the global ecosystem. The thesis has been arrived at in light of mounting evidence, 
principally from the UNCED, that the integrity of our global ecosystem is being 
dangerously eroded. This has occurred especially since the Industrial Revolution and 
more recently, the post World War II growth in the number of sovereign states. 
Various actors have vigorously campaigned for both universal awareness of global 
environmental problems and increased international cooperation in solving them. 
Their actions have sometimes challenged the traditional perceptions of both sovereign 
independence and what is often described as unsustainable economic development. 
Other actors have resisted such efforts at imposing limitations upon their activities. A 
re-examination of sovereignty will, therefore, involve the juxtaposition of international 
law with evolving perceptions of nature, changing geopolitical circumstances and 
current environmental concerns. 
This Chapter identifies some of the major environmental crises which have driven 
contemporary environmental politics, tracing the emergence and clarifying the roles of 
key actors and the subsequent development of the intellectual foundations of a re-
thinking of traditional approaches to state sovereignty. 
Three core components can be identified. The first concerns the carousel of 
environmental crises which has been powered by the existence of independent 
sovereign states and their desire for economic enrichment and equality. On board the 
carousel are such factors as human population growth and poverty; food production 
and consumption patterns; depletion of non-renewable resources and species diversity; 
resource security; and the massive 20th century industrial and technological expansion 
with their accidental by-products of ozone depletion, acid rain, potential global climate 
change and the like. Each of these factors is in some way or another linked to the 
others and each has provided a degree of political and economic input in attempts to 
halt or reverse the destructive cycle - assuming, of course, that we are heading down 
that road. 
The second component is the place of key actors in the process of global 
environmental politics and law-making. The key actors are sovereign states, the 
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United Nations and its organs, scientific communities and the global environmental 
movement. Both individualy and colectively these actors have been involved in the 
advancement of what some see as a new global environmental agenda for the 21st 
century. 
The third component identified and defmed in this Chapter is a re-thinking of 
governance in light of this developing agenda of responsibility for the global 
ecosystem. Are we heading into a trend towards permeable sovereignty, an expansion 
on the traditional approach, as a more eficient means of managing our global 
ecosystem? 
To test this proposition about permeability, the Chapter concludes by identifying five 
key principles which have evolved during the past several decades into paradigms of 
responsibility for the global ecosystem and which are inextricably bound to the notion 
of sovereignty. These five principles, under the general rubric of ecosystem 
responsibility, are then used as part of a template for analysis of the polar eco-
management arangements. The analysis wil show the nature and extent of the 
erosion of sovereignty in favour of international regime formation, and thus the 
template also requires parameters by which regime function can be measured. Three 
variables: legitimacy, efectiveness and accountability, fulfil this role. It wil be 
shown that these variables accord with the broader notion of responsibility for the 
global ecosystem. 
1.1 	 A Carousel of Environmental Crises 
Reconciling human behaviour with indiscriminate and indiferent natural processes, 
with the aim of designing and maintaining a sustainable coexistence between al 
elements of the biosphere, is proving to be an enormously dificult exercise — 
politicaly, technologicaly and moraly. The chalenges may be common to al but the 
cause/efect linkages are problematic. While this work deals specificaly with the polar 
regions, some statements can be made about global environmental crises in general 
terms. 
1.1.1 	 The Human Dimension : Population and Poverty 
Many of our problems began around 5000 BC when hunter-gatherers and herders 
discovered the utility of agriculture and grouped into '...settled, complex, 
hierarchical societies' (Ponting 1991:37). Early societies were responsible for 
ecological degradation but the contribution of any one generation could only be 
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considered small in the extended timeframe of nearly 7000 years of social history.lo 
From post-Industrial Revolution times, however, no such disclaimer can be made for 
today's global society. 
One of the most crucial characteristics of 20th century life is the rapid expansion of 
population numbers. The planet's human population has doubled between 1950 and 
1987 and is estimated to reach 6.25 thousand million by the year 2000, with over 90% 
of the projected increase to take place in developing countries. 11 It is also estimated 
that in the corresponding period the amount of arable land will have declined by nearly 
50% (Porter & Brown 1991:3). It has been stated that: 'Overpopulation and 
rapid population growth are intimately connected with most aspects 
of the current human predicament_'. 12 Thisisbecausetheformula:total 
population multiplied by its per capita consumption can be used as one means of 
determining the rate of ecosystem disruption (Porter & Brown 1991:5). 
Furthermore, while it is considered that the world's food resources can - theoretically - 
feed 40 thousand million people, of the current 5.3 thousand million human population 
an estimated 14.6 million children die annually from hunger-related diseases. 13 No 
matter how accurate the statistics are, it is plain that poverty - a social and political 
problem - has the potential to be a major factor in environmental stress, as both a cause 
and an effect. 
This is because in many regions of the world, developed and developing alike, poor 
agricultural and land management practices like urban degradation, deforestation, 
overgrazing and overcropping have become a means to an end — the survival of the 
human species and the perpetuation of economic prosperity. Paradoxically these 
practices have also become ends in themselves by jeopardizing the carrying capacity of 
the particular ecosystems. This in turn puts other ecosystems and ultimately the whole 
biosphere into peril. The conjunction is based on the potential for these scenarios to 
undermine the political and social security of developing countries in particular, but of 
developed countries too, because of the expanding and intricate economic and strategic 
interdependence of states (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992:3). 
Agriculture is one case in point. The use of highly mechanised equipment, 
sophisticated irrigation techniques, soil enhancing fertilizers and pesticides and 
herbicides have helped to intensify food production to all time record levels in the mid-
1980s (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990:20). But in so doing they have also helped to make 
major contributions to land and water-table degradation. In 1988, the United States 
consumed more grain than it produced, primarily because one-third of its crops were 
drought-affected (Ehrlich & Ehrlich 1990:9). Also in the 1980s an estimated 35 
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million people in Africa's Sahel region were at risk of starvation as their lands became 
deserts (WCED 1990:75). It is difficult to know how, or indeed if, these problems 
can or should be rectified. 
So-called natural disasters like drought and flood take their toll on land weakened by 
human abuse. 14 For example, in some cases the natural consequences of flooding 
have been aggravated by a cycle of overgrazing, overcropping and forest clear-felling, 
which all loosen the top soil and alter the earth's ability to hold moisture, resulting in 
erosion, the silting up of river systems and altered local ecosystems. This can 
interrupt the resource base and hence the ability of primary producers to manage their 
resources sustainably. 
Consequently, for one reason or another, there may be as many as 300 million so-
called environmental refugees whose homelands can no longer support them. 15 
Recent examples are parts of Haiti, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia. It may be 
simply that there are too many people; or that the soil is in poor condition; that drought 
and flood have contributed to crop failures; that flood and wind have eroded top soil; 
that river topography and resources have been significantly altered; that forests have 
been cleared but the nutrient-poor land cannot sustain agriculture; or that the general 
disaffection of the population has contributed to conflicts resulting in mass refugee 
migration, revolution and war. As Ehrlich and Ehrlich point out, food shortage is not 
the only consequence of overpopulation (1990:20). 
But this disaster perspective is not a readily accepted fact. Economic growth and 
development have also contributed to a greatly enhanced living standard and have 
positive flow-on effects like better health and education, lower fertility and infant 
mortality rates and increased knowledge of how to use resources productively. 16 
Notwithstanding, in many cases growth and development have come at a price. 
During the 20th century, but primarily since 1950, global use of fossil fuels has 
increased 30-fold and industrial production has risen 50-fold (WCED 1990:75). But 
in 1980-82, only 26% of the world's population (that is, in developed countries) 
consumed 80% of commercial energy, 85% of paper, 76% of steel and 86% of other 
metals produced (WCED 1990:77). This consumption pattern by the developed 
world demonstrates the disparity between rich and poor. Such disparity has always 
existed, but in modern times the coefficient has widened under the influence of the 
carousel of environmental crises. This has led to a struggle for economic growth by 
developing countries and a growth and development ethic by developed countries, all 
of which puts synergistic stresses on the global environment. 17 
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The UNCED process recognized poverty as a 'complex, multidimensional 
problem' ranging across the state and into the international realm (United Nations 
1992:Ch.3). An inherently dificult facet of poverty is the need to balance the 
conservation and preservation of resources with the dependence by the population on 
these resources for survival. One position which the UNCED arived"at involved 
participation at every level, from the individual to global institutions, empowering the 
poor at the most fundamental level of their existence to take responsibility for 
preservation and enrichment of the resources of their livelihoods. However, this is 
very dificult to achieve if you and your children are starving. 
As contributing factors to environmental crises, population and poverty are 
inextricably linked to consumption paterns developed during the 20th century. 
1.1.2 	 Accidental By-Products of the Industrial 
Revolution 
While the 20th century patern of industrial expansion and economic growth has had a 
profound efect on the lives of milions of people, some of its accidental by-products 
like air and water polution have the potential to render primary resources unusable.18 
Large-scale international environmental problems like potential global climate change, 
ozone depletion and acid rain have been tagged with producing this consequence. 
Their influence can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution but their efects are only 
now becoming beter understood. Three of these by-products are discussed below and 
are indicative of the kinds of global environmental problems which are now out of the 
hands of states as independent entities and onto the global agenda. 
Potential Global Climate Change 
The terms greenhouse efect and climate change tend to induce confusion because too 
litle is genuinely understood about the possible, or indeed the probable, consequences 
of human activity on climate. The scientific community readily admits that the threat 
of artificialy-induced, ireversible climate change is problematic and while the 
physical basis is fairly wel understood, the more complex feedback mechanisms are 
not (Zilman 1992:26). This does not mean that we should not be concerned about 
potential global climate change, however. 
The magnitude of change, geographical distribution paterns, the types of changes 
which might be expected (and in some cases whether these may even be beneficial) 
and importantly, the timing of any changes are issues with which the scientific 
community, policy- and law-makers are grappling. One commentator has suggested 
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that it may be decades before quantitative, detailed proof is available. 19 These kinds of 
questions have led to uncertainty about the policies and legal actions required to 
satisfactorily address the problems. 
The physical basis for climate change may have been discovered as early as 1827, 
when French mathematician Fourier discerned the role of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere as having a 'hothouse' effect (Lunde 1992:54). Since that time there 
was very little scientific interest in such theories until much more conclusive evidence 
was found less than four decades ago. This study does not attempt to chronicle the 
complete development of the greenhouse and climate change theories. 20 However, 
because this is one issue which has particular relevance to the polar regions, some time 
will be spent here examining the issues. 
The greenhouse effect is a popular euphemism for increased warming of the earth's 
surface, but it neither resembles the process which occurs in garden greenhouses, nor 
takes account of the earth's natural greenhouse effect (Zillman 1992:14). 
The mechanisms of global climate are dynamic, involving solar radiation; the spherical 
shape of the earth which causes the temperature to decrease from the equator to the 
poles; the natural greenhouse condition which causes temperature to decrease upwards 
from the earth's surface; the exchange of mass, energy and momentum between the 
atmosphere and other components of the climate system; and the earth's rotation 
(Zillman 1992:13). The atmosphere is a thin shell of air bound to the earth by gravity 
and is composed primarily of nitrogen (78% by volume) and oxygen (21%). Water 
vapour and argon are the next largest components, with carbon dioxide and methane 
making up the bulk of the remainder, albeit in trace quantities only. The latter are 
collectively referred to as radiatively active trace gases or, popularly, greenhouse 
gases. 
The surface warming of the earth is essentially determined by the radiative properties 
of the so-called greenhouse gases. While the atmosphere is virtually transparent to the 
incoming shortwave radiation (heat) from the sun, it is almost opaque to the longer 
wavelength infrared radiation emitted by the solar heated earth, thereby trapping some 
of the outgoing heat (Zillman 1992:14). In lay terms this exchange of heat is in 
approximate equilibrium, thereby keeping the earth's temperature relatively constant. 
But the addition of small amounts of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere reduce the 
loss of heat and a new equilibrium is set up at a higher temperature. 
This temperature constancy is relative because climate itself is subject to variability. 
Using time scales from millions of years to just one day, it has been possible to 
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identify natural climatic changes. Alterations in the earth's shape and rate of rotation, 
the amount of radiation emitted from the sun, land and ocean floor topography, 
continental drift and the internal processes of the climate system all effect global 
climate processes and are considered natural occurrences. Alterations not considered 
natural are anthropogenic and include changes in land use patterns and atmospheric 
composition, which have the potential to cause irreversible trends in climatic 
conditions (Zillman 1992:21-3). 
When the earth's natural greenhouse condition is disturbed, say by significant 
alteration to the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, a new equilibrium in 
heat exchange will be created. In the 1950s, the scientific community began to have 
concerns about the prospect of artificially induced and escalated changes to global 
climate via a disequilibrium of the earth's natural greenhouse condition. Their 
concerns were based on two simple premises: 
physical arguments which suggested that the greater the concentration of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, the greater would be the surface warming; 
and 
the expectation that the burning of fossil fuels which had been going on since 
the Industrial Revolution would eventually lead to significant build-up of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Zillman 1992:23). 
Monitoring of the upward trend in average atmospheric carbon dioxide from the late 
1950s on revealed that the new temperature profile was likely to be warmer. 
Unprecedented scientific research has since indicated that global warming will have an 
effect on global climate processes (Zillman 1992:23-4). 
The links between major greenhouse gases and their anthropogenic sources and uses 
have been fairly well established. Carbon dioxide primarily comes from fossil fuel 
burning, deforestation and cement production; methane from rice paddies, ruminants, 
biomass burning, gas and coal fields, land fills and the tundra; chlorofluorocarbons, 
non-existent in nature, come from industrial and consumer goods, refrigeration and 
solvents; and nitrous oxide comes from biomass burning, agriculture and fossil fuel 
burning. These four gases together are thought to account for about 95% of the 
enhanced greenhouse effect (Zillman 1992:25). 
The major consequences of an enhanced greenhouse effect, given all the uncertainties, 
are likely to be: 
• that there will be a general global temperature warming; and 
• that there will be a general global sea level rise. 
• 
• 
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These two consequences are a primary motivation for presenting the polar regions as 
case studies in this work, as the polar regions are both global weather factories and 
repositories of a significant proportion of the earth's fresh water, contained within 
their ice. If the current trends continue, an average global temperature rise of between 
1.5° and 4.5° C may occur during the next 50 years or so. A consequential sea level 
rise of as much as 1.5 metres may also occur. 21 The implications for the polar 
regions, and ergo the rest of the world, may be enormous despite the lack of 
understanding about the potentially mitigating feedback processes. Even though we 
do not know enough about the potential for enhanced climate change to satisfy all the 
critics and disbelievers, can we afford not to take it seriously? What is needed, despite 
the uncertainty, is precautionary and preventative action to both halt the anthropogenic 
climate alterations and to protect the polar laboratories which supply essential scientific 
information and warning indicators. 
Ozone Depletion 
Ozone depletion is a separate though related problem. Ozone (03) is an atmospheric 
gas found in the stratosphere. It is created by solar radiation and it in turn absorbs 
ultraviolet radiation, screening out UV-B wavelength rays which are harmful to living 
tissues (Schneider 1976:11). Ozone depletion may have the potential to severely 
undermine the primary resource base which sustains humanity and indeed may have 
health consequences for humans themselves. The causes and consequences are far 
from certain, however. 22 
Ozone depletion was first reported by atmospheric scientists, and its consequential 
effects on living systems predicted by biological scientists, as early as 30 years ago. 
At that time however, realistic long-term funding for effects research was not 
forthcoming (SCOPE 1992:7). 
The possible connection between ozone and chlorofluorocarbons was brought to the 
attention of the wider scientific community in 1974 by Mario Molina and Sherry 
Rowland in an article in the scientific journal Nature (Rowland 1990:281). These 
two scientists hypothesised that the destruction of ozone was brought about by the 
chlorine atoms of CFCs. When CFCs are released into the atmosphere, they assist in 
trapping outgoing heat, which contributes to the enhanced greenhouse effect. The 
normally inert CFCs are also broken down by extremely energetic solar radiation and 
consequently release chlorine atoms. The chlorine atoms react with other chemicals in 
the atmosphere and this process is known to destroy ozone, thereby reducing the 
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thickness of the protective layer (Massey 1992:176). The fluorine released by the 
breakdown of CFCs is also thought to interact with ozone (Schneider 1976:11). 
In the mid 1980s, confirmation of the severity and potential consequences of this 
reduction of the ozone layer was a catalyst of unprecedented import to the development 
of international environmental law for the atmosphere. 23 
Importantly, proactive polar eco-management will preserve the polar laboratories 
which figure prominently in ozone research, especially since ozone depletion has been 
identified over Antarctica and to a lesser extent over the Arctic. 
The two scenarios discussed above are, to some degree, still not quantifiable. 
Speculation about the accuracy of computer modelling techniques has meant that 
almost as much activity today is concerned with the science of methodology as it is 
with the science of prediction. Indeed, some scientists query whether the generalized 
trend of global warming is, in fact, a natural phenomena of climate variability rather 
than artificially-induced (Paltridge pers.comm.). There is little speculation about acid 
rain, however. 
Acid Rain 
Acid rain is a generic term used to describe a variety of compounds in the atmosphere 
which, when they come into contact with moisture, fall as acidic gases and particles 
(Porter & Brown 1991:8). Sulphur dioxide emissions from industry are currently 
around 180 million metric tons annually. When combined with nitrogen oxide from 
automobiles and the agricultural burning of forests, for example, the emissions are 
diluted in the atmosphere into sulfuric and nitric acid. The resulting precipitation falls 
as rain with a higher than normal acidic content. 24 
Since the late 1970s, acid rain has been identified as being a widespread phenomena 
affecting North America and Europe, where the increased acidity of precipitation has 
been declared responsible for the killing of forests, the damaging of inland waterway 
ecosystems and for the accelerated decay of buildings. The extent of damage by acid 
rain to soils is unknown (WCED 1990:2). 
Acid rain became an icon for an insidious, uncontrollable carousel of environmental 
crises which put environmental diplomacy onto the public agenda in the so-called 
developed northern hemisphere. Given the large numbers of independent states 
coexisting in Europe and the relative proximity of both the United States and Canada, 
concern about this phenomena and recognition of the fundamental principle that the 
effects were transboundary in nature, led to an hitherto unprecedented level of 
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international cooperation. The 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air 
Polution (LRTAP) is a direct result of the identification of and concern over acid 
rain.25 
Together both the population/poverty scenario and the accidental by-products of 
industrial expansion are thought by some to have taken their tol on the earth's natural 
resource base. This may or may not be the case; notwithstanding, the depletion of 
natural resources is worthy of consideration in light of the developing stream of 
protective international law. 
1.1.3 	 Threats to the Natural Resource Base 
Humans co-exist with unknown milions of other animal and plant species in a 
biosphere rich in living and non-living life-sustaining commodities. These al belong 
in the category of natural resources. The UNCED determined that development cannot 
proceed independently of rational conservation and management of these resources — 
living and non-living, renewable and non-renewable — because in the long run, al 
resources are finite (United Nations 1992:Ch.2). Even so-caled renewable resources 
like plants and animals are only renewable insofar as their genetic material and habitats 
remain viable. 
What has happened in recent history is that in our struggle for survival we have 
intervened in the natural cycle of life and death. Human cleverness in using and 
manipulating our environment has instigated what some see as an unprecedented 
acceleration in the depletion of natural resources to a point, in some cases, beyond 
replenishment levels.26 Myers, for instance, suggests that we are probably losing 
between 50 and 200 living species a day (Myers 1993a:179). Despite debate about 
the accuracy of these kinds of statistics, what can be said is that until the value of these 
resources and their place in the global ecosystem is beter understood, alowing their 
depletion beyond replenishment levels is moraly unacceptable to many people. 
Human ingenuity has also facilitated the invention of substitutes and alternatives, but 
three primal resources - clean air, arable soils and uncontaminated water - cannot be 
syntheticaly replicated to the same degree as other materials. 
The disappearance of natural resources or the depletion of species diversity is not 
simply an aesthetic loss; it has far more wide-ranging efects. The UNCED process 
took up the issue of species loss with some seriousness, culminating in the conclusion 
of a framework protection and trade treaty, the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity, which was signed on 5 June 1992 and entered into force on 29 December 
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1993.27 The Preamble to the Convention reaffirms states' rights to own and 
obligations to conserve their biological resources for the good of all humankind of this 
generation and beyond. It also promotes sustainable use of these resources so that the 
whole world can retain the benefits of species diversity.28 A range of other 
international environmental law aims to protect wildlife and their habitats.29 
The disappearance of species diversity may not reversible, unlike other examples of 
environmental harm described above. Notwithstanding, the ecological 
interdependence evidenced in the preceding discussions has stimulated a growing 
realization that we are all part of one Earth, although sequestered in our human domain 
it is often very difficult to see the world as a whole, of which we - as individuals - are 
only small, insignificant units. The factor which best determines that the circle of 
interdependence includes environmental issues is the asymmetrical distribution of costs 
and benefits between states from such transboundary environmental problems as 
these. When environmental problems become transboundary in nature, they gain the 
potential to threaten both the security of states and their economic viability (Carroll 
1988:3). 
The examples of environmental stresses given above also illustrate how insignificant 
state borders are in containing problems, both physically and politically. Not only 
have independent political units often been unable to take full responsibility for the 
harm that escapes their custody, but also they are becoming increasingly critical of 
other states which abuse their own resources. The global debate about deforestation 
practices in the Amazon is one case in point. 30 
This study has begun from a position which is distinctly idealistic in a deliberate 
attempt to show that while international protective laws have grown out of just such a 
position, they ultimately reflect concerns about human impact on the global 
environment in a Realpolitik world of security and economics. These idealistic 
underpinnings have indicated a need for international interaction among the world 
system of states to find solutions to many problems which, although common in a 
broad sense, have unequal distribution in real terms. The key actors have therefore 
been not only the states themselves but the global overseers - the United Nations and 
its various organs; the scientific community, which has supplied crucial data upon 
which political decisions have been based; and the environmental movement, whose 
role has been to disseminate information into the public arena and to enliven the 
political debates. 
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1 . 2 	 Key Actors 
The global political system is composed of the world's population of individuals, 
formed into diverse nations and inhabiting sovereign states. This system of states is 
the prevailing universal political institution, said to exist in a state of anarchy, that is, 
in the absence of a world government, as each state has competence (in theory) over 
the use and alocation of its own resources. This heterogeneous nature of states has 
not, however, precluded states from adopting certain common interests and values 
through inter-state cooperation, thereby forming a global community - a so-caled 
society of states. 
In ecological terms, the world society of states is said to exist in circumstances which 
have been described as 'colective insecurity': a new condition of threats to 
state security based on global environmental problems, which binds al states and cals 
for unprecedented international cooperation in problem-solving.31 Doubts have been 
raised about the capacity of the system of states to provide the kind of supranational 
governance indicated by the increasing incidence and seriousnes of transboundary or 
global environmental problems because of the chalenges such cooperative behaviour 
pose to traditional notions of state sovereignty. It is thought, for instance, that the 
'...fragmented and uncoordinated political order...' characteristic of the co- 
existence of sovereign states cannot adequately addres the protection and rational 
management of the global ecosystem (Caldwel 1990:151). 
Imperatives for unprecedented international cooperation are gaining increasing 
prominence within the community of lateral thinking policy- and law-makers as this 
echelon considers ways to bridge the gap between the reality of global environmental 
threats and the void of efective international rules to deal with these threats at 
appropriate overarching levels within the established political framework of state 
sovereignty. At the most fundamental level, states are principal actors in this proces 
in both an independent capacity and by virtue of their role as members of the 
international society of states - the United Nations. 
1.2.1 	 States as Independent Entities 
A state is a political and legal institution characterised by defined teritory, a permanent 
population, government and independence32 (that is, the capacity to enter into relations 
with other states, also sometimes caled sovereignty). Historicaly, certain teritory 
and people were the property or patrimony of the ruler or sovereign and hence the term 
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sovereignty evolved (Bull 1977:19). Defined territory and a permanent population go 
hand in hand in the sense that a social community must be stable enough to facilitate 
the establishment of an effective political community. The best evidence of this is the 
existence of a government with centralised administrative and legal organs. Statehood 
is achieved in part when independence from other states and their interference is 
confirmed (Brownlie 1990:72-4). 
The term sovereignty originally described the nature of states which, within their 
respective territories, were completely independent of each other and had absolute 
power over their own affairs.33 This was called absolute sovereignty. In time 
sovereignty came to be regarded as a social contract between the people and the 
government. This was known as popular sovereignty and it characterises the modern 
political system wherein dissatisfied citizens may rid one government of its power and 
install another. Sovereignty now connotes quite a deal more than mere independence 
or popular contractual rights and obligations. Whereas state borders were once 
considered impervious, political post-modernists view state sovereignty in a more 
pragmatic light, considering that the legal membrane may in fact be permeable, 
allowing for trans-border intercourse between a variety of actors which does not 
destroy the underlying fabric of the nature of the state. In today's situation of complex 
ecological interdependence, the post-modernist concept of sovereignty is gaining 
increasing credibility in moral terms, while posing enormous difficulties in politico-
legal terms. 
A state has exclusive competence within its own territory and general competence to 
legislate on all matters 1...unless international law contains specific rules 
to the contrary (de Lupis 1987:5, 21). This is not a straightforward limit to 
sovereignty as there must be '...unequivocal proof that such a title to 
restrict the sovereignty exists' (de Lupis 1987:23). Notwithstanding, the 
state theoretically enjoys both supremacy over its subjects in a particular territory 
(internal sovereignty) and the freedom from interference by other states (external 
sovereignty) (de Lupis 1987:3). 
Matters which come exclusively under the domestic jurisdiction of states are the 
reserved domain of a state and thus its jurisdiction is not bound by international law 
(Brownlie 1990:291). However, making an absolute distinction between the 
domestic and international domains of sovereignty is problematic, particularly with 
regard to environmental matters: a valid exercise of state power in the domestic realm 
may have transboundary repercussions which would elevate that act into the 
international domain (Brownlie 1990:292). Importantly, after the making of an 
international agreement, a state cannot subsequently invoke conflict with, or 
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deficiencies in, its own domestic laws as a defence against a breach of its international 
legal obligations.34 
The basic doctrine of the law of states deems states to be sovereign and equal with 
uniform legal personality.35 This implies a number of rights, but also corresponding 
obligations upon states in their relations with one another. It also imposes necessary 
limitations upon states because of the coexistence of sovereignties (Brownlie 
1990:288). 
Because states are sovereign and equal and there is a duty of non-intervention imposed 
upon each of them with regard to the others, the making of global environmental 
regulations which may impinge upon a state's internal sovereignty is impossible 
without that state's consent and active participation. Furthermore, diverging values, 
interests, costs, benefits and other domestic factors among states makes the pursuit of 
global environmental policies vulnerable to the dynamics of economic and military 
power and the relative bargaining positions of the states.36 
As this study is concerned primarily with environmental threats of a transboundary or 
global nature, it is necessary to set aside the issue of unilateral behaviour by a state in 
its own realm of jurisdiction and to concentrate more on multilateral actions. In this 
sense international environmental policy- and law-making is centred on the United 
Nations; but it is acknowledged that only the states themselves, and in a few cases 
regional economic organizations, can be signatories to pieces of international law. 
1.2.2 	 The United Nations, its Agencies and Programs 
The United Nations is the coalition of world states and a forum which reflects world 
opinion. It has been suggested that membership of an international organization like 
the United Nations may be strong, although not conclusive, evidence of statehood.37 
To gain entry to the United Nations, a state must apply to the Security Council, in 
which a nucleus of powers - the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia and 
China - have the right of veto. A Security Council recommendation must also be 
passed by the General Assembly (not necessarily by consensus vote). 
Al new states agree to be bound by the principles of the UN Charter, which is 
analogous to a global peace treaty.38 In so doing, states also agree to be bound by the 
rules of international law via links with the UN Security Council (Article 25) and the 
International Court of Justice (Article 93.1). There are now about 185 states which 
are recognised by, and are members of, the United Nations. 
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This study does not directly address the eficacy of the United Nations. At certain 
times there has been profound criticism about the behaviour of the UN with regard to 
particular incidents: the Gulf War and the Somali and Bosnian crises are recent events 
which come to mind. Each critique invokes strong views about the fundamental role 
and operation of the UN — an institution with processes far from perfect. What is 
important to note is that the UN provides a substantive and procedural foundation 
which acts as a forum for active international discourse; how some states use or abuse 
this opportunity is not so much the issue here, as how the existence of the UN has 
helped to facilitate, among other things, the rapid growth of international 
environmental law in response to the carousel of environmental crises discussed 
earlier. 
During the decades of the 1970s, 80s and 90s, some important UN-sponsored or UN-
legitimated gatherings made their mark on present day ecological awareness and the 
progressive development of international environmental law. Viewed individualy 
there is litle to distinguish one above the others; but viewed as a colective history of 
environmental perceptions, each has merit as it builds upon the work of forerunners, 
exposing inadequacies, demonstrating new concerns and postulating new directions. 
A selection of these gatherings is presented below, to ilustrate the primary role of the 
United Nations in assisting in national environmental management; in helping to frame 
modern environmental perceptions; and in facilitating global environmental law. 
The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment 
The 1972 Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm was an initiative of 
the United Nations in response to their perceived need for the coordination of 
previously fragmented and spasmodic eforts at environmental protection (Nanda 
1983:411). The Stockholm Conference discredited the falacies of the infinite nature 
of resources and the indestructible carying capacity of the global ecosystem. It also 
exposed the fundamental inequities between developed and developing countries with 
regard to the consequences of ecological problems.39 
Two of the beter known accomplishments of this Stockholm Conference are its 
Declaration on the Human Environment40 and the creation of the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP) in 1973. 
• 	 The Stockholm Declaration 
The Stockholm Declaration expressed guiding principles and general international 
obligations which now form the intelectual foundations of international environmental 
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law. In particular two principles of the Declaration emerge as being fundamental to 
global ecosystem integrity. The first is Principle 1: 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of quality that permits a 
life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for 
present and future generations. In this respect, policies 
promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, 
discrimination, colonial or other forms of oppression and 
foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated. 
Principle 1 espouses two kinds of equality: individual and state. Furthermore, it 
implies that humankind cannot sustain itself unless it acknowledges and respects the 
interconnectedness between all elements of the global ecosystem and the 
interdisciplinary nature of life's order. This necessitates both the political will and 
imagination to think and act holistically in the pursuit of social order as opposed to 
anarchy. 
Principle 21 is a fundamental tenet of international environmental law: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principle of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Principle 21 represents the dual agenda of sovereignty - internal and external - and of 
the corresponding rights and obligations on a sovereign state: to satisfy its own needs 
without compromising the ability of other states to satisfy theirs (Haas & Sundgren 
1993:407). 
Although Principle 21 is merely a statement reflecting the general opinion of the time, 
this study will develop the argument that it is a profound and fundamental doctrine 
which critically challenges traditional approaches to sovereignty in the context of 
responsibility for the global ecosystem. 
• The UN Environment Programme 
UNEP, established one year after the Stockholm Conference, is an intergovernmental 
organization operating at both the international and national levels, to assist in the 
creation of international agreements, guidelines, principles and standards. 41 Its three 
main objectives are: 
• to facilitate international cooperation in all matters affecting the human 
environment; 
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to ensure that environmental problems of wide international significance 
receive appropriate governmental consideration; and 
• 	 to promote the acquisition, assessment and exchange of environmental knowledge. 
UNEP lacks any formal executive powers. It can, and does, advise and direct states, 
but it can neither make binding decisions nor coerce states into accepting its principles. 
UNEP acts alongside the FAO, WHO, WMO, IMO and UNESCO, al of which are 
under the aegis of ECOSOC and the UN General Assembly (Palmer 1992:261). 
UNEP was constituted to, inter alia, further promote the development of international 
environmental law (UNEP 1978). To this end it conducted an in-depth review of 
environmental law in 1981, resulting in a programme for the development and periodic 
review of environmental law.42 Known as the Montivideo Programme, this review 
mechanism involved a range of other specialised UN organs, UNEP units and 
regional and non-governmental organisations such as the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN). 
UNEP has also been involved in the formulation of a range of international 
environmental agreements. In the context of the polar regions, the most salient 
accords are the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora;43 the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, its 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer plus its Helsinki 
Declaration and London Amendments described above; and the Basel Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
The establishment of UNEP reflects the '..catalytic and coordinating role.: 
the Stockholm Conference obviously sought in an environmental agency.45 
Through its project work, UNEP was instrumental in informing the global community 
of states about, among other things, the threat of artificialy induced, ireversible 
climate change. As discussed above, this is undoubtedly one of the most important 
environmental situations of our generation, and an issue which has strong cause/efect 
links with the polar regions. While UNEP has been considered reasonably successful 
in its assessment role, it has been criticized as being less than efective in terms of 
operationalizing management plans to deal with the environmental problems it 
exposed. This has been thought due to a lack of both political wil and adequate 
resources at the level of the state (Thacher 1992:187-8). 
The nexus between the environment and development (or lack of it) was first explored 
in the Founex Report — prepared for the Stockholm Conference.46 The notion that this 
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environment/development relationship was fundamental to basic human needs was 
further elaborated in the UNEP/IUCN/WWF World Conservation Strategy, which 
was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1980 (Thacher 1992:189). 
Importantly the Strategy dealt with the notion of sustainability — the balance between 
over- and under-development which was to become the enduring principle emanating 
from the World Commission on Environment and Development of 1987. 
The Brundtland Commission : From One Earth to One World 
International reaction to environmental crises crystallized in 1987 and the World 
Conunission on Environment and Development, which became known as the 
Mundtland Commission after its Chair, Gro Harlem Brundtland, was convened to 
develop a 'global agenda for change' (WCED 1990:xiii). Its brief was fourfold: 
• to propose long-term strategies for sustainable development; 
• to foster international ecosystem cooperation; 
• to strengthen environmental concern and the efficacy of environmental action; 
and 
• to develop a long-term agenda. 
(VVCED 1990:xiii) 
In terms of its brief, the Brundtland Commission considered that the way to achieve a 
shared perception and common concern was through education, institutional 
development and law enforcement (WCED 1990:90). It noted that national 
boundaries had become so 'porous' that traditional political distinctions had become 
blurred. It further acknowledged that while traditional social systems recognized 
interdependence, on a broader scale the enforcement of common interest was often 
impeded because '...areas of political jurisdictions and areas of impact 
do not coincide' (WCED 1990:91). Therefore, in the absence of a supranational 
authority, common interest could only be articulated through international cooperation. 
This would be relatively simple if it was, in game-theory language, a win-win 
situation, but in dealing with environment and development questions, there were 
bound to be losers. 
The Brundtland Commission pointed out that as each community strives to survive, 
some get the lion's share while others are destined to a life of '...hunger, squalor, 
disease and early death' (WCED 1990:71). Its strategic imperatives for change 
included, among others, major policy changes in all countries; the revival of growth in 
developing countries; the incorporation of non-economic variables in the notion of 
sustainability; changes in energy consumption patterns; the conservation and 
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enhancement of the natural resource base; and the reorientation of technology (WCED 
1990:93-104). 
The chief institutional challenge of the 1990s was thought to be the incorporation of 
ecological dimensions into the policy process. This would embrace six priority areas: 
• getting at the sources; 
• dealing with the effects; 
• assessing global risks; 
• making informed choices; 
• providing the legal means; and 
• investing in our future. 
(WCED 1990:357-8) 
Dedicated commitment would be required at the national, regional and international 
levels to achieve this agenda for sustainability. In view of the status of the United 
Nations as the only intergovernmental organization with universal membership, it was 
thought to be the logical forum for facilitating global institutional initiatives (WCED 
1990:360). 
The UN did, in fact, begin an important process towards this objective by addressing 
the issue of potential global climate change. 
Global Climate as Common Heritage? 
In 1988 at the 43rd UN General Assembly session, Malta proposed that global climate 
be conserved as part of the common heritage of mankind. 47 Malta's kudos after 
having successfully helped negotiate common heritage into the Law of the Sea 
Convention did not help in this instance as the UN did not accept Malta's rather grand 
proposal. Instead it passed a Resolution acknowledging that: '...climate change is 
a common concern of mankind, since climate is an essential condition 
which sustained life on earth.'" The legal significance of the phrase 
common concern was not spelt out and possibly no legal inference can be drawn from 
the use of the term in this Resolution (Birnie 1991:2). 
Notwithstanding, the UNGA made a crucial contribution to the philosophy of global 
ecosystem integrity in the framing of this Resolution. More importantly perhaps was 
the Resolution's pragmatic entreaty to the scientific community to continue its 
research, and to the international political community to give climate change priority 
political status. In so doing, the UNGA endorsed the establishment of an 
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (EPCC), a joint initiative of the WMO and 
UNEP.49 At the same time, in acknowledgment of the achievements of the 
Stockholm Conference, the UNGA directed that a Conference on Environment and 
Development be held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, to mark Stockholm's twentieth 
anniversary. 
The UNCED : All Roads Lead to Rio 
All of the information presented so far in this chapter had some part to play in the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). Concerns were first raised 
at the Biosphere Conference (described below at p.36) and later at the Stockholm 
Conference that population growth and poverty underpin the environmental aspects of 
unsustainable development, climate change threats and depletion of the natural 
resource base. These variables cannot be neatly categorised as independent of each 
other and the UNCED did not attempt to do this. Rather the UNCED process, which 
consisted of lengthy and intense preparatory fora 50 and the final session in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 1992, dealt with cross-sectoral issues, admitting that a '...new 
appreciation that environment and development are part of an 
indivisible whole: had been reached. 51 
The UNCED process generated mountains of documentary evidence of its 
commitment to securing 'a global partnership for sustainable 
development' which became the catchcry of its blueprint for future action, contained 
in the document Agenda 21 (United Nations 1992:Preamble). Agenda 21 comprises 
40 chapters on such seemingly diverse issues as desertification and the role of trade 
unions.52 In addition to this blueprint, the UNCED produced a Declaration and a 
framework Climate Change Convention53 ; a Statement on Forest Principles; and a 
framework Biodiversity Convention (discussed earlier). 
Importantly too, the UNCED developed a strategy for financing environmentally 
sound development programmes and projects. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF), under the joint management of the World Bank, UNEP and UNDP, is to fund 
the incremental costs of global environmental protection which are additional to the 
costs incurred by states alone. This was intended to ensure that environmental 
protection provided global benefits above and beyond what a state could provide. 54 
The components of this blueprint were not so much the product of Rio as the 
substantive work of the preparatory fora. The negotiating texts were finalised at Rio 
in what amounted to little more than a symbolic forum for their signing. This fact did 
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not detract from either the inherent value of the Rio forum or of the documents 
themselves; it simply made good sense to negotiate the texts in more suitable 
circumstances. 
Reporting the whole of the UNCED process and its outcomes is outside the scope of 
this study, consequently the years of negotiations, the interim statements and the last-
minute posturing and recalcitrance in Rio are not dealt with here. What is important to 
note in the context of this study, is how the UNCED perceived itself and the general 
principles which the UNCED contributed to the notion of states taking responsibility 
for the global ecosystem. 
The preambular chapter of Agenda 21 states that this blueprint for the 21st century: 
_reflects a global consensus and political commitment at the 
highest level of development and environment cooperation. 
(United Nations 1992:1.3, emphasis added) 
There is speculation that such statements are simply gloss and there has been criticism 
from non-governmental organisations concerning what they saw as manufactured 
consensus in these final documents. 55 This criticism is no doubt true, as international 
agreements almost always contain elements of manufactured consensus; without such 
trade-offs, final accord may never be reached. However there is little doubt, despite 
the criticism it has attracted, that the UNCED process can be considered legitimate and 
representative by virtue of the quality and quantity of attendance; by the generally 
encouraging language of the Rio documents; and by the common acceptance of the 
process by the international community. 
It was stated elsewhere in the Agenda 21 Preamble that: 
_integration of environment and development concerns and 
greater attention to them will lead to the fulfilment of basic 
needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and 
managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future. No 
nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can - in a 
global partnership for sustainable development. 
(United Nations 1992:1.1) 
The global partnership concept is the cornerstone of this study. It implies that 
international cooperation is an essential ingredient in the solution to global 
environment problems, which, as a new class of problems, are difficult to handle 
within the traditional norms and practices of state sovereignty (Haas & Sundgren 
1993:402). 
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Criticism of a more profound nature has been articulated by scholars who question the 
practicality of the UNCED's global partnership concept. Some see the maintenance of 
economic growth and national security as incompatible with a global partnership 
(Keohane et al 1993:3-4). This is precisely the kind of atitude investigated in this 
study. As Keohane et al rightly note, there have been many succesful examples of 
international cooperation on such isues as cholera, slavery and atmospheric testing of 
nuclear weapons, al of which relied on efective international cooperation, institutions 
and law (Keohane et al 1993:4-5). However, whether states have the ability and 
more importantly, the wil to re-examine their atitudes, actions and relationships with 
each other, empowering themselves to deal efectively with global environmental 
isues under traditional Interpretations of state sovereignty, is debatable. Keohane et 
al consider that as world government is not around the corner: '...organised 
international responses to shared environmental problems will occur 
through cooperation among states, not through the imposition of 
government over them (Keohane et al 1993:4). The degree of cooperation wil 
depend in some measure on the ability of the scientific and environmental communities 
to induce or scare states into colective action. What the UNCED did was to put the 
cards on the table, as the first step. 
In summary, the new agenda entails a global partnership for sustainable development 
and acknowledges that its succesful implementation is first and foremost the 
responsibility of governments (United Nations 1992:Preamble). Such anodyne 
phrases were perhaps designed in part to evoke a healthy ecological conscience in the 
state oficials atending Rio, and at best may only be actionable if states have the 
capacity and the wil, along with cohesive ecological ethics, to execute this blueprint. 
The emergence of this new global environment agenda articulated through the UNCED 
proces has not occured in isolation. Rather it has been part of a gradual shift in the 
political, economic and social orders since the end of World War 1.56 One of the 
best ilustrations of the scope of this shift can be found in the topic areas covered by 
the agenda of the UNCED.57 One complete Chapter in Agenda 21  (Chapter 35) is 
devoted to science, specificaly the role and use of science in supporting the UNCED 
principles. Scientists have often been leaders in the field of international cooperation 
and are thus accorded the status of key actors in the proces of the evolution of 
responsibility for the global ecosystem. 
1.2.3 	 Scientific Communities 
The imperative to re-examine traditional notions of sovereignty, in the context of 
international cooperation in the field of the environment, is based primarily on six 
33 
variables which help to define and clarify the origins, nature and potential remedies for 
environmental problems: 
• 	 advanced scientific knowledge; 
• 	 visible physical damage to vulnerable ecosystems; 
• 	 risks to human health and welfare; 
• 	 the general inadequacy of global environmental law, especialy with regard to 
enforcement and liability; 
• 	 economic factors such as the North/South debate, destruction of traditional 
markets and industrial imperatives to polute; and 
• 	 the political ramifications of a new world order.58 
Of these, the first three are science-related. 
Science is a dichotomy: it exists to serve humans and it exists in its own right as a 
body of knowledge. There is often an uninformed scepticism towards scientists by 
non-scientists: scientists developed nuclear devices but then acquainted us with the 
dangers in using them; scientists developed CFCs but told us their use was causing 
damage to our protective ozone layer. The words of Karl Popper epitomise the 
dilemma of science: '...scientific theory has to survive a detailed 
confrontation with experience' (in Magee 1975:30). 
In the context of this study it is reasonable to conclude that scientists have partly 
contributed to environmental problems by inventing the technology and the means for 
humanity to behave in ecosystem-unfriendly ways. The paradox is that we then cal 
upon the scientific community to provide instant expertise and definite answers 
towards solving the problems (Underdal 1989:254-6). Scientists defend themselves 
by arguing that they only make discoveries; they do not tel us how to use them 
wisely. This is a convoluted argument that takes us nowhere. The international 
community owes an enormous debt of gratitude to scientists: their discoveries are so 
pervasive in modern society as to be unquestionably taken for granted — most of the 
time. Just occasionaly humanity does have misgivings about scientific ethics and 
standards and seeks to extract a certitude of assurance which cannot possibly be 
forthcoming. This is one of the great myths of science. To quote Popper again: 'No 
theory could ever be relied upon to be the final truth. It is still 
replaceable by a better theory' (Magee 1975:29). 
Many social science papers which provide commentary on the politics of the 
environment do not deal adequately with the input from scientific communities. There 
are given variables that reports from state-run scientific institutions inform government 
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policy, and that these high-level policy-makers also operate within the international 
realm. But often litle formal credibility is given to the work which goes on behind the 
scenes. This study considers that the global scientific community is a key actor in 
environmental politics because it provides the fundamental information upon which 
policies, and ultimately laws, are based. It may also provide a new perspective on the 
place of humanity in the global order: 
From space, we see a small and fragile ball dominated not by 
human activity and edifice but by a pattern of clouds, oceans, 
greenery, and soils. 
(WCED 1990:1) 
Science can, and does, contribute to resolving environmental conflicts in many ways, 
for instance: 
• 	 by describing what the system is composed of; 
• 	 by analysing and diagnosing its present condition; 
• 	 by predicting the capability of the system to support various functions 
proposed or to regenerate itself; 
• 	 by prescribing requirements to maintain the system within acceptable limits; 
and 
• 	 by providing advice on formulating management activities. 
(Culen 1990) 
Scientists who support the basic tenet of science: that evidence cannot be falsified or 
ignored if it does not suit the prevailing hypothesis, should theoreticaly be in a more 
neutral position than politicians or bureaucrats when it comes to presenting the truth 
(Culen 1990:7). While many elements of environmental problem-solving go beyond 
the realm of science, providing accurate and honest information about a situation is 
one crucial factor in policy choice.59 However, not al scientific information wil be 
wel-received, nor wil it have a critical impact on policy. The table below indicates 
likely conditions which may afect the impact of scientific input into the policy 
proces: 
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Strong Weak 
'Definite' or at least consensual conclusion 
Feasible 'cure' available 
Efects close in time and (social) space 
Problem afecting 'social centre of society 
Problem developing rapidly and surprisingly 
Efects experienced by or at least visible 
to the public 
Political conflict: low 
Issue linkage: none, or on substantive 
merits only 
Institutionalized seting, interactive 
decision-making 
Tentative or contested hypothesis 
'Cure' unclear or not feasible 
Efects remote 
Problem afecting 'periphery' only 
Problem developing slowly and according to 
expectations 
Efects not yet experienced by or visible 
to the public 
Political conflict: high 
Tactical issue linkage; issue 'contamination' 
Not institutionalized, ad hoc decision-making 
Impact likely to be 
Figure 1. 	 Conditions Affecting the Impact of Scientific Input 
(Source: Underdal 1989:259) 
The growth in consensual knowledge about environmental problems, visible efects 
and likely cures have helped to strengthen the position of scientific input into the new 
global environmental agenda. In many cases, however, political conflict has been 
high and the issues have been contaminated by tactical questions which have served to 
delay or difuse the process. The benchmark conferences mentioned below ilustrate 
in general terms the role of the scientific community in helping to define the new 
agenda. The conferences chosen are mainly concerned with global climate because it 
is this issue which has direct relevance to the polar regions. Many other international 
organizations such as the International Maritime Organization and the World Health 
Organization which deal with the social, economic and political consequences of other 
scientific issues were also active at the same time. Their agendas, however, are of 
only marginal relevance to this study. 
The Biosphere Conference 
A litle-known Intergovernmental Conference of Experts on the Scientific Basis for 
Rational Use and Conservation of the Resources of the Biosphere (the Biosphere 
Conference)60 held in Paris in 1968, helped to bring environmental issues into the 
international and political arenas. 
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The Biosphere Conference was a scientific forum which discussed the impact of 
humanity on the biosphere. It acknowledged public concern and calls for corrective 
action, implying that critical thresholds had already been reached with regard to some 
ecological problems. 61 
The Biosphere Conference was the birthplace of the international Man and the 
Biosphere (MAB) project, launched in 1971. 
First World Climate Conference 
In 1979 the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), concerned about humanity's 
influences on climate, convened the First World Climate Conference in Geneva. In 
comparison to the Stockholm Conference's more generic environmental agenda, the 
First World Climate Conference was a benchmark attempt at incorporating low-level 
politics into the scientific debate about potential climate change (Lunde 1992:66-7). 
The First World Climate Conference discovered that a vast number of scientists were 
significantly concerned about potential anthropogenic impact to take up global climate 
research. Irrespective of the uncertainty of their state of knowledge, the scientists 
spelt out a warning in the Conference Declaration: 
The present understanding of climate processes leads us to 
recognise the clear possibility that [these] increases in CO2 
may result in significant and possibly major long-term changes 
of global-scale climate. 
(Lunde 1992:68) 
This was clearly a message meant for the policy- and law-makers. Although the links 
between human behaviour and climate change were becoming more apparent with 
increasing scientific knowledge, the magnitude was still uncertain however, and 
scientific . consensus, absent. 
One month after the First World Climate Conference, the 8th World Meteorological 
Congress adopted the World Climate Research Programme. This Programme invited 
participation by both the UNEP and the International Council of Scientific Unions, 
among others, and promised to provide a new international forum for discourse on 
climate studies (Lunde 1992:67). 
Villach Conference on Greenhouse Gases 
In 1985 the International Council of Scientific Unions, the World Meteorological 
Organization and the UN Environment Programme organised a scientific conference 
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on greenhouse gases in Vilach, Austria. This represented a major workshop on 'the 
assessment of the role of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
in climate variations and associated impacts', which was the Conference 
title. The results of six major assessments in this field, caried out between 1980 and 
1985, were systematicaly compared to reveal the present state of knowledge (Lunde 
1992:70. 
The importance of the Vilach Conference lies in both its acknowledgment of the 
international import of potential climate change and in its claim that an international 
cooperative efort would possibly serve as the basis for a future plan of action (Lunde 
1992:73). Importantly, agreement on the efect of increased CO2 became more 
evident: 
_a doubling of the CO2 concentration would lead to an increase 
in the globally averaged surface temperature by 1.5 to 5.5C. 
The uncertainty is considerable, but there is almost unanimous 
agreement that a substantial warming would occur_ 
(quoted in Lunde 1992:73) 
The climate change issue appeared to be changing focus. The cause and efect 
dichotomy was becoming clearer, but what was troubling scientists was the 
timeframe. As explained earlier, climate change is a natural phenomena occuring over 
hundreds, thousands and milions of years. However, this normal rate was apparently 
being accelerated to, as one WMO report phrased it: 	 thin the lifetime of a 
single member of the human species '62 This temporal dimension was 
popularly perceived as one qualifying variable between natural and enhanced climate 
variability. But it certainly was not the only one; for example the dust clouds from 
major volcanic eruptions may also have a profound efect on the rate of change in the 
natural sense.° 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
The IPCC was established by the UN in 1988, folowing Malta's proposal for global 
climate to be considered the common heritage of mankind. Its brief included the tasks 
of: 
i) assessing the scientific information that is related to the 
various components of the climate change issue, such as 
emissions of major greenhouse gases and modification of the 
Earth's radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that needed 
to enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of 
climate change to be evaluated; and 
ii) formulating realistic response strategies for the management 
of the climate change issue. 
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Accordingly, three working groups and one special commitee were established, to: 
I 	 assess available scientific information on climate change; 
2 	 assess environmental and socio-economic impacts of climate 
change; 
3 	 formulate response strategies; and 
4 	 promote full participation of developing countries in its 
activities. 
(WMO/UNEP 1990:Preface) 
Part of the mandate of the IPCC was also to discern the likely contents of a possible 
future international convention on climate.64 
The 44th UNGA in 1989 agreed, as a mater of urgency, on the need to prepare a 
framework convention on climate change. One year later, the 45th UNGA agreed on a 
single intergovernmental process - the Intergovernmental Negotiating Commitee - to 
draft the framework convention (UN Res.451212). 
The IPCC's interim reports from its Working Groups were completed in August 
1990. Lunde's assessment was that over one thousand scientists were engaged in this 
two year review process, making it the most concerted scientific efort in 
contemporary history (Lunde 1992:78-9). The IPCC process has been lauded as an 
integrated, internationaly cooperative forum for dealing with the potential of 
artificialy-induced, ireversible global climate change.65 
An updated scientific assessment was issued in 1992 prior to the Rio Earth Summit 
(WMO/UNEP 1992). A further update was drafted in May 1994 and is due for 
release shortly.66 
In conclusion, throughout the past several decades there has emerged a growing 
interest in and concern about the global environment by the scientific community. 
Consensus has been developing slowly about the nature of the problems and their 
likely causes and efects and this has helped to validate the impact of scientific input in 
the policy process. However from the perspective of an outsider it is impossible to 
know how much of the scientific information which is readily accessible in the public 
domain is the product of bias. Bias, in this sense, implies that scientists may have 
been paid to find evidence to support the particular policy position of a vested 
interest.67 For every socialy responsible scientist, there may be another whose 
research direction is conditioned by his/her working environment. The bias may only 
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become apparent when it is discovered who is actualy using scientific results and for 
what purpose. Notwithstanding, these benchmark conferences have had the efect of 
both bringing to the fore scientific concern over environmental issues and helping to 
stimulate the law-making process. Environmentalists are one group which have used 
science both to bolster their own credibility and to give weight to their campaigns.68 
1.2.4 	 The Global Environmental Movement 
The new global environmental agenda has evolved from a primitive state of intuitive 
knowledge about our living environment and is due in some measure to the 
mobilization of the information-gathering and disseminating environmental 
movement.69 
For the sake of expediency this study concerns itself primarily with selective accounts 
during the three decades folowing the publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 
1962. That period witnessed a dramatic upsurge in both thinking about our 
environment and framing an agenda for future action. 
The 1962 book Silent Spring contained a stinging indictment of United States chemical 
companies for their iresponsible promotion of chemical biocides ('killers of 
life') in agriculture without adequate '...advance investigation of their 
effect on soil, water, wildlife and man himself' (Carson 1962:13). 
Silent Spring struck a chord in those with an environmental conscience because it 
highlighted the potentialy serious ecosystem consequences (like the cumulative efects 
of toxins and by-product deaths of non-target species) of previously acceptable 
behaviour.70 Carson, a Master of Biology and a naturalist, was vilified by her critics 
- the US Department of Agriculture and some of the industries she indicted - who 
questioned both her professional ability and her warnings, considering them more 
sciencefiction than scientific prediction:71 Regardless of the criticism, which persists 
to this day, Silent Spring succeeded in puting Carson's particular ecological 
perspective and, more importantly, the whole question of environmental ethics, onto 
the public policy agenda. 
The global environmental movement began to take on its modern shape from the 
1960s, although an ecological conscience of sorts had been known for centuries.72 
By the 1970s a mass movement of environmentalists was sweeping the western 
industrialised world. This mass action had two features which distinguished it from 
earlier conservation movements. It was noted to have '...a broader conception of 
the place of man in the biosphere, a more sophisticated 
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understanding of that relationship, and a note of crisis...'. The 
second feature was its more 'direct political impact' (McCormick 1989:48). 
Accordingly, the new environmentalists travelled a more anticipatory, holistic road 
than their predecessors, seeing the principle of scientific certainty as being less 
important than evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Furthermore, as a social and 
political action, new environmentalism became inherently universa1. 73 The era was 
also one of an unprecedented public display of frustration and displeasure with the 
establishment and reigning social and political values, thereby embroiling other more 
domestic factors into the global debate. 
A total of 400 non-governmental organisations were officially represented at the 1972 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, thereby promoting the role of 
NGOs and their value in the global communication of environmental interests and 
concerns. Although their participation at Stockholm was strictly limited to 
observance, the post-Stockholm era spawned a rebirth of interest in the NGO 
movement (McCormick 1989:101). 
There was no Martin Luther King of this new environmentalism. Instead there was a 
steady stream of prophets of doom. commentators like Paul Ehrlich, Barry 
Commoner, Garret Hardin, and works such as the Limits to Growth and A Blueprint 
for Survival generated enormous interest and debate. 74 Out from beneath the 
doomsday treatises came a fountain of environmental groups, and both Friends of the 
Earth (FoE) and Greenpeace were two such products of the post-Silent Spring era of 
ecological awareness.75 There have been times of great acrimony between FoE and 
Greenpeace, reflecting their differing operational structures and executive preferences. 
Notwithstanding, their role in the process of disseminating information in the 
international community is without question. 
New environmental facilitators like the European Environmental Bureau and 
environmentally-based political parties also sprang up during this time (McCormick 
1989:101-143). New Zealand was the first state to have a green political party - the 
Values Party, founded in 1972. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many European 
countries also witnessed the formation of such political groups. In the 1990s, green 
politicians operate in all tiers of government in most democratic assemblies of the 
world. Their existence implies neither success nor wide public acceptance of their 
policies, however (Caldwell 1990:87). 
While the ideologies, objectives and methods of the environmental advocacy are 
sometimes diverse, their ultimate goals have often converged. One common aim of 
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note is the desire for a sustainable economy of high environmental quality (Caldwell 
1990:86). One commentator sees the global environmental movement as bringing 
about three fundamental changes in human values: 
• acknowledgment of the dependence of humanity on a healthy natural 
environment; 
• a readjustment to the legacy of technology; and 
• a challenge to orthodox models of economic growth. 
(McCormick 1989:194-5) 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the environmental movement was to ensure that: 
'...the relationship between humans and their environment will never 
be quite the same again' (McCormick 1989:203). FoE put it somewhat 
differently: 'If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the 
problem' (FoE 1972:166). 
In terms of western politics in general and polar politics in particular, ecological 
advocates have become legitimate actors in international relations, although the 
confusion and lack of cohesion regarding their ethics remains troublesome (Caldwell 
1990:Ch.5). Notwithstanding, their ability to widely condition social beliefs has led 
to a degree of influence over political discourse (at all levels of government), priority-
and agenda-setting and sometimes ultimately state behaviour. 76 
Contradictions still exist though, between the social perspective of ecological 
questions and the political viewpoint. This is due in some measure to the incongruity 
of power between the two forces, and also to the salience of the issue to immediate 
lifestyle values (Caldwell 1990:88). Before states choose, or are forced to take the 
committed step of further yielding elements of their sovereignty in favour of the 
common good, there are several procedural stages which emerge. One is the gathering 
and assessment of information crucial to determining the level of knowledge necessary 
to make informed decisions. The second stage is a further expansion of the 
international consultative process to identify who the actors are, what their interests 
are, and sources of potential conflicts and choices. 77 Brown argues that because the 
results of the expanded consultative process are sometimes legal instruments, and 
states are aware that such instruments may further erode their sovereign autonomy, the 
process of gathering information, consulting and negotiating will be gradual and 
voluntary. This is particularly pertinent since international law seeks voluntary 
enforcement and compliance (Brown 1992:100). This pattern does, in fact, typify the 
development of international environmental law through the international policy 
process. 
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The above contextual background is evidence of the underlying features of state 
responsibility for the global ecosystem, and explains not only some reasons why a 
new environmental agenda has evolved but also why a shift in focus was necessary. 
From this discussion certain conclusions can be drawn about the modern world order. 
The first is that while all states are independent and equal, they have a responsibility to 
acknowledge both the independence and equality of all other states. Therefore, while 
they have sovereignty over resources within their jurisdiction, they cannot use those 
resources in such a way as to jeopardise the ability of coexisting states to use theirs. 
To do so would be to place in danger the integrity of other states. This is the doctrine 
of state responsibility: all rights of an international character involve international 
responsibility (Dixon & McCorquodale 1991:400). Secondly, the balance of scientific 
evidence indicates that when environmental harm occurs, it can have one or more 
consequences: i) it can affect only an area within a sovereign state; ii) it can affect 
neighbouring areas contained within the borders of neighbouring states; or iii) it can 
have affects which range far wider, possibly globally. The third conclusion is, 
therefore, that there are several levels of competence at which actions could be taken to 
mitigate harm: i) at the level of the individual state; ii) at the level of two or more 
states; or iii) at a level which transcends the competence of sovereign states and implies 
a global solution. 
Responsibility for the global ecosystem thus represents the third tier of both harm and 
competence to act. It arises when the level of harm (or potential harm) and the ability 
to manage that harm are beyond the ability and the jurisdiction of a small number of 
sovereign states. Evidence of responsibility for the global ecosystem is found in 
international environmental law and in the corresponding domestic laws of states. 
There are several crucial elements to be evaluated here. The first is the more detailed 
composition of this notion of responsibility for the global ecosystem. The so-called 
new global environmental agenda and the corresponding level of responsibility it 
entails rests on five key concepts and principles which are now, or may become, 
central defining elements of responsibility in the 21st century. These concepts and 
principles are evaluated below. The second crucial element is the selection of criteria 
which can be used to measure levels of responsibility. These have been determined as 
legitimacy, effectiveness and accountability and they will also be evaluated below. 
The third crucial element is the relevance of this analytical perspective to the polar 
regions, discussion on which forms the concluding sections of this Chapter. 
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1.3 	 Key Concepts and Principles of Responsibility 
As an ethical and practical response to environmental issues of global relevance, state 
responsibility for the global ecosystem is, at this stage, immature and incomplete. As 
it develops it may embody an amalgam of concepts and principles which have also 
evolved from the past three decades of environmentalism since the publication of 
Silent Spring. Issues like the poluter pays principle, sustainable development, the 
common heritage of mankind, intergenerational equity, and the precautionary principle 
are likely to figure more prominently in state policy- and law-making in the future. Al 
of these seek to arouse in the key actors a practical, holistic, temporal or anticipatory 
approach to environmental issues and multilateral cooperation. 
It is uncertain what future role such concepts and principles wil actualy play in 
international environmental law as they are often abstract in their definitions and hence 
ambiguous in terms of interpretation. Notwithstanding, each merits a short discussion 
here, to lay the foundation for the remainder of the study. 
1.3.1 	 Poluter Pays Principle 
The notion that a poluter should be held accountable is three-dimensional. The first 
perspective concerns economics and can be found in the formal proposal of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) made in 1972.78 
In this context, the 'poluter pays principle' was described as: 
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution 
prevention and control measures to encourage rational use of 
scarce environmental resources and to avoid distortions in 
international trade and investment_ 
(OECD 1975:12). 
The original intention of the OECD was that the poluter should bear the cost of 
polution prevention and control measures primarily in order to: i) ensure that the 
environment remained in an acceptable state; and i) to internalize costs so that 
significant distortions in international trade and investment were not created (Gaines 
1991:468). 
The second dimension is a legal one which rests on the assumption that poluters 
should be made liable for their actions. It originates from the OECD's 1972 
proposition, but is not found within it. The OECD's notion concerned alocation of 
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the costs of prevention and control of pollution, rather than - as is more commonly 
accepted today - a mechanism to ascribe liability. 
What has happened in international environmental law is that the premise of the 
polluter being held liable has developed over time and in such a manner that the 
'polluter pays' tag has been applied to it in modern times, along with a meaning which 
goes beyond the original OECD proposition. The 1941 Trail Smelter Arbitration is 
one well-known example of the principle of polluter liability which became well-
entrenched in environmental law long before the OECD's 'polluter pays principle' was 
articulated.79 
In this Case, a smelter located at Trail in British Columbia, Canada, emitted into the 
atmosphere sulphur dioxide which subsequently damaged land in Washington State, 
US. Canada did not dispute liability for the smelter's pollution and agreed to the 
payment of compensation. The Arbitral Tribunal requested that Canada ensure the 
Smelter enacted abatement measures to control the pollution. Importantly it also found 
that : 
45 
_under the principles of international law, as well as of the 
law of the United States, no State has the right to use or 
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the 
property or persons therein, when the case is of serious 
consequences and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(Dixon & McCorquodale 1991:453) 
Thus the poluter pays principle is both an economic principle and has expanded into a 
mechanism for liability as wel. It has found favour as a regional political and 
economic solution to the problem of polution, particularly in the United States. In the 
international realm too, a form of poluter pays principle is embodied in such 
instruments as the International Maritime Organization's International Oil Polution 
• 	 Compensation Fund (Birnie 1992:80) and the Commission of the European 
Communities' 1991 Amended Directive on Civil Liability for Damage Caused by 
Waste.80 
However, there are operational dificulties with this concept, not the least of which are 
finding the burden of proof (for instance, who is responsible for the polution from 
motor vehicles: the fuel producers, the vehicle manufacturers, the drivers?); how to 
account for cumulative efects; when and how to bring instruments for implementing 
the principle into play (for example, at the level of processing and product standards, 
individual regulations and prohibitions, fees and fines?); and who is responsible for 
designing, implementing and monitoring regulations? Perhaps one of the greatest 
problems with the poluter pays principle is in determining whether the costs should be 
internalized or should be borne by the community which desires such controls (OECD 
1975:68-9). 
Notwithstanding, the concept that the poluter and not the community should be held 
accountable is a key concept in environmental management at a regional level and one 
which doubtless has some practical application in the international realm. This is 
because there is a certain moral validity to the notion, which is its third dimension. 
1.3.2 	 Sustainable Development 
In 1987 the World Commission on Environment and Development saw the chalenge 
of reconciling human afairs with natural laws as being conditional upon decisive 
polificalactionto'...begin managing environmental resources to ensure 
both sustainable human progress and human survival (WCED 1990:1). 
This translates to the concept of sustainable development. 
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The Brundtland Commission's formal definition of sustainable development is: 
[development that] meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. 
(WCED 1990:8) 
No single term has ever had to cary such a burden as this and it remains one of the 
most abused and misunderstood concepts in today's environmental vocabulary. 
Further consideration of the WCED's original definition has eliminated some of its 
ambiguity 81 and UNEP's 1989 definition is interesting in the context of this study: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs and does not imply in any 
way encroachment upon national sovereignty.82  
The IUCN/UNEP/WWF Strategy for Sustainable Living has since re-defined 
sustainable development as: 
_improving the quality of human life while living within the 
carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems. 
(IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1991:10) 
This later definition, while essentialy anthropocentric, is adopted by this study 
because it does acknowledge ecosystems as being crucial to human survival. 
Furthermore it does not make state sovereignty inviolable and thus a qualifying 
variable in sustainable development. It is acceptable too because it circumvents what 
would otherwise be an exceedingly cumbersome exercise in trying to devise a beter 
definition. 
Despite the ambiguity and confusion over the concept of sustainable development, the 
merit of having ethical regard for the global ecosystem and for future generations has 
become the catchcry of some holistic environmental thinkers, due largely to this 
original proposition by the World Commission on Environment and Development. 
1.3.3 	 Common Heritage of Mankind 
The common heritage of mankind principle is to politico-legal theory what sustainable 
development is to the contemporary environmental vocabulary. The common heritage 
concept originated during the UN Law of the Sea negotiations in 1967, when Maltese 
Ambassador Pardo successfuly appealed for the deep sea bed, beyond areas of 
national jurisdiction, to be considered the common heritage of mankind.83 In this 
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context, Ambassador Pardo is interpreted to have meant that the deep sea bed should 
not be owned by anyone; management and benefits should be shared; it should be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes; and the deep sea bed should be conserved for 
mankind, including future generations.84 
Like other buzz words and phrases, common heritage tends to be used 
indiscriminately and inappropriately (Burton 1979:502). This principle has been 
encoded into the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC Preamble) where it 
refers to the deep sea bed beyond national jurisdiction. LOSC came into force on 16 
November 1994 folowing deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification and the expiry 
of one year.85 The entry into force of LOSC has thus given legal credibility to 
common heritage.86 
A concept akin to common heritage is also conceptualized in both the Outer Space 
Treaty,87 where outer space and the moon '...shall be the province of all 
mankind' and the Moon Treaty.88 It is argued, however, that 'common heritage of 
mankind' does not have an unambiguous legal definition and may not stand 
independently of these various treaties which invoke it (Triggs 1986:280). Persistent 
usage and common interpretation may alter this perception in time and in any case, its 
so-caled ambiguity does not detract from the philosophical merit of common heritage 
in discussions on the global commons.89 
In 1989, a United Nations University project was mandated to provide 'a 
comprehensive insight into the increasing importance of the concept 
of global commons and its expression in international law'andthe 
findings were subsequently reported by Edith Brown Weiss (1989). The common 
heritage of mankind was identified in Weiss' work as embracing the notion of 
conservation for mankind, including future generations, via an international regime of 
management. This is consistent with the findings of the Brundtland Commission, 
which also reported that the chalenge of the future included that of 'safeguarding 
the interests of coming generations' (WCED 1990:x). Weiss thus 
introduced new terminology into an old theme, in the form of intergenerational equity 
(IG). 
1.3.4 	 Intergenerational Equity 
A generation represents an amorphous cycle of human life with no beginning and no 
ending. It existed yesterday, it exists today, and it wil probably exist tomorow, 
although no-one can be absolutely certain of this. Uncertainty in this instance is not a 
valid excuse for not acknowledging the potential for future generations to exist. While 
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intergenerational equity (IG) is perhaps the most logical of the philosophical concepts 
presented in this study, its form is still abstract and thus not readily definitive.% ) 
The terminology - intergenerational equity - looks and sounds cumbersome, yet its 
meaning is really quite simple. Sustainability is the key. Humanity does have some 
rational, sustainable policies guiding its relationships with the natural system because it 
does acknowledge the likelihood of the existence of future generations. If this was not 
true, there would be no need for any environmental behavioural controls whatsoever. 
The underlying principles of IG concern the fairness of the partnerships between past, 
present and future generations and obligations toward natural and cultural resources 
(Weiss 1989:49). Just how fairness is determined and by whom is not stated. 
Notwithstanding, IG suggests that each generation has a right to enjoy and use the 
planetary legacy, with a corresponding obligation to conserve those rights for the 
future. Hence some equity is passed on. These obligations are not only moral, but 
can be transformed into legally enforceable norms. According to Weiss, the notion of 
equity is central to the legal tradition (Weiss 1993:333). 
Weiss argued that we have obligations not only to our own nationals, but to nationals 
of other countries, as well as to future generations. This intra-generational equity 
means that justice may be implemented across one generation as well as between them 
(Weiss 1989:21). Sceptics would have immediate problems with this, as they would 
see obligations as fundamentally moral concepts not readily transferable to normative 
legal frameworks. But Weiss substantiates her argument by stating that our 
obligations are to future generations as a class, and not simply as nationalities, because 
'our planet is finite and we are becoming increasingly 
interdependent in using it'(Veiss1989:27). 
This notion is supported by the findings of the Brundtland Commission, which also 
reported that: '...traditional forms of national sovereignty are 
increasingly challenged by the realities of ecological and economic 
interdependence' (WCED 1990:261). Malnes concurs, but is more guarded: 'The 
mere possibility that future people won't exist does not justify a 
total disregard of their welfare'(VIaneS 1990:25, emphasis added). 
Rather, he suggests that we have a duality of duties to both nationals and foreigners, 
spatially, and to present and future generations, temporally (Malnes 1990:21). 
The middle ground of IG indicates that there is a minimum level of equity due between 
generations and across one generation. Weiss notes that this middle ground has deep 
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roots in International Law, citing as evidence the Preamble to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights:91 
_recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world... 
Weiss also lists many international covenants and charters which afirm the 
fundamental equality and dignity of al people, infering that a minimum level of equity 
is due to al people.92 
While these facets of IG may be constraining at best, or idealistic at worst, they are not 
prohibitive and could be considered compatible with the Brundtland Commission's 
notion of sustainable development. In order to fulfil intergenerational obligations to 
future generations, there is a need to step outside tradition and consider the whole of 
the planet, symbolicaly if not politicaly, as a global commons shared by each 
generation. Because much of what we do in the way of impacting on our planet 
impinges on others, it is no longer appropriate to consider the world simply in terms 
of regional political identities. 
A further dimension is the fact that in order to protect our own environment for future 
generations, we must also participate in helping others to protect their environment, so 
that as near to total protection as possible is achieved, for al future generations. 
Herein lies the greatest obstacle to intergenerational equity; that of intra-generational 
equity, and specificaly the role that wealthier countries must take in order to assist 
poorer countries fulfil their planetary obligations as wel as to maintain access to their 
planetary rights. In fact, the UNCED process took up this chalenge in its Agenda 21 
blueprint for action, which was discussed earlier. 
In summary, IG is operationalized by the application of the poluter pays principle, the 
common heritage of mankind concept and sustainable development. Each of these 
rest, in some measure, on our ability to act in a precautionary manner. 
1.3.5 	 Precautionary Principle 
Simply put, the precautionary principle may be construed to mean that: 
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_where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental 
degradation before the threshold of risk is reached. 
(Freestone 1991:21-39) 
It has been shown that scientific understanding has been crucial in raising concerns 
about global environmental problems and stimulating the process of law-making 
through recommendations, benchmark conferences and reports. The precautionary 
principle is tangential to this scientific understanding. We readily accept the 
preventative aspect of medicine, for instance, and it would seem to make good sense 
to apply the same concept to the environment. However, there are two very important 
limitations with the precautionary approach: the variables of scientific certainty and 
identification of the appropriate risk threshold. Figure 1 (on page 36) indicated that 
the stronger the element of consensus, the more likely the scientific input is to have an 
impact in the policy process. The same is true for the identification of a risk threshold; 
if the scientific community can supply quantitative and qualitative data about risks to 
the system, such information is likely to be well-received. But taking this one step 
further, should the absence of strong scientific evidence be used to inhibit preventative 
policies? 
The principle of precautionary action emerged during the North Sea Conferences in the 
1980s. (The International Conference for the Protection of the North Sea was held in 
London in November 1987 and met again in the Hague in 1990 to determine issues 
regarding coastal state jurisdiction, habitats, species, fisheries and pollution from 
ships.) Although the principle has usually been framed in preambular statements and 
does not contain any qualifying statements on how scientific certainty or risk 
thresholds are to be measured or how they interact, its acknowledgment is now 
widespread. In fact, Freestone goes so far as to state that the acceptance of the 
precautionary principle is 'unequivocal' (Freestone 1991:25). This would seem 
true, in principle, as it is a component of various pieces of law including the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe's Bergen Declaration, the Bamako Convention93 
and the Bangkok Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Development 
in Asia and the Pacific, among others (Freestone 1991). The Southern Ocean fishing 
regime, CCAMLR, would also seem, at first glance, to embrace the principle of 
precautionary action implicitly in its objectives and principles, but without the 
accompanying burden of the ambiguities in terminology like scientific certainty and 
risk threshold. 94 
The precautionary principle, per se, is an immature and emerging component of soft 
law with minimal treaty law application. While it, the polluter pays principle, 
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sustainable development, common heritage and IG al have considerable philosophical 
merit, they are not without operational problems. Thus there is room for scepticism 
and Birnie, for one, expresses her caution: 
It is doubtful...whether adoption of such futurological 
concepts...will enhance the existing methods of developing the 
necessary regulatory regime, although they clearly play 
political, publicizing, educative roles in raising public 
awareness and generating the debate that cranks the existing 
mechanisms into action. 
(Birnie 1992:83) 
Notwithstanding, the introduction and discussion of these new concepts and 
principles, of which more wil be heard in the future, has already contributed both 
directly and indirectly to the new global environmental agenda and to the law-making 
process. 
In combination, these five concepts and principles constitute the crucial elements in 
what this study cals responsibility for the global ecosystem. Someone must be held 
accountable for undesirable environmental activities: Principle 21 from the Stockholm 
Conference directs that states have the right to use the resources within their 
jurisdiction, providing that such use does not have unwanted transboundary efects. 
When efects cross state borders and have spatial consequences, or indeed threaten to 
cross generational borders and have temporal consequences, the situation may become 
unacceptable. This means that we need to be wel-informed about how we can behave 
and stil keep within the guidelines for acceptable practices. No longer can we aford 
to sit back and say that we are not certain of the consequences. While we 
procrastinate, further damage could be accumulating, until we reach beyond the point 
of no return. Then it may be too late; and even given that it may not be, are we 
prepared to take the chance? As custodians of planetary resources, aren't we moraly 
obliged to conserve at the very least the global commons areas for al generations now 
and in the future? The major operational problem may be the lack of political wil to 
embrace responsibility for the global ecosystem. 
1 . 4 	 Re-Examining Traditional Approaches to Sovereignty 
The evidence presented so far indicates that ecological interdependence and the 
heterogeneous nature of the state system are not necessarily compatible because 
efective international ecosystem management would require limits to be imposed on 
traditional applications of the principles of sovereignty. Birnie, in this context, 
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redefines a state's rights to autonomy by application of the prefixes reasonable or 
responsible to sovereignty (Birnie 1992:83). This might be construed to imply a less 
rigid approach than the traditional. After al, states comprise colections of individuals 
with the common objective of survival. But with a global society composed of diverse 
nations, states and ecosystems, this underlying common struggle becomes more 
problematic. The pursuit of survival, while establishing and perpetuating society as 
we presently know it, also places great strain on the planet as a whole because of the 
varying propensity of teritorial ecosystems to both sustain their own inhabitants and 
their impact, and to absorb the impacts from neighbouring teritories. As a 
consequence, the survival of the system of states which makes up the global political 
fabric has been chalenged because the traditional perspective of the inviolability of 
state sovereignty is seen as an inhibiting factor in the development of a colective 
environmental conscience and efective multilateral or international ecosystem 
management. Does this then, imply world government? 
1.4.1 	 World Government? 
The idea of colective responsibility for environmental maters strikes at the heart of the 
pervasive condition of the anarchy of states and is thus a highly sensitive political issue 
(Hure11 & Kingsbury 1992:6). One scientist has argued that two important features 
of our post Cold-War world bear litle relation to conventional politics, economics or 
military strategy. They are, that: '...no territory can support an indefinite 
increase either in its number of creatures or in consumption per 
creature, let alone both...1 andfurther, that: 1...all mainstream policies of 
all governments assume that, on the contrary, it canqin Myers 
1993a:13). To some degree we have been able to adapt to changing circumstances, 
but the transition is far from ideal or complete. 
Some commentators today consider that traditional notions of sovereignty have been 
transcended by an interdependence which has shrunk the planet and made a world 
order based on teritorial boundaries increasingly insignificant (McGrew 1992:66). 
But does this necessarily herald the imposition of a type of world governance, as 
opposed to the internationalization or globalization of specific issues like ecosystem 
management, which do not inherently lend themselves to unilateral state actions? 
Hurel and Kingsbury (1992) have identified five factors to help explain why world 
governance, particularly in the field of eco-management, has traditionaly taken a back 
seat to the authority of the anarchic system of states. In the first place, they consider 
there is litle or no evidence that world leaders and their populations either support a 
world government, or think it particularly desirable. For many people, the 
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achievement of a post-Colonial condition of statehood was hard-fought and they 
would have little desire to resubmit themselves to domination. Secondly, the 
autonomy and sovereignty of states have a 'moral validity' which deserves respect 
and might require protection from the power of a world authority. As Hurrell and 
Kingsbury observe, 'Once power is given over, it is not easy to limit 
it to a particular sphere (1992:8). Their third inhibiting factor concerns the 
externalities and realities of the international order. They observe that world eco- 
management should be put into context and not into a vacuum. States have many roles 
in society, and eco-management is only one of them, albeit an important role. Fourth, 
there is little evidence to suggest that a supranational authority would be more effective 
than the practices that states, as the most empowered actors, could employ (Hurrell & 
Kingsbury 1992:8). The final, and perhaps most salient feature, is that the time it 
takes to reach agreement on the nature of any supranational authority may divert 
valuable resources away from the environmental problems themselves, as such 
negotiations are likely to be lengthy, perhaps causing conflict and the postponement of 
solutions while consensus is being reached. Paradoxically, the level of agreement 
necessary to produce a world authority may also indicate that the level of inter-state 
cooperation is high enough to effectively render the need for such a supranational seat 
of power largely redundant (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992:8). 
Hurrell and Kingsbury further observe that one alternative to world governance which 
has been suggested - that of the decentralization of authority involving the 
empowerment of local communities (as per Agenda 21) - also may not be viable when 
viewed in context. Some traditional practices of local communities, for instance, may 
not be compatible with rational eco-management (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992:9). This 
is particularly so despite the expression of many anodyne sentiments to the contrary, 
and also since many modern values are essentially Western values and thus invite 
questions of their appropriateness to traditional behaviour. The whaling practices of 
northern Arctic communities is a case in point. 
The decentralization argument also neglects the broader important functions of the state 
system in fields other than eco-management. The most obvious field to suffer from 
decentralization would be the global economic system, which Hurrell and Kingsbury 
thought would be thrown into chaos, causing enormous disruption and conflict. 
Finally, to sound the death-knell for the decentralization argument, they note that the 
increased numbers of communities, as opposed to the larger state unit, would become 
virtually unmanageable (Hurrell & Kingsbury 1992:9). 
Hurrell & Kingsbury envisage, in the light of their preceding observations, that: 
'_environmental issues will still of necessity be managed within the 
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constraints of a political system in which sovereign states play a 
maj or part...' while conceding that new forms of cooperation and further constraints 
on state sovereignty would emerge (Hurel & Kingsbury 1992:9). 
The modern historical period has witnessed the progressive globalization of human 
afairs, but caution should be exercised in expressing this because it implies neither 
cultural homogenization nor political integration. Globalization defines more complex 
issues concerning human interaction, interconnectedness and awareness (McGrew 
1992:65). Globalizationis'..a process through which events, decisions, 
and activities in one part of the world can come to have significant 
consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts 
of the globe' (McGrew 1992:65-6). Nowhere is the notion of globalization more 
salient than with regard to our common ecological interdependence. 
The popular perception, shared by this author, is that states wil endure but that they 
cannot act alone on maters of substantial importance to the global community of 
states, means that there needs to be an intermediary force between world government 
on the one hand and unilateral state action on the other. That intermediary force is the 
international regime. 
1.4.2 	 International Regimes as Viable Alternatives? 
Aregimeis'a mode or system of rule or government' (Macquarie Dictionary 
1981). As an entity, a regime generaly arises to deal with interdependence and 
conflict in a specific issue area as part of a larger policy area (List & Ritberger 
1992:90). In the literature, one theorist who recognises regimes as entities in the 
international order, describes them thus: 
_social institutions governing the actions of those involved in 
specifiable activities or sets of activities...practices 
consisting of recognized roles linked together by clusters of 
rules or conventions governing relations among the occupants of 
these roles. 
(Young 1989:12-13, emphasis added) 
A regime as a social institution alows for the possibility that participation is not 
confined to states: sub-national, transnational or transgovernmental groups also may 
be actors (Tooze 1994:202). 
Regimes have also been described as: 
_sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations. 
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(Krasner 1982:186, emphasis added) 
Despite the variation in definitions,95 generally there is a focus on rules and norms, 
and these may be useful tools in helping to explain the process and outcomes of 
international cooperation (Tooze 1994:202). 
The central core of regime theory has been described thus: 
In conditions of international interdependence characterized by 
complex relations (multiple channels, multiple issues and the 
irrelevance of military power) and the consequent breakdown of 
the traditional distinction between international and domestic 
politics, the assumption that international relations are 
characterized by anarchy is no longer appropriate (if it ever 
was)...What has taken the place of anarchy is some form of 
international authority...The existence of authority is 
demonstrated by adherence to regimes. 
(Tooze 1994:202) 
International regimes can come in a variety of shapes and sizes. They can be simple: 
composed of just a couple of actors (principally states) seeking a solution to a common 
problem, or more complex: embracing international cooperation in solving a universal 
or substantial problem. Regimes, as defined above, generally comprise a group of 
stakeholders, the rules and practices they devise to deal with a specific situation, 
related behaviour and outcomes. 
The establishment of a regime may be a reactive response to a given situation. In the 
environmental context, it can be, and often is, crisis-motivated (Boardman 1991:454). 
It can also be the product of a proactive vision, based on the probability of a problem 
emerging or being exacerbated unless collective action is taken or when the cumulative 
effects and risk spirals, or the synergism of environmental problems as Prins calls 
them, may not be amenable to traditional political treatment (Prins 1990:714-15). 
Young has identified three principal means of regime formation. One is a spontaneous 
process, by which it is presumed he refers to such practices as custom, 
professionalism and accepted diplomatic behaviour.96 The second method of regime 
formation, negotiation, is characterised by agreement, consent and formal expression 
of the results (Young 1989:86). Lastly, imposed arrangements, in Young's theory, 
involve the dominance of power (Young 1989:88). 
Of these methods of regime formation, the one which appears to be more appropriate 
in the environmental context than the others is that of negotiation. This is because the 
spontaneous process may evolve over a long period of time which, in ecosystem 
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management terms, may not necessarily be desirable. Moreover, an imposed 
arrangement would necessarily involve the use of hegemonic force, which is of little 
practical value when cooperation is required. Negotiation, on the other hand, may be 
seen as analogous to the normal diplomatic processes of international cooperation. 
Individual stakeholders involved in a process of regime negotiation will be driven by a 
range of motivations. Depending on the issue at hand, they may, for instance, be 
exercising power, promoting and protecting national interest, pursuing economic 
imperatives, demonstrating virtue and values or showing concern over the possible 
implications of their inaction. However, collective recognition of a problem does not 
necessarily imply collective agreement and commitment. 
Taking the more benevolent form of argument, the reasons for negotiations aimed at 
the formation of a regime to solve a particular problem (assuming of course that the 
problem has been identified as a problem per se) may reflect the acceptance of a 
shared-interest in that problem which transcends unilateral action, either because one 
state is incapable of, or unable to, act alone, or because the cause and effect involves 
more than one state. This is particularly pertinent to eco-management, as ecosystems 
respect neither arbitrary political borders nor prevailing state interests. These factors 
require that the level of legitimacy of a regime be evaluated as part of any regime 
analysis. 
The structure of a regime will necessarily depend on the nature of the problem and 
how the actors initially intend to deal with it. They will most likely employ 
conventional practices and precedent with regard to the making of rules of 
membership, decision-making, dispute resolution, liability and enforcement, 
flexibility, reporting and other procedural and substantive devices. 97 These are the 
kinds of variables which help in the analysis of the effectiveness of a regime. 
Similarly, the outcome of regime formation will depend on the nature of the problem 
and the specific objectives of the group. An end product may be a free-standing treaty 
or other accord into which specific rules and regulations are embedded in order to give 
legal effect. Another outcome may be simply a statement of non-binding principles as 
the first phase of an on-going course of action — a blueprint for future action. The 
outcomes of regime formation, which this study focuses on, are another means by 
which the impact and likely effectiveness of a regime can be measured. Furthermore, 
the factors which help in the analysis of both legitimacy and effectiveness can also 
assist in measuring accountability, that is, the level of responsibility shown by the 
regime. 
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The diversity of models, of application and even of terminology among regime 
theorists is problematic to the researcher. Oran Young, one of the principal regime 
proponents, lamentsthat'...the fundamental character of regimes remains 
elusive...' (Young 1989:12). Furthermore Young maintains that '...there is 
nothing approaching consensus on the role of regimes in 
international society' (Young 1989:12). The same appears to be true for the 
nature of regime formation. One problem is that actor behaviour may not always be 
predictable and may not always conform to traditional patterns because one issue will 
invoke a different set of state priorities and interests to another issue. 98 While general 
models in regime theory can be useful, Levy, for one, argues that some regimes may 
in fact be set up to fail by actors who intentionally wanted them to fail (Levy 1993:27). 
Theoretical regime models traditionally do not cover a contingency like this. 
Not surprisingly, in view of the variation among regime theories and theorists, the 
question has been posed as to whether regimes actually matter at all. It has been 
suggested, for instance, that the regime concept is useless, if not misleading.99 
Much of the literature relating to international regimes deals with their formation and 
operation, but as illustrated above, the literature is unsatisfactory for a number of 
reasons, not the least of which is that it does not deal adequately with regime 
dynamics. Accordingly, this study is less concerned with the theoretical debate about 
regimes: international regimes do exist, they do facilitate collective action based on a 
common desire among concerned actors to solve a particular problem, and therefore 
they do matter. Although regime theories have been praised as being most appropriate 
where there is a 'specific and clearly defined regime' in operation (Tooze 
1994:212) which is certainly the case in the Antarctic, it is most definitely 
inappropriate within the context of regime emergence in the Arctic. Therefore this 
work is more concerned with, in addition to regime dynamics, the way new regimes 
emerge, evolve and adapt through time. Accordingly it has been necessary to develop 
of hybrid template of analytical inquiry specifically with this objective in mind. This 
will be presented at point 1.5. 
In conclusion, one could argue that the system of states has on the one hand served the 
people well, but in another sense failed them. Rapid population growth has led to 
many instances of environmental abuse, attended by severe poverty and devastation of 
primary resources such as air and water quality and species biodiversity. These 
characteristics have contributed to gross economic disparities, both within the 
populations of states and between states themselves. Economic disparities exist in 
natural terms, as some lands are more capable of sustaining human populations and 
resource exploitation than others. In addition, some cultures, religions and political 
ideologies are more amenable to the nuances of 20th century life than others. Natural 
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variability in the world order is, therefore, an accepted factor which has the function of 
stimulating the market forces of the institutions of world production and trade. But 
unnatural variability may cause extreme socio-economic hardship with consequences 
stretching far beyond the political borders of sovereign states. Some commentators 
today have acknowledged this in their re-examination of traditional approaches to 
sovereignty, particularly as it relates to environmental issues. How is this relevant to 
the polar regions? 
1.5 	 Implications for the Polar Regions 
The study so far has demonstrated the range of environmental rights and duties which 
atend to the sovereign state. It has also ilustrated the curent trend towards re-
examining the meaning of sovereignty in the light of concerns about the state of the 
global environment. Sovereign states are being asked to impose further limitations 
upon themselves in the pursuit of ecosystem management in a rather more egalitarian 
manner than ever before. In this sense the Arctic can almost be considered a 
microcosm of the world. 
The sovereign Arctic states, which have many similarities and diferences between 
them, have been faced by the prospect of environmental calamities which could engulf 
them al. Some are perpetrators, some simply victims. Al, however, may be 
implicated.100 How they envisage dealing with their problems may provide useful 
extrapolations to the global environmental macrocosm. 
Furthermore, the Antarctic provides a useful counterpoint to the Arctic scenario. Here, 
sovereignty has been given a diferent treatment within the aegis of the Antarctic Treaty 
System. While the states which form the management coalition under the System are 
sovereign, they have, by virtue of their participation in the Antarctic Treaty regime, 
accepted self-imposed restrictions upon their behaviour, pursuant to the spirit and 
intent of that Treaty. Yet superficialy at least, both polar regions are striving for the 
same goal: that of ecosystem management. 
Central to the thesis is the argument that the polar areas can be considered at once both 
regional and international areas of interest. They are largely self-determined regions 
(by virtue of their climate) composed of or managed by states and state processes; at 
the same time they are of considerable international significance and in some instances 
are under some form of international control. They are both comprised of resources 
(renewable and non-renewable) and are themselves resources of the global 
community. Polar management, therefore, is multi-dimensional. On one plane, states 
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with polar territory act within their capacity as sovereigns to make management 
arrangements for their areas of jurisdiction. On another plane, states with polar 
interests combine to form a management coalition. Within the broader context of 
international law, some of the designated courses of action, as outcomes of 
international cooperation between polar states, are treaty-based and thus intentional. 
Ironically, international treaty-based law usually operates on consensus, 
recommendation and cooperation in an effort to, inter alia, preserve state sovereignty 
(Bennett 1988:3). Accordingly questions about the polar regions are very much 
embedded within the broad issue of sovereignty. 
Theories about sovereignty have been further developed to include the notion of 
permeable sovereignty, as identified by Gustafson (1988) and McGrew (1992), 
whereby political boundaries become flexible to allow for the absorption of external 
concerns and assistance. This study aims to determine whether a kind of de facto 
internationalization of the polar regions is emerging by looking for evidence of moves 
towards permeable sovereignty. This might be found by showing how polar states 
balance their state interests against the demands of interdependence. For instance, 
how tractable are the polar states with regard to the issues they address; how willing 
are they to enter into multi-level discourse; how willing are the polar states to 
recognise non-aligned outsiders; and are they able to amend their views or concede 
disparate views in favour of collaborative agreement? 
Three of the fundamental objectives of eco-management were earlier stated to be 
dealing with existing causes of damage to ecosystems; minimizing or preventing 
additional forms of damage; and preserving and using ecosystems rationally and 
sustainably. Attaining these objectives is attempted through the application of 
regional, national and international arrangements through regimes. Accordingly, it has 
been possible to identify three concepts which critically underpin the validity of polar 
ecosystem management and highlight its value in pragmatic legal terms: 
• legitimacy; 
• effectiveness; and 
• accountability. 
These three concepts form the analytical parameters of the study and accord with the 
broader notion of responsibility for the global ecosystem which will emanate from 
regional responsibility. For a regime to be legitimate, it should primarily be both 
useful and acceptable to the community of interested groups, including governments, 
and in some cases the wider international community. Although the imperatives for 
international, as opposed to regional, acceptance are not as convincing in a legal sense, 
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the polar regions may be exceptions because of the perception of their utility as global 
resources or global commons areas. 
For a regime to be efective, it should have clearly defined goals or objectives which 
can later be measured against output, with a demonstrated causal relationship between 
actions and outcomes. Efectiveness may be identified in variable temporal 
dimensions, usualy represented by short-, medium- and long-term phases of the 
stated objectives. Efectiveness in a regional sense wil add credibility to global 
responsibility. 
For a regime to be accountable to the interested parties, it should have both legitimacy 
and efectiveness and importantly, it should contain mechanisms for ensuring 
transparency, commitment, compliance and liability. Without these components an 
agreement may be worth litle more than the paper it is writen on. This is the essence 
of responsibility at the regional level. 
Accordingly, to determine if a regime is legitimate (in a regional as opposed to global 
sense, initialy) it should be decided, among other things: i) who are the actors? i) are 
they representative of al the rightful stakeholders? and ii) do the boundaries of scope 
of the regime embrace both the essence and the periphery of the problem? In the 
global sense, legitimacy is also to be found in comparative linkages with other 
components of the international order which have a bearing on the regime's objectives. 
To be able to make useful judgments about efectiveness, it is necessary to establish: 
i) the objectives; their relevance to the problem; and 	 the anticipated phases of 
progress towards a desirable outcome. Only once those phases are in motion wil it be 
possible to observe quantifiable outcomes. 
Accountability largely stems from the procedural and substantive conditions built into 
the regime — the endogenous forces. It is likely that accountability cannot be tested 
until, or unless, a breach occurs. Certainly though, accountability could be measured 
in a theoretical sense by examining reporting procedures, compliance and enforcement 
mechanisms and the regulations governing liability for harm. 
To underscore the utility of these three working parameters, the final analysis includes 
discussion on how wel, if at al, the polar regimes embrace in an holistic sense the 
notion of responsibility for the global, as opposed to the regional ecosystem. The 
preceding discussion can be represented on a template as shown in Figure 2: 
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Figure 2. 	 Analytical Template for Legitimacy, Effectiveness, Accountability and Responsibility for the Global Ecosystem 
There are methodological problems with the measurement of the first three parameters, 
however. Levy points out that efectiveness can be measured by a change in actor 
behaviour which leads towards the solution of the problem in a more eficient manner 
than alternative solutions (Levy 1993:17). But this begs the question: unless 
alternative solutions are tried, is there any substantial way of assessing this? 
In measuring output against rhetoric, one must be mindful of the quality and 
reasonableness of the objectives adopted by the regime at the outset. It would seem 
that if the regime includes al of the actors who could reasonably be expected to make 
an informed and valuable contribution to the dialogue on goal-seting, the likelihood of 
the regime's objectives being more appropriate and its problem-solving capacity more 
significant, is enhanced. But this is not necessarily so. Levy cites the Haas study of 
the Regional Seas Programs, which found that the most successful Program eforts 
contained a combination of three factors: 
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i) 	 able actors [specificaly marine scientists]; 
political respect for their authority and expertise; and 
ii) 	 open discourse between the actors and policy makers. 
(Levy 1993:24) 
But Levy criticises one particular aspect of this example, claiming that the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) actualy created the community of scientists 
because one did not exist (Levy 1993:32). 
Further, with regard to actor representation, Wetestad cites the Montreal Protocol 
negotiations, in which a range of key stakeholders were involved, as an example of 
constructive pluralism in action (Wetestad 1992:45). But he argues that there are 
good reasons for 'more exclusive' approaches to state participation, and mentions 
the deep seabed mining negotiations in the UN Law of the Sea conferences as a case in 
point. His criticism here was that there were too many actors with diverse political 
and ideological preferences, resulting in a stifling of the substance of the debate 
(Wetestad 1992:45). But this raises questions about how many is too many, and 
who decides on the parties to be included and those to be excluded. 
Wetestad's solution to the problem of actor legitimacy is to employ a sequential 
approach, with the initial stage of negotiations being represented by a broad range of 
participants, but with a coresponding narowing of representation as events become 
more defined and focussed (Wetestad 1992:45). 
Levy further proposes that the substantive output of a regime should be considered as 
a means of achieving objectives and not ends in themselves, and concludes that 
'...compliance is not given a privileged conceptual position...' (Levy 
1993:19). This is debatable. If any positive action towards problem-solving is beter 
than nothing, how do you account for the types of regimes Levy claims might have 
been designed to fail? Levy agrees, however, that the ability to monitor colective 
behaviour is, of itself, a factor that can influence efectiveness (Levy 1993:26). 
This work supports analysis of compliance mechanisms as being integral to 
accountability. It is conceded that the ability to monitor is directly relative to the nature 
of the problem and the procedural and substantive mechanisms the regime has adopted 
to ensure both compliance and liability for breaches. Levy cites atempts to regulate 
international fisheries as an example of the inherent problems of monitoring and 
enforcement and he concludes that '._this may be an important reason why few 
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fisheries have succeeded at preserving their stocks' (Levy 1993:26). 
(Presumably, Levy means conserving stocks, rather than preserving them.) 
Initial criteria for measuring the value of the output of a regime have been identified by 
the work of Wetestad and Andresen (1991) who sought to determine the degree of 
efectiveness in international resource cooperation. For them, efectiveness implied 
three factors. One was '...the degree to which the cooperating parties 
have achieved the declared goals of the cooperation.' Secondly, they 
sought to determine '...the degree of correspondence between expert advice 
(indicating what would be the technically ideal solution) and the 
regulatory political decisions taken.' Finaly, it was necessary to find 
'...the degree of improvement in relation to the hypothetical state of 
affairs that would have occurred had no international cooperation 
been initiated in the field in question' (Wetestad and Andresen 1991:2). 
Of course, comparing hypotheticals with actual events is a very dificult, if not 
impossible, undertaking. 
Wetestad and Andresen's methodological pathways to measuring efectiveness are to 
some extent compatible with Young's elementary notions of regime inquiry. 
Methodologicaly, Young would seek answers about regimes in five specific issue 
areas: Institutional character: what are the principal rights, rules and social choice 
procedures? How does the regime structure individual behaviour to achieve colective 
outcomes? Jurisdictional boundaries: what is the coverage in terms of functional 
scope, boundaries and membership, and is this appropriate under prevailing 
circumstances? Conditions of operation: what conditions are necessary for the regime 
to operate at al? Under what conditions wil regimes yield desirable results? 
Consequences of operation: what kinds of outcomes (individual/colective) are 
produced and how are these evaluated? Finaly, Dynamics: how it came into 
existence, its evolution and future direction (Young 1989:29). 
Al of the above wil be taken into account in the application of this template to 
analyses of the polar regions, although it is acknowledged that the variables are in an 
immature stage of intelectual development. There is no certainty that they represent a 
reliable method of regime analysis. 
1.6 	 Conclusions 
A series of environmental crises, the concurent rise of scientific curiosity and 
investigation and the existence of an environmental movement have al stimulated a 
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new global environmental agenda. This agenda is based on the concept of ecological 
interdependence, which calls for a common responsibility for the global environment. 
This newly developing ethic has been located within such realms as the United Nations 
and the global information network wherein the formulation of international opinion 
occurs. It embraces notions which cannot be contained solely within political borders: 
universal ideas about fairness and reasonableness and justice, and importantly, the 
survival of the planetary biosphere as a functioning unit. But ecological 
interdependence and common responsibility do not necessarily sit comfortably with 
sovereign state independence. Development activity is not always in a symbiotic 
relationship with the environment, and in cases where unwanted transboundary effects 
occur, as exemplified in the climate change debate, a new kind of diplomacy is called 
for in seeking solutions to common problems. There has been a gradual shift towards 
the notion that state borders are becoming increasingly insignificant in the context of 
taking responsibility for the global ecosystem. International regimes have been 
identified as appropriate intervening variables between states and the less-acceptable 
forum of a world government. 
This inquiry investigates the competence of polar states to make and enforce 
multilateral environmental law given the constraints of, or the freedom to manoeuvre 
within, evolving paradigms of responsibility for the global ecosystem. The analytical 
template to be applied to the case study areas seeks to determine the level of legitimacy, 
effectiveness and accountability each polar regime exhibits, and thus in general terms 
how they fulfil their roles as regional ecosystem managers. Their competence in the 
latter will give some valuable insight into their potential competence in the global 
context. 
Environmental law-making is a relatively new field of international law. Of the 140 
multilateral environmental treaties concluded since 1921, more than half are dated post-
1973 (Keohane et al 1993:6). Of these, few relate directly to either the Arctic or the 
Antarctic. Interestingly there have been, to date, few systematic bi-polar investigations 
into the nature and efficacy of what little polar environmental law there is. 101 
Furthermore, the UNCED process did not deal directly with either of the polar 
regions. The Arctic as a region was not mentioned per se, and there was but one brief 
mention of the Antarctic Treaty System in the oceans chapter of Agenda 21. 102 Given 
the central position of the polar regions to global climate processes, this disregard by 
the UNCED may seem quite remarkable. However, it is understandable given the 
enormous agenda that the Rio participants worked with, and their holistic rather than 
regional focus. It may also have been an intentional strategy by the Treaty Parties to 
avoid political complications with Malaysia and common heritage advocates. 
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There were certainly many generic statements and declarations emanating from Rio 
regarding sovereignty and state's rights and duties with respect to the environment 
which could be applied to both polar regions, in general rather than more specific 
terms. But the polar regions as ecosystems were largely ignored. Accordingly, this 
study fills the UNCED void. Following on from the issue-based focus of the 
UNCED, it takes what was perhaps one of its most important acknowledgments: 
'...the need to take a balanced and integrated approach to environment 
and development questions' (United Nations 1992:Preamble) and applies the 
concept to the polar regions. The comparative study undertaken here seeks to 
contribute to the general literature on global ecosystem management with a particular 
focus on the most recent attempts by polar states to address this issue. This will be 
achieved by using the three concepts which critically underpin the validity of polar eco-
management: legitimacy, measured by acceptance; effectiveness, measured in terms of 
output versus rhetoric; and accountability, measured by the level of responsibility 
shown. Responsibility is also brought into play in a global sense by measuring the 
acknowledgment of such concepts as the polluter pays principle, common heritage, 
intergenerational equity, sustainable development and the principle of acting in a 
precautionary manner. 
The next chapter will describe the geographical and geopolitical architecture of the 
polar regions, as an introduction to the emergence of polar ecosystem management 
regimes. 
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The Geography and Geopolitics 
of the Polar Regions 
Introduction 
There is no denying that penguins, whales, icebergs and 
even blizzards do have an appeal far beyond any rational 
appraisal of their place in nature. 
E Fred Roots (1985) 
The polar regions are so different that commentators have in the past almost 
unanimously cautioned against drawing superficial comparisons between them 
(Osherenko & Young 1989:244). However, some authors in recent times have begun 
to take note of the utility of polar comparisons, particularly with relation to 
environmental issues. 103 This study is no exception. 
Both of the polar regions are high-latitude, low-population-density, peripheral 
geographical and geopolitical areas managed by states, but here the similarity ends. 
The very nature of state relations is diametrically opposed: the Arctic is the province of 
eight sovereign states; the Antarctic, on the other hand, is in the custody of 42 states 
comprising an hierarchical decision-making coalition. This raises questions about how 
polar environmental law is made and enforced within these unique political 
dimensions, which by their very nature indicate that different solutions must be found 
to essentially the same problem - that of ecosystem management. 
The objective of this Chapter is to present a contextual introduction to the case study 
subjects. It is divided into two parts and begins by defining the Arctic and the 
Antarctic from the perspective of their quite remarkable geographical architecture, in 
order to establish the physical context in which the legal and political frameworks have 
evolved. The second part re-defines the areas in terms of their geopolitical 
characteristics, describing the political boundaries, the stakeholders and selective 
historical features relevant to contemporary politics and thus regime-building. 
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The Chapter concludes by drawing three principal similarities between the regions. 
The first is that the locus of decision-making is peripheral to the regions themselves, 
which has important implications for the relevance of polar environmental law. The 
second is that the history of state-building in the Arctic and the dynamic process of 
evidencing state presence in the Antarctic, have determined that the making of 
concessions to sovereignty wil be an important feature of any atempt to regulate 
anthropogenic activity in both regions. The third similarity between the two regions is 
the inherent value of the pursuit of science, which incidentaly identified both the 
potential scope of resources and the vulnerable nature of polar ecosystems, thereby 
adding a further dimension to the law- and policy-making processes. 
Part 1 The Geographical Architecture of the Polar Regions 
Physicaly, the polar regions are completely diferent. The Antarctic can be described 
as a self-contained geographical region completely isolated from the rest of the world. 
Its closest physical connection occurs between the southern tip of South America and 
the northern extremity of the peninsula of Antarctica — a distance of about 800 
kilometers across Drake Passage. This physical isolation has proved to be an 
important parameter not only with regard to Antarctic science but also in regional 
political afairs. 
The Arctic, on the other hand, comprises diferent physical and cultural parameters 
which provide both opportunities and constraints with regard to regime building 
because of its physical configuration and political delineation (Friedheim 1988:496). 
However, defining the spatial context of either polar region is not a dificult 
undertaking in this instance. 
2.1 	 The Antarctic 
For the purposes of this work, the Antarctic is described as either: 
• 	 the area south of 60° South latitude, including al ice shelves; (Antarctic Treaty Article VI) 
or 
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• 	 the area south of 60 South latitude, including al ice shelves, and the Antarctic marine ecosystem delineated by a northern perimeter approximating, as closely as posible, the Antarctic Convergence.104 (See Map) 
Unlike the Arctic, which is a cros-continental region, the Antarctic is les problematic 
to describe because it is, in fact, not contiguous with any existing above-water land 
mas and therefore does not require distinguishing terestrial zones such as tree-fines 
or permafrost borders to help determine its boundaries.105 It should be noted that 
references to the Antarctic in this work include the terestrial mas and the ocean,106 
islands,107 icebergs and ice shelves108 south of 60° South latitude, except where 
otherwise indicated, whereas Antarctica refers only to the continental mas.10 
Antarctica is an ice-capped continent surounded by ocean." Almost 12 milion of 
Antarctica's 13.9 milion sq km are ice-covered. The thicknes of the continental ice 
determines the surface elevation, which is about 4 km at its maximum. Some sub-
glacial basins, such as the Vincennes and the Wilkes Basins, are below sea level but 
about one-quarter of the continent is over 3,000 metres above sea level. 
Antarctica is generaly colder than the Arctic because it is continental. It has an 
average surface temperature of between -60°C and -15°C."2 There is very litle melt 
of continental ice because of the dry snow proces; rather, mas is lost by iceberg 
calving from glaciers into the ocean. In West Antarctica the bedrock is below sea level 
and the ice sheet is therefore marine. 
The Antarctic marine area is about 36 milion sq km and the extent of sea ice varies 
according to the seasons, wind and ocean curent efects. At its peak in about October 
ice coverage posibly extends over 20 milion sq km, retreating to a summer zenith 
minimum in February of about 4 milion sq km. The continent is surounded by a 
moat of very deep water with few bridges of shalow water connecting it to other 
oceans. 
Most of the continent is xeric, that is, characterised by litle free water for most of the 
year. Consequently there is only a simple freshwater environment. With only about 
2% of the continent ice-free, there are few conditions conducive to terestrial faunal 
and floral population colonization. That is not to say there are no plants or animals, 
but what are there - algae, mos, lichens, bacteria and other microbes - are localized 
and living at sometimes the absolute limit of existence. The Antarctic marine 
environment, however, supports a range of floral and faunal colonies from 
phytoplankton to seaweeds, zooplankton, kril and fish, seals, penguins, sea birds and 
whales. Seals haul out on the ice to moult, and penguins form colonies in the sparse 
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ice-free areas. The interdependency between components of the marine ecosystem is 
the subject of intense scientific investigation and is stil not wel understood. 
Because it has not been proved conclusively that the continent was ever inhabited, 
humans are aliens in the Antarctic environment. To survive there requires a mastery 
over Nature and while sophisticated technology may provide relative comfort, it 
cannot completely insulate the human visitor from the reality of natural forces so 
powerful as to be almost unimaginable. 
Politicaly, the Antarctic has been partitioned into sectors and this wil be discussed 
further below. The northern limit of each sector coresponds to 600 South, with the 
exception of the Norwegian claim, which has unspecified northern and southern 
boundaries and the Chilean claim, which has an unspecified northern boundary13 
(See Map). The area of application of the governing Antarctic Treaty is south of 60° 
South. 
The geographical architecture of the Antarctic ensures that polutants wil stay trapped 
in the ice for up to hundreds of thousands of years.114 Furthermore, its isolation 
makes the containment and clean-up of oil spils and the disposal of waste from 
scientific stations and field activities both dificult and costly. Importantly too, the 
vast size of the region makes monitoring and enforcement of environmental law almost 
impossible. 
2.2 	 The Arctic 
The Arctic as a geographic location is variously and somewhat loosely described as 
either: 
• al terestrial and marine areas above the Arctic Circle,I15 
Or 
north of 60°, 65° or 66° North latitude; 
or • al areas north of the 10° Celsius surface air isotherm for the warmest month of July. This may coincide in places with the terestrial designation of the tree-
line; 
or • the area north of the Continuous Permafrost line. 
(See Map) 
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It is usual to apply several of the above definitions, depending upon the context in 
which the region is being defmed.I 16 This study cites which definition is being 
applied, as appropriate. 
The Arctic includes the marine areas of the Arctic Ocean: the Beaufort, Bering, Eastern 
Siberian and Chukchi Seas; the Laptev, Kara and Barents Seas on the Eurasian side of 
the Arctic Ocean; Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland; the Denmark Strait 
between Greenland and Iceland; and the Norwegian Sea between Norway and Iceland 
(Friedheim 1988:496). 
These marine areas are bordered by the terrestrial masses of the Russian Federation, 
Canada, the US State of Alaska, Greenland and Norway. Although all of the land 
mass of Iceland is below the Arctic Circle, it is traditionally considered an Arctic 
nation, as are both Finland and Sweden, whose northern extremes are above the Circle 
though they have, in modern terms, no Arctic coastline. 
The marine openings to the Arctic are relatively narrow — the Bering Strait between the 
Arctic and Pacific Oceans; the Greenland-Iceland and Iceland-United Kingdom 
(GIUK) Gap to the North Sea and North Atlantic; and the Nares Strait-Baffin Bay-
Davis Strait passages between the Canadian Arctic and the Atlantic Ocean. This 
configuration has led to the generally accepted designation of the Arctic as a semi-
enclosed sea' in conformity with the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea 
definition (LOSC, Article 122). 
The Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas cover an area estimated to be about 14 million sq 
km. Apart from some deep basins, the ocean is generally relatively shallow. 
Consequently parts of the marine environment are hazardous to shipping.I 17 Some 
of the continental shelves on the Eurasian side are thought to extend outwards for up 
to 1500 km and the potential for hydrocarbon resources to be located within them is 
high (Friedheim 1988:496). 
For approximately 9 months of the year (October to June) the Arctic Ocean is virtually 
ice-locked, with a frozen coverage of 11.7 million sq km. The ice recedes to less than 
half that (5.2 million sq km) in summer, allowing considerable opportunity for coastal 
navigation, although too little is known about the distribution and characteristics of 
Arctic ice coverage to complete such voyages without risk. There are, however, small 
areas which remain ice-free year round 118 (Friedheim 1988:496). 
The circulation of the Arctic water masses is a complex process involving interaction 
between the topography of the region, the inflow of warmer North Atlantic water, 
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fresh water from the Siberian rivers, melting glacial ice, the presence of sea ice, and 
the atmospheric flux. The ocean circulation and mixing patterns reflect the 
vulnerability of the Arctic to the long-range transportation and deposition of pollutants 
from extra-regional sources. Combined with cold temperatures, ice-cover and simple 
ecosystems, the risk to the Arctic environment from pollution is high. This condition 
is analogous to that of the Antarctic. 
While the Arctic winters are lengthy and severely cold, the summers are short and 
cool. This seasonal reprieve promotes congenial habitats for a variety of flora and 
fauna, especially land-based animals such as caribou, reindeer, bears, foxes and musk 
ox as well as large stocks of marine mammals and fish. These resources are the staple 
diet and principal trading commodities of many of the indigenous human populations 
of the polar north. Furthermore, the value of marine resources is heightened by the 
fact that there is a significant proportion of land which is continually in a state of 
permafrost, in some places extending below the tree-line - a condition which makes 
agriculture difficult, if not impossible, in some areas. 
These complex physical characteristics of the Arctic also make resource exploitation 
problematic and risky. It will be shown later that there is a vital nexus between the 
ability of the scientists to know the Arctic and the ability of policy-makers to tame the 
Arctic for their particular economic, military and territorial purposes. 
In summary, the polar regions are quite distinct from each other in geographical terms. 
About the best that can be said as far as comparisons go is that they are both cold and 
isolated and that their ecosystems are simple and vulnerable. When all of these polar 
features are combined, the outlook for devising, implementing and monitoring 
behavioural controls to effectively manage such robust yet vulnerable ecosystems is 
daunting. Furthermore, different geopolitical idiosyncrasies make the pursuit of eco-
management more problematic still. 
Part 2 
The Geopolitics of the Polar Regions119 
The poles are the antithesis of each other, in more ways that just geographically. The 
Arctic supports indigenous communities, large-scale and varied resource exploitation, 
generally undisputed sovereignty, relative proximity, unrestricted uses including those 
of a military nature, major shipping and air transport routes and substantial terrestrial 
faunal and floral populations. The Antarctic has none of these, except for the 
controlled exploitation of fish stocks in the Southern Ocean and a small-scale tourism 
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industry. Paradoxicaly, the Antarctic has a coherent regional management regime 
with legal personality, whereas the Arctic, with its population, resource exploitation 
and prominent strategic profile, does not. 
A primary similarity between the Arctic and the Antarctic is their importance to the 
scientific understanding of global processes, and of intrinsic polar processes. It is 
known and widely accepted that human activities may be substantialy altering global 
climate paterns by enhancing the earth's natural greenhouse condition. Consequently, 
scientists anticipate a generalized global warming trend and sea level rise, with the 
greatest physical changes or early indications of such changes being probable in the 
polar regions, although these conclusions are stil highly speculative.120 Actual 
scientific information may vary between the Antarctic and the Arctic, due to intrinsic 
data gathering and interpretation diferences and dificulties, but this does not detract 
from the paramount value of polar science. Together with the oceans and the 
atmosphere, the poles form an integral part of the global climate process. Therefore, 
while the regions are remarkably opposite in many ways, there are fundamental 
similarities based on scientific utility and the vulnerability of the polar ecosystems. 
A brief examination of the complex historical foundations of present-day polar 
geopolitics is useful at this point to put the processes of regime building and dynamics 
covered in the next two chapters, into perspective. 
2.3 	 Antarctica : From Myth to Reality 
Antarctica comprises almost 10% of the terestrial surface of the earth, and it remains 
the only place where there is a portion of unclaimed teritory.I21 The continent's 
existence was the subject of much speculation until its actual discovery less than 200 
years ago. In the 6th Century BC, the Greek mathematician Pythagoras theorised 
about the harmony of the spheres, reasoning that there should be a southern counter-
balance to the configuration of the known northern hemisphere. Such was the 
incredulity of his belief, however, that it took more than a thousand years to prove. 
From a Eurocentric world, great adventurers set sail to explore the unknown world. 
In so doing, they proved the ancient Greek theory that the earth was round simply by 
not faling of the edge. Their perseverance, described as a 'triumph of hope over 
evidence' (Reader's Digest 1985), is testimony to the great vision of the 
entrepreneurial Europeans, particularly since many of the expeditions ended tragicaly 
or inconclusively. 
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The first known circumnavigation of the globe in 1519 by an expedition initialy led by 
Ferdinand Magelan12 did give weight to the theory of the earth as a sphere, but proof 
of the existence of the great south land was to be more elusive (Reader's Digest 1985). 
In hindsight it seems that many of the early southern hemisphere explorers may not 
have comprehended the exact nature of what they were witnessing. Descriptions of 
huge ice islands and freezing, hazardous sailing weather obviously positioned them 
further and further south, with each subsequent voyage adding smal pieces to the 
large puzzle of Terra Australis Incognita, the unknown southern land. Jean-Baptiste 
Bouvet de Lozier, a French explorer venturing to 57° South in 1737, encountered flat-
topped icebergs and corectly surmised that they might have originated from a land 
mass further south (Reader's Digest 1985). Captain James Cook is believed to have 
traveled as far as 71°10' South during his 1773 voyage and concured with Bouvet's 
assumption about the origins of icebergs. When the existence of Australia as an 
island, and the southern extensions of South America and Africa, were verified during 
the 17th and 18th centuries, the southern hemisphere began to take shape. 
The risque [sic] one runs in exploring a coast, in these 
unknown and icey [sic] seas, is so very great that I can be 
bold enough to say that no man will ever venture farther than I 
have done; and that the lands which may lie to the South will 
never be explored. 
Captain James Cook 
Cook could never have envisaged the role his logs and meticulous charts would play 
in the development of the Antarctic. The returning mariners, Cook included, 
recounted stories of teeming sea life, which prompted the massive exploitation of 
southern polar seals, penguins and whales. Prefaced by the discovery of many sub-
Antarctic islands and resources, commercial whaling and sealing ventures (principaly 
undertaken by Americans, Norwegians, British and Russians) eventualy led to the 
identification of Antarctica itself. These ventures also had a profound efect on the 
nature of Antarctic politics. The spread of national interests and the threat of cross-
political cleavages motivated the signing of a joint management accord - the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959. 
2.4 	 The Partitioning of the Antarctic 
Historicaly and chronologicaly there are four elements which have characterised 
Antarctic afairs prior to the adoption of the Antarctic Treaty: i) discovery and 
exploration; i) the harvesting of marine living resources; ii) the pursuit of scientific 
information; and iv) security concerns. Each of these four stages are intrinsic 
74 
elements of the problem of what to do with the Antarctic which gave rise to the 
formation of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
The folowing discussion introduces the nature and role of international cooperation 
(or lack of it); the issues of sovereignty and security; and the role and politics of both 
science and resource exploitation, as they are placed in the historical context of regime 
formation. 
2.4.1 	 Discovery and Exploration 
There are three acknowledged phases of Antarctic discovery and exploration: the 
heroic age, including the air age and the scientific age. 
The so-caled heroic age prior to World War I is thoroughly documented elsewhere 
and it is not the intention of this study to reproduce historical events extensively.123 
However a brief account of the principle milestones of discovery and exploration is 
useful for introducing the genesis of Antarctic regime formation. 
Credit for the first sighting of Antarctica in modern times is debatable. Who knows 
how far some early civilizations may have traveled in their primitive craft, or for that 
mater, whether some of the 19th century merchant whalers and sealers had seen or 
landed on the continent without realizing, or keeping quiet about it so as not to risk 
losing commercial advantage? Conventionaly, Britain's Edward Bransfield (c1795- 
1852), Russia's Thaddeus von Belingshausen (who was actualy a German) (1778- 
1852) and an American sealer named Nathaniel Palmer (1799-1877) al vie for the 
honour of the first sighting some time in 1820. It is important to note that both 
Russia and the United States have reserved their rights to claim Antarctic teritory 
partly on the basis of this early activity by Belingshausen and Palmer. Furthermore, 
some of Britain's Antarctic claims are based on Bransfield's discoveries. 
Sealers are known to have operated extensively throughout the south polar region and 
American Captain John Davis documented his landing on the Antarctic Peninsula in 
February 1821. Another American, Lieutenant Charles Wilkes was active in the area 
between 1838 and 1842, exploring the coastline that bears his name, Wilkes Land, in 
what is now the Australian Antarctic Teritory. Much was to be made of this early 
American activity, with the US government naming the Peninsula south of the 
Shetland Islands 'Palmer's Land'. The British, on the other hand, caled it 'Graham 
Land', which persists today as the name of the slim northern extension of the 
Peninsula. The wider southern portion retains Palmer's name. This was perhaps the 
first sign of the kinds of conflict unleashed by the desire to possess Antarctic teritory. 
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The principal nations involved in this heroic age were Britain (inclusive of Australia 
and New Zealand), Norway, Russia and the United States, with Chile and Argentina 
keeping a watchful presence and the French and Japanese registering an uncommon 
interest in a land far to the south of their homelands. 
The air age of the interwar years prior to 1939 is also well documented e1sewhere. 124 
It perpetuated the dominant notions of exploration and science which characterised 
Antarctic affairs of the time. This period of adventure was enhanced by the use of 
aircraft and other inventions like radio, more sophisticated camera equipment and 
tracked vehicles. It also represented a time of unprecedented American influence in the 
Antarctic. 
The names of Americans Richard Byrd and Lincoln Ellsworth are synonymous with 
Antarctic aviation of this period. Their use of post World War I technology facilitated 
the extensive mapping of the continental coastline and interior. Byrd was the first to 
fly over both poles and in November 1929 he dropped the flags of Britain, the US, 
Norway and France at the South Pole. Byrd's chief scientist, Lawrence Gould, 
travelling inland in West Antarctica, claimed Marie Byrd Land as 'a dependency or 
possession of the United States' but this claim was never officially endorsed 
by his government. 125 Australian Douglas Mawson was again active during this 
time, leading the tripartite British, Australian and New Zealand (BANZARE) 
expedition of 1929-31. Ellsworth, paired with Herbert Hollick-Kenyon, made the 
first transcontinental flight from the Peninsula to US Base Little America, on the Ross 
Ice Shelf, in November 1935. Along the way Ellsworth claimed the land between 80° 
and 120° West 126 for the United States (Quigg 1983:32). This claim, too, was never 
formally endorsed by the US government. 
Several comments should be made at this point about the political ramifications of a 
German Antarctic presence. First, just prior to World War II, the Schwabenland, 
under orders from Hermann Goering, visited the coast of Queen Maud Land. 127 
Seaplanes were dispatched to take aerial photographs and during these sorties 
propaganda darts emblazoned with swastikas were deposited on the ice. The Germans 
renamed the area 'Neu-Schwabenland', but this has not been retained. Second, the 
majority of the so-called heroic expeditions had normally been funded by public 
subscription. However, following the intensity of interest in the Antarctic by the 
Germans 128 future expeditions would be government funded and directed (Quigg 
1983:33). This represented a cross-over point between discovery, exploration, 
science and politics and was indicative of the way international political affairs were to 
impinge upon Antarctic affairs in the future. 
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The scientific age wil be dealt with separately at point 2.4.3. Al of this historical 
information is useful to understanding some of the politics behind the ensuing claims 
to Antarctic sovereignty. The partitioning, described below, remains the most 
contentious issue in Antarctic afairs today (Hal 1994:Ch.3). Britain would formaly 
claim a large percentage of the continent, now separated into the British Peninsula 
claims of 1908 and 1917, the Ross Dependency (New Zealand) claimed in 1923 and 
the Australian Antarctic Teritory proclaimed in 1933. The later two claims were 
ceded to the Governments of New Zealand and Australia by the British. No serious 
or substantial objections were raised to any of these British claims at the time (Quigg 
1983:112). Norway staked its claim to a large sector of Antarctic teritory 
encompassing Queen Maud Land while the Schwabenland was en route from 
Germany. France successfuly claimed Adelie Land, after a simmering controversy 
with British and Australian authorities over its right to do so.129 Each of the above 
five countries based their claims on discovery and occupation. In the early 1940s two 
South American countries, Chile and Argentina, also made claims to portions of the 
Antarctic Peninsula and the proximate continental area. Argentina and Chile both 
based their claims partly on the succession to original Spanish rights through a Papal 
Bul dated 1493. This is not considered valid, however, as the Spanish neither 
discovered nor occupied any part of Antarctica (Myhre 1986:13). The Chilean and 
Argentinian claims overlap, both with each others' and with the British clthm.130 
Both the United States and the former Soviet Union (now Russia) reserved their right 
to claim, no doubt in response to their perceived interest and activity in the entire 
region. 
The reason why al of these countries were in the Antarctic in the first place was 
because of the promise of a rich Southern Ocean harvest, the potential for which was 
identified during the early discovery voyages. Marine resource exploitation, therefore, 
played a prominent role in the partitioning of the Antarctic. 
2.4.2 	 Marine Living Resources Harvesting 
The first rush to exploit Antarctic living resources began in 1784, coresponding with 
the decline in northern polar whale and seal stocks. Using data from Cook, among 
others, to locate the resources, the harvesting was rich and relentless. This had 
disastrous results for some Southern Ocean species of fur and elephant seals. By 
1830 their colonies were almost wiped out and the harvesters turned to the more 
dificult and dangerous pursuit of the great whales (Quigg 1983:9). They also turned 
their atention to penguins, milions of which colonized the sub-Antarctic islands. 
Penguins were slaughtered en masse for their oil. While the mid-19th century period 
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represented a relative hiatus in Antarctic continental exploration, much activity was 
occurring in the Southern Ocean at this time. From about 1871 on, sealing resumed in 
response to the partial recovery of the seal stocks depleted forty years earlier. 
A shore-based Antarctic whaling station was established in 1904 at Grytviken on the 
island of South Georgia by a Norwegian Antarctic explorer, C A Larsen, and was 
funded by Argentinian capital (Walton 1987:26). The first attempt to regulate the 
whaling industry was made in 1906 when the British Governor of the Falldand 
Islands (with responsibility for South Georgia) issued The Whale Fishery Ordinance 
(1906) laying down rules for commercial exploitation (Walton 1987:26). Harvesters 
were required to hold licenses and to respect both quotas and designated fishing areas 
(Hall 1986:17). 
As the fishery expanded within the region, the British were compelled to formally lay 
claim to their Antarctic territory and to constitute the Falkland Island Dependencies 
(FTD) (Hall 1986:17). The FTD thus incorporated the rich sealing and whaling 
grounds off South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands and the South 
Sandwich Islands, along with the northern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, Graham 
Land (Hall 1986:13). The original definition of the FTD was amended in 1917 to 
expand the British claim into an Antarctic continental sector extending south to the 
Pole (Hall 1986:14). 
The Argentinian presence at Grytviken from 1904, the Chilean presence at Deception 
Island in the South Shetlands from 1906 and the omnipresence of the Norwegians 131 
stimulated and underpinned the British sovereignty claims (Hall 1986:15-16). An 
official Norwegian inquiry regarding British intentions in the region prompted the 
British to formally annex their sub-Antarctic and Antarctic territory. This was done 
essentially to protect British economic resources: the rent from licences, an expanded 
investment in the industry by British capital, and the industry's primary products, 
especially whale oil (Hall 1986:15-16). 
Without presenting an expansive history of whaling,in the Southern Ocean, which has 
been well documented elsewhere, 132 suffice to say that massive exploitation 
occurred, facilitated by the slip ramp, the development of steam and diesel-driven 
catchers, factory ships and the explosive harpoon gun. 
It is interesting to note the involvement of a Norwegian scientist, J A MOrch, at this 
time. Morch urged the British to tighten up 'a scandalous waste of raw 
material' by not issuing whaling licences to any company without first gaining their 
assurance that they would use the whole carcass instead of just extracting the blubber 
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oil (Walton 1987:26). The British accepted this proposal and all licences issued from 
October 1909 onwards contained such a requirement (Walton 1987:28). Initiating the 
collection of catch data is also credited to Mach. Canvassing the British Museum of 
Natural History in 1910, he sought an obligation on whalers to record information in 
log books on the number of whales taken, species, sex, the gravidity of females, 
weather conditions and the presence of plankton. Mach also suggested that charts 
should be annotated with distribution characteristics and furthermore, that a portion of 
the rent from the licences be set aside to fund scientific investigation (Walton 
1987:28). The British endorsed all of Mach's ideas and the subsequent RRS 
Discovery and the William Scoresby scientific voyages were funded in this way. 
While this was not necessarily the first evidence of the influence of science, which 
was a primary motivation in the heroic age of exploration too, it was possibly the first 
instance of a measure of species protection prompted by scientific concern. 
Antarctic whaling proved to be a double-edged sword. It did, in fact, facilitate a large 
amount of scientific information on marine biology (including birds and seals), 
weather conditions, ice characteristics and transport in the Southern Ocean. Because 
whaling was initially an extremely lucrative business, tax receipts funded many early 
scientific investigations and industry vessels transported expeditioners around the 
region. But like sealing, the whaling industry was self-defeating. Whale stocks 
declined rapidly and despite the negotiation of an International Convention on Whaling 
in 1937 which subsequently proposed, among other constraints, quotas and inspection 
procedures, this destructive trend seemed irreversible. A Whaling Commission was 
established in 1946, but it had little immediate effect. The last shore-based whaling 
station on South Georgia was closed, due to lack of whales, in 1965, but it was not 
until 1982 that the Commission announced its intention to prohibit commercial 
whaling four years hence. In the meantime, many species of whales were harvested 
dangerously close to extinction. The great whales are now protected in the Southern 
Ocean Whale Sanctuary, negotiated by the IWC in Mexico in May 1994. 
In a way the tragic consequences of this early unfettered marine harvesting were the 
conduit to recognition of the economic value of polar marine sciences, and led to 
several attempts to regulate the harvesting.I 33 It was acknowledged that this kind of 
artificial disruption to the balance of the Antarctic marine ecosystem had the potential 
to effect the fecundity of other species in the food chain. By removing the large 
species of prey,I 34 the food chain is altered in favour of other species and may modify 
the population characteristics of a number of associated and dependent species. It was 
also acknowledged that the exploitation of marine stock such as krill from the lower 
end of the food chain may also have unknown consequences (Quigg 1983:77). In 
fact, the interdependence between the elements of the Antarctic marine ecosystem is a 
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subject which occupies significant scientific enquiry today, simply because too litle is 
known about it. 
As stated earlier, many of the adventurous expeditions of the 19th century were 
science-oriented, and science has provided a continuous impetus to Antarctic activity 
up to the present time. 
2.4.3 	 Scientific Endeavour 
Most notable among the early scientific endeavours are the voyages of Belingshausen 
(representing Russia), Wilkes (US), Dumont d'Urvile (France) and James Clark 
Ross (Britain). Retrospectively, their scientific exploits are seen as important and in 
some respects as seting the tone of things to come (Walton: 1987:8). Beter prepared 
expeditions, beter ships and charts and the application of Arctic experience al 
combined to make Antarctic exploration valuable in contemporary scientific terms. 
It must be noted that the value of international cooperation in Antarctic science, which 
is the keystone of scientific endeavour generaly today, was recognised as early as the 
middle of the 19th century. Commander Mathew Fontaine Maury, head of the US 
Naval Observatory and Hydrographical Ofice, frustrated by the inadequacy of 
Southern Ocean data, proposed in 1861 an 'international cost-sharing 
assault on Antarctica' (Quigg 1983:16). The United States, Austria, France, 
Britain, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Russia were to be involved and 
although this ofer was never taken up, Maury's notion indirectly led to the famous 
British HMS Chalenger oceanographic expedition of 1874. 
The Antarctic was also the subject of limited scientific focus during the First 
International Polar Year of 1882-83, when three stations were established in the 
southern hemisphere, one of which was on South Georgia. A much higher profile 
was achieved during the Second Polar Year of 1932-33, when 44 nations took part in 
polar observations. But World War 1 neutralised many of the achievements of this 
occasion because records were lost or never writen up. It was therefore decided to 
hold another - the International Geophysical Year (IGY), beginning in 1957 (Walton 
1987:32). In the interim, the Discovery voyages 1925 - 1939 (Discovery I from 
1929) and 1950- 51, represent perhaps the most comprehensive marine science 
investigations of the time. 
The International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) was in favour of the proposed 
third international year and established the Comite Speziale de l'Annee Geophysique 
Internationale (CSAGI) to coordinate programming and participation. The Antarctic, 
by virtue of the paucity of existing scientific information, was singled out for special 
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treatment, as was outer space. In 1955 the Soviet Union registered its intention to 
participate in the Antarctic programs of the IGY and then, in 1957, launched its first 
Sputnik spacecraft (Quigg 1983:47). These activities by the Soviets caused 
significant concern throughout the scientific community, however CSAGI managed to 
'depoliticize' science in this instance, despite the undercurrents of disputes between 
the US and the Soviet Union, and between Britain, Chile and Argentina, not to 
mention global politics in general (Hall 1994:Ch.5). 
The ensuing 18 months of data collection from July 1957 to December 1958 by 
12,000 scientists from 67 nations generated a total of 48 volumes and a collection of 
scientific papers the number of which is unknown (Walton 1987:34; Quigg 1983:47). 
This was quite an achievement considering the placement of the IGY within the Cold 
War power struggle and is testament to the conflict resolution and confidence building 
skills of the national scientific entrepreneurs. 
One commentator, in fact, has suggested that the success of the IGY might in part be 
due to the fact that scientists, not governments, were the negotiators and set the 
programmes and sites (Quigg 1983:48). It will be shown later that, prior to the IGY, 
the governments with an interest in the Antarctic had tried and failed to come to 
agreement on the administration of this valuable polar laboratory. Thus in many 
respects the success of the IGY in purely functional terms provided the kind of 
stimulus the policy-makers needed to begin negotiating a solution to the problem of 
Antarctic administration. The fact that the placement of scientific stations 
recommended by CSAGI was accepted by the participating nations exemplifies their 
willingness to cooperate during the IGY. The US, for example, were located by 
CSAGI at the South Pole, and the Soviets who had originally wanted that site, 
deferred and attempted to establish bases elsewhere (Quigg 1983:48). 
The nature of science programs during the IGY, encompassing 14 different fields of 
inquiry, was also left to the province of CSAGI. A Special Committee on Antarctic 
Research (SCAR) 135 was formed in 1957 on the initiative of the United States to 
coordinate the extended post-IGY activities (Walton 1987:58). In one sense the 
establishment of SCAR could be regarded as tangible evidence of a science-driven, 
confidence-building, international cooperative effort manage the Antarctic for the 
benefit of all humans. 
The relationship between the Soviets and the Americans demonstrates the scientific 
priority of the IGY, particularly since both countries, along with other participants, 
freely exchanged their scientific personnel and data. The post World-War II Cold-War 
tensions were superficially seen as secondary to the pursuit of scientific 
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information.136 Both the US and the Soviets played an enhanced role, as their global 
status demanded, with each having one of the principal IGY data centres on its soil 
(there were three in total). And further, the Soviets, despite atracting the disdain of 
the scientific community, caried out extensive mapping projects thought too 
controversial to be supported by CSAGI because of military and political 
connotations. The Americans, it appears, did not conduct similar studies because of 
budgetary restraints. The Soviets also announced at this time their intention to study 
Antarctic mineral resource potential (Quigg 1983:48). 
Alongside the major players whose nationals had discovered and explored parts of the 
continent, the Republic of South Africa entered Antarctic afairs at the time of the IGY. 
South Africa continued and expanded its operations in its sub-Antarctic teritories of 
Marion and Prince Edward Islands and occupied the British meteorological station at 
Gough Island. Thus by the end of the IGY, the 12 nations which were to become the 
founding members of the Antarctic Treaty had established a profile in Antarctic 
exploration, science and resource exploitation. 
To assert that the Antarctic was anything greater than a marginal or peripheral area of 
international concern prior to the IGY is to over-emphasise the profile of the southern 
polar region at that time in the mind of the international community. With two world 
wars, global depression and innumerable outbreaks of regional hostilities to contend 
with, the Antarctic was only a relatively minor area of concern in the strategy of the 
pursuit of global peace and harmony. However, this does not detract from the 
importance placed on the Antarctic by a few powers central to polar afairs. Nor does 
it detract from the extraordinary levels of cooperation reached during the so-caled 
depoliticised IGY. 
It is incomplete, however, to represent the IGY as simply one huge cooperative 
scientific expedition unrelated to or unafected by other political machinations. 
Consideration of the underlying state security concerns, pre-Antarctic Treaty, is 
important to an understanding of the political emotions which led to the formation of 
that historic accord. 
2.4.4 	 Security Concerns 
One of the major security considerations in the period before the Antarctic Treaty was 
the atitude of the Soviet Union. They had participated in the IGY, despite atempts to 
exclude them. They had also signaled, in 1957, their intention to continue and 
expand their Antarctic activities post-IGY, which one commentator noted may have 
been a stimulus towards the establishment of SCAR (Hal 1994:111-12). While other 
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participating nations were initially reluctant for fmancial reasons to extend their IGY 
activities, the Soviet announcement led them to review their decisions. Security 
concerns did not begin at this time, however. It has been identified that they had, in 
fact, surfaced more than thirty years before the IGY. 
The discovery of a use for whale oil as a component of glycerine used in explosives 
was a major coup for the British which held power over the Antarctic whaling grounds 
and thus a strategic advantage during World War I (Hall 1986:27). Obviously those 
whaling grounds required Imperial sanction to both protect and expand investment, as 
the British actions in claiming territory during the first two decades of the 20th century 
witnessed. 
In 1924 the United States publicized its policy with regard to the nature of claims to 
Antarctic territory. In the light of British and French claims, the US Secretary of 
State, Charles Hughes, in a communication to the Norwegians, stated that mere 
discovery and taking possession of Antarctic territory: '...would afford frail 
support for a reasonable claim to sovereignty-unless the discovery 
is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country' 
(Hughes, quoted in Hall 1989:137). Essentially the US felt it was not in a position to 
either make claims to Antarctic territory, or to acknowledge the claims made by others 
(Hall 1989:137). This attitude, embodied in what has become known as the 'Hughes 
Doctrine', might explain why the United States did not formally endorse those claims 
made by its early explorers (as noted above). Interestingly, the US attitude was not 
affected by international legal precedents which were to follow. 
The cases of the Island of Palmas, 137 Clipperton Island 138 and the Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland139 provided precedents regarding sovereignty over territory by 
establishing, among other things, a definition of the concept of effective 
occupation. 140 The principal opinions of these judgments were that territory, having 
been acknowledged terra nullius (that is, owned by no-one) was thus susceptible to 
occupation. For that occupation to be effective, per se, there must be displayed on the 
partofthesovereign,both'...the intention and the will to act as 
sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority' 
(Dixon & McCorquodale 1991:232). Although the climate and isolation of Antarctica 
were not conducive to the growth of settlements and population, it was still 
theoretically possible, in the context of these cases, to exhibit effective occupation 
through the siting and staffing of scientific bases and the conduct of scientific activity. 
On an entirely different plane, several factors pointed to the perception that the 
Antarctic might be used as a base against the southern hemisphere dependencies of 
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Britain (Hall 1986:28). There was speculation about the strategic importance of Drake 
Passage, the shipping route between the tip of South America and the Antarctic 
Peninsula. The Panama Canal, which was opened in 1914, was considered 
vulnerable to enemy activity and thus Cape Horn and Drake Passage were seen as a 
vital alternative Pacific-Atlantic link which must be secured in times of tension (Hall 
1986:23; Beck 1986b:32). It was also known that German naval vessels were 
cruising the Southern Ocean during the Second World War. The proximity of 
Antarctica to the southern colonies of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the 
Falldand Islands presented a potential challenge to the British Empire by the Germans 
(Hall 1986:28). Accordingly in 1944 the British initiated a secret naval expedition, 
Operation Tabarin, to assert an Antarctic presence. 
The move was prompted in part by the establishment of the US Antarctic Service 
(1939) and the announcement of the claims to Antarctic Territory by both Chile (1940) 
and Argentina (1943, amended 1946), which overlapped with each other's claims and 
with the British claim. The pre-existing Anglo-Argentine dispute over the FID 141 , 
particularly South Georgia, added to the tension, as the British suspected that the 
Argentinians intended to assert title over the whole of the Dependencies (Beck 
1986b:32). This was happening at a time when the US had publicly voiced its 
concern over the notion of effective occupation and had articulated its open door policy 
(Beck 1986b:31). The door to the Antarctic was, presumably, open as well (Hall 
1989:139). The war-time allegiance of Argentina with Germany and the German 
activity against British-financed Norwegian whalers added to Britain's security 
concerns. 
Operation Tabarin established scientific bases on the ice and thus became a 
demonstration of the intent and will of the British to act as sovereign in relation to its 
Antarctic territory - sending a clear signal to any intruders (Beck 1986b:32). 
Operation Tabarin was decommissioned after the end of World War II into a civilian 
organisation - the Falkland Island Dependencies' Survey (FliDS) and was later 
renamed the British Antarctic Survey (BAS). 
There followed a period of intense interest in the region by the United States. Its 
Operations Highjump (1946-47) and Windmill (1947-48) were large-scale scientific 
expeditions during which barely disguised military training exercises were conducted. 
The training was considered as essential polar experience and there is no doubt that the 
North Americans had the Arctic in mind in this context, but because of the proximity 
to the Soviet Union, it was prudent to shift the venue to the southern polar region. 
Furthermore, manifestations of Cold War tensions had seeped into Antarctic 
endeavours (Hall 1994:68). Despite United States activity during these two 
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Operations and speculation of a claim being imminent, still no formal claims to 
Antarctic territory were made by them (Hall 1994:68-69). 
Both Chile and Argentina increased their presence in the Antarctic post-World War H. 
Tense political relations between them and Britain led to Britain seeking a solution in 
the International Court of Justice in 1947 and again in 1955. 142 Not surprisingly, the 
South Americans presented a united front against Britain by both refusing to accept the 
Court's jurisdiction (which was their right) and by reaching a bilateral agreement 
asserting their sovereignty (albeit with unspecified national boundaries) over and 
above that of Britain, in the disputed areas (Beck 1986b:35-6). A number of volatile 
disputes between the three were dealt with by diplomatic means, which produced 
nothing better than stand-off results. But there was little doubt that the rivalry was 
fuelled by sovereignty and security issues, with the pursuit of scientific information 
being invoked to legitimate any presence on the ice (Beck 1986b; Hall 1986, 1994). 
The United States found itself in an ambiguous and compromising position. It was 
allied to the British through NATO and to the South Americans through the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947. 143 The dilemma was that the Rio 
Treaty, a 20-nation agreement on pan-American security, obliged the US to assist any 
American state against an aggressor (Article 3). The area of application of the Rio 
Treaty included that part of the Antarctic where the British, Chilean and Argentinian 
claims overlapped. It was entirely possible, therefore, that the South Americans could 
invoke the Rio Treaty against Britain as an 'aggressor' in their Antarctic jurisdiction. 
Accordingly the US made reservation to the Treaty's effect upon the status of 
sovereignty in the Security Zone (which contained these disputed Antarctic territories) 
thereby distancing itself from any possible conflict of allegiance. 
US ambivalence towards the problem of whether or not to claim Antarctic territory 
was thus understandable. One argument against making a claim was that it would 
inevitably bring them into conflict with other claimants: the appropriate territory for a 
US claim had already been seized, and what was left - the unclaimed sector - was not 
coveted because of its inaccessibility and unattractiveness in material terms (Beck 
1986b:39). On the other hand, it was thought that a US claim would both satisfy 
domestic wishes and perhaps more importantly, preempt any Soviet claim (Beck 
1986b:39). 
This was a difficult time for all Antarctic stakeholders or potential stakeholders. 
There were seven states already claiming territory: Argentina, Australia, Britain, 
Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway. Australia, Britain and New Zealand had 
formally recognized each other's claims, along with recognizing the French and 
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Norwegian claims. In return, both France and Norway acknowledged the Australian 
claim. Chile and Argentina stood united against the overlapping British claim, despite 
the fact that their claims overlapped with each other's as wel. By this stage Japan too 
had expressed its interest in and rights to Antarctic teritory. The Soviets had reserved 
their opinion about the status of claims, and the US, by virtue of the Hughes Doctrine, 
had rejected al extant claims, reserving its right in the process (Hal 1994:62). In 
short, the whole sovereignty question had become a problem to which no solution 
seemed immediately forthcoming. 
In the context of regime formation, many of the stakeholders had fairly distinctive 
Antarctic administrations placed within the ambit of their national scientific 
programmes. Building upon the framework of discovery, exploration and the pursuit 
of science, the stakeholders had legitimate interests in the future of the Antarctic. 
Furthermore, a problem existed which was a common concern to al parties. But how 
to solve the problem became, in fact, part of the problem because of the complex 
alegiances between the United States and Britain, and between the United States, 
Chile and Argentina. The insistence by the Soviets of participation in Antarctic afairs 
underlined the whole issue. It is important to note that during this period no explicit 
environmental concerns were raised by any nation, despite scientific evidence of the 
vulnerability of the polar ecosystem. 
2.5 	 Antarctic Sovereignty: a modus vivendi 
How was the Antarctic problem solved, or rather, was it solved at al? There were 
three proposals made during 1947 and 1948 to resolve the international discord 
emanating from the issue of Antarctic sovereignty.'" The first two atempts were 
unsuccessful, for a variety of reasons, but the third became the foundation upon which 
the Antarctic Treaty was built. 
In the first atempt, the United States initialy proposed the internationalization of the 
Antarctic through something like a UN Trusteeship, but Britain opposed this on the 
grounds that it would necessarily permit Soviet participation. The British prefered a 
planned administration by an 8-nation condominium, which would necessarily exclude 
the Soviet Union but include the United States as the eighth stakeholder (the other 
seven being the claimant nations). The US was persuaded to adopt the condominium 
proposal in principle, however neither suggestion gained the support of al other 
Antarctic nations, to some degree because of a desire to keep the Soviet Union, for 
security reasons, and the United Nations, generaly, out of the Antarctic (Beck 
1986b:39-40; Hal 1994:Ch.4). US foreign policy was stil stridently anti-Soviet: 
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occasion should be given to the Soviet Union to participate in 
an Antarctic settlement or administration-'malifurtherjhattRiactions 
ShOUkr_forestall any Soviet attempt to become a territorial 
claimant' (Beck 1986b:40). Conversely, the Australians could see no reason why 
internationalization was necessary at all, preferring instead to retain the status quo 
(Hall 1994:120-21). There is evidence to suggest that the United States was 
operating in close liaison with its NATO ally, Britain, during this time (Hall 1994:71- 
7). However, it was Chile which proposed the third solution - a modus vivendi . 
Chile's unilateral Escudero Declaration of July 1948 sought a 5 or 10 year suspension 
of claims and rights in the interests of the pursuit of science. The Declaration also 
proposed that the area of application be south of 60° South; that scientific information 
be exchanged; that freedom of scientific research prevail and that a consultative 
committee be established (Beck 1986b:40; Hall 1994:81, 86). 
Learning of the Chilean modus vivendi, South Africa and Belgium both made 
representations to the US government in 1948 for the right to participate in any 
negotiations towards a solution to the Antarctic problem on the basis of their interests 
in the region (Hall 1994:83). However, outright rejection of internationalization by 
the Argentinians, this counter-proposal by the Chileans and scepticism from Britain, 
France, Norway and Australia delayed commencement of any dedicated negotiations. 
Ironically, it may have been the Soviet Union which propelled the issue towards the 
seemingly inevitable conclusion of an Antarctic conference. In 1950 the Soviets 
countered US enmity with a public declaration that it was opposed to attempts to 
exclude it from any Antarctic regime, firmly asserting that they could not: 
'...recognise as lawful any decision on the Antarctic regime taken 
without its participation' (Beck 1986b:40). 
An interesting nexus can be drawn here between Arctic and Antarctic affairs. Beck 
noted: 
For some Antarctic powers - most notably Norway, the UK and the 
USA - Soviet moves possessed Arctic implications, such as on 
account of the long-standing tendency to interpret legal and 
other inter-connections between the two polar regions. 145 
As evidence of this, a 1948 US policy paper recommended that the successful 
conclusion to the internationalization proposal should be accompanied by an official 
US claim to Antarctic territory. This was justified on the basis of discovery and 
exploration and was designed to preempt any possible Soviet claim to the hitherto 
unclaimed Pacific sector. It was argued at the time that the Soviets were not likely to 
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make an Antarctic claim on the strength of Bellingshausen's alleged first sighting 
because such a move would have implications for the Arctic. The irony was that 
Soviet Union claimed sovereignty over islands in the Arctic to which it applied the 
sector principle but over which other nations would have similar claims on the basis of 
discovery and exploration. 146 
The Soviet declaration about participation subsequently brought France onside (with 
the proviso that its sovereign claim was not compromised) but had the effect of further 
alienating both Chile and Argentina. At the same time it placed the United States in the 
invidious position of equality with the Soviet Union: neither had the status of 
claimants to Antarctic territory, but neither would allow the negotiation of a solution to 
the Antarctic problem to proceed without their participation. 
During the decade of the 1950s tensions between Britain, Chile and Argentina 
concerning their overlapping territorial claims continued to escalate. However with all 
of the Antarctic states diverging in their support for either one proposal or another, 
achieving a level of international cooperation with a corresponding element of 
consensus over the issue which would be conducive to regime formation, was proving 
to be a difficult task. While there was recognition of the problem (that is, the status of 
territorial claims, the security dimension, and their common effects) states quite rightly 
were unwilling to forego domestic interest for the sake of international cooperation. 
After all, apart from science and marine resources, what else did the Antarctic have to 
offer? The low international profile of the Antarctic problem during the early 1950s, 
despite the ongoing Anglo-Chilean-Argentinian conflict, might also be attributed to the 
intervention of the Korean War in the foreign affairs priorities of both Britain and the 
United States. 
In essence, the most salient features of the Antarctic problem were: i) the desire to 
exclude the Soviet Union from the Antarctic for security reasons; ii) the desire to 
safeguard both claims to territory and the elitist position of the claimant nations; iii) 
the non-claimant status of both the Soviet Union and the United States; iv) the Anglo-
Chilean-Argentinian stalemate; and v) the prominent role of the United States in 
seeking a solution to these problems. The impasse was eased by the International 
Geophysical Year of 1957-58. 
The success of the IGY in terms of cooperative scientific programs must have had 
some influence on the decision of the Antarctic stakeholders to meet at the conference 
table. As a confidence building measure, the IGY was unparalleled given the 
prevailing political circumstances of the time. It was thus in a climate of international 
cooperative scientific effort, international security concerns, the American open door 
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and obvious anti-Soviet policies and the Soviet recalcitrance that the negotiation of the 
Antarctic Treaty was placed. 
It is known that the Eisenhower administration reviewed US Antarctic policy in 1954, 
prior to the IGY, and resolved to reassert its rights in the Antarctic at an appropriate 
time; to seek a resolution with Britain, New Zealand, Australia, France, Norway, 
Argentina and Chile to conflicting claims; and to pursue an international remedy to 
reduce friction and solve territorial problems (Hall 1994:119-120). No multilateral 
discussions were forthcoming at this time. However, notice of the intention of the 
Soviets to actively participate in the IGY became a cause for concern, not only for the 
United States but also for Australia, Britain, South Africa and New Zealand. 147 
Secret, informal discussions were held in 1957 between the United States, Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand. The participants canvassed a range of options for an 
international regime to administer the Antarctic, including the condominium proposal. 
It is known that at this time the US was still procrastinating over making a territorial 
claim (Hall 1994:129). It is also known that official US policy included in its 
objectives provision for the equitable exploration and exploitation of Antarctica's 
natural resources (Hall 1994:132). But there was no mention made of environmental 
considerations. A decision was taken to postpone formal negotiations until after the 
IGY had ended and after the conclusion of Argentinian elections in early 1958. 
The pre Antarctic Treaty history has been investigated extensively by, among others, 
Plott (1969) and Hall (1986, 1994). The studies have demonstrated that the process 
of getting to the conference table was driven by a prolonged diplomatic paperchase 
between the interested parties. The complex range of motives and objectives 
articulated by the various governments was further complicated by domestic politics, 
particularly between the internal departments of the United States government. Keen 
to capitalise on the positive precedent of international cooperation during the JOY, US 
President Eisenhower finally invited the other 11 Antarctic nations to participate in a 
conference on the Antarctic (Hall 1994:153). The conference was described by 
Secretary of State, John Dulles, as intending to: 
_establish in Antarctica an international regime which will 
prevent the monopolizing of any part of this new continent for 
the military purposes of any nation but assure an 'open door' 
for the peaceful pursuits of all mankind. 
(Dulles quoted in Hall 1989:111) 
Representatives of the 12 nations historically most active and interested in Antarctic 
affairs — the US, Soviet Union, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, South 
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Africa, Norway, Chile, Argentina, France and Japan — met at the conference table in 
Washington in October 1959. The inclusion of the Soviet Union was a contentious 
issue, but prudence prevailed and it was eventualy agreed that to exclude them would 
have been politicaly unsound, given their position as a world power (Hal 1994:127). 
Thus years of closed diplomatic dialogue folowed by nearly 18 months of preparatory 
meetings (60 in total) finaly brought order and a widely acceptable agenda to the 
Conference. 
After lengthy and spirited negotiation lasting six and a half weeks, the Antarctic 
Treaty, embracing the essence of the Escudero Declaration, was signed on 1 December 
1959 (Appendix 1). At the very least, the Treaty was a 'framework for effective 
international cooperation in Antarctica' (Parsons 1987:6) and at best, a 
remarkable example of international diplomacy and cooperation in extremely tense and 
volatile political circumstances. 
2.6 	 Conclusions 
Investigation of Antarctic regime formation usualy centres on three aspects: science, 
security and sovereignty. How much the pursuit of scientific curiosity butressed the 
ability of the states to cooperate on the formulation of the Treaty is a subject of much 
debate. Scientific commentators tend to focus on the provisions within the Treaty for 
scientific freedom in support of their argument (Walton 1987). How virulent the 
security concerns were is also debatable; political historians are likely to focus on the 
demilitarisation aspects (Beck 1986b) and Soviet containment (Hal 1994) of the 
Treaty. Legal commentators predictably focus on the unique and ambiguous treatment 
of sovereignty issues. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, which wil be discussed in 
more detail later in this work, has been remarkably efective in facilitating international 
cooperation despite claims to sovereignty (Triggs 1986, 1987). Regardless of the 
supremacy of any one notion over the others, it is certainly a great irony that a 
rudimentary accord born out of enmity, suspicion, hegemonic aspirations, domestic 
political complexities and colonial expansionism could have endured for 35 years. 
Investigation into the nature of ecosystem management of the Antarctic, pursuant to 
the Antarctic Treaty and its atendant legal instruments, wil continue in Chapter 3. 
Meanwhile, this study turns to the northern polar region, to identify the salient features 
of its geopolitical history. 
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2.7 	 The Geopolitics of The Arctic 
The Arctic has been in the spotlight of international politics since the end of World 
War 11 because of the strategic proximity of the teritories of the former USSR and the 
United States. But with the end of the Cold War having been proclaimed, Arctic 
afairs have begun to take on a new, more cooperative hue. The hegemonic 'East-
West' competition which subsumed al other activities and efectively constrained the 
development of pan-Arctic (and international) relations no longer manifests itself quite 
so boldly. Bilateral arms reductions, coupled with a lessening of tension between the 
US and Russia, are expected to change the strategic nature of the Arctic from that of a 
potential theatre for war, to one of a less-threatening nature.148 In addition, there is 
mounting evidence of the re-emergence of regionalism, based historicaly on close 
cultural, political and economic ties within parts of the Arctic. 149 
To the untrained analyst it appears that the complex inter-state and regional aliances, 
which wil be described below, have in large measure been dictated by political 
expediency in the context of regional, national, state, international and more recently, 
European Community considerations. Pursuing independent foreign policies could 
not have been a simple mater for the Arctic states in the four decades post-World War 
I. While Canada and the US are typicaly Western alies, they have had major 
diferences of opinion and policy regarding such issues as sovereignty and 
transboundary polution. This is exemplified by their continuing disputes regarding 
the right of passage of US surface vessels through what the Canadians claim as their 
historic internal waters150 and the groundbreaking unilateral declaration of the 
Canadian Arctic Waters Polution Prevention Act151 and the Trail Smelter Case.152 
Furthermore, the Nordic countries, while aligned on some maters, naturaly act 
unilateraly on others. Norway and Iceland are both NATO alies, yet Sweden has 
remained neutral outside NATO, and Finland has held Russian atention for the most 
part at arms-length while also managing to retain its neutrality. Furthermore the issue 
of European Union has been fought along purely nationalistic lines. 
It is in the northern reaches of the Nordic countries that regionalism can most readily 
be identified. It is occuring in several spheres: i) at the intra-state level, where a 
specific geographical area necessitates political diferentiation; 	 at the trans-state 
level, where interaction occurs between adjacent areas separated by state borders; and 
ii) at the inter-state level, where common features are conducive to some 
integration. 153 
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Geopoliticaly the Arctic is characterised largely, though not exclusively, by extremely 
low population density consisting primarily of composites of indigenous groups and 
regional immigrants to the peripheral northern areas of the Arctic states. The major 
political and economic centres are usualy outside the region, hence direction and 
change in Arctic politics has been dictated to a very great degree by forces external to 
the Arctic per se (Lyck 1991). The recent Canadian experience does not fit neatly 
into this scenario, however, as the Canadians work towards a greater degree of 
autonomy for their Arctic indigenous groups. The chalenge of the Canadian Federal 
Government in meeting its legal and moral obligations to its aboriginal (Inuit) 
communities is slowly and progressively being fulfiled. Through the declarations of 
teritorial governments of Inuvialuit (in 1984) and Nunavut (in 1992, to come into 
force by 1999), a significant measure of self-government for the Inuit has been 
achieved. 154 
The major stakeholders in Arctic afairs are the governments - state, regional and 
municipal; indigenous populations; scientists; industry and environmentalists. 
Peripheral stakeholders include countries outside the region with specific Arctic 
interests such as scientific research and resource exploitation. Arctic political conflict 
commonly involves dichotomies of interest between two or more of these stakeholders 
and is characterised by multifaceted cleavages like cross-cultural, cross-political and 
fundamental diferences between core values (Osherenko & Young 1989:Ch.6). 
To begin this study of the contemporary geopolitics of the Arctic, it is useful to give a 
brief factual account of each of the Arctic sovereign states. 
2.8 	 The Sovereign Stakeholders 
The Arctic comprises eight sovereign states with teritory or interests traditionaly 
considered Arctic.15 In the context of this work, these states, plus a range other 
interested states and groups, are colectively termed stakeholders, that is, they can 
show material, economic or other interests in the past, present and future directions of 
the Arctic as a region.156 
2.8.1 	 Canada 
The Canadian Arctic comprises the area known as the North West Teritories 
(including the vast island groups to the north, Inuvialuit and Nunavut) and the 
northernmost part of the Yukon Teritory. The southern boundary coresponds fairly 
closely to both the tree line and the area of continuous permafrost. In the east this 
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extends wel below the Arctic Circle to the western shore of Hudson Bay in Manitoba 
Province, the eastern shore of Quebec and the eastern coastal region of 
Newfoundland. This Arctic area comprises the native cultural region described as 
'Arctic' and coresponds with the Inuktitut-speaking family areas of the 'Eskimo-
Aleut'. These people are known as 'Inuit' in oficial Canadian terminology.157 
Localy-produced maps show the margins of the Canadian Arctic extending to the 
North Pole. They show Canada's western boundary extending north in a straight line 
from the border between the Yukon Teritory and Alaska (US) to the Pole. The 
eastern margin, on the other hand, is straight from the Pole to about 88° North, then 
meanders south, equidistant between Canada and Greenland through Nares Strait, 
Bafin Bay and Davis Strait. The line south from the top of Elesmere Island is not 
described as an international demarcation, therefore it may not represent the application 
of the sector principle.I58 
Canada has a population of just over 28 milion, 77% of whom live in urban areas. 
Only 1.5% of the total are of aboriginal origin according to a 1986 Census, and the 
population density of the Arctic teritories is les than 0.05 persons per square 
kilometre (SBS 1994). 
Canada is a federation with a ruling Liberal Government based in Otawa. Regional 
self-government is vested in the twelve provincial parliaments through a constitution. 
Canada is a member of the United Nations. 
2.8.2 	 The United States 
The United States is a relatively smal stakeholder in the Arctic in physical terms, with 
only about one-third of the US state of Alaska situated north of the Arctic Circle. The 
US Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 defines US Arctic teritory as: 
All territory north of the Arctic Circle and...north and west of 
the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon and Kuskokwim 
Rivers; all continuous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the 
Beaufort, Bering and Chukchi Seas; and the Aleutian chain. 
(Friedheim 1988:496) 
Actual US teritory is relatively smal compared to that of Rusia and Canada, 
consequently the US must rely on the benevolence of other Arctic states, especialy 
Canada, Greenland and its NATO alies, to support their Arctic strategic policies 
(Young 1992). 
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The US Arctic comprises two distinct indigenous populations - Indian (Athapaskan) 
and Eskimo (primarily Inupiat). The later are known as the 'Alaska Eskimo' in 
oficial Alaskan terminology (Government of US 1992a:5). 
Alaska is the largest of the US states, covering over 1.5 milion square kilometres, yet 
has the third lowest population. Washington, D.C., the US capital, is on the eastern 
side of the continent several thousand kilometers south of the state of Alaska and the 
US Arctic teritory. 
The US has a presidential democratic government comprising a senate and house of 
representatives. The sovereign integrity of the 50 regional (state) governments is 
protected under the Constitution. The United States is a permanent member of the 
United Nations Security Council. 
2.8.3 	 The Russian Federation 
Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Rusian Federation has 
asumed the legal position as succesor state.159 It is the only state of the former 
Union with an Arctic border — its 8,000 km long coastline. The former USSR, like 
Canada, had applied the sector principle (see p.108) in delimiting its polar boundaries, 
albeit unoficialy (Shusterich 1984:257). 
The Rusian political machine is in a disturbing state of chaos at the present time and it 
is therefore dificult to provide an accurate and up to the minute account of Rusian 
domestic afairs. More is becoming known about the kind of bureaucracy which 
existed prior to the break-up, however, and it is this information that outside 
governments and researchers must rely upon for analysing and asesing the state of 
afairs in Russia today. For instance, it is known that as a result of the 1991 
constitutional revisions, each Republic claimed control over the management and 
protection of its environment, while unfortunately inheriting the consequences of past 
denial by the Soviet central government of environmental polution and local isues 
(Boston Colege 1992:486). The Russian regions of Magadan, Khabarovsk, 
Kamchatka, Chukotka and the Jewish Autonomous region are members of The 
Northern Forum - a municipal polar council. 
Rusia has a population of nearly 150 milion and its northern regions are home to a 
variety of indigenous people, including Inuit on the eastern fringe and Sami on the 
western fringe. 
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Rusia is a presidential democracy with a federal constitution adopted in December 
1993. It has a bicameral asembly comprising the Federation Council and the State 
Duma. The Federation administers 21 republics, one autonomous region (Jewish 
oblast) and 10 autonomous areas (okrugs). The capital, Moscow, is in the far central 
west. The Rusian Federation inherited the former USSRs position as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council (SBS 1994). 
	
2.8.4 	 Finland 
The Finnish Arctic comprises the Sarni homelands of the districts of Enontekio, Inari, 
Utsjoki and Sodankyla, colectively caled Lapland. Almost al of Finland is above 
60° North. Finland has a population of just over 5 milion, of whom only between 
2000 to 4500 are ethnic Sarni (SBS 1994). 
Finland's principal industries are timber processing and metalurgy. It is a presidential 
democracy with a unicameral asembly (the Eduskunta) and the reigning president is a 
Social Democrat. The capital, Helsinki, is on the south coast. Finland is a member of 
the United Nations. 
2.8.5 	 Norway 
The Norwegian Arctic comprises the counties of Troms, Nordland and Finnmark, the 
island of Jan Mayen and the islands of the Svalbard archipelago over which Norway 
aserts sovereignty through the 1920 Treaty of Spitzbergen. These are the traditional 
homelands of the estimated 20,000 Sarni people. Norway has a total population of 
4.3 milion (SBS 1994). 
Norway is highly industrialised and its main export earnings are derived from 
petroleum, gas, ships, fish and pulp and paper. 
The country is a monarchy with a prime minister and a bicameral asembly (the 
Storting) comprising an upper and lower house. The capital, Oslo, is in the south. 
Norway is a member of the United Nations. 
2.8.6 	 Sweden 
Although Sweden has no Arctic coastline, the northern-most region of the district of 
Norbotens, comprising 15% of the country, is above the Circle. The people who 
live here are also Sarni, related to the Sarni which inhabit areas right acros the top of 
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Scandinavia into western Russia. Sweden has a population of 8.7 milion, of whom 
only 15-17,000 are Sarni. 
Sweden has very rich mineral reserves, including uranium and iron ore, which 
contribute to its lucrative manufacturing sector. 
Sweden is composed of 24 counties under the administration of a parliamentary 
democracy. The monarchy plays a ceremonial role only. It has a unicameral assembly 
(Riksdag) headed by a prime minister. The capital, Stockholm, is in the south-east. 
Sweden is a member of the United Nations. 
	
2.8.7 	 Greenland16° 
Al but a tiny portion of the huge continent of Greenland, which covers nearly 2.2 
milion square kilometres, is above 60° North. A thin coastal fringe representing less 
than 7% of the continent is ice-free. Greenland is a unique Arctic state in the sense 
that it has a Home Rule government under a Danish master. The Danish government 
granted domestic autonomy to Greenland in 1953 but retained control of its foreign 
policy and international relations. Denmark is represented in Greenland by a High 
Commissioner while Greenland itself has a domestic prime minister. 
The US maintains an air base at Thule, at about 76° North on the west coast. Fishing 
is the principal economic activity for Greenland's estimated 58,000 people, the 
majority of whom are Eskimo (Kalaalit). The capital is Nuuk, located in the south 
west. Greenland is represented by Denmark in the United Nations. 
2.8.8 	 Iceland 
Iceland is an active volcanic island which is traditionaly considered an Arctic nation 
although its entire land mass is below the Circle. Its population of 270,000 is 
primarily native Icelandic. 
Iceland is a presidential republic with a prime minister and a bicameral parliament 
(Althing). In 1985 Iceland and its 200 nm exclusive fishing zone were declared to be 
nuclear-free by the Althing. The United States maintains a NATO military base at 
Keflavik, close to the capital, Reykjavik on the southern coast. 
Half of Iceland's GDP and 75% of its export earnings are derived from the fishing 
industry (including whaling). Iceland left the International Whaling Commission and 
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jointly formed a pro-whaling organisation, the North Atlantic Marine Mammals 
Commission, in 1992.161 Iceland is a member of the United Nations. 
As indicated earlier, one of the most obvious characteristics underpinning Arctic inter-
state relations is the presence of the two superpowers, Rusia and the United States, in 
the polar north. The world may never know how close it came to nuclear warfare at 
the height of Cold War. Presumably either nation could have initiated a nuclear atack 
against the other at any time. Presumably also they stil have this capacity. Why this 
has not happened is not so much the isue here. What this study is more concerned 
with is how the tenor of Arctic state relations has been shaped by the fact that the 
Arctic was the strategic theatre for superpower posturing and activity for so long. In 
fact it stil is, in the sense that total demilitarization is both unrealistic and unwise and 
complex aliances stil exist. The geostrategic aliances between the Arctic 8 is further 
discussed at point 2.10. 
The present-day political configuration of the eight Arctic states has an intricate 
historical base. A generalized examination of pan-Arctic history wil help to iluminate 
the development of contemporary politics. 
2 . 9 	 Pan-Arctic History 
By the time Europeans discovered the Arctic, the Inuit and other indigenous groups 
had been in residence for a long time: as early as 7,000 - 10,000 years ago, Palaeo-
Arctic hunter-gatherers wandered throughout, pursuing seasonal migrations of game 
herds and marine mammals.162 The climate was cooler then and the sea level lower; 
the unglaciated lowlands of north-eastern Siberia and the ice-free peninsula of Beringia 
became the heartlands of these nomads.163 The Arctic Smal Tool Tradition 
supposedly ranged acros Siberia, the Canadian Arctic (as the Laurentine Ice Sheet 
disappeared) and into northern Greenland. Separate cultures evolved as the groups 
adapted and specialized according to local conditions. They remained completely 
isolated from the civilized European world, however. 
Then around 300 BC, during an interglacial period, a Greek explorer claimed to have 
sailed to a frozen sea somewhere to the north of Scotland. The Greeks named this 
area after a familiar northern constelation, Arktos (the bear). The region was 
subsequently ignored. 
Just past the apex of the warm interglacial period, around the 10th century, the Thule 
Culture developed. Based on coastal whaling vilages which relied on marine 
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transport, the Thule Culture spread from its origins in the Bering Strait area into 
Canada and Greenland. Today, Eastern Greenlanders and the Inuit of Alaska can 
converse with each other (Sugden 1982:192). 
The Vikings 164 were the most prominent peoples in later Arctic history. They had a 
strong maritime tradition developed when the climate was still relatively warm and 
ship transport was highly sophisticated for the time. These irascible people sailed 
throughout the Scandinavian Arctic and Europe, as far south as the Mediterranean, 
plundering, trading and settling along the way throughout the early Middle Ages. 
The Swedish Vikings, invited by Slavic and Finnish tribes, established the Russian 
state in the 9th century. At the same time Norway became unified under Harald I 
Fairhair in 872, who subsequently established and dismantled colonies at various 
times in various places. Iceland was discovered by Vikings of Norwegian and Celtic 
origin in 860 and was inhabited as early as 874. At the same time the Norse Vikings 
reached the White Sea (Baird 1964:14). Eirik the Red (eventually banished from both 
Norway and Iceland) discovered land to the west of Iceland around 982, calling it 
Greenland in a bid to lure potential colonists. 165 A trading colony was formed there in 
986 and endured for nearly 500 years. Greenland thus had a strong Scandinavian 
culture and in 1261 accepted the sovereignty of Norway; similarly Iceland declared 
allegiance with Norway in 1262 (Sugden 1982:201). However, conflict with the 
native Inuit, climatic changes (the climate was becoming colder) and the reducing 
viability of its tradeable commodities saw the settlements in Greenland abandoned by 
the Norwegians in the middle of the 14th century. In the late 14th century Norway 
was annexed by Denmark and they remained in union until 1814. Vinland, on the 
eastern coast of the North American continent (now Newfoundland), was allegedly 
discovered by the Norwegian Vikings around 1000 AD but for various reasons was 
considered unsuitable for permanent settlement and largely ignored. 
Whaling became a lucrative fair-weather business from the 14th century on in this 
newly-discovered Arctic region. British, Spanish and Dutch whalers were to provide 
valuable oceanographic information for the second wave of interest in the Arctic, 
which spanned the 16th and 17th centuries. 
Europeans began to venture north to find an alternative trade route to Asia, with its 
promise of a haul of rich resources recently discovered by Marco Polo and other 
overlanders. 166 The quest for the north-east passage 167 by the British and Dutch was 
also a strategic move to outflank the Spanish and Portuguese, whose fleets controlled 
the ocean routes of the south. 168 At the same time a north-west passage was sought 
through the northern islands of Canada. 
98 
These times (the 16th and 17th centuries) were characterized by the daring and tragic 
exploits of man against Nature. Names synonymous with the period include the 
British Muscovy Company, Chancellor (who established diplomatic relations with 
Moscow), Frobisher (who rediscovered Greenland), Brunel (a Dutchman who 
reached the mouth of the OW River overland), Barents (who rediscovered Svalbard), 
Hudson (who explored Spitzbergen and reported the presence of whales), and Davis 
(who explored the region between Greenland and Baffin Island). Baffin's epic 
journeys of the 17th century achieved the most northerly point of any of these early 
expeditions. 
The privately-sponsored expedition of Hudson and the mutiny by some of his party at 
Hudson Bay in 1610 is one of those famous tales of polar adventure, ingenuity and 
tragedy. In 1670 the Hudson's Bay Company was established under Royal Patronage 
and there began a continuing conflict between the British and the French. French 
explorers, Radisson and Groseillers, had been discouraged by their own government 
and had taken their interest in the resources of the area, especially furs, to the British. 
There was then a relative hiatus in Arctic oceanic exploration for several hundred 
years. 
The history of the spread of the great Russian empire (formerly Muscovy) rested 
largely on the use which was made of her big rivers — including the Lena, Yana, 
Indigirka and Kolyma, as well as the OW in the west. 169 During the reign of Ivan IV 
(Ivan the Terrible) in the late 1500s and through to the middle 1600s, the Arctic 
mouths of these great rivers were reached by Cossacks and Siberian tribes in the 
pursuit of resources for the rich fur trade. From 1581-84 Yermak and his team of 800 
men crossed from the west into eastern Siberia, conquering and building settlements 
along the way. In 1619 the authorities in Moscow closed the fur-trading port of 
Mangazeya, a focal point in easterly travel, thereby protecting Moscow's control over 
its fur resources by effectively freezing out foreign ships (Armstrong 1992:34). In 
the west the Great Northern War was fought from 1700 to 1721 and involved, among 
other actions, incursions into Finland and Sweden by Russia. 
One of the most significant phases of Russian exploration was during the Romanov 
Dynasty, which is generally credited with having Europeanized Russia. 170 Tsar Peter 
I (Peter the Great) established the Great Northern Expedition of 1725 to 1742. With 
Vitus Bering (a Dane) as leader of one group, these journeys consolidated almost the 
whole of the Russian empire from west to east, including what is now the US State of 
Alaska and the Aleutian Islands. 171 The latter two areas became rich whaling and 
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sealing grounds. Because of security restrictions, the results of this Expedition were 
not published for over 200 years (Armstrong 1992:35). 
Baron Wrangel's 1821 sledging journey filled in the missing link (that is, that there 
was no land bridge between the eastern extent of Russia (Chukotka) and Alaska). 
Wrangel's discoveries also proved conclusively that there was indeed a navigable 
north-east passage. During the reign of Peter the Great, Russia supplanted Sweden as 
the great military power of north-east Europe, although it was the Swede, Otto 
Nordenskiold, who finally achieved the north-east passage in 1879, travelling in his 
schooner Vega from Stockholm to the Bering Strait. Roald Amundsen also travelled 
the route in 1918-1920. 
The advent of more sophisticated techniques enabled the achievements of these early 
explorers to be extended. Further exploration of the northern polar seas confirmed 
that no land mass existed inside the Arctic basin. The same zeal that existed in the 
Antarctic in the great race for the pole was also evident in northern polar history. 172 
Englishman William Parry travelled northwards from Spitzbergen in the Hecla, over 
both the ocean and the ice, to reach 82° 45' North (within 800 km of the North Pole) 
in 1827. In 1893, the Norwegian zoologist and oceanographer, Fridtjof Nansen 
conceived his now famous plan to deliberately set his expedition adrift in the pack ice. 
Nansen was inspired by the accidental drift voyage of the Jeanette, commanded by an 
American De Long, a few years earlier. Nansen's Fram completed its novel journey 
in two years. The Fram was later captained by Sverdrup in further polar exploration. 
In 1898, Sverdrup was forced to abort an attempt on the pole and diverted his attention 
to exploring the northern islands in the Canadian archipelago. American Robert 
Peary, after two close but unsuccessful attempts, finally reached the North Pole in 
April 1909. 
Information from the early voyages of Barents, Hudson and others led to a surge in 
whaling and sealing effort by the English, Dutch, Danish, Norwegians, Russians and 
Germans, particularly around Svalbard (Sollie 1989:16). When stocks were severely 
depleted towards the end of the 18th century, the location shifted to waters between 
Greenland and Canada and in Baffin Strait. 
In 1745 the British government offered an award of £20,000 for the discovery of the 
north-west passage. It also offered other financial inducements for outstanding polar 
exploration. But in 1754 war broke out with the French in the Canadian Colony, 
resulting in the fall of Quebec in 1759 and ultimately the defeat of the French and their 
Indian allies. The 1762 Treaty of Fontainbleu ceded all French territory in Canada to 
the British victors. The exploration of the Canadian north then proceeded, but at a less 
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frantic pace than that of the Russians in Siberia. Much of this early venturing was 
sponsored by the Hudson's Bay Company or by independent fur traders based in 
Montreal, in an effort to gain greater access to fur resources. Important discoveries of 
the period included the mouths of the Mackenzie and Coppermine Rivers. 
The British, having been released from the encumbrances of war, continued their 
pursuit of the north-west passage by sea. Three explorers, John Ross, 173 William 
Parry and John Franklin were prominent leaders of voyages which attempted to 
identify possible routes through the north-west passage. This was actually achieved 
by the Norwegian, Roald Amundsen, in 1903-1906 by sea, and in the 1920s by the 
part-Inuit Greenlander, Knud Rasmussen, and his overland expedition. 
There followed an air age of Arctic exploration during which time Amundsen, Byrd 
(the first to successfully fly across the pole), Nobile (an Italian aviator) 174 and the 
Russian Papanin all made great inroads into Arctic aviation and exploration. The 
importance of this early aviation was to confirm the viability of trans-polar 
intercontinental air routes. 
As the ingenuity of the explorers increased, polar exploration became more successful. 
The expeditions began using newly invented equipment and revised techniques based 
on the experiences of those who had gone before them and most importantly, 
incorporating lessons from the indigenous people. This also meant that such amateur 
adventures also became more expensive, and generally required the financial support 
of governments. 
As an aside, it is worth noting that despite the heroism of Arctic explorers, it was 
neither an easy nor comfortable transition from their points of departure far to the 
south. Like in the Antarctic, humans were essentially aliens in this environment, with 
the exception of the indigenous people who had made some physical and cultural 
adaptations over many thousands of years. This is the basis upon which the 
indigenous groups today argue for self-determination or at the very least a key role in 
the political processes of decision-making which affect their lives. 
The modern political configuration of the Arctic has its roots in these historical phases 
of discovery and occupation, with an emphasis on physical connection or 
contiguity. 175 Sugden's evaluation illustrates some inconsistencies between discovery 
and exploration and the principle of contiguity, however. For example, Russia 
claimed Franz Josef Land without ever having explored it. Furthermore, the 
Canadians claimed islands to their north which were in fact discovered by the 
Norwegian, Sverdrup (Sugden 1982:217). Norway, on the other hand, claimed 
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Eastern Greenland on the basis of traditional hunting rights but this was ruled on in 
favour of Denmark by the International Court in 1933. 
Modern geostrategic aliances have been formed over several centuries of delicate 
peace and conflict relationships between the Arctic states. A very short-hand history is 
presented below in an atempt to clarify the nature of modern geopolitics. It is 
acknowledged, however, that such representations are limited in both scope and 
depth. 
2.10 	 Modern Multidimensional Geostrategic Aliances 
The 18th, 19th and 20th centuries witnessed consolidation of the political autonomy of 
the eight Arctic states. The British Colony of Canada, having successfuly repulsed 
the French in the mid-18th century, was increasingly drawn into conflict with the 
Americans to their south. During the American Revolution (1775-83), Canada became 
a refuge for thousands of British loyalists from the south, who brought with them a 
strong anti-American sentiment and biterness at the expropriation of their property. 
This was one factor which induced the Americans to atempt to invade Canada in 
1812. Over a 30 year period of conflict the boundaries between the two were 
conclusively drawn. The British Government then granted Canada internal self-
government in 1848, while retaining veto over its foreign afairs. The British 
Commonwealth's common foreign policy survived until 1926 when Canada (along 
with the Irish Free State and South Africa) achieved curtailment of the powers of their 
British Governors-General. 
During the depression which began in 1929, Canada forged strong economic links 
with the United States, formalized in joint Trade Agreements of 1935 and 1938. This 
economic amity later alowed the two North Americans to negotiate a coordinated 
defence policy for their northern teritories. (The American Early Warning System for 
detecting a Soviet nuclear atack across the Arctic was later based on Canadian soil). 
Both states also became founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). Despite the rapport, US-Canadian relations have often been precarious, 
particularly during the time of the Vietnam War when thousands of Americans again 
sought refuge in Canada to evade conscription. 
The United States is regarded as an Arctic state for one principal reason: its actual 
possession of Arctic teritory — the State of Alaska. However its profile in the Arctic 
has been greatly enhanced by its status as a world superpower. This reputation of the 
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United States was established when it became a British ally during the World War I 
German offensive against neutral shipping. US President Woodrow Wilson 
committed troops to the war effort in Europe and later dominated the Paris peace 
conference. Wilson championed the establishment of the League of Nations, but US 
participation was subsequently rejected by its Senate. Finding it impossible to remain 
isolated from world affairs during World War IL the United States was inveigled into 
a Lend-Lease supply arrangement with its ally, Britain, and later entered the War when 
its Pacific Fleet was bombed by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour in Hawaii. 
The most significant development of World War IL with everlasting implications, was 
the creation of atomic bombs, which the US dropped on the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki to effectively end the War. That unprecedented destructive 
capacity became the single most important factor in post-war politics. 
The articulation of the Truman Doctrine 176 in 1947 and the Marshall Plan 177 in 1948 
set the foundations for a 'cold' war (that is, a war with no large-scale fighting) 
between the communist Soviet Union and the democratic United States, and their 
respective allies. 178 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was devised and 
its Article 5 stated that an armed attack against one or more member nations in Europe 
or the United States shall be considered an attack against al1. 179 The Soviet Union 
established its own Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949 
and announced its formal alliance — the Warsaw Pact — in 1955. 180 The Soviet 
capacity to produce an atomic bomb, first demonstrated in September 1949, was one 
catalyst which sent the Cold War spiralling into the history books as the prevailing 
global political condition of the next four decades. 
The most complex and dynamic Arctic-state relationships occurred between Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Greenland, Finland and Iceland. During the 19th century the 
strong history of unification, Scandinavianism - based on cultural and political 
traditions - failed. 181 When the Norwegian and Danish Crowns unified in 1380, 
Iceland came under Danish rule, which also included Sweden, Greenland and Finland. 
But in the 1814 Peace of Kiel after the Napoleonic Wars, Denmark lost its Norwegian 
territory to Sweden (Convention of Moss); however, Iceland and Greenland remained 
Danish. Denmark fought several wars with Germany over its southern territory of 
Schleswig-Hostein, which had been at various times either under Prussian or Austrian 
administration, or acquired by a Prussian/Italian alliance in 1866. Denmark ultimately 
lost Schleswig-Hostein to the German Reich in 1871. 182 The Swedish parliamentary 
reform of 1866 included a pro-German policy of neutrality. Norway, struggling to 
implement a foreign policy to protect its shipping interests independent of Sweden's 
veto, dissolved its union with Sweden in 1905. 
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Finland had been part of Sweden since the 1323 Treaty of Pahkinasaari but after Peter 
the Great defeated the Swedes, Finnish territory was gradually annexed by the 
Russians. This was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Throughout the 
19th century, under Russian sovereignty but with acknowledged basic Finnish rights, 
a Finnish nationalist movement emerged, with extensive acceptance of both the 
Finnish and Swedish languages. However, the upper classes, the Swedish Finns, 
and the 'peoples', the Finns, were in conflict. A Finnish army, established in 1878, 
was dissolved by the Russian Governor-General in 1899-1904 and Russian became 
the official language. The Russian Revolution and World War I afforded the Finns 
considerable opportunity to revoke the former Tsarist decrees, however, and the 
Finnish popular assembly became a democratically elected body by 1917. 
Iceland achieved constitutional autonomy from Denmark in 1903 and full sovereignty 
in 1918, although still under the Danish Crown. Denmark claimed total sovereignty 
over Greenland in 1921. The League of Nations accorded rights over Svalbard to 
Norway in a 1920 Treaty, giving free access to its resources to other nations. Norway 
obtained sovereignty over Svalbard in 1925. 183 
In 1939, Russia - in a bid to secure a strategic advantage against the emerging Nazi 
movement - invaded Finland, which had been trying to maintain its neutrality 
alongside Sweden. Finland lost one-tenth of its territory to the Soviets (1940 Moscow 
Treaty) and for a brief period a Finnish pro-German faction joined the German assault 
on the Soviet Union in the hope of regaining its pre-war borders. The Finns were 
again defeated by the Soviets and entered into peace negotiations with them in 1944. 
The 1947 Treaty of Paris confirmed the Moscow Treaty's delimitation of the Finnish 
borders, which deprived Finland of its Arctic coastline and created a Norwegian-
Soviet border to the north of the country. In addition a Soviet naval base was 
established on the Porkkala Peninsula to the south-west of Helsinki, forcing Finland 
to enter into a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948. After making the 
territorial concessions to the USSR, Finland was able to maintain jurisdictional 
discretion over its airspace (Archer 1990). 
During World War II, Denmark was occupied by the Germans and Iceland declared 
itself an independent republic (1944), although it was occupied by both British and 
American troops. Iceland became a founding member of NATO in 1949 and joined 
the Nordic Council in 1953, as did Denmark and Norway. The latter two both made 
reservations to NATO, however, and prohibited the basing of foreign troops in their 
territory during peacetime. Later in 1957 they banned nuclear weapons during 
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peacetime also. Sweden remained armed but non-aligned during peacetime, with a 
declared position of neutrality during wartime. 
All of the 8,000 km long coastline belonging to the former Soviet Union is now 
contained within the Russian Federation. Its history of expansion and invasion in all 
territories close to its borders is too long and complex to reproduce here. 184 Russia's 
northern territories were discovered to contain a rich variety of mineral deposits, 
including gold, coal, diamonds, nickel, and hydrocarbons. The opening of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway in 1905 facilitated the expansion of the Soviet economy with 
the establishment of a network of industrial centres from the Kola Peninsula in the 
west to the Bering Sea in the east to exploit these lucrative resources. This expansion 
was so rapid that poorly developed building techniques and improvisations are today 
one of Russia's greatest headaches in its massive restructuring process. The industrial 
centres are at once both famous for the magnitude of their output 185 and infamous for 
the massive environmental damage emanating from their smelters and refineries. 
Eastern Siberia is also infamous for its slave camps (gulags) of criminals and political 
prisoners. These reluctant Siberians provided vital labour for building the massive 
industrial infrastructure of the north, and many thousands perished in the process. 
Russia developed an extensive maritime fishing and cargo fleet which used the 
Northern Sea Route. 186 The need for contact with its industrial infrastructure spread 
along the Arctic coastline and the mouths of the big rivers, saw the Russians excel in 
the capacity to build and operate sophisticated ice-breakers, the latest of which are 
nuclear powered. In addition, the formal claim by the Soviet Union to its island 
territories, especially Wrangel Island in 1924, had important implications with regard 
to the Law of the Sea Convention. The possession of these island territories allowed 
the Russian Federation to draw straight baselines and thus claim the Northern Sea 
Route as 'internal waters' (LOSC Article 8) which were thus subject to its 
jurisdictional control. In line with ex-President Gorbachev's new policy of openness 
(discussed in Chapter 4), Russia officially opened the Northern Sea Route for 
international use in 1991. 
The Russian Ministry of Defence published its 'Regulations for Navigation on the 
Seaways of the Northern Sea Route' as a Notice to Mariners. 187 The regulations 
specify the coordinates of the NSR (Article 1.2), which is a major enhancement on 
previous descriptions. They also emphasise safety and protection of the marine 
environment (Article 2); ice-breaker assisted pilotage to vessels with unqualified or 
inexperienced crew through designated areas (Articles 3, 4 and 7); civil liability for 
marine pollution (Article 5); the right to inspect vessels prior to transit (Article 6); and 
the right of expulsion for breaches of the Regulations (Article 10). 188 
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The opening of the Northern Sea Route presented the Russians with a unique 
opportunity to both expand its industrialintion of the north and to earn a valuable 
income from pilotage fees. 
The strategic standing of Scandinavia was considered peripheral during the 1950s and 
1960s. However, this was upgraded as the Russian Northern Fleet, which was based 
on the Kola Peninsula close to the northern Finnish and Norwegian borders, grew in 
prominence in the next two decades. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 
1985, the end of the Soviet hegemonic rein over the Warsaw Pact Eastern bloc was 
not envisaged. But in a speech in Murmansk in October 1987, President Gorbachev 
heralded a new thinking in Soviet foreign and defence policy, espousing a new 
cooperative role for his country in Arctic science, joint resource development and 
strategic concerns (Archer 1990:26). This speech is elaborated on in more detail in 
Chapter 4, as it is generally seen as a great stimulus to the regime development process 
in the Arctic. 
Within this political asymmetry, each Arctic State negotiated bilateral agreements with 
both the United States and the former Soviet Union, as well as among themselves, on 
such matters as commerce and trade, transport and navigation, economic cooperation, 
strategic military and diplomatic relationships (see the Legal Framework Appendix 5). 
In this way, while the whole of the region was permeated by the paranoia of the Cold 
War, Arctic states succeeded in concurrently maintaining both a level of international 
sovereign integrity and the ability to satisfy domestic political demands. 
The superpower competition for arms superiority took military technological expertise 
to soaring new heights, but at a cost which has been argued to be unsustainable in 
financial, economic, political and social terms. It is not surprising, therefore, that a 
plateau would be reached beyond which neither the US nor the USSR could afford to 
go, and that a re-evaluation of military strategy might focus on more realistic defensive 
rather than offensive capabilities. Complete demilitarisation of the Arctic is neither 
envisaged nor realistic, however. It must be noted that all Arctic nations would have 
been implicated in any superpower military confrontation, because of a variety of 
factors including those complex alliances mentioned above and the indiscriminate 
effects of a nuclear holocaust. Therefore the security of the whole region remains an 
essential characteristic of Arctic affairs, as much as a realistic defence capability 
remains a priority in the domestic affairs of the rim States. 
Recent moves by the former Soviet Republic of Lithuania towards gaining 
membership of NATO caused ripples of concern throughout the international 
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community, which saw the West as trying to balance the strategic aliance concerns of 
former Warsaw Pact members. The Russians objected to what they perceived as a 
strengthening of NATO through this partnerships for peace concept.189 However, 
now that Russia has aligned itself with NATO by signing a partnership for peace 
accord, said to be more advanced that the agreements with other ex-Warsaw Pact 
states and neutrals, some of these fears may have been mitigated (Archer, 
pers.comm). 
Having determined the historical basis of the present-day configuration of the eight 
Arctic states, it is also necessary to briefly mention another point with salience to this 
study. The borders of the eight Arctic states are today largely undisputed. However, 
because the region is largely composed of marine areas, it is important to note the 
conflicts which have arisen over delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
2.11 	 The Sector Principle and Jurisdictional Issues 
While the sector principle of teritorial distribution has been a popular concept, no 
Arctic state supports it as oficial policy (Friedheim 1988:494).190 Joyner notes, 
however, that the application of the sector principle seems beter suited to the Arctic 
than it does the Antarctic (Joyner 1992:58). The sector principle involves the action 
of drawing: 
a base line or arc described along the Arctic Circle through 
territory unquestionably within the jurisdiction of a temperate 
zone state, and sides defined by meridians of longitude 
extending from the North Pole south to the most easterly and 
westerly points on the Arctic Circle pierced by the 
state_creat[ing] pie-shaped sectors. 
(Friedheim 1988:494) 
Simply put, straight lines drawn from the reaches of each state's terestrial mass at the 
Arctic Circle to the North Pole should, theoreticaly, neatly apportion the marine Arctic 
into sectors. Each of the litoral states191 has sovereign jurisdiction over its teritorial 
lands, seas and airspace, with Russia dominating in area (see Map). However, 
delimitation of teritorial seas and exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, 
archipelagoes, ice-covered areas, polution zones, historic internal waters and closed 
seas and straits used for navigation only with the consent of the coastal states, are 
some areas of contention uncovered by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea and unresolved by the application of the sector principle. 
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Actual disputed boundaries in the Arctic include areas of the continental shelf, Wrangel 
Island, the US/Canadian common Beaufort Sea boundary, Canada/US and the North-
West Pasage, and the Norway/Rusia continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea 
(Shusterich 1984:243). 
Shusterich argues that according to most governments, the '...sector principle is 
not based on international legal precedents...t and thus provides only 
limited guidance in determining Arctic jurisdiction (Shusterich 1984:255). The 
problem is that the Arctic is a commons area in the sense that fish, animals and 
sometimes people migrate acros politicaly defined borders.I92 In addition, polution 
- whether it be airborne, marine or river-based, knows no political boundaries. 
Therefore, even if sovereign jurisdiction is proven, unilateral action is very often 
inappropriate when seeking remedies to transboundary isues (Friedheim 1988:495). 
Not only is unilateral action often inappropriate, but also action by governments alone. 
As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of non-state stakeholders with Arctic interests. 
To give further weight to the thesis that sovereignty may be becoming permeable, this 
study also considers the position of entities other than states in the Arctic policy and 
law-making process. 
2.12 	 Non-State Actors as Stakeholders 
One perspective is that the Arctic wil play an increasingly important role by employing 
innovative initiatives and new paterns of interaction that circumvent or simply by-pas 
the traditional dominance of the state in international society, with non-state actors 
central in this process (Young 1992:11). This section looks at some of these 
stakeholders and their roles in Arctic afairs. 
2.12.1 	 The Northern Forum 
The Northern Forum is an international organization whose membership (curently 20) 
comprises the Governors of the northern regions of each of the Arctic states, plus 
China, Mongolia, Japan and Korea. It also has an asociate membership drawn from 
universities, special interest groups and the private sector. 
This body was formaly established in 1991 and has a Secretariat in Anchorage, 
Alaska. Its agenda, as its name implies, is region-specific. The Forum has a stated 
list of priority projects which include environmental research and monitoring, wildlife 
studies, the Northern Sea Route, capital formation in the north, human ecology, 
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environmental health and health-related issues, east-west air routes and northern 
housing (Arctic Centre 1992:11). 
A significant advancement in the profile of The Northern Forum was achieved in 1993 
when it was granted accreditation as a non-governmental organization by the United 
Nations (The Northern Forum 1994:7). 
	
2.12.2 	 The Nordic Council 
The Nordic Council is another region-specific organization. It was established in 
1952 to promote cooperation among the Parliaments and Governments of Iceland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Finland became a member in 1955. Greenland, the 
Faroes and Aland Islands have associate membership status with representatives on 
the Danish and Finnish delegations. The Sarni people are represented on the Council 
by a multinational observer delegation, thereby representing the Sarni as a nation rather 
than as citizens of individual states. 
The Nordic Council holds a Plenary Assembly and has a Presidium and various 
standing commitees. 
At its International Conference for Parliamentarians on Development and Protection of 
the Arctic region in 1993, the Nordic Council publicly declared its support for the 
moves towards pan-Arctic regime building which wil be discussed later in this work 
(Nordic Council 1993:9-10). 
2.12.3 	 The Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference 
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference is the product of a meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers (or their representatives) of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, the 
Russian Federation, Sweden and the Commission of the European Communities 
which took place in Kirkenes, Norway in January 1993. The Conference was 
described as a forum to promote stability and progress in the region, in Europe and 
internationaly. Representatives from the US, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
Poland and the United Kingdom atended as observers. 
2.12.4 	 Indigenous Peoples' Representation 
There are a range of dependent nation groups within the Arctic, which is home to the 
Inuit, Indian, Aleuts, Lapps, Altaic and Paleoasian peoples. Some stil depend on 
subsistence activities, while others have been integrated into the industrial economies 
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of their region (Friedheim 1988:499). Increasing evidence is coming to light that in 
heavily industrialized areas of the Arctic, the indigenous people and their homelands 
are gradually being displaced by imported labour and the industrial infrastructure. 193 
This has left many local communities without the benefit of their traditional lifestyles: 
an unskilled workforce relying on the welfare of the state. 
The Sarni 'snowmobile revolution' is just one such example. It illustrates the effect of 
the head-on meeting between traditional ways of life and the technological, market-
based economic realities of the 20th century. This interdiction is causing enormous 
problems for both the people and the policy-makers in the northern Nordic regions. 
For instance, there is growing pressure on young people to choose between a 
traditional subsistence means of survival and the lure of capitalist economy wages and 
consumer goods. Traditional hunting grounds have been either over-exploited by the 
indigenous people themselves 194 and others, or protected in law, and there has ensued 
a clash between environmental and humanitarian ethics (Helander pers.comm). 
The rights of indigenous peoples are being closely scrutinized by human rights groups 
as they either strive for survival in an increasingly industrialised North, or attempt 
integration. 
The indigenous groups most politically active in the Arctic include the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Sarni Council and the Association of Small 
Peoples of the North (a Russian minority group). In much the same way as the 
Malaysian-led UNGA lobby group sought participation in Antarctic affairs, 195 these 
indigenous groups seek participation in Arctic affairs, based first and foremost on their 
fundamental rights as circumpolar people. But there is disharmony between and 
among indigenous groups over many issues, resulting in an inability to unify into a 
strong single voice in Arctic affairs and thereby losing a measure of legitimacy. 196 
It is not only the Arctic governments which have problems with pan-Arctic solidarity; 
the inherent differences between and among both the politically-based and ethnicity-
based nations make the pursuit of Arctic regimes that much more complicated. 
Forcing linkages where they should not be forced and denying individualism where it 
should be acknowledged results in the sometimes patronising or token gestures 
towards indigenous groups which they do not fail to recognise but are often powerless 
to stop. Two of the most active and successful indigenous groups are the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference and the Nordic Sarni Council and Parliaments. 
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• Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
The ICC was formed in Barrow, Alaska, in June 1977 and adopted its formal Charter 
in 1980. It represents the indigenous members of the Inuit homelands, including such 
regional groups as the Inupiat and Yupik of Alaska, the Inuit and Inuvialuit of Canada 
and the Kalaallit people of Greenland. The Inuit from the former Soviet Union were 
welcomed into the Conference in 1989. 
Inuit homelands of Alaska, Canada and Greenland 197 are described as '...those 
arctic and sub-arctic areas where, presently or traditionally, Inuit 
have aboriginal rights and interests CDC 1980:3). 
The ICC has a Secretariat located in Canada which is funded by equal contributions 
from each member party (ICC 1980:Articles 8 and 9). 
In the context of this study it is important to note several of the fundamental purposes 
of the ICC: 
• to ensure the endurance and the growth of Inuit culture and 
societies for both present and future generations; 
• to promote long-term management and protection of arctic and 
sub-arctic wildlife, environment and biological productivity; 
to promote wise management and use of non-renewable resources 
in the circumpolar [ie. Inuit homeland) region and 
incorporating such resources in the present and future 
development of Inuit economies, taking into account other 
Inuit interests. 
(ICC 1980:Article 2 (e), (f) and (g), emphasis added) 
The political message of the ICC from its first conference in 1977 was that it 
represented: '...one indivisible people with one common language, 
culture, environment and concerns...and that it is only the boundaries 
of certain nation states that separates [us]i(Resolution77-01 in 
Fcegteborg 1992:243). This sentiment has been carried through into the ICCs Charter 
and subsequent public statements. 
The political awareness and profile of the ICC grew rapidly during the 1980s. The 
International Whaling Commission granted the ICC observer status in 1980, in 
recognition of the traditional subsistence harvesting practice of many Inuit 
communities. In 1983 ICC was granted consultative status by ECOSOC, the UN 
Economic and Social Council. That same year the ICC established the Alaska Native 
Review Commission to review the Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 and began 
developing an official Arctic policy. In 1985 it established an Environmental 
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Commission. In 1991 the ICC organized the First Arctic Leaders Summit in Denmark 
(Fcegteborg 1992:244-5). 
Two of ICC's projects are noteworthy. In the document 'Principles and Elements for 
a Comprehensive Arctic Policy', published in 1992, the ICC provided an extensive 
view of a range of Arctic policies which, it said, was '...a crucial first step to 
the full and productive exercise of Inuit self-determination and 
self-government' (ICC 1992:2). In recognition of the dynamic nature of Arctic 
affairs, the ICCs Arctic Policy document was to be seen as a living blueprint, to be 
refined and improved with changing circumstances (ICC 1992:148). However, it 
alsocontainedawarning: 'Unless basic collective and individual rights 
are respected in the policies and actions of state governments and 
others, well-meaning initiatives in the Arctic will not be 
successful' (ICC 1992:3). 
The ICC is also in the process of developing a Regional Conservation Strategy. A 
local application of the World Conservation Strategy produced by IUCN, the Inuit 
Regional Conservation Strategy was a product of the 1986 ICC General Assembly 
(Resolution 86-18) and has received praise from the UN Environment Program (ICC 
1989). In fact it has been lauded as having become '...a significant force in 
promoting international cooperation on Arctic environmental issues' 
(Young 1992:187). 
The ICC's Arctic Policy document deals with the environment, social issues, culture, 
economic issues, education and science, but it also contains generic statements about 
peace and security issues. One potential area of conflict has been the Greenlandic 
Home Rule Government's opposition to the ICC addressing Arctic military questions. 
Theoretically the ICC, as a transnational, non-governmental body, should not be 
impeded by restrictions on the kind of issues it adopts. In a speech to the 1991 
Leaders Summit, the Prime Minister of Greenland warned of the dangers of tackling 
these subjects, saying they could jeopardize many other positive purposes of the ICC 
(Fcegteborg 1992:248). It is difficult to see how, or indeed why, the ICC should 
side-step issues of such great importance to circumpolar solidarity. 
The ICC is also hampered by, in Canada at least, a lack of both financial resources and 
expertise to carry their message into the international diplomatic world. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests, for example, that poor communication between the ICC and other 
groups (mainly governmental) active in Arctic affairs had sometimes led to 
misunderstandings about the aims and intentions of the ICC (Reimer pers.comm.). 
While the ICC has intrinsic legitimacy, its standing within the Realpolitik world is 
112 
another mater. Moreover, these anecdotes suggest a real compromise of its 
efectiveness. 
• 	 The Nordic Sarni Council and Parliaments 
The estimated 60,000 Sarni people live separately in Norway, Sweden, Finland and 
Russia but are united ethnicaly under the slogan: 'we, Sarni, are a people and 
the national borders shall not divide the community of our 
people:198 Sarni political mobilization has been the product of a generalized trend 
towards acknowledgment of native peoples' rights post World War I, facilitated by 
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, especialy Article 27.199 
The Nordic Sarni Council is an association of Sarni groups from Norway, Sweden 
and Finland, with its Secretariat and conferences funded by the Nordic Council. 
These Sarni associations were apparently established with litle or no government 
support, and their main emphasis has been to try to atract both domestic and 
international recognition of the Sarni as a 'separate but equal people'. 
(Brantenberg 1991:76). The Council was established in 1956 and is a founding 
member of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (VVCIP).200 The Russian Sarni 
have their own association — the Kolasami — established in 1989. 
Both Finland and Norway have Sarni parliaments, and Sweden is considering a bil to 
establish one. The Finnish Government began to consider a Sarni parliament in 1972 
and a trial election was caried out in 1972-73. Finland's Sarni parliament was more 
formaly established in 1975-76 (Brantenberg 1991:78). The Samidiggi (Sarni 
parliament) of Norway was oficialy proclaimed in 1989 through the Scimi Act 1987. 
Only Sarni voters are permited to participate and only Sarni candidates can be elected 
to this parliament. The Samidiggi is granted a mandate, under §2.1 of the Act, to 
include in its area of competence: 'mall matters which in the opinion of the 
Samidiggi are of particular concern to Sarni people' MIg0 1991:114 
However, the Norwegian Sarni Parliament is primarily a consultative body. There are 
considerable restrictions on its authority to pass measures in any issue area other than 
education and research, trade and industry, nature and the environment, rights, social 
afairs and health, culture and language and organizational and constitutional afairs 
(Nyst0 1991:113). 
2.12.5 	 Environmentalists 
The rise in prominence of environmental NGOs in the Arctic has been viewed as 
chalenging the legitimacy of traditionaly closed decision-making at both the state and 
international levels (Stokke 1992:228). There are a range of environmental groups 
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operating in the Arctic, including the Norwegian group Belona201 and Greenpeace 
International, which is based in Amsterdam. Greenpeace in particular has been a 
strong and active campaigner in the European Arctic, and two curent issues which 
they have taken a particular interest in are the dumping of radioactive wastes by the 
Russian Federation and the Norwegian whaling issue. 
,/ Greenpeace became aware of persistent but unconfirmed reports that the Soviet Union 
had been dumping radioactive wastes at sea from the 1960s. It had repeatedly voiced 
its concerns over these activities to the Consultative Meetings of the London 
Convention.202 With regard to the dumping of radioactive wastes in the Sea of Japan 
(of the northern island of Hokkaido), Greenpeace accused the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) of impropriety by knowingly alowing the Russian Federation 
to breach the provisions of the London Convention, particularly Articles I and I 
regarding protection of the marine environment.203 The so-caled 'aggressive 
attitude' of Greenpeace International has apparently been questioned on several 
occasions; however, Greenpeace stil continues to lobby the London Convention.204 
Greenpeace later conducted a limited joint survey to assess the environmental impact 
of ilegal dumping operations. The study, conducted in April 1994 (the results of 
which were unavailable to the author) involved colaboration with the governments of 
the Russian Federation, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the IAEA.205 
Greenpeace is also active in the International Whaling Commission.206 In 1992 
Norway clearly signaled to the rest of the world (via the IWC meeting at the time) its 
intention to recommence whaling operations in 1993, and to resume scientific whaling 
immediately.207 Greenpeace swiftly launched one of its now famous anti-whaling 
direct action campaigns, which was successful in interupting the hunt. Greenpeace 
has voiced speculation that Norway's decision to resume whaling was a political vote-
gathering exercise, aimed at protecting the sustainable lifestyle of traditional whaling 
vilages (and thus guaranteeing their vote) rather than a decision based on the best 
scientific advice.208 
Greenpeace International, its presence legitimized by being granted observer status in 
many international fora, continues to play a high-profile, active role in Arctic 
affairs.209 
2.12.6 	 Industry as Stakeholders 
Hydrocarbons, minerals such as copper, nickel, phosphates, gold, silver, cobalt, iron 
ore, coal, diamonds, tin, lead and zinc, timber, water for hydro-electric generation, 
marine living resources and indigenous labour are al commercial commodities of the 
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Arctic. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was an increasing focus on these vast 
natural resources, both living and non-living, renewable and non-renewable and the 
growing technological capacity to exploit them commercialy. Their cost, in both 
economic and political terms, is their most crucial feature. 
Hydrocarbons in particular are of substantial importance to the domestic and foreign 
earnings of the United States, Canada, Norway and Russia. While actual estimates 
vary, the consensus is that recoverable reserves of hydrocarbons in the North 
American Arctic and gas reserves in north west Siberia are enormous. Similarly, 
Arctic fishing accounts for an estimated 90% of the total Icelandic fish-catch and the 
Alaska polock industry was said to be the largest single-species fishery in the 
world.210 But while some resources like oil and fish have proven to be profitable 
over time and in favourable market circumstances, concerns over extraction and 
processing methods, transportation, harvesting practices and the variability of markets 
are raising critical questions of a political as wel as an economic nature. 
The industrialization of the Arctic from undeveloped lands far removed from their 
markets and with litle or no infrastructure into economicaly viable, self-sustaining 
industrial regions has in some cases crashed head-on into the environmental movement 
and indigenous groups, which see this expansion as conflicting with both 
environmental concerns and traditional native rights (Osherenko & Young 1989:51-2). 
The Arctic Pilot Project was one such test case which ilustrated the wide discretionary 
powers of government bureaucracies over the use of Arctic resources and the catalytic 
role NGOs have played in northern environmental and developmental questions.211 
• 	 The Arctic Pilot Project 
The Arctic Pilot Project (APP) was initiated by a consortium headed by Petro-Canada 
in 1976, as both a stimulus to Arctic development and as an additional energy source 
for Canada. It was designed to test the feasibility of producing natural gas from wels 
in the Canadian Arctic islands and transporting it 160 km overland in a buried pipeline, 
chiled to stop thawing of the permafrost through which it would travel. The gas 
would be transformed into liquefied natural gas (LNG) and shipped by icebreaking 
cariers through Bafin Bay and Davis Strait (which separate Canada from Greenland) 
to a regasification plant in southern Canada. The transport was to take place on an 
year-round basis. The two icebreaker transporters were to be revolutionary in design, 
recycling the boil-of of their gas cargo into fuel for the ship's gas turbine/electric 
propulsion systems. Specialy reinforced double huls would lessen the chances of 
rupture of the forward LNG tanks during icebrealcing activity. The shipping route 
through the north-west Passage to ports in either Nova Scotia or Quebec was carefuly 
chosen after years of study of ice data. The spin-of for the Canadians would be that 
115 
western Canadian gas would be made available for export, instead of having to be 
piped east to supply energy needs there. 
A submission by Petro-Canada and its partners was required to be sent to three 
diferent Canadian Government departments - the National Energy Board and the 
Federal Departments of Transport and the Environment, the later to hold detailed 
hearings through its Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) (Petro-
Canada 1980). Petro-Canada's application involved three crucial phases: i) the 
construction of the natural gas pipeline and liquefaction plant on Melvile Island; 
the transport of the LNG to eastern Canada; and 	 the export of natural gas to the 
United States. Petro-Canada's application did contain a strong emphasis on the pilot 
nature of the project. 
The EARP hearing process began in 1980 in the four Arctic communities of Resolute 
Bay, Arctic Bay, Grise Fiord and Pond Inlet. In its report on the northern component 
of the APP, the Environment Assessment Panel concluded that while it had some 
reservations, overal the project was environmentaly acceptable. The Panel therefore 
made its recommendation to proceed conditional upon the establishment of a shipping 
control authority and the conduct of on-going and further research, to be guided by the 
advice of both the Inuit communities and Federal scientists.212 
After years of submissions, hearings, delays and counter-tactics by a variety of 
interest groups, the Arctic Pilot Project was unceremoniously dumped.213 Petro-
Canada's 1983 Annual Report simply stated that: '...a number of projects which 
had appeared viable in a higher energy price environment but which 
could no longer be sustained were discontinued or deferred. 0214 The 
APP was deferred indefinitely after Petro-Canada and its partners had spent over 
Can$58 milion up to 1982 (Petro-Canada 1983; Petro-Canada 1982:10). According 
to the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), the deflated international 
market price of oil and gas was the principal reason why the APP was defered. The 
four-tiered bureaucratic jurisdiction215 and the lengthy environmental evaluation 
process and subsequent restrictions accounted for only a smal percentage of the 
reason (Brouchet pers.comm). However, according to a representative of the Inuit 
groups involved in the hearings, their pressure was responsible for bringing the 
project to a standstil (Fenge pers.comm). In fact, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference 
claim the mothbaling of the APP as one of their prize scalps (Fcegteborg 1992:244-5). 
o 	 The Arctic as a Market and a Resource 
There have been several important external factors which have strengthened the 
potential of the Arctic as a resource-base in both political and economic terms. The 
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OPEC oil crisis of the 1970s was cited in Petro-Canada's 1976 Annual Report as a 
major concern for Canadian energy policy (Petro-Canada 1976:16). In 1988 it was 
estimated that 40% of all US oil reserves were located in the US Arctic (Friedheim 
1988:497). Similarly the Iraqi War of 1991 reinforced the need to strengthen self-
sustainability of hydrocarbon production by North America. 
Another important set of factors in Arctic affairs is the intra- and inter-regional 
economic and political linkages between Canada and the US, and between the Nordic 
Countries and the European Community (EC). 
The US and Canada have a free trade agreement, concluded in 1988 and extended in 
1991 to include Mexico, in what is now the North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA).216 NAFTA was a contentious issue with many Canadians, 
notwithstanding their strong connections to the US. The US is Canada's major 
trading partner, representing 75% of export earnings in 1990 (SBS 1994:105). 
Similarly in Scandinavia, the transition into union with the EC has been a contentious 
issue. Denmark has been a member of the EC since 1973. Norway attempted to join 
also in 1973 but its referendum was rejected by the people. Sweden and Finland 
considered that their neutrality might be compromised, as the EC was seen as 
essentially a western organisation and neither therefore sought membership. Iceland 
rejected membership because of the EC's Common Fisheries Policy. Instead, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland negotiated separate Free Trade Agreements 
(Laursen 1993:115-18). These agreements were seen by the Nordic countries as 
being less restrictive than full and committed integration into the larger European unit 
because of their more modest intergovernmental cooperative nature and minimalist 
institutional character (Laursen 1993:119). 
Possibly as an alternative to European Community membership, in 1989 the EC 
offered the EFTA partners (including the Nordic countries) a different package - a 
more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative 
institutions, but with retention of full decision-making autonomy. This would become 
known collectively as a European Economic Area (EEA) with two factions - the EC 
and the EFTA countries, and be finalised in 1992 (Laursen 1993:123-4). 
A parallel development was the concept of comprehensive European Union through 
the Maastricht Treaty. The four freedoms of the EC's internal market programme 217 
were extended into the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which also contained 
the potential to deal with issues such as a common environmental policy alongside 
democratic legitimacy, common foreign and security policy, European citizenship, 
common social policies and an enhanced European Community (Laursen 1993:116, 
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127). The debate regarding the application of this community method of regional 
integrated problem-solving wil not be elaborated here. What is important to note, 
rather, is the atitude of the Nordic countries to Maastricht and the consequences for 
Arctic afairs. 
One of the most obvious areas of concern was the planned common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP). In a survey folowing the Danish referendum's rejection of 
Maastricht in June 1992, the apparent perception was that the Treaty represented a 
considerable loss of political autonomy. Despite admissions by some Danish voters 
(45%) that they had litle or no knowledge of Maastricht, a common defence policy 
was favoured by only 30% of Danes, common citizenship by 13% and only 19% 
favoured a United States of Europe concept. However, the internal market 
programme received majority support (74%) (Laursen 1993:129). It appears that 
while the Danish government wanted Maastricht, the people did not. A compromise 
which alowed the Danes to opt out of al questions relating to common judicial, 
strategic and military policies was agreed to in what is known as the Edinburgh 
Decision by the EC in late 1992. The subsequent May 1993 referendum narowly 
secured Denmark's ratification of Maastricht. 
Perhaps facilitated by Eastern European disintegration, the other Nordic EFTA 
countries acquiesced: Sweden applied for EC membership in July 1991, Finland 
applied in early 1992 and Norway in late 1992; al were subject to domestic support, 
however. Folowing successful referenda, Finland and Sweden joined the Union in 
January 1995. Another Norwegian domestic referendum was held on 28 November 
1994 and the Norwegians again rejected Union. Iceland too is stil out in the cold 
alongside Norway (Laursen 1993:133). 
It is interesting to note that the Sarni of Norway, Sweden, Finland (and perhaps 
Russia) have proposed that their homeland be treated as an autonomous economic 
region with regard to the EC (Helander pers.comm). 
2.12.7 	 The Scientific Community as Stakeholders 
The Arctic scientific community are major players in Arctic afairs and by implication, 
major stakeholders. Their role in bringing into existence an Arctic scientific 
organization and their part in the emerging Arctic eco-management regime is such that 
they deserve special treatment in this work. Accordingly, the Arctic case study, 
presented in Chapter 4, wil describe the genesis of the Arctic scientific organization 
and its implications for the future direction of the hitherto absent Arctic regional 
environmental management regime. 
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2.13 	 Conclusions 
What does the information presented here mean in terms of global ecosystem 
responsibility measured through the legitimacy, efectiveness and accountability of 
polar eco-management regimes? This Chapter has been structured in such a way as to 
highlight the major diferences and similarities between the two regions. For example, 
in the Antarctic it has largely been events like discovery and occupation leading to 
continental partitioning and the cooperation of the IGY leading to the Antarctic 
conference which have shaped the nature of multilateral responsibility for the polar 
ecosystem. In the Arctic, however, the historical process of state-building has led to 
the determination of eight major stakeholders which for the most part act unilateraly in 
polar concerns. This Chapter has not taken account of the domestic politics of the 
Arctic 8 nor their environmental agencies. Rather, it has described the very long and 
complex historical process of both nation- and state-building in the Arctic. Importantly 
it has identified the fact that no states exist in a vacuum of sovereignty. There have 
been a number of dynamic forces, particularly wars (or the threat of war) and 
economic imperatives, which have impinged politicaly and economicaly on a state's 
existence and independence, shaping its foreign policy directions towards other states. 
In presenting the above geographical and geopolitical architecture of the polar regions, 
the intent of this Chapter has been to put the Antarctic and the Arctic in a modern 
context. 
At the outset it was noted that there are few similarities and many diferences between 
the poles as regions and regimes. The most prominent similarities and diferences 
identified in the study so far are as folows: 
• 	 The Peripheral Locus of Decision-Making 
The centres of authority for Arctic policy- and law-making are located far to the south 
of the polar regions of the eight rim states.218 Furthermore, the Antarctic is 
uninhabited apart from a transient population of scientists and logistics personnel, 
tourists and Southern Oceans resources harvesters. It wil be shown in the next 
chapter that the Antarctic Treaty System's policy- and law-making machine does not 
have a secretariat and is therefore located within the government bureaucracies of each 
participating state. The machine only becomes a coalition at Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Party Meetings. 
This raises interesting questions about the relevance of environmental law which may 
be determined by outsiders219 in the case of the Arctic; and in the case of the Antarctic, 
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where those laws have no direct physical impact on the states making them.220 The 
second part of the case studies wil take up these questions in more detail. 
• 	 The Transitional Nature of Polar Sovereignty 
According to Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment 
(discussed in Chapter 1), sovereign states have the right to exploit resources within 
their jurisdiction, providing there are no unwanted transboundary efects. In the case 
of the later, a state's sovereignty should not shield it from environmental obligations. 
While the eight rim states of the Arctic basin have almost total sovereign jurisdiction 
over the Arctic region, other than the high seas, only inchoate claims exist to Antarctic 
teritory. Logic would seem to suggest, therefore, that the Arctic states should have a 
more advanced environmental ethic than those states responsible for management of 
the Antarctic. Because they are the sovereign owners of their teritory, everything that 
happens in the Arctic directly or indirectly afects some or al Arctic states. In the 
Antarctic, by contrast, the possibility that claimant states might have their teritorial 
claims universaly recognized at some point in the future would not seem a likely 
enough reason to take good environmental care of their claimed teritory now. But the 
opposite has, in fact, been true. This has been due in large measure to the prominence 
in the Arctic of Cold War tensions and the diplomatic retardation such a situation has 
perpetuated. But the Cold War is now over. 
The Arctic states have proven sovereign title but the Antarctic claimants have not. The 
Antarctic sovereignty issue has been temporarily set aside through Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Therefore, diferent treatment of essentialy the same problem — that 
of ecosystem protection — is indicated. 
Furthermore, the intent of the UNCED's Agenda 21 to establish a global partnership 
should not be taken literaly.21 Rather, a more plausible interpretation is that states or 
regimes wil operate regionaly or localy for the long term benefit of al humankind 
(or, as this work advocates, al living things). In this sense, the global partnership is 
likely to be more a philosophical or conceptual notion than a pragmatic arangement. 
The Arctic case study wil show that there are growing indications that the Arctic 
nations are creating a new Arctic order by placing increasing emphasis on 
environmental issues. This is evidenced by the existence of several new institutions 
and initiatives charged with pan-Arctic cooperation and is facilitated in part by the 
opportunity for post Cold War communications with the industrial centres (Russian, 
English, Asian and European) largely responsible for much of the transboundary 
polution. 
120 
It is not, however, a cause for euphoria. Old rivalries, customary reticence, 
intransigence, political uncertainty, new stakeholders and traditional ethnic groups 
seeking empowerment, al combine to make the pursuit of a resistant multilateral Arctic 
eco-management regime more complex and problematic. The concepts dealt with here 
in this study - ecosystem responsibility and international cooperation - are first and 
foremost political decisions. 
Other factors which have contributed to the complexity of Arctic environmental 
protection include insuficient scientific knowledge regarding the physical and 
biological processes, technological poverty and political inability to regulate the 
industrialization of the Arctic (Stoldce 1991). Added to these are the conflicting 
interests of indigenous people and state governments, market forces, and the 
frequency and eficacy of the chalenge from exogenous forces such as environmental 
non-governmental organisations. Disagreement over the degree to which Arctic 
resources are shared resources is another important variable. So too is the lack of a 
suitable forum and procedural and legal mechanisms for securing commitment, 
compliance and liability. 
How much the notions of sovereignty and security may be undermined by the 
ecological imperative - or conversely, how state's rights with regard to sovereignty 
and security may be used to subvert the ecological imperative - are issues which wil 
be atended to in the case studies. 
• 	 The Nexus Between Polar Science and Polar Politics 
Science has played a prominent role in the historical development of both polar 
regions. Much early exploration was science-driven and in some cases (especialy the 
IGY) cooperative science was able to endure in a climate which fostered litle in the 
way of international cooperation on other issues. By identifying such features as 
visible and potential physical damage to vulnerable ecosystems and risks to human 
health and welfare, the communities of polar scientists have successfuly assisted in 
increasing the international profile of the polar regions, albeit within the specific 
dimension of science. 
Moreover, advanced scientific knowledge is atracting greater legitimacy in policy 
formation. It is therefore incumbent upon the polar states to make appropriate 
ecological policy choices from the best available scientific information. 
In conclusion, it is safe to say that in the case of the Arctic, the Cold War political 
climate was not conducive to the development of a pan-Arctic environmental ethic, as 
the priority of the Arctic states was to preserve their economic and political autonomy. 
121 
But with the declaration of the end of the Cold War has come a measure of 
commitment to the resolution of environmental concerns never before experienced in 
Arctic affairs. This may well be an accidental by-product of a trend towards regional 
harmonization for the purposes of economic advantage, research and development 
interests. It may also be, to some extent, a natural progression as states become more 
seriously affected physically, economically, politically and socially by transboundary 
environmental concerns, as identified by the scientific community. Lastly, it may also 
be the product of changing values as the ecological debate becomes more informed and 
the stakeholders more empowered. 
A different situation prevails in the Antarctic. Scientific programs have a dual 
function: on the one hand they produce valuable scientific information, often through 
cooperative joint ventures; and on the other, they also give the Antarctic Treaty 
claimant states a legitimate presence in the region - an undisguised assertion of 
sovereignty. 
While the problem of ecosystem management is common to both polar areas, only the 
Antarctic has had a suitable regional management infrastructure for comprehensively 
addressing the issue. The Antarctic Treaty System has been in existence for over 35 
years and the coalition of states have at their disposal the existing mechanisms within 
the Treaty System for cooperation towards achieving ecosystem protection. The 
Arctic nations, on the other hand, have a fragmented array of mainly bilateral 
agreements concerning the environment. Furthermore, these ad hoc policies have 
obviously been seen as insufficient regional protective mechanisms, as ecosystem 
degradation is continuing and in some cases increasing .222  There is only one 
multilateral regional initiative specific to the Arctic — an agreement about the protection 
of Polar Bears. Just prior to the end of the Cold War, however, the former Soviet 
President Gorbachev acknowledged that the Soviet Union sought regional discourse 
on such issues as environmental management and scientific cooperation. This 
encouraged the Arctic states to begin a process of regional cooperation, the level of 
which has never before been experienced in Arctic affairs. But because no pan-Arctic 
forum was in place to facilitate political cooperation, the northern polar states have had 
to begin from scratch. 
The next two chapters continue the case study examinations, in the context of the 
historical development and the nature of laws which determine a level of responsibility 
for polar ecosystems. In the following case studies, the analytical framework will be 
applied in order to measure the analytical parameters. 
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3 
The Antarctic Treaty System 
Introduction 
Nowhere is ecological interdependence more widely studied than in the Antarctic and 
nowhere is the issue of sovereignty handled with such artifice. Environmental 
protection, if not strictly with an ecosystem approach, was on the agenda of the very 
first Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) of 1961. This is rather 
remarkable considering that the Meeting pre-dated Carson's Silent Spring and the 
genesis of modern environmentalism. The Parties at that first meeting recognized an 
'...urgent need for measures to conserve the living resources of the 
Treaty area and to protect them from uncontrolled destruction or 
interference by man '223  There is ample evidence throughout the documented 
history of the Antarctic Treaty System to indicate an evolutionary approach to 
environmental protection in the Antarctic. 
The environmental agenda of the Antarctic Treaty Parties was considerably broadened 
in the following three decades by virtue of the Treaty — the primary international legal 
instrument guiding the administration of the Antarctic. 
The Treaty and its system of Antarctic administration has set aside sovereignty 
questions in order to govern and direct a variety of human activities from the 
behaviour of expeditioners to the sustainable harvest of Southern Ocean resources. 
The system is lauded as an example of adaptability, endurance and success in terms of 
international cooperation. It is also criticised as lacking effectiveness and the ability to 
protect the interests of the international community in the Antarctic. 
This Chapter seeks to determine what characteristics the System has which attracts 
such acclaim and at the same time such criticism. It begins by investigating the period 
of evolution of the System from its rudimentary beginning through to the acceptance 
of the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection in 1991. This 30 year period 
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coresponds with the development of an international environmental conscience and is 
portrayed as an era in which the System evolved, adapted and changed according to 
altered perceptions of the unusual and highly prized environment of the Antarctic. 
The chapter then examines the notion that while the historical placement of the 
Antarctic Treaty is useful in understanding the content of the parent agreement, of 
more pragmatic benefit in analytical terms are the provisions of the Treaty and its 
subsequent embelishments. These are thought to be of greater assistance in 
understanding the nature of Antarctic ecosystem management today in the context 
pursued in this study. 
3.1 	 The Antarctic Treaty System 
In this study the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) refers to: 
...the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect under that 
Treaty, its associated separate international instruments in 
force and the measures in effect under those instruments. 
This description, formalized by the Antarctic Treaty Parties themselves in Article 1 of 
the Madrid Protocol to the Treaty, was chosen in order to bypass what could be a 
lengthy and only marginaly relevant discussion on the various meanings of the word 
system.224 
The Antarctic Treaty System is composed of three tiers of law: international legal 
obligations through binding agreements; less formal yet no-less important rules and 
regulations originating from meetings of the Parties; and the domestic enabling 
legislation of the Parties as sovereign states. This study concerns itself with the first 
two tiers only as the assumption is that they would not be in force without their 
implementation through domestic laws.225 
The Antarctic Treaty226 is the foundation of the System, which also includes the 
Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora227, the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals228, the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources229 and the Madrid Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.230 In addition, the Parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty have negotiated a Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities231, which did not enter into force.232 The System also includes 
sundry in-house meeting recommendations, the content of which may not be covered 
in the other more formal instruments of the System. 
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Treaty 
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ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
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Agreed 
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 
This System is embedded into the wider international legal system which comprises a 
range of regimes covering many subjects with relevance to the Antarctic. These 
include treaties on the marine areas, transboundary environmental pollution, climate 
change, atmospheric protection and the like, along with the soft law norms and 
principles which underpin international law generally. The relationship between the 
various regimes is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. The Placement of the Antarctic Treaty System Within the 
International Legal System 
This Antarctic legal regime did not develop in isolation from wider international legal 
regimes and must therefore be viewed in the context of the System being a component 
of the international legal order. It is important to note the cross-over into the 
international legal system of CCAS and CCAMLR, both of which allow for 
participation by states not party to the Antarctic Treaty. It is noted also that the Madrid 
Protocol and CRAMRA are not in force. The Agreed Measures and other Meeting 
Recommendations are contained wholly within the Antarctic Treaty System and do not 
cross over into the international realm. 
Each of these components of the System will be described in brief in order to illustrate 
the progressive development of an ecosystem management regime for the Antarctic 
and the corresponding dynamics of the ATS. 
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3.1.1 	 The Antarctic Treaty 
The Antarctic Treaty was drafted in 1959 and entered into force in 1961.23 The 
Treaty evolved before a strong environmental ethic was established within the 
international community, consequently it contains litle in terms of holistic ecosystem 
management principles. However it wil be shown that the Treaty has proved to be 
both robust and flexible enough to expand upon the scope of its original, rather 
rudimentary principles. In this sense the Treaty has been able to embrace ecological 
imperatives on a needs basis, albeit over a 35 year period. Importantly, the parent 
document contains a unique compromise on the isue of sovereignty by virtue of its 
Article IV, which has facilitated its growth into a system comprising a range of legal 
regimes dealing with the administration of the Antarctic by a disparate group of 
sovereign states. 
The Antarctic is, first and foremost, the world's only nuclear free, demilitarized zone. 
The Antarctic Treaty states specificaly that: 'Antarctica shall continue forever 
to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord' (Preamble). This is 
reinforced in Article 1 which expresly prohibits military activity (with the exception 
of logistic support for scientific activity) and Article V, which prohibits nuclear 
explosions and the disposal of nuclear waste. There is a nexus in Article V.2 to any 
international law which is concluded to deal specificaly with the nuclear isue. Indeed 
the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (agreed to 30 years after the Antarctic Treaty) 
has done just this by prohibiting absolutely the export of hazardous wastes to the 
Antarctic Treaty area south of 60° South.234 
The nucleus of the Antarctic Treaty is found in Article 2: 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and 
cooperation toward that end, as applied during the 
International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the 
provisions of the present Treaty. 
This reference to the IGY indicates acknowledgment by the Treaty Parties of the 
importance of both the science and the cooperation fostered by that event. Freedom of 
scientific investigation is cardinal to the operation of the Antarctic Treaty and is 
protected in al of the System's subsequent instruments. 
Article VI of the Treaty protects the freedoms of the high seas. A huge expanse of the 
Antarctic Treaty area (that is, south of 60° South, pursuant to Article VI) is high seas 
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and via this Article such international law as the United Nations LOSC, the 
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Polution from Ships (MARPOL), the Convention 
on the Prevention of Polution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mater (London 
Convention)235 and others are connected to the Treaty as external factors. This al 
provides some measure of protection for the Antarctic marine ecosystem, but is only 
binding on States which are party to either the Treaty or to these external agreements 
or in some cases, both.236 
The Parties to the Treaty are mandated to consider making environmental regulations 
via Article EK.1(0. Although this Article specificaly refers only to 'preservation 
and conservation of living resources in 	 (emphasis 
this does not preclude the taking of measures regarding non-living resources as wel, 
since the wording of Article pc!: '...including measures regarding: ..' (emphasis 
added) is not exclusive. In fact the Article alows the Treaty Parties to make decisions 
on any subject which is relevant to the Antarctic. 
The Article which has prompted the most discussion and remains the most contentious 
in law is Article IV which deals with the sovereign claims. Of sovereignty, one 
international lawyer has commented that: 'it is doubtful whether any single 
word has ever caused so much intellectual confusion and 
international lawlessness (Akehurst 1987:15). Given that the conflict; over 
teritorial sovereignty claims were so crucial in the Treaty negotiation process, Article 
IV stands alone as the single most important element in the Treaty. It atracts great 
controversy over its interpretation, with one commentator suggesting that '..it 
states what it does not mean and does not state what it was intended 
to mean' (Gruenig in Triggs 1985:199). • 
Article IV reads: 
1 	 Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be 
interpreted as:- 
(a)a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously 
asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica; 
(b)a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of 
any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
which it may have whether as a result of its activities or 
those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c)prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as 
regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other 
State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. 
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2 	 No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty 
is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, 
supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in 
Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be 
asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
(Antarctic Treaty Article IV) 
In the most reductionist terms, what Article IV means, in part, is that those states 
which have made claims to Antarctic teritory can maintain them; those which have not 
made claims but which might do so in the future, maintain that right; any Contracting 
Party to the Treaty can choose to recognise another's claim or not, as it sees fit; neither 
new claims nor enlargement of existing claims are alowed; but in any case, nothing 
anybody does wil in any way efect the present status quo regarding claims during 
the life of the Treaty. In short, Article IV appears to mean 	 things to all 
States' (Gruenig in Triggs 1985:201). Significantly, the principles of Article IV 
have been perpetuated in each instrument additional to the original Treaty (Bush 
1982:56-63). 
The Antarctic Treaty embraces a unique system of governance based on several 
categories of participants. Al states which are Contracting Parties to the Treaty (that 
is, have ratified the Treaty) are either original signatories, acceding states or 
succeeding states. Any state which is a member of the United Nations may accede to 
the Treaty; others may be invited after agreement between al of the Contracting Parties 
(Article XBI). Al Parties are entitled to send representatives to meetings. However, 
the original 12 signatories to the Antarctic Treaty automaticaly have Consultative Party 
(decision-making) status. Any other Contracting Party may become a Consultative 
Party: 
_during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its 
interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific 
research activity there, such as the establishment of a 
scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. 
(Article IX.2) 
Antarctic Treaty Parties meet annualy or at specialy convened sesions, to give efect 
to these principles and objectives of the Treaty. In addition to concluding binding 
pieces of international law like conventions and protocols, the Consultative Parties 
make recommendations by unanimous agreement. The representatives take these 
recommendations home to their state governments for consideration. The legal status 
of meeting decisions is uncertain. However, the botom line is that the Treaty Parties 
may be bound moraly, if not strictly legaly, to adopt and enforce recommendations 
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from their meetings, particularly in view of the fact that such decisions are reached by 
consensus.237 The Treaty Parties themselves consider that Recommendations are 
both legally binding and retroactive: Recommendation 7 of Meeting DEE regarding 
Acceptance of Approved Recommendations states that: 
Since the Recommendations approved by the Contracting Parties_ 
are so much a part of the overall structure of cooperation 
established by the Treaty, the Representatives recommend to 
their governments that any new Contracting Party entitled to 
participate in [such] meetings should be urged to consider 
accepting these recommendations and to inform other Contracting 
Parties of its intention to apply and be bound by them. 
In terms of effectiveness, accountability and legitimacy - the analytical parameters used 
in this study - the Antarctic Treaty presents opportunities to make only superficial 
judgments. The range of objectives like freedom of scientific investigation, nuclear-
free status and reconciled sovereignty claims for instance, can usefully be assessed 
according to the template on page 62. The Antarctic problem was essentially one of 
conflict over sovereignty, identified through the activities of the state governments, 
their explorers, Southern Ocean resources harvesters and scientific teams. Because no 
regime existed to manage the Antarctic, the interested parties agreed that one was 
necessary and accordingly negotiated the Antarctic Treaty. The regime did not arise 
spontaneously, nor was it necessarily imposed, although there are indications that 
entrepreneurial and intellectual leaders guided the negotiations (Hall 1994). In terms 
of legitimacy, the Treaty represented the most agreeable alternative to all of the parties 
collectively, despite what some would see as its compromise on sovereignty 
questions. The wider international community, not represented explicitly within the 
Treaty group, did not immediately dispute the legitimacy of the regime, hence at this 
point its legitimacy must be assumed. 
The procedural and substantive devices employed by the Treaty ensure a measure of 
effectiveness. The Treaty Parties are bound by the principles of freedom of scientific 
investigation, the nuclear-free status, inspection procedures and so on, and are also 
obliged to 'exert appropriate efforts' to ensure that no-one breaches the spirit 
and intent of the Treaty (Article X). 
Unfortunately, there are few measures which display overt accountability. There are, 
for instance, no liability rules, no indications of how compliance is ensured and no 
sanctions. Rather, compliance is voluntary, based on the possibility of scrutiny via 
the inspection procedures in Article VII. The best that the Treaty offers is a dispute 
mechanism (Article XI) based primarily on in-house, peaceful means, but with an 
optional remedy of the International Court of Justice for judicial settlement. The 
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original Treaty did not encourage the public dissemination of information, and this 
secretive nature of the Treaty mechanism has attracted much criticism over the 
years.238 However subsequent modifications have made documents from Treaty 
Meetings available to the public, unless otherwise indicated by the Parties 
(Recommendation XIV.1, 1987). Regime accountability, originally low, has been 
considerably enhanced by this move. 
It should be emphasised, moreover, that in measuring legitimacy, effectiveness and 
accountability, such judgments must be made within the context of the explicit 
principles and objectives of the original Antarctic Treaty. In this sense, the Antarctic 
has remained demilitarized, is free of nuclear waste, is still a locus of energetic, 
cooperative scientific activity and has not become the scene or object of international 
discord.239 Each of the subsequent embellishments to the parent document have 
succeeded in increasing the Treaty's overall operating accomplishments and 
acceptability, although the road ahead was not always smooth and well sign-posted. 
In terms of responsibility for the global ecosystem, the Antarctic Treaty offers little 
evidence of acknowledgment, primarily because the evolution of most components of 
this ethic post-date the Treaty. Language similar to the common heritage of mankind 
concept and the notion of respect for future generations is used. In an indirect and 
abstract way, the Preamble acknowledges these concepts by stating that '...i t is in 
the interest of all mankind that the Antarctic shall continue 
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes'andfurther, that 
the freedom of scientific investigation accords with the interests of science '...and the 
progress of all mankind' (emphasis added). These references do not apply in a 
literal sense as the Treaty area is not considered a global commons area beyond 
national jurisdiction by the Parties to the Treaty, nor are future generations mentioned 
explicitly. The Treaty did not advance an opportunity to incorporate the polluter pays 
principle as development, upon which the principle rests, was not considered likely. 
Hence the notion of sustainability was not an issue; nor was the principle of acting in a 
precautionary manner with regard to scientific certainty or risk thresholds. The most 
important component of the Antarctic Treaty is Article IV, which redefines sovereignty 
so that it does not impair the ability of the Parties to make decisions regarding a region 
which they have determined to be more appropriately considered as a whole rather 
than as individual sectors of claimed sovereign jurisdiction. 
One of the first substantive environmental directives to come from a Treaty meeting 
recommendation was the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna 
and Flora. The Agreed Measures is the first evidence of the Treaty Parties' ability to 
adapt policies in line with changing circumstances. It is through studies of this and the 
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other instruments in the System that the parameters of efectivenes, accountability and 
legitimacy are more beneficialy measured, and the notion of responsibility for the 
global ecosystem becomes more obvious. 
3.1.2 	 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora 
Although the Antarctic was to be used for peaceful (scientific) purposes only, the 
Treaty Parties recognised that many activities had the potential to cause environmental 
harm. Therefore they moved to mitigate harm by constituting the Agreed Measures for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora in 1964. 
The history of the Agreed Measures is documented in the Handbook of the Antarctic 
Treaty System (Heap 1990a:2402-10). Folowing the advice of the Scientific 
Commitee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), Recommendation 8 of Meeting II 
elaborated the concept of the Antarctic Treaty Area as a Special Conservation Area 
composed of Specialy Protected Areas and Specialy Protected Species. Regulations 
sought a prohibition on the: 
_killing, wounding, capturing or molesting of any native mammal 
or native bird, or any attempt at any such act, except in 
accordance with a permit. 
(Article V.1) 
Permits constituted the writen permision of an 'appropriate authority', that is, 
any person authorised by a participating government to isue permits (Article I (d) 
and (e). A permit could be isued for the provision of indispensable food for men or 
dogs, for scientific specimens or for museum specimens. A caveat required that 
Specialy Protected Species could only be taken for 'compelling scientific 
purpose' (Article V.7 (a), providing such taking did not '..jeopardise the 
existing natural ecological system or the survival of that species' 
(Article V.7 (b). There was, however, no barometer for gauging how such jeopardy 
could be measured. 
Areas of 'outstanding scientific interest' were designated Specialy Protected 
Areas (Article W11) in which the colection of flora, the driving of vehicles and 
indeed entry itself was restricted without a permit. Once again, permits could be 
isued for compeling scientific purposes which could not be served elsewhere, 
providing the resulting actions did not jeopardize the natural ecological system existing 
in the Area (Article VI11.3 - 4). Importantly, Article IX.1 prohibited the introduction 
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of alien species of flora and fauna into the Antarctic Treaty Area, south of 600  South, 
except in accordance with a permit. 
The Agreed Measures was required to be legislated through state governments to give 
it legal effect; in the meantime it was issued as an interim guideline (Recommendation 
M.9). SCAR was given the task of overseeing and reporting on the efficacy of the 
Agreed Measures (Recommendation M.10). The Agreed Measures was able to be 
amended as necessary and subsequent amendments were made following experience 
with their application and increased knowledge of the Antarctic environment (Heap 
1990a:2406). 
Although it receives little academic attention today because of its relatively narrow 
focus and lack of definition, on reflection the Agreed Measures was probably 
visionary for its time, that is, 1964. In this sense, it could be considered to have a 
medium degree of legitimacy (according to the parameters in Figure 2, p.62). At the 
time, little was understood about the devastating ecosystem damage that human 
activity was causing around the world and very little of this kind of species and special 
area protection was instituted elsewhere, apart from the national parks systems. But 
the Antarctic Treaty States could see, first-hand, the potential dangers to the resources 
of their region and moved to take responsibility for them. 
Unfortunately, the Agreed Measures was a Treaty Recommendation only and did not 
have the full force of an independent legal instrument.240 Accordingly, despite the 
permit system, the later amendments on cooperation between proximate stations and 
the standardization of the format for exchanged information, all of which contributed 
to a measure of control, accountability was limited. The permit system was loose and 
there were no adequate methods of policing specially protected areas. Effectiveness 
was thus also reduced, although in fairness the original objectives of the 
Recommendation were admirable. In hindsight it could be said that as a first attempt, 
the Agreed Measures was useful, if for no other reason than it showed the Treaty 
Parties what needed to be done in the area of fauna and flora protection. 
Casually embracing ecosystem principles, the Agreed Measures was a start. The area 
protection mechanism has been refined many times since and is the basis upon which 
the current area management practices are founded. All species of Fur and Ross Seals 
in the Antarctic Treaty area were protected under Annex A of the Agreed Measures but 
despite recognition of the susceptibility to extermination of all Antarctic fauna, the 
Agreed Measures was not applicable to the high seas, where commercial whaling and 
sealing had been responsible for reducing whale and seal stocks. This was one 
serious anomaly which required several attempts at regulation before a measure of 
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success was achieved. The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
(CCAS) was the first atempt. 
3.1.3 	 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals 
The Consultative Parties chose an independent legal instrument - a convention, rather 
than a meeting recommendation - to signal their seriousness about the conservation of 
Antarctic seals. At the outset the Seals Convention had a greater measure of both 
efectiveness and accountability than the Agreed Measures because of the independent 
legal status of the instrument. Legitimacy was not in question, as the Antarctic Treaty 
States were obviously in the prime position to determine what kind of regulations were 
appropriate in their area of administration and their actions went unchalenged by the 
international community. 
The Seals Convention was signed in 1972 but did not enter into force until 1978.241 
Only Parties at the 1972 London Conference were entitled to ratify the Convention, 
but others could be invited by the Contracting Parties to accede to it (Articles 10 and 
12). This further increased the legitimacy of the regime by alowing non-Treaty 
States the right to participate in the Seals Convention.242 
The prohibitions contained in CCAS extended from pelagic sealing south of 600 South 
(Article 1.1), to the taking of fauna of the ice pack, and the protection of stocks in 
their terestrial habitat (Annex). This was a vast improvement over the protective 
rules under the Agreed Measures. In the Interim Guidelines issued prior to the 
adoption of CCAS, the term maximum sustainable yield made its debut in Antarctic 
environmental terminology (Recommendation D7.21). This introduced both the 
concept of sustainable development (development being, in this case, harvesting) and 
some precautionary behaviour in the practice of pelagic sealing. This recommendation 
also acknowledged the value of seals in the 'natural ecological system', thereby 
embracing a more ecosystem-orientated perspective. 
Seal species either wholy or partly protected under CCAS included Southern 
Elephant, Leopard, Weddel, Crabeater, Ross and Southern Fur Seals (Article 1.2). 
Importantly, the Annex to the Convention prescribed permissible catches, protected 
species vagaries, seasons, zones, reserves and methods. The taking of seals for 
scientific research was alowed provided a permit was obtained from the national 
authority. 
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A 10-year review of CCAS held in 1988 elaborated and extended some elements of the 
Convention, particularly with respect to clarification of the objectives and 
interpretation of the permit system (Heap 1990a:4113). It was at this review that 
serious concerns were raised about the accidental introduction of infectious diseases 
and it was decided to minimise the contact between the sled dogs and seals in the 
Convention area as a precaution.243 
The review meeting concluded that the Convention's operation was reasonably 
satisfactory. Seal captures and kils by permit were reported as being low, 
consequently they could not be considered to have had any '..s igni f i cant adverse 
effect on any seal populations' (Heap 1990a:4112). Furthermore, no 
commercial sealing was envisaged in the near future (Heap 1990a:4112). However, 
CCAS Parties were reminded of the importance of their reporting obligations pursuant 
to Article 4.2. The obvious inference from this information is that the Seals 
Convention could be considered reasonably efective in terms of its original 
objectives, as actor behaviour had been changed. However, a counterpoint may be 
that the taking of seals was not being reported, or was being under-reported. 
There have been some tragic instances of gross over-exploitation of Antarctic living 
marine resources: seals in the early 1800s, whales in the 1800s and again in the 1900s 
and fin fish in the mid-1960s. The Seals Convention was rather more reactive than 
preventative as it was established to deal with over-exploitation after the event, in 
addition to managing and protecting existing stocks. The Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), on the other hand, 
provided a major turning point in the philosophy of the Antarctic Treaty Parties 
towards both the exploitation and protection of marine resources. 
3.1.4 	 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources 
Fish are a common property, open-access, highly prized resource. Unmanaged or 
poorly-managed exploitation has brought disastrous consequences: historicaly, 
fisheries have been over-harvested and in such circumstances, the harvesters have 
simply moved on to new grounds. As the historical account of Chapter 2 indicated, 
the Southern Ocean has been no exception. The 1964 Agreed Measures was not 
applicable to the high seas and therefore did not give any protection to the living 
resources of the high seas. In any case, the Agreed Measures was only a Treaty 
Recommendation and had uncertain legal standing. Furthermore, the 1972 Seals 
Convention dealt only with seals. But there are far more resources than just seals and 
whales in the Southern Ocean. 
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In the 1960s fm fisheries were wel established in the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic 
waters, with an experimental kril fishery begun early in the 1970s. Kril had then, 
and stil has now, the potential to be the largest single crustacean species fishery in the 
world. 
In general terms, there are several reasons why fisheries resources need to be 
managed: 
The resources are plentiful and could make significant contributions to world 
food supplies; 
• Interdependence between vital elements of the food chain is not wel understood; 
• The notion that resources should be maintained in an optimal condition; 
and with particular reference to the Antarctic — 
• 	 the efects a large-scale kril fishery might have on the species which feed on 
kril, which, in the Antarctic ecosystem, is almost every living thing in the food 
chain above kril, were poorly understood. 
Some kind of management of the kril fishery was therefore indicated, seemingly as a 
mater of urgency before the traditional open access patern of harvesting wrought 
havoc on that resource too. 
Building on the successful negotiation of the Seals Convention, the Treaty Parties took 
issue with the possibility of over-exploitation of kril and other Southern Ocean living 
resources. By 1975 the Parties had embodied these concerns in Recommendation 10 
of Meeting VILE, stating their objectives to be protection, scientific study and rational 
use of marine living resources (Heap 1990a:4201). Scientific study was seen as the 
conduit to both protection and rational use. 
In 1976, SCAR established the Biological Investigation of Marine Antarctic Systems 
and Stocks (BIOMASS) program of research,244 which was assisted by reports from 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. As a consequence, kril resources were 
elevated to a principal position of importance in the food chain. Furthermore, the 
motivation to establish a mechanism for marine resource management became more 
urgent with the development of extended coastal state jurisdiction over fisheries, which 
was an integral part of the UNCLOS II negotiations of the time (Heap 1990a:4201). 
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Using the Treaty mechanism of ad hoc Special Consultative Meetings, negotiations 
began in February 1978 and were concluded in May 1980. The Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) was opened for 
signature by those who attended the 1980 Canberra Conference (Article XXVI) and 
thereafter by any states or regional economic organizations interested in research or 
harvesting in the Southern Ocean (Article XXIX). 245 The inclusion of non-Treaty 
states and regional economic groups in the CCAMLR regime was an enhancement of 
the regime's legitimacy, tempering but not jeopardizing the Treaty Parties' exclusive 
rights over all matters Antarctic. 
CCAMLR entered into force on 7 April 1982. The Commission for CCAMLR, 
established under Article VII, was the first Antarctic Treaty organisation — the first time 
the Treaty Parties had acknowledged the utility of an organ independent of the Treaty 
Meeting process. 246 By virtue of this Commission, CCAMLR has legal personality 
(Article VIII), that is, it is: 
a subject of the law-capable of possessing international rights 
and duties and having the capacity to maintain its rights by 
bringing international claims. 247 
Article XII provides for consensus voting on issues of substance by the Commission, 
consistent with common practice in the Antarctic Treaty Meetings. This effectively 
gives the Treaty Consultative Parties, which are also parties to CCAMLR, a veto and 
maintains their elite position within the System by ensuring that their domestic interests 
and priorities prevail. This is not necessarily a bad thing while their interests accord 
with the interests of the wider international community with regard to marine resource 
management. The fact that non-harvesters outnumber harvesters in the membership of 
CCAMLR makes little difference because of this consensus voting arrangement. 
Consensus decisions, while obviously much harder to reach, are likely to be more 
effective. 
CCAMLR could be said to have a measure of legitimacy which is unprecedented in 
terms of the Antarctic Treaty System because of its legal standing, its inclusion of 
external participants and its accountability through the public release of published 
information. 248 Moreover it has some other noteworthy features. The northern limit 
of CCAMLR's area of application coincides with the so-called Antarctic Convergence, 
the circumpolar bio-geographic boundary where the cold northerly-moving water sinks 
below the warmer, southerly-moving sub-tropical water (Article I.1). This gives 
CCAMLR a biological as opposed to a political foundation for its conservation 
measures. It is the first extension of an area of application past the Treaty boundaries 
(south of 60° South). In fact, the primacy of the role of science is evidenced 
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throughout CCAMLR, which establishes a Scientific Committee as a consultative body 
to its Commission (Article XIV). 
Krill is a much prized crustacean and the Antarctic Treaty Parties, aware of the 
potential global importance of this seemingly abundant marine resource,249 chose to 
regulate its harvesting before the threshhold of risk was reached (Article II). This is a 
good example of the emerging soft law precautionary approach with regard to a living 
resource. CCAMLR did not, however, include extra protection for whales and seals, 
which were already regulated under the Whaling and Sealing Conventions (Article VI). 
Although its conservation principles were defined to include rational use (Article 11.2), 
the Convention contains the requirement that exploited populations do not fall below a 
level close to that which ensures their greatest net annual increase (Article II.3(a)) 250 ; 
depleted populations must be restored to such levels and the ecological relationships 
between harvested dependent and related species must be maintained (Article 113(b)); 
and risks of changes to the marine ecosystem that are not potentially reversible over 
two or three decades must be minimised (Article 11.3(c)). This is an ecosystem 
approach to rational use of Antarctic marine living resources (excluding whales and 
seals) as opposed to a single species approach, and is supported by the Scientific 
Committee which collects, studies and exchanges data. 251 
Lastly, two further dimensions to CCAMLR deserve comment. Article IX.6(c) and 
(d) are essentially opt-out clauses, through which Members can choose whether or not 
to accept and be bound by a particular conservation measure. Article XXI designates 
that compliance is voluntary. Given the physical dimensions of the Southern Ocean, 
this means too that compliance is almost certainly unenforceable. These loopholes 
have the potential to jeopardize the overall effectiveness of the regime. 
As an aside, it is also important to note the wording of Article P1.2(b) regarding the 
exercise of coastal state jurisdiction in international iaW. 252 This issue is taken up 
further in the concluding Chapter in the context of the Law of the Sea, exclusive 
economic zones and the current debate about whether coastal states actually exist in the 
Antarctic. 
In terms of measuring CCAMLR's effectiveness, it must be restated that such a 
judgment should only be made against its explicit biological objectives of conservation 
through rational use, rather than against any implicit political objectives like 
maintaining the status quo of sovereign claims or maintaining the exclusivity of the 
Treaty Parties' management of the Southern Ocean resources. Because the operation 
of CCAMLR involves an exercise of power over the allocation and distribution of 
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resources, it is bound to be more contentious than purely regulatory regimes like the 
Agreed Measures or the Seals Convention. Accordingly, when measuring 
efectivenes, account needs to be taken of the balance between CCAMLR's 
conservation principles and its rational use principles. The problem is that if catch data 
is inaccurately reported or scientific advice is ignored or the power of veto is exercised 
to protect domestic interests, measurements of efectivenes must reflect this. 
Furthermore, a regime would be considered seriously flawed if it alowed these types 
of anomalies to unbalance its objectives. 
Overal CCAMLR scores reasonably highly with regard to legitimacy, accountability 
and responsibility. Not surprisingly, the area where it does not score wel is 
efectivenes. Unfortunately this is consistent with the performance of other 
international fisheries regimes and in this instance is based upon the fact that there is 
no evidence available to suggest that species have been protected as such. This may be 
more a product of lack of information rather than lack of efectivenes on the part of 
the regime. 
Although it was dificult to negotiate a regime for fisheries management, the 
concurent UNCLOS 111 negotiations had already provided both a measure of 
confidence and some basic guidelines. Moreover, negotiating CCAMLR was 
relatively easy considering what was next on the agenda: the regulation of mineral 
resource activities. 
3.1.5 	 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic 
Mineral Resource Activities 
The developments discused so far had been posible through the Treaty System's 
evolution and adaptation in response to a degree of scientific prompting from SCAR. 
There was nothing within the System, however, which prepared the Parties for 
dealing with the isue of mineral resource activities. Ironicaly it was to be the 
conclusion by the Treaty Parties that unregulated mineral activity was more likely to 
pose serious environmental hazards than regulated activity, which led them to cal on 
SCAR experts to investigate the System's options in this regard in the late 1970s. 
In hindsight, the findings of the SCAR experts are noteworthy: 
- there are no known mineral reserves - deposits of a size and quality to be potentialy exploitable in the Antarctic; 
- such resources as there may be are unlikely to be economicaly exploitable until wel into the next century, if ever; and 
138 
- the technology does not yet exist to cope adequately with the particular 
challenges of the Antarctic environment, particularly off-shore. 253 
- Therefore there is no need to negotiate a regime at this stage. 
(Heap 1990a:4301) 
Nevertheless the Parties did proceed with the negotiation of CRAMRA. The question 
must be asked: Why? Most commentators agree that it was an anticipatory move in 
which the Parties were concerned more with possibilities than with probabilities, and 
with a preference for regulation before the fact rather than after. 254 The Antarctic 
Treaty Parties had successfully concluded CCAMLR, which dealt with living 
resources, and this had left a void in the System: there was no regime for management 
of non-living resources. 
CRAMRA was concluded in 1988 after six years of intense negotiations. 
Unfortunately, the final instrument attracted the title of 'Minerals Convention' and 
was, rightly or wrongly, perceived as being pro-mining. It is true that the Convention 
did permit mining - at the end of an elaborate qualification procedure - but CRAMRA 
arguably contained some of the most stringent safeguards with relation to the 
environment (Blay 1992:377). There is little point in labouring over the provisions of 
CRAMRA as is unlikely that it will ever enter into force. 255 However it does contain 
several significant articles, especially ones regarding liability — one essential issue the 
Treaty Parties are yet to adequately address. 
The first stated objective of CRAMRA is to assess '...the possible impact on the 
environment of Antarctic mineral resource activities (Article 2.1(a)). 
Further, should such activities occur, the Parties to the Convention are reminded of 
their special obligations to, inter alia: 
(a) protect the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems; 
(b) respect Antarctica's significance for, and influence on, the 
global environment; 
(c) respect other legitimate uses of Antarctica; and 
(d) respect Antarctica's scientific value and aesthetic and 
wilderness qualities. 
(Article 2.3 (a)-(d)) 
Once again the Parties had taken an ecosystem perspective, but while virtuous in 
tenor, no specific definitions were given to guide the Parties about the meaning of 
damage, what conduct caused damage or how to measure impact. 
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CRAMRA would have established a quite substantial organizational and regulatory 
infrastructure comprising the Antarctic Mineral Resources Commission, an Advisory 
Committee, Special Meetings of Parties, Regulatory Committees, a Secretariat and 
any subsidiary bodies that might have been required. These would have been 
financed by prospecting, exploration and development fees, levies on Operators and 
contributions from the Parties to the Convention. 
Essentially there would have been three levels of activity: i) prospecting, which 
would not have required authorization by the organizations within CRAMRA but 
would have required a Sponsoring State; ii) exploration, which would have 
required a permit; and iii) development, which would have been the final 
exploitation phase of mineral resource activity. 
Article 8 of CRAMRA relating to Response Action and Liability required that each 
'Operator' (that is, prospector or miner) should have a 'sponsoring state' (that is, 
a Treaty Party) and that the State could become, under certain circumstances, 
residually liable for the actions of the Operator. This had major implications in terms 
of both effectiveness and accountability, as a mechanism for acquiring appropriate 
compensation and also as a mechanism for ensuring the compliance by the Sponsoring 
State with their obligations. Further, Article 8.9 required that an annex on liability be 
concluded before any applications for exploration or development permits would be 
issued.256 The operation of CRAMRA was thus contingent upon the adoption of 
liability measures. This was an extraordinary measure of accountability in Antarctic 
Treaty System terms. 
How could such an instrument as CRAMRA fail? It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that 
the burgeoning world-wide environmental movement had gained momentum 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s. There were concepts such as greenhouse and ozone; 
there were oil spills (the Exxon Valdez off Alaska and the modest yet nonetheless 
severe Bahia Paraiso off the Antarctic Peninsula, and others); and suddenly, though 
perhaps not surprisingly, the polar regions began to take on a particularly vulnerable 
profile for environmentalists. There was a groundswell of environmental lobbying 
against CRAMRA, based primarily on what the lobbyists saw as a lack of specific 
environmental' protection regulations against all activities, as well as those concerning 
mineral resources. But there were also endemic problems within CRAMRA itself. 
CRAMRA, like most pieces of international law, was an instrument full of 
compromises. For instance, it failed to acknowledge two issues central to the claimant 
states: requests for mining royalties to be paid to claimants, and a prohibition on 
subsidised mining (Bergin 1990). Because the power of the claimants' position 
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within the Antarctic Treaty System was supreme CRAMRA, through its failure to 
accommodate this explicitly, was doomed. It was a force majeure, with just too many 
credible criticisms, suggesting that the Parties had taken the wrong policy and law 
approaches to the issue of Antarctic non-living resources (Joyner 1994). The 
relativity of the exploitative versus environmental measures simply had no place in 
modern Antarctic management. 
It has been suggested that CRAMRA left the Treaty System a legacy of legitimacy. 
(Joyner 1994). Legitimacy, according to Joyner, arises when states impose legal 
obligations upon themselves. Yet by rejecting CRAMRA, and particularly Articles 2 
and 4 which contained the environmental principles, the legitimacy of CRAMRA was 
disputed by the Parties themselves. 257 Rather, it could be said that CRAMRA left 
them a legacy of illegitimacy. 
Australia and France were the first claimant-state dissenters; they were able to effect a 
veto because all seven claimant states were required to ratify CRAMRA (pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 62.1). Australia and France set out on another course 
entirely - that of greening the Antarctic.258 Many other Antarctic states followed their 
lead, which culminated in a series of four Special Consultative Meetings held in the 
space of less than one year. The compromise Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty was finally adopted — in lightning speed in Treaty terms — in 
1991.259 
The pre-Protocol Antarctic Treaty System comprised an array of legal regimes, as 
described above. While many of their objectives were similar with regard to respect 
for the Antarctic environment, comprehensive ecosystem protection would only be 
achieved by drawing together these hitherto ad hoc components into one new 
instrument. Although each regime was a component of the broader Antarctic Treaty 
System, their piece-meal development and somewhat inconsistent environmental 
principles did not necessarily accord with the sophisticated ecosystem approach 
advocated for the 21st century. The Antarctic Treaty Parties therefore had no choice 
but to negotiate their way out of CRAMRA, which contained environmental 
provisions relating to mineral resource activity only, and into a legal instrument which 
would provide so much more in the way of substantive ecosystem protection and 
restrictions on all human activity. World opinion dictated that this should be so, 
particularly since: 
...most people know it is fundamentally crazy to be thinking 
about obtaining oil and other minerals that may be in the 
Antarctic, particularly in view of the latest reports from the 
scientific community in the climate context. 
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(Barnes 1992:21-2) 
This work would not be complete without a brief mention of the role of environmental 
NGOs in the demise of CRAMRA. 
• 	 Role of Environmental NGOs 
The Antarctic Treaty System has relied, to varying degrees, on the advice of experts in 
formulating its policies on the Antarctic. These have included SCAR, the World 
Health Organization, the International Maritime Organization and others. However, 
the System has constantly resisted the advances of environmental NG0s. Despite 
this, three principal NGOs have maintained a strong profile in Antarctic afairs: 
Greenpeace International, the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) and the 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC). 
These three NG0s, which al had a long history of interest and involvement in 
Antarctic afairs, became involved with the issue of mineral resource activities. The 
groups each employed unique terminology and methods for geting their message 
across, for mobilizing public sentiment, and for participating in the negotiation 
process. However, they did have one common goal: the comprehensive protection of 
the Antarctic ecosystem.260 The ACF, for example, had begun its push for the 
Antarctic to be declared a World Park in the 1970s and had carefuly cultivated 
beneficial Australian political aliances since that time.261 The campaign of the ACF 
was primarily located in the Australian domestic arena, where its credibility and 
legitimacy as an environmental crusader was wel established. Through its political 
connections, the ACF gained representation at Treaty meetings by having its staf 
chosen as delegation members, and to put its message across in an educative, non-
confrontationist manner. 
Greenpeace International was less circumspect than the ACF. Greenpeace is wel 
known internationaly for its direct-action style of campaigning and this is possibly 
due in some measure to the fact that Greenpeace is wholy funded from public 
subscription (compared with ACF, for example, which does accept government grants 
and support); hence it feels more of an imperative to make its presence felt and its 
opinions known in very positive terms (Wiliams 1993:57). Greenpeace went straight 
to the heart of the mater in the summer of 1986 by establishing its own base in the 
Antarctic - World Park Base at Cape Evans on Ross Island. From here Greenpeace 
was able to cary out inspections of other stations; to gather evidence of environmental 
malpractice; to show the ATS how an environmentaly-friendly base could operate; 
and to conduct minimal scientific programs in an atempt to atract legitimacy to its 
campaign and to its presence in Treaty teritory.262 
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Significantly Greenpeace, through its actual presence on the ice, was able to mobilize 
media support and public hysteria over the issue of Antarctic mineral resource 
activities. Greenpeace was also instrumental in the campaign to save the Antarctic by 
being in a financial position strong enough to enable them to support the third, and 
perhaps the major environmental NGO, ASOC. 
The Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition was formed in 1977 and is composed of 
about 60 interest groups. Unlike Greenpeace and ACF, the primary focus of ASOC 
is, as its name suggests, Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Accordingly, as early as 
1983 ASOC was granted official observer status within the CCAMLR regime. This 
official legitimacy meant that ASOC was almost an insider. In fact, with ASOC on 
board, Greenpeace was able to quit its improbable pursuit of insider status and to 
attach itself to the legitimacy of ASOC. As an observer ASOC attended the XVIth 
ATCM in Bonn in 1991; the XV[Ith meeting in Venice in 1992 (along with IUCN); 
and the XVIIIth ATCM in Kyoto in 1994 (along with both IUCN and UNEP). 
Factions developed within the Antarctic Treaty System during the CRAMRA debate. 
Some states were pro-mining; some were anti-mining; and some were more cautious, 
desiring to see both protection of the environment and rational use of resources 
covered by some kind of control mechanism. The concerted push, both domestically 
and internationally, by the world-wide network of environmental NGOs was 
instrumental in the re-shaping of Antarctic policy in favour of the more comprehensive 
protection of the environment and the corresponding total , prohibition of commercial 
mineral resource activities. 
In summary, a dedicated regime - the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to 
the Antarctic Treaty - was formed because the existing regimes (Agreed Measures, 
CCAS, CCAMLR and CRAMRA) were inappropriate in terms of holistic ecosystem 
management, despite whatever credibility they had as autonomous regulations for 
issue-specific areas. While there was a high degree of legitimacy within the pre-
Protocol ATS, both effectiveness and accountability scored only marginally well. 
Thus in terms of overall responsibility for the global ecosystem, it was not until the 
Protocol came along that any true measure of general accountability was to be found. 
The next section will look at the Protocol in more detail to see how well it measures up 
within the analytical purview of this study. 
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3 . 2 	 The Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
The study so far has presented a description of the Antarctic region, its political and 
scientific history, geophysical architecture and the environmental ethics of the 
Antarctic Treaty System, as background to the analysis which is to folow. 
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Madrid Protocol) 
was concluded on 4 October 1991 in Madrid.263 The Treaty Parties met at specialy-
convened sessions of the XIth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, in Chile in 
November 1990 and again in Madrid in April, June and October of 1991. The 
instrument is not yet in force. 
The Madrid Protocol re-defines the Antarctic Treaty area and re-casts the rules and 
regulations governing behaviour there into more ecosystem-orientated terms. It is a 
framework instrument into which minimum standards are embedded as a guide 
towards future directions of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
3.2.1 	 The Antarctic : 'A Natural Reserve Devoted to 
Peace and Science' 
The Madrid Protocol contains 27 Articles, a Schedule on Arbitration and five Annexes 
which, according to Article 9, are to be considered integral parts of the Protocol itself. 
The Annexes elaborate on the issues of Environmental Impact Assessment, 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, Waste Disposal and Waste Management, 
Prevention of Marine Polution and Area Protection and Management. In addition, the 
Parties to the Protocol are to conclude a further annex on liability, pursuant to Article 
16. 
The nature of the Protocol is such that it represents a framework document containing 
broad, fundamental principles and directives which are further defined in the Annexes. 
The amendment procedure contained within each annex makes them ideal vehicles for 
progressively up-dating the details of environmental protection, without the need to 
negotiate a completely new parent document. 
The objective of the Madrid Protocol is found in Article 2: 
The parties commit themselves to the comprehensive protection 
of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems and hereby designate Antarctica as a natural 
reserve, devoted to peace and science. 
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This objective wil be atained through giving fundamental consideration in the 
planning and conduct of al activities in the Antarctic Treaty Area to the environmental 
principles contained in Article 3. Specificaly, such activities should limit adverse 
impacts on the total ecosystem (Article 3.2(a), emphasis added). Activities should 
avoid having adverse afects on climate or weather paterns; air or water quality; the 
atmospheric, terestrial, glacial or marine environments; the distribution, abundance or 
productivity of species or populations of fauna and flora; or placing in further 
jeopardy endangered or threatened species; or degradation of, or risk to, areas of 
biological, scientific, historic, aesthetic or wilderness significance (Article 3.2(b), 
emphasis added). 
Parties to the Protocol are directed that in the making of planning decisions, account 
should be taken of, inter alia, cumulative impacts, detrimental efects, safety of 
technology and whether there exists a capacity to monitor the ecosystem, identify 
problems and provide early warning of and response to adverse efects (Article 
3.2(c)(i)-(vi). In addition, the predicted impacts of on-going activities must be 
verified (Article 3.2(d) along with unforeseen efects (Article 3.2(e). Scientific 
research is given priority in the planning of activities (Article 3.3). 
Any activities, governmental or otherwise, can be modified, suspended or canceled if 
they result in, or threaten to result in, '...impacts upon the Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated ecosystems inconsistent with 
[those] principles' (Article 3.4(b). Criticism regarding Article 3 focuses on the 
fact that it is couched in hortatory language. Despite this, Article 3 contains the 
binding principles for environmental protection (Joyner 1995:19) 
Any activity relating to mineral resources, other than scientific research, is prohibited, 
according to Article 7.264 
These environmental principles of the Protocol are further elaborated in its Articles 8 
and 9. Article 8 provides for environmental impact assessments to be caried out on 
three levels of activity having: 
1 	 less than minor or transitory impact; 
2 	 a minor or transitory impact; 
3 	 more than a minor or transitory impact. 
(Article 8.1) 
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The Parties are refered to Annex I for further instructions in this area (Article 8.1, 
8.3). The environmental impact asesment (ETA) proces is further discused later 
in this Chapter. 
Article 9 stipulates that annexes are integral to the Protocol (Article 9.1) and that 
additional annexes may be adopted as necesary, in addition to those already 
mentioned (Article 9.2). 
The stated principles of the Protocol atract a high score in terms of responsibility for 
the global ecosystem by embracing an ecosystem approach to al Antarctic activity. 
How, then, wil this comprehensive regime function? 
3.2.2 	 Conditions of Operation of the Madrid Protocol 
The Madrid Protocol supplements the Antarctic Treaty but does not stand alone 
because it relies on the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings for much of its 
procedural direction. The Protocol's direct link to its parent instrument is embodied in 
Articles 4 and 5: 
1. This Protocol shall supplement the Antarctic Treaty and 
shall neither modify nor amend that Treaty. 
2. Nothing in this Protocol shall derogate from the rights 
and obligations of the Parties to this Protocol under the 
other international instruments in force within the 
Antarctic Treaty System. (Article 4) 
and Article 5: 
The Parties shall consult and cooperate with the Contracting 
Parties to the other international instruments in force within 
the Antarctic Treaty System and their respective institutions 
with a view to ensuring the achievement of the objectives and 
principles of this Protocol and avoiding any interference with 
the achievement of the objectives and principles of those 
instruments or any inconsistency between the implementation of 
those instruments and of this Protocol. 
These two Articles preserve the status quo of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
Notwithstanding, it was necesary to insert an entreaty to the Parties to ensure that 
cooperation was maintained (Article 6).265 Importantly, the Protocol also pays 
respect to adjacent jurisdictions, urging Parties to cooperate with such states so as to 
ensure activities in the Antarctic Treaty area do not cause trans-frontier environmental 
harm (Article 6.3). This external linkage adds legitimacy to the System in general and 
to the Protocol in particular. 
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The conditions of operation of the regime are divided into two categories: the 
procedural or administrative devices which determine how it wil function, and 
substantive mechanisms which regulate behaviour and create legal obligations. 
• 	 Procedural Devices Within the Madrid Protocol 
The Protocol contains a range of procedural devices to ensure that its primary objective 
is atained. The Protocol via its Articles 4 and 5, adopts the Treaty's Article 1X on the 
nature of meetings: who can be present; their status; the exchange of information; and 
consultation, formulation and policy recommendation on the Antarctic (Treaty Article 
IX. 1-3). Article IX of the Treaty also regulates the procedure for policy to become 
efective (Treaty Article IX.4-5). 
Article 11 of the Protocol establishes a Commitee for Environmental Protection 
(CEP). There are two tiers of participants in CEP: representatives from al Protocol 
Parties (Article 11.2); and representatives from any Antarctic Treaty Parties which are 
not a party to the Protocol. The participation of this later group is restricted to 
observer status only (Article 11.3). The heads of both SCAR and CCAMLR's 
Scientific Commitee are invited as observers, along with anyone else the Commitee 
sees fit to invite, with the approval of an Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (Article 
11.4). A Transitional Environmental Working Group (TEWG) has been set up as an 
interim body until the Protocol comes into force and the CEP is formaly 
established.266 
The rules of procedure for the CEP are to be laid down by Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings (Article 11.6) which also hold responsibility for reviewing the 
work of the CEP (Article 10.2). Importantly for the assessment of accountability, the 
CEP is to report to Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings and then make their reports 
publicly available (Article 11.5). 
At a functional level, the CEP is only an advisory body to the Consultative Meetings 
(Article 12). It is mandated to both provide advice and formulate recommendations 
on every aspect of the Protocol and the measures taken for ecosystem protection. The 
assumption of course is that the CEP wil be stacked with experts and that the 
Consultative Meetings wil recognise and respect such expertise. The failure of the 
ATS to establish an independent external CEP sacrifices a smal measure of external 
legitimacy, but it is consistent with the usual practice of keeping the Antarctic Treaty 
System free from external interference. There is no indication that the in-house, 
advisory status of the CEP wil necessarily inhibit the enforcement of the Protocol's 
regulations as the System has relied, with success, on cooperation and consensus in 
the past. 
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Each Party to the Protocol is required, under Article 17, to provide an annual report on 
its implementation of the provisions of the Protocol. Such reports, once circulated 
throughout the System, are also to be made publicly available (Article 17.2). Once 
again there is a measure of accountability implicit in the procedural conditions of the 
Protocol. 
A standard dispute setlement clause is contained in Article 18. It recommends, as the 
first course of action, passive in-house consultation among Parties to mediate disputes 
concerning interpretation or application of the Protocol. Although no state is permited 
to make reservations to the Protocol, pursuant to Article 24, certain of the Protocol's 
Articles may be chalenged through a more regulatory dispute setlement procedure 
contained in Article 19. Problems associated with Article 7 (mining prohibition), 
Article 8 (environmental impact assessment), Article 15 (emergency response) or 
indeed any problems of compliance with the Protocol which relate to these Articles and 
their relevant Annexes may be taken to either the International Court of Justice or the 
Arbitral Tribunal (specialy constituted under the Schedule to the Protocol), or both. A 
declaration in writing is required by each Party to the Protocol to state their preference 
in this regard. If no declaration is valid, the forum of the Arbitral Tribunal shal 
prevail. 
Article 25 deals with amendments and modifications to the Protocol, which may occur 
at any time in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Treaty Article XI.1(a) 
and (b). Annexes may contain their own amendment provisions (Article 25.1). A 
Review Conference is provided for after 50 years, and modifications or amendments 
proposed at that forum require only a majority, but must include a 3/4 majority of al 
Consultative Parties which atended the original Protocol signing (Articles 25.2-4). 
In conclusion, proceduraly the Protocol is inextricably linked to the Antarctic Treaty. 
The elite position of claimants and Consultative Parties to the Treaty is preserved. 
There are several positive accountability measures, especialy the public release of 
information. The CEP, once established, is expected to provide the best scientific 
advice available and the assumption is that this wil increase the efectiveness of 
decisions taken by the Parties. These conditions of operation of the Protocol are 
further enhanced by the substantive mechanisms the Parties have devised to execute 
their objectives. 
• 	 Substantive Devices Within the Madrid Protocol 
There is a range of substantive devices throughout the Protocol which impose 
particular legal obligations upon the Parties. 
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Article I 
The fundamental substantive provisions of the Protocol are found in Article 1, which 
defmes the Antarctic Treaty; its area of application (Treaty Article VI); Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings and Consultative Parties (Treaty Article IX); the Antarctic 
Treaty System; the Arbitral Tribunal (as per Protocol Schedule); and the Committee for 
Environmental Protection. Article 1 does not critically define up-front environment, 
impact or any of the other esoteric language of the Protocol. This may have been 
deliberate, leaving Parties free to develop their own interpretations, with the security 
of having in place a mechanism for dealing with disputes arising from any ambiguity 
of interpretation (Arbitral Tribunal). 
The Environmental Impact Assessment provisions of Article 8 and Annex I, together 
with the Schedule on Arbitration and the other Annexes, form the substantive 
foundation of the Protocol's environmental principles found in Article 3. 
Article 8 and Annex I 
Article 8 deems that all authorized human activity in the Antarctic comes under its 
provisions, together with those of Annex I on environmental impact assessment 
procedures, as well as other instruments in international law which are cited. 
Unauthorized activity obviously does not. 
The responsibility for conducting EIAs rests with the state operators. As mentioned 
earlier, there are three levels of assessment: a preliminary stage, an initial 
environmental evaluation and a comprehensive environmental evaluation. Assessment 
occurs prior to an activity being undertaken. 
At the preliminary stage, any activity deemed to have a less than minor or transitory 
impact may proceed forthwith (Annex I, Article 1). The type of activity allowable in 
this category would be, say a photographer taking pictures of a station and its 
environs. Even such an innocuous action as this would be required to be assessed at 
the preliminary level, but would most probably only entail making a statement on the 
original research application form. It is likely that no further assessment or inquiry 
would be considered necessary. 
An Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE) would be conducted if the proposed activity 
was deemed likely to cause more than a minor or transitory impact. In such cases, the 
assessment would include a description of the activity, its purpose, location, duration, 
intensity and consideration of alternatives. Some examples of IEEs already conducted 
are for the proposed replacement, operation and decommissioning of the ice wharves 
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at McMurdo Station (May 1992) and for the removal of Greenpeace's World Park 
Base (1991). 267 Approval will be given for the activity to proceed if it can be shown 
that it will cause not more than a minor or transitory impact. Monitoring and 
assessment procedures may be put in place, however, to verify the stated level of 
impact (Annex I, Article 2). 
If the activity is found likely to cause more severe or cumulative effects, a 
Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation (CEE) will then be required. This is far 
more extensive, requiring that the IEE be followed up with a description of the 
methods and data used to forecast the impacts and a further estimation of the likely 
direct, indirect, cumulative and unavoidable impacts. Applicants will be required to 
identify measures which might be taken to minimize impacts or provide early warning 
of unforseen adverse effects. This is relevant not only to the environment but also to 
the other existing uses and values of the Antarctic, meaning that activities which might 
impact on scientific programs, for instance, must be subject to the assessment process. 
Applicants will be required to identify gaps in their knowledge and uncertainties 
encountered in compiling their CEE, and to provide a non-technical summary for lay 
interpretation (Annex I, Article 3.1-2). 
Draft CEEs are to be made available to the public and the Treaty Parties for comment at 
the same time as they are forwarded to the CEP for its consideration (Annex I, Article 
3.3-4). 
Ultimately, Final CEEs and an accompanying CEP recommendation are reviewed by 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties, at least 60 days prior to the commencement 
date of the proposed activity (Annex I, Article 3.5-6). The activity may be allowed to 
proceed conditonal upon acceptance of the Final CEE and other relevant considerations 
such as the establishment of monitoring and verification measures (Annex I, Articles 4 
and 5). 
There is an exception in the environmental evaluation process for cases of emergency 
involvingthemsafety of human life or of ships, aircraft, or 
equipment and facilities of high value, or the protection of the 
environment (Annex I, Article 7.1). In the case where a CEE would normally have 
been required, the document must be prepared and circulated within 90 days after the 
event, complete with a full explanation of the emergency situation. 
• The EIA procedure has been criticised because the onus is on the state operator to 
conduct the assessment. It is felt that if the state operator wanted an activity to go 
ahead, they would be likely to proceed with it regardless of the outcomes of the ETA 
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process. This may well be true. But theoretically the process would seem to have 
enough checks and balances to help expose and eliminate such behaviour. 
Annex II 
Annex II covers the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. According to this 
Annex, the taking of or harmful interference with native fauna and flora is prohibited, 
except in accordance with a permit. 
Permits will be issued by state authorities for the taking of scientific or educational 
specimens, strictly on a needs basis (Annex II, Article 3). The Annex, in its Article 
1, provides expansive definitions of what constitutes a native mammal, bird, plant and 
invertebrate, who is an appropriate authority for the issue of permits, what a permit is, 
what 'take' or 'taking' means and what constitutes 'harmful interference'. 
(Annex II, Article 1). It leaves little room for ambiguity in its definitions. 
An appendix to Annex II lists Specially Protected Species, the taking of which shall 
not be permitted unless for compelling scientific purpose, provided it does not 
jeopardize the survival or recovery of the species or local population, and unless non-
lethal techniques can be used if appropriate (Annex II, Article 3.4 and 3.5). There is 
the usual caveat on cases of emergency (Annex II, Article 2). 
The Treaty Area is protected against the introduction of alien species under Article 4, 
but this may not apply to the discharge of alien organisms in the clean ballast water of 
ships.268 Importantly this Annex defers to the International Convention for the 
Regulation of Whaling because only Fur and Ross Seals are on the specially protected 
species list (Annex 11, Article 7). 
Annex III 
Annex IR on waste disposal and management imposes general obligations on the 
Parties to minimise waste production and to clean up past and present waste disposal 
sites on the continent. It also seeks to have as much waste as possible returned to the 
country of origin and gives guidelines for the minimum levels of waste treatment and 
the disposal of combustible and liquid wastes on the continent or at sea (Articles 1-5). 
There are some prohibited products. These include polychlorinated biphenyls 
(PCBs), non-sterile soil, polystyrene beads, chips or similar forms of packaging and 
pesticides (other than for limited purposes) (Article 7). 
Waste management plans are required for five classes of waste and those plans are to 
be included in annually exchanged information, which the CEP may also review and 
advise upon: 
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1 	 sewage and domestic liquid waste; 
2 	 other liquid wastes and chemicals, including fuels and lubricants; 
3 	 solids to be combusted; 
4 	 other solid wastes; and 
5- 	 radioactive material. 
(Article 8) 
The Parties are required to designate a waste management oficial to oversee 
management plans (Article 10). 
Annex IV 
Similarly, the fourth Annex on the Prevention of Marine Polution contains expansive 
definitions and defers to the International Convention for the Prevention of Polution 
from Ships 1973 and its 1978 Protocol (MARPOL). Discharging oil or oily mixtures 
is prohibited, except as permited under MARPOL (Annex IV, Article 3); the discharge 
of noxious liquid substances is strictly prohibited (Annex IV, Article 4); and the 
disposal of most garbage is also prohibited (Annex IV, Article 5). Cases of 
emergency are exempted from these prohibitions (Annex IV, Article 7). 
To further strengthen the provisions of this Annex, the Parties are asked to take into 
account its objectives when designing, constructing, manning and equipping ships to 
be used in Antarctic operations (Annex IV, Article 10). Government, non-
commercial ships are granted sovereign immunity, but are asked to act in a manner 
reasonably consistent with the Annex (Annex IV, Article 11). 
In recognition of the potential for accidents to occur and the enormous dificulties 
faced in responding to such incidents, the Parties are required to have in place 
preventative measures and emergency preparedness and response plans (Annex IV, 
Article 12). Within the broader international legal regime, the Protocol - through this 
Annex - defers to the acknowledged expertise of other pieces of international maritime 
law. The nexus is important for underlining the legitimacy of this regime. 
Unfortunately, in terms of efectiveness there is litle incentive for states to cooperate 
because the chances of being discovered breaching these regulations is minimal given 
the circumstances of Southern Ocean travel. 
Annex V 
This Annex describes the Area Protection and Management provisions which replace 
the constantly reviewed and updated protected areas system. The values are stated 
quite simply in Article 2: 
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For the purposes set out in this Annex, any area, including any 
marine area, may be designated as an Antarctic Specially 
Protected Area or an Antarctic Specially Managed Area. 
Activities in those Areas shall be prohibited, restricted or 
managed in accordance with Management Plans adopted under the 
provisions of this Annex. 
The reasons for designating Specially Protected Areas (SPA) and Specially Managed 
Areas(SMA)arefor '...outstanding environmental, scientific, 
historical, aesthetic or wilderness values, any combination of those 
values, or ongoing or planned scientific research' (AnnexV,Article 
3.1). It is promising to note the inclusion of aesthetic and wilderness values in the 
Protocol's eco-management blueprint. In line with good environmental practice, the 
Treaty Parties have stated their values up front, followed by provisions for tailoring 
management plans to suit. Also of note is the fact that any Protocol Party, the CEP, 
SCAR or CCAMLR can submit a management plan for consideration (Annex V, 
Article 5). CCAMLR must agree, however, to a marine SPA or SMA within its area 
of jurisdiction (Annex V, Article 6.2). Management Plans will be adopted through 
the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meetings procedure. Thereafter permits must 
be obtained to enter SPAs (Annex V, Article 7). 
Article 13 
Article 13 of the Protocol contains substantive clauses dealing with compliance. The 
Antarctic Treaty System intends the Protocol to apply not only to those states party to 
it, but to any state. This is consistent with the Treaty's Article X, which states that no-
one should engage in any activity in the Antarctic contrary to the principles or 
purposes of the Treaty. The wording of Article 13 of the Protocol is necessarily 
hortatory: 
1. Each Party shall take appropriate measures within its 
competence, including the adoption of laws and regulations,. 
administrative actions and enforcement measures, to ensure 
compliance with this Protocol. 
2. Each Party shall exert appropriate efforts, consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one 
engages in any activity contrary to this Protocol. 
(Article 13, emphasis added) 
This compliance is a voluntary arrangement, relying on self-regulation by Parties 
being fully aware of how other Parties conduct their affairs (Article 13.3) and 
exposing dissenters from within or outside the System. It is not made explicit how, 
exactly, outsiders will be discouraged from performing unacceptable actions within the 
Treaty area, but the assumption is that the first recourse is through diplomatic protest. 
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There is a measure of accountability here, but it is no more or no less than what it 
states: an entreaty to al states to abide by the regime's regulations. This raises 
interesting questions about the ability of the Antarctic Treaty System to be considered 
an objective regime.269 The development of customary international law with regard 
to the Antarctic and the obligations upon third states has not found favour in 
international law to date, primarily because it has not been put to the test.270 
Article 14 
Article 14 contains a further procedural tool for encouraging compliance with the 
Protocol. It provides for observers to cary out inspections of the stations, their 
logistic support facilities and records (Article 14.3). This is alied to Article VI of the 
Antarctic Treaty, which states that: 'Each observer...shall have complete 
freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica' 
(Treaty Article VI.2). A major advance in this inspection procedure concerns 
reporting. The inspectors' reports are to be circulated throughout the System and are 
to eventualy become public record (Article 14.4). This once again adds to the 
accountability of the Treaty System. 
One must be realistic about the System's transparency, however. In a democratic 
country like Australia, it may be a relatively simple mater to obtain or view copies of 
these types of documents. However, not al Antarctic Treaty States have such liberal 
public access laws. Furthermore, while the Freedom of Information Act may be of 
assistance in some cases, information relating to international treaties usualy atracts 
an exemption from public disclosure.271 
Article 15 
The Madrid Protocol cannot prohibit accidents. What it can and did in fact do, is to 
make provision for emergency response action and the drafting of contingency plans. 
Article 15 places the onus on the Parties to provide prompt and efective response 
action to any emergency occurring from the conduct of an 'authorized activity'. 
Authorized activities are defined in the Antarctic Treaty's Article MI5 as activities 
relating to expeditions, stations and the movement of military personnel originating 
from the teritory of a Treaty Party. Advance notice must be given for these activities. 
The wording of the Protocol's Article 15 does not preclude the Parties from 
responding to the threat of adverse efects on the Antarctic environment from 
unauthorized activities, however, as 15.1(b) states that each Party agrees to: 
(b) 	 establish contingency plans for response to incidents 
with potential adverse effects on the Antarctic environment or 
dependent and associated ecosystems. 
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Indeed it would be inappropriate for the Protocol Parties not to respond to incidents 
arising out of unauthorized activities. This introduces the sometimes contentious issue 
of tourism in the Antarctic. 
Although there is only a modest tourism effort in the Antarctic Treaty Area, the issue is 
one which has regularly appeared on the agenda of Treaty Meetings since 1966 when 
Recommendation 27 of Meeting IV acknowledged that '...tourist activities may 
prejudice the conduct of scientific research, conservation of fauna 
and flora and the operation of Antarctic stations' (Heap 1990a:2601). 
With regard to the Madrid Protocol, the assumption is that if a tourism venture departs 
from the territory of an Antarctic Treaty State, prior notice is given and the venture 
thus becomes an authorized activity which then becomes subject to the EIA process. 
If, on the other hand, the point of departure is the territory of a state not party to the 
Treaty, a Pandora's box of legal and political issues regarding customary law, state 
responsibility and jurisdiction is opened. 
The Treaty Parties have partially dealt with tourism by making a Recommendation at 
their XVIllth Meeting in 1994 (Recommendation XVIII-1). The Recommendation 
contains two annexes: 'Guidance for Visitors to the Antarctic', and 'Guidance for 
Those Organising and Conducting Tourism and Non-governmental Activities in the 
Antarctic'. These documents simply reaffirm the environmental principles of the 
Treaty and the Protocol and urge all who are involved with tourism to abide by the 
rules laid out therein. This falls a long way short of an annex on tourism that some 
Parties thought desirable. However, the Treaty Parties have chosen to allow the 
industry to be largely self-regulatory and further, expect that authorized activities will 
be governed by the EIA process and by the domestic laws of signatory states. In this 
sense it would seem that a tourism annex is unnecessary for several reasons: it cannot 
be justified in terms of effort and expense since the tourism industry is modest relative 
to tourism elsewhere; and it cannot regulate against states which are not bound by the 
Treaty or the Protocol in any case. Parties to the Treaty and the Protocol are bound by 
the EIA process, which requires assessment of all activity, including tourism, and in 
which cumulative impacts could be measured and monitored. This is the end of the 
tourism story as far as the Treaty System is concerned, for the moment at least. 
Article 16 
In light of this rather economical treatment of Antarctic tourism, another problem 
arises which has the potential to cause the Protocol Parties headaches in the future. 
That is the issue of liability. Under Article 16, the Parties are obliged to: '...elaborate 
rules and procedures relating to liability for damage arising from 
activities taking place in the Antarctic Treaty area.(Article10. 
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Liability was a central but unresolved issue under CRAMRA, but unlike CRAMRA, 
the Protocol's operation is not made conditional upon the adoption of a liability annex. 
There are, however, compelling reasons for having liability provisions in place and the 
Parties are attempting to conclude such a regime. 272 
Unfortunately the Treaty Parties have become bogged down with questions of 
interpretation. This was discussed at the XVIIIth Meeting in Kyoto in April 1994. 
The Consultative Parties recognized the importance of the exchange of information on 
domestic enabling legislation in helping to harmonize interpretation of the Protocol, yet 
due regard was also given to the impossibility of uniformity '...given different 
national legislative approaches' (ATCM/WP 37 1994:8). With only eleven 
of the requisite 26 ratifications deposited to date, and perhaps a few more to be 
expected at the time of the next meeting in May 1995, the Parties are not under any 
pressure to complete this task with haste.273 Indeed no time limit has been set in 
Article 16 for the adoption of liability measures. 
A liability annex will add important credibility to the Madrid Protocol, but negotiating 
one will not be an easy process. Apart from making choices on the legal mechanics of 
such provisions as the standard of liability (strict, absolute or fault-based), whether or 
not to allow excuses and defences, the types of remedies (injunctions, compensation, 
restoration) and a suitable forum for adjudicating claims, the Treaty Parties are faced 
with another dilemma related to the issue of sovereignty. They will need to determine 
who the appropriate plaintiffs are. Should they, for instance, be only Antarctic 
claimant states whose territory or interests have been damaged? Should the plaintiffs 
be only those states which have incurred the costs of cleaning up and restoring the 
environmental damage caused by a third party? Should the plaintiffs be all of the 
Antarctic Treaty Parties jointly? What implications does this have pursuant to the 
Treaty's Article IV on maintaining the status quo of sovereignty claims? (Blay & 
Green 1995). 
This issue, coupled with who can be pursued as defendants, has the potential to be as 
contentious in the context of liability as the issue of mining royalties was under 
CRAIVIRA. There are no quick answers, as the experience with CRAMRA indicates, 
and the formation of a liability annex will take careful consideration and possibly 
compromise. 
Article 25 
Lastly, one of the most important substantive provisions as far as the mining 
prohibition is concerned, is Article 25 on modification or amendment of the Protocol. 
Deferring to Article XII of the Antarctic Treaty, modifications or amendments may be 
'I 
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made at Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Meetings by the unanimous agreement of 
al Consultative Parties. Modifications or amendments wil enter into force when 
instruments of ratification have been received from al Consultative Parties (Treaty 
Article X11. 1(a). Non-Consultative Parties (refered to in Treaty Article XI.1(b) as 
'any other Contracting Party') are then expected to ratify modifications or 
amendments. However, if one of these Parties subsequently fails to ratify within two 
years after the entry into force of the modification or amendment, that Party wil be 
considered to have withdrawn from the Treaty (Treaty Article X11.1(b). 
In general terms the Protocol is also modified or amended in this way. Exceptions are 
made for its Annexes, which may also be modified or amended in any manner so 
nominated in an Annex (Article 25.1). A review conference may be caled, if 
requested, after 50 years of operation of the Protocol (Article 25.2) but it is not 
obligatory that amendments are made or the mining ban lifted in this forum. 
With respect to Article 7 and the mining prohibition, however, there are more stringent 
modification rules: 
5. 	 With respect to Article 7, the Parties agree that the 
prohibition on Antarctic mineral resource activities contained 
therein shall continue unless there is in force a binding legal 
regime on Antarctic mineral resource activities that includes 
an agreed means for determining whether, and if so, under which 
conditions, any such activities would be acceptable. This 
regime shall fully safeguard the interests of all States 
referred to in Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and apply the 
principles thereof. Therefore, if a modification or amendment 
to Article 7 is proposed at a Review Conference referred f.o in 
paragraph 2 above, it shall include such a binding legal 
regime. 
A three-quarters majority of Consultative Parties, but including al Consultative Parties 
at the time of the original signing of the Protocol, must both adopt and ratify a Review 
Conference amendment or modification for it to enter into force. Theoreticaly, if an 
amended CRAMRA were resurected, which subsequently included claimant state 
mining royalties and the other concessions that the claimants failed to secure in the 
original Convention, mineral resource activities could proceed. The general view of 
the mining prohibition, therefore, is that it extends for a minimum period of 50 years 
after the ratification of the Protocol. 
Considerable space has been given to examining these substantive provisions of the 
Madrid Protocol because of their potential importance as models for other regional 
regimes of ecosystem protection. This wil be further discussed in the final chapter. 
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3.3 	 Questions of Legitimacy 
In analyzing the formation of the Madrid Protocol regime for ecosystem management, 
as a component of the larger Antarctic Treaty System, it is necessary to ask a range of 
questions dealing with the nature of regime formation, the merit of the actors, the 
extent of community acceptance, external linkages and the overal adaptability of the 
System from which it originated. 
The Antarctic Treaty Parties themselves formed this new regime. Historicaly they had 
assigned themselves a custodial role over the Antarctic, in general terms, with some 
states actualy claiming sovereign teritorial possession of parts of the continent. The 
existence of these claims is a fact in law and as such cannot be disputed. Furthermore, 
the Antarctic had not been legaly declared the common heritage of mankind, a world 
park, world heritage area or any other type of commons space, despite much rhetoric 
to this end.274 The Antarctic Treaty Parties were, historicaly and legaly, the rightful 
stakeholders. This does not mean, however, that there have not been chalenges to the 
legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System, both external and internal. There are two 
useful examples of these chalenges: the 'Question of Antarctica' in the United 
Nations (external), and the dumping of CRAMRA (internal). 
3.3.1 	 Chalenges to the Treaty System's Legitimacy 
The external chalenge began in the early 1980s and continued throughout the decade. 
In the 20 years between 1960 and 1980, the Treaty System had 22 signatories, six of 
which had acceded to the Treaty between 1971 and 1980. But from 1981 to 1990 this 
additional membership rate nearly tripled, with another 17 States signing the Treaty. 
Chief among them were China and India, both of which quickly became Consultative 
Parties. India achieved this in record time, ratifying on 19 August and becoming a ful 
Consultative Party just three weeks later, on 12 September 1983. China took a litle 
longer, from ratifying on 8 June 1983 to gaining ful decision-making status on 7 
October 1985. Having both China and India on board, along with the Soviet Union, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Brazil and Japan meant 
that the Antarctic Treaty System represented the demographic, geopolitical, economic 
and ideological force of the world. Therefore, throughout the chalenge to its 
legitimacy waged in the United Nations General Assembly, the Antarctic Treaty 
System was more than adequately prepared and capable of defending itself. 
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Spearheaded by a persistent, sometimes iconoclastic Malaysia on behalf of developing 
countries collectively, the UN regularly discussed the 'Question of Antarctica' each 
year at its General Assembly, beginning with the 38th session in 1983. The line of 
argument was that the developing countries wanted the Antarctic to be declared the 
common heritage of mankind, under UN care. This was a remnant of the post-
colonial push for a new international economic order for developing countries, and 
translated into a greater participation in Antarctic affairs by them and a share in 
Antarctic resources to them. These states had the numbers in the General Assembly to 
force the adoption of resolutions to this end. This was almost totally ineffectual 
because, while the UNGA did make many resolutions imploring the Treaty System to 
embrace the interests of developing countries, such resolutions were not binding on 
the Treaty states - nor most certainly on the Treaty System. This did not mean that the 
ATS ignored the challenge, however, as evidenced by India and China's rapid rise 
within the System and the large increase in Treaty Parties during the 1980s. 
CRAMRA can be cited as a case of both internal and external conflict. Simply put, 
many of the Treaty Parties wanted to be able to exploit Antarctica's non-living 
resources in the future. Certainly they approached this with great caution and 
forethought, concluding CRAMRA before mining or even commercial prospecting 
began. The mineral activities regime was, in many respects, adequate in terms of 
both regulating activity and providing protection for the Antarctic ecosystem. 275 
Given the chance, CRAMRA may well have promoted an acceptable equilibrium 
between the environment and development. Motivated in part by the persistent UN 
scrutiny of the System's operations, CRAMRA included an acknowledgment of the 
special situation of developing countries Party to the regime (CRAMRA Preamble, 
Articles 6 and 29). In so doing, the hierarchical elite of claimants and Consultative 
Parties gave some ground without compromising their own status: an action which 
was perceived as enhancing the System's overall legitimacy (Zou 1993:245). 
The internal challenge to the System's legitimacy manifested itself through the 
recalcitrance of Australia and France over CRAMRA, which could very nearly have 
brought the System undone. The fact that under CRAMRA potential prospectors 
would not be issued permits until a liability annex was in place, highlighted the fact 
that ecosystem damage was envisaged as a consequence of mining activity. The 
Antarctic Treaty Parties were aware, through their links to such fora as SCAR and 
CCAMLR of the nature of potential threats to the Antarctic ecosystem. In addition, the 
environmental movement was pushing the three-Es barrow of natural resources 
management — ecology, economics, and emotions; the developing countries were 
lobbying for participation and common heritage; and the scientists were emphasizing 
the integral importance of the polar regions in the Earth's natural processes. 276 
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Crucial to their studies was a pristine environment, which could not be guaranteed if 
mining activities were to proceed. Actual visible pollution was confined to the 
immediate vicinity of scientific stations, and because Antarctica is a huge continent and 
the Southern Ocean expansive, the conduct of scientific endeavour, while certainly 
having some impact, was considered negligible in terms of ecosystem harm. The 
global obsession with greenhouse and ozone and climate change made it imperative 
that the System take stock of the role Antarctic science played in providing answers to 
these scientific puzzles. 
The dilemma is best summed up by the words the Treaty Parties themselves used in 
the Preamble to the Protocol: 
Convinced of the need to enhance the protection of the 
Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems; 
Convinced of the need to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system 
so as to ensure that Antarctica shall continue forever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord; 
Bearing in mind the special legal and political status of 
Antarctica and the special responsibility of the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Parties to ensure that all activities in 
the Antarctic are consistent with the purposes and principles 
of the Antarctic Treaty; 
Recalling the designation of Antarctica as a Special 
Conservation Area and other measures adopted under the 
Antarctic Treaty system to protect the Antarctic environment 
and dependent and associated ecosystems; 
Acknowledging further the unique opportunities Antarctica 
offers for scientific monitoring of and research on processes 
of global as well as regional importance; 
Reaffirming the conservation principles of the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; 
Convinced that the development of a comprehensive regime for 
the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and 
associated ecosystems is in the interest of mankind as a 
whole; 
Desiring to supplement the Antarctic Treaty to this end;... 
(Madrid Protocol Preamble, emphasis added) 
The overwhelming message from the Preamble is that the Parties collectively perceived 
their role as custodians of the Antarctic as a very serious responsibility. The 
terminology 'Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
ecosystems' is an holistic interpretation not previously so well articulated in Antarctic 
Treaty System language. The Preamble emphasised the omnipotence of the Antarctic 
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Treaty System and its environmental principles, the Consultative Parties, the global 
role of Antarctic science and the value of the Antarctic to all humankind. 
There was thus an underlying assumption of competency on the part of the actors 
involved in the Protocol negotiating process. The Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties had been managing Antarctic affairs for over 30 years and were well 
credentialled in this area. They were not an elite club. Additional Contracting Parties 
had an opportunity to become decision-makers by displaying active interest in 
Antarctic affairs. The modern view of participation and eventual elevation from 
Contracting to Consultative status is that this is as likely to be achieved through joint-
venture research with a better-established Antarctic scientific state, as it is through 
making the huge financial commitment to launch individual state scientific programs. 
Therefore, in theory any state which desired to participate in Antarctic affairs, was at 
liberty to do so. This gave legitimacy to the process of regime formation, the actors 
involved and their representation of the interests of the global community. 
In addition, the holistic ecosystem approach of the Protocol embraces the whole of the 
Antarctic Treaty area and a wide, though not exhaustive, range of possible activities 
which could incur ecosystem harm, further adding to process legitimacy and to 
responsibility for the global ecosystem. 
Moreover, the area of application of the Madrid Protocol embraces the whole of the 
Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR Areas. 277 The activities regulated by the Protocol 
embrace all human activity in the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean south of the 
Convergence, although there is the issue of its application to third parties outside the 
System still to be tested. 
The problem the Treaty Parties had to deal with was essentially two-tiered: regional 
contamination and transfrontier global degradation. The regional contamination is 
dealt with by the Protocol, facilitating the continuing conduct of scientific research in a 
near-pristine environment. This will assist in finding solutions to the transfrontier 
dimension of the problem. Therefore, on these bases the boundaries of scope of the 
regime can be said to embrace both the essence and the periphery of the problem. 
The legitimacy of the Protocol is also found in the linkages it draws with other 
components of the international order like MARPOL and the International Convention 
for the Regulation of Whaling. However, if there is to be any criticism of the ATS in 
this regard, it is the fact that no account is taken of the efficacy of those other pieces of 
international law. It could be argued that if the Treaty System was thorough in its 
responsibilities for the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated 
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ecosystems, it would create its own regulations regarding whaling or marine polution 
in an efort to strengthen the other international law. The overlapping regimes would 
merely create greater obligations upon the Treaty Parties. 
Notwithstanding, the conclusion is that the process of forming a regime for the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and its dependent and 
associated ecosystems, as an additional component of the Antarctic Treaty System, 
was a legitimate one and has been viewed as such by the international community. 
Detractors such as Malaysia have an opportunity to join the Antarctic Treaty System 
should they so desire. They have chosen not to. But the System does not exclude 
them. 
3.4 	 Questions of Effectiveness 
The Madrid Protocol has not yet entered into force, therefore it is premature to 
speculate too broadly on its potential efectiveness. However, the preceding 
discussion has shown that there is a clear commitment on the part of the Treaty Parties 
to protect Antarctic ecosystems to the best of their ability. Critics of the Madrid 
Protocol tend to focus on pedantic points like its provision for sovereign immunity for 
government vessels, divergent interpretation, provisions which enable the taking of 
fauna and flora for scientific purposes and so on. But it must be noted that, 
conceptualy at least, the merits of the Protocol far outweigh these criticisms. 
In terms of international relations and international environmentalaw, the Protocol 
represents the most comprehensive regional protection instrument in existence. 
Furthermore, in time the Parties wil find their own place within the rules and 
regulations. To expect al Parties to be in perfect harmony with each other over 
interpretation, for instance, is simply asking too much of diverse political, ethnic and 
ideological entities. Rather, the Antarctic Treaty System represents a framework of 
rules and procedures within which the Madrid Protocol wil be built upon or reshaped 
according to experience, interests, expediency and commitment, with the passage of 
time. 
Notwithstanding, it is true that the Protocol does create high expectations, and it 
remains to be seen how wel these can be met in pragmatic terms. This raises two 
important questions: i) how has the Protocol improved Antarctic environmental 
protection? and i) how wel has it dealt with the issue of mineral resource activities? 
Once the Protocol enters into force, it wil have the ful force of an independent legal 
instrument. In addition, it is a framework document which has the flexibility of being 
amended as necessary, particularly through the Annex system. The Treaty System has 
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brought together its ad hoc regulations into one coherent, comprehensive arrangement 
and this has no doubt been a progressive step in Antarctic environmental protection. 
Moreover, even if the Protocol does collapse after 50 years and mineral resource 
activity becomes inevitable, the Protocol review mechanism requires that some kind of 
regulatory instrument should be in place before such activity proceeds. As already 
discussed, the requirements under CRAMRA were inordinately strict in terms of 
getting to the stage of actually conducting mining activity. There is no reason to 
suggest that the case will be any different 50 years hence. Of course, if the whole 
Antarctic Treaty System was to break down completely over the issue of mineral 
resource activities, any theories about how the former Parties might react would be 
turned upside-down.278 
The impacts of the designated courses of action are not yet known. It is too early to 
tell, for instance, if the increased workload on the state operators will stifle the 
progress of scientific endeavour. However, there are encouraging signs that the 
Antarctic Treaty Parties are taking their Protocol obligations seriously. The 
Inspectors' Report at the Treaty meeting in Kyoto in 1994 concluded that: 
'...substantial progress is being made in implementing the provisions 
of the Protocol I (ATCM 1994:16). While neither the United States nor New 
Zealand, for example, had ratified the Protocol at that stage, both had conducted IEEs 
and CEEs. 
Returning to the template on page 62, it can now be stated that in terms of 
effectiveness, there is the potential for individual state behaviour to be modified quite 
considerably by the regulations of the Protocol. Antarctic Treaty Parties are required 
to ratify the Protocol, and for many states this will require the passage of domestic 
enabling legislation as the first phase. In addition, collective behaviour will also be 
modified by the rights and obligations which attend each Party to the Protocol. They 
have an extra duty of care imposed upon them as their custodial role has now been 
expanded to embrace ecosystem protection against all human impacts. There will be 
no such thing as good or bad activities any more. Any activity which passes the ETA 
procedure will be acceptable because the Treaty Parties have deemed it so within the 
specific purview of the ETA process. Because all decisions in Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Party Meetings are taken by consensus, the decision to allow an activity 
to proceed will be a collective one. For the purposes of assessing liability, moreover, 
the Treaty Parties will most likely adopt the principles of the EIA process as 
fundamental in their definition of the type of conduct which constitutes damage. The 
assumption will be that if an activity clears the ETA process and its impacts, as 
envisaged, are deemed acceptable, then no liability is indicated. The converse is also 
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true: if an activity clears the EIA process but its impacts are greater than what was 
envisaged, then liability may be indicated (Blay & Green 1995). 
In seeking to analyse efectiveness as a variable, it is necessary to determine the 
Protocol's objective and how appropriate this is to the problem's solution. The 
objective was stated simply as the comprehensive protection of the environment and its 
dependent and associated ecosystems. The anticipated phases of progress towards 
this outcome are to be the EIA process, the provisions contained within the other 
Annexes and their constant revision. Once these processes have been in operation for 
some time, it should be possible to observe quantifiable outcomes. The Protocol has 
not yet entered into force but already the Treaty Parties can be seen to be observing its 
principles. There is room for optimism that this trend wil continue. If the trend is 
indicative of future behaviour, then efectiveness as a measure of the actions taken to 
comply with the objectives of the Madrid Protocol wil become quantifiable in the 
future. 
3.5 	 Questions of Accountability 
Accountability (both internal and external) must stem from the procedural and 
substantive conditions built into the regime. Accountability cannot be thoroughly 
tested until, or unless, a breach occurs. Theoreticaly however, the reporting 
procedures give a considerable measure of transparency to the operations of the 
Protocol and may in fact be the mechanism through which intended breaches are 
circumvented. 
Compliance and enforcement are other issues entirely. The Treaty Parties have put in 
place the best provisions they can under the circumstances when policy is adopted by 
consensus: those of voluntary compliance. In the absence of polar police, they can do 
litle else. If the states perceive their obligations to be legaly binding, opinio juris, 
and they accept the Treaty and Protocol pacta sunt servanda, then there is no need for 
the system to act otherwise in terms of legal compliance. However, regulations 
governing liability for harm wil help strengthen the overal intent and efect of the 
Protocol. 
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3.6 	 The Protocol and Responsibility for the Global Ecosystem 
In terms of acknowledgment of the various components which comprise this study's 
definition of responsibility for the global ecosystem, the Madrid Protocol scores 
reasonably wel. It wil most probably adopt the basic premise of ataching liability to 
the poluter as a fundamental consideration in the formation of its liability annex, 
although this is by no means certain. Unless such an annex is established, however, 
the legal issue of who pays for intentional or unintentional harm to the Antarctic 
environment and its dependent and associated ecosystems remains unresolved. In 
fact, because authorized Antarctic operators are state operators (with the exception of 
tourist ventures) who are responsible for the costs associated with conducting their 
activities in a manner consistent with the Protocol, it appears that in the absence of a 
liability annex, it is the community which pays, rather than the poluter. 
The concept of sustainable development is tacitly addressed in the Protocol. Despite 
the fact that development as such is not envisaged in the short term, the main thrust of 
the Protocol is environmental protection which must be the underlying principle of 
sustainable development. The Protocol refers to the 'Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems', thereby implying an ecosystem-
orientated approach to environmental protection. Humanity is an integral part of any 
ecosystem and although humans are aliens in the Antarctic environment, they benefit 
indirectly from responsible eco-management there. 
Similarly, as discussed above, the broad implications, if not the language, of the 
concepts of both common heritage and intergenerational equity have been embraced in 
the rhetoric of the Protocol's Preamble and elsewhere. 
Importantly, through a nexus to CCAMLR's conservation principles (Preamble), and 
the EIA process of the Protocol, a precautionary approach to al human activity in the 
Antarctic is also taken on board. The EIA process particularly is of paramount 
importance since it seeks relative assurance that harm wil only be of an acceptable 
level before the activity is conducted. 
Outside these five specific components — the poluter pays principle; an ecosystem-
orientated approach; common heritage; intergenerational equity; CCAMLR's 
conservation principles; and a precautionary approach — a general responsibility 
towards the Antarctic ecosystem is in part addressing a global ecosystem responsibility 
because of the System's acknowledgment of the role and value of the Antarctic in 
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global processes. However, there does remain room for scepticism about the 
Antarctic Treaty System considering its response in the United Nations to the 
'Question of Antarctica'. Its defence in the UNGA was far superior to the chalenge 
waged by the Malaysian-led lobby. This underscores the point that not every state is 
benign towards the System and its elitist hold over al things Antarctic. Despite a 
virtual back-down by the UN chalengers, the feeling remains that the System 
provides only symbolic respect for the good of al humanity, and that its fervent desire 
to retain power in the Antarctic is more related to politics and sovereignty than it is to 
these more egalitarian principles.279 
3.7 	 Conclusions 
The Antarctic Treaty System began operating at a time when there was litle 
environmental conscience in the international community, but almost at once the 
Parties to the Treaty recognized the unique position they held with regard to the 
administration of the Antarctic. The System began in a rudimentary way with the 
Treaty of 1959 and it has since evolved into perhaps the most sophisticated regional 
environmental management plan in existence in international law. 
The Treaty itself contained several enduring principles: demilitarization, non-
nuclearization, freedom of scientific investigation and the containment of sovereign 
claims. This artificial impasse of reconceptualized sovereignty created by the Treaty's 
Article IV has facilitated the growth and development of a substantial system of 
Antarctic administration, not the least of which is the environmental protocol. 
Early atempts at environmental protection were reactionary and usualy issue-specific; 
notwithstanding, the conclusion of CCAMLR brought a new ecosystem ethic 
embracing both conservation and rational use, and the idea that fisheries harvesting 
should be conducted in a precautionary manner. CRAMRA further developed these 
approaches, albeit with regulation of mineral resource activities only. 
The Madrid Protocol is a comprehensive arangement for ecosystem protection which 
fulfils most expectations of curent mainstream environmentalism. It wil never be 
comprehensive enough to satisfy eco-radicals; conversely the more conservative 
factions of state politics, especialy the mining industries, are never likely to accept the 
mining prohibition. But for the moment at least, the intention of the Treaty System is 
to strengthen its efectiveness by adopting liability provisions. 
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The process of getting to this stage involved all of the key actors identified in Chapter 
1 as being legitimate stakeholders in the making of Antarctic environmental policy and 
law. The only key actor which did not fit snugly into the Antarctic scenario was the 
United Nations. Despite references to this body's principles and purposes throughout 
the Treaty and subsequent pieces of Antarctic law, along with recognition of the value 
of expert groups under the auspices of the UN to the functioning of the Treaty 
System, the political movement within the UNGA has been kept at bay by the ATS. 
The minimum application of the rules of coexistence between sovereign states has 
been overturned in the Antarctic, through the existence of Article IV of the Treaty. 
The NGO movement was successful in helping to overturn CRAMRA, although the 
traditional disaster perspective which drove the environmental movement did not 
necessarily apply to the Antarctic, with the exception of potential climate change and 
ozone depletion. Accordingly the scientific community was particularly prominent in 
Antarctic affairs. 
Certainly the process of achieving comprehensive ecosystem protection in the 
Antarctic was not without its difficulties, and many issues remain unresolved. 
Compromise and cooperation have been the underlying features, as indeed they are 
with international affairs generally. Unless states seek to impose their will upon 
others with coercive behaviour, accommodation of each other's interests and priorities 
is a necessary factor leading to appropriate and acceptable solutions to cross-sectoral 
problems. This has been exemplified in the Antarctic. 
At the other end of the planet, however, the Arctic nations find themselves in much the 
same position today as the Antarctic Treaty Parties did in 1959. 
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4 
Towards An Arctic 
Eco-Management Regime 
Introduction 
In complete contrast to the established Antarctic Treaty System, the situation in the 
Arctic is immature in terms of holistic ecosystem management. The Arctic is a region 
of great political, economic and social diversity characterised by the domestic priorities 
of sovereign states. While that same diversity is also true of the states which 
participate in the Antarctic Treaty System, these variables have historically played an 
important role in the Arctic in inhibiting the development of an appropriate regional 
ecosystem management regime. As such, this also highlights the lack of progress, 
until recently, towards taking responsibility for the global ecosystem. 
The fact that the Arctic is inhabited is a fundamental difference between the two polar 
regions. It is all very well to credit the Antarctic Treaty Parties with achieving 
outstanding levels of multilateral cooperation in the field of eco-management, but it 
must be borne in mind that they did not have to take account of indigenous people in 
their policy- and law-making processes. The Arctic is home to many disparate 
groups, including ethnic nations which for many centuries have maintained their 
existence in a fairly harmonious way within their homeland ecosystems. There are 
also immigrant workers and bureaucrats who attend the vast industrial centres of the 
polar north, of Russia and Canada in particular; and there are large numbers of service 
personnel deployed to the military complexes which provide northern defences. 
The past two decades have heralded major environmental challenges to the viability of 
the homelands of Arctic people. The worst of these are pollutants derived from ocean 
dumping, Arctic haze and acid rain; and threats to the habitats of subsistence species. 
These environmental challenges arise partly as a result of ad hoc sovereign 
government policies, and may originate outside the Arctic region. However, the 
parallel developments of a scientific organization and an environmental regime to deal 
with the region's problems at a planned, inter-state level indicate an encouraging trend 
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in the field of Arctic politics towards responsibility for the Arctic ecosystem at least. If 
this can be achieved, another regional component of the global ecosystem wil have 
been addresed. 
Apart from the kind of détente represented by the 1920 Treaty of Spitzbergen and the 
1973 Polar Bear Convention, the development of pan-Arctic solidarity has historicaly 
been slow and restrained. But this situation is in transition. The remotenes and 
inhospitability which once aforded the Arctic a degree of protection and anonymity 
are now les of a shield because of the development of sophisticated transport and 
communications technology, cooperative eforts at regional problem-solving and 
resource exploitation, and the gradual disintegration of the concept of enmity between 
the two Arctic superpowers. 
The curent emergence of an Arctic environmental regime is therefore useful as a case 
study because it represents a distinct paradigm of fresh diplomatic approaches to the 
unique chalenge of ecosystem management that the Arctic nations have never before 
addressed.280 
This Chapter investigates the nature of Arctic ecosystem management, specificaly the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: what it contains and how its legitimacy, 
efectivenes and accountability may be interpreted in these formative stages of an 
emerging Arctic ecosystem management regime. Importantly too, it investigates the 
level of responsibility for the global ecosystem exhibited in the Arctic. The Chapter is 
prefaced by a description of the genesis of what many see as a confidence-building 
measure of major significance: the development of the International Arctic Science 
Commitee (IASC). First however, in order to put these events into context it is 
useful to note the kind of legal and administrative arangements already in existence in 
the Arctic. 
4.1 	 Existing Institutional Framework 
There is no political institutional framework specific to the Arctic region as a whole.281 
As described earlier in Chapter 2, complex aliances between the Arctic states do exist 
on a variety of levels, but pan-regional regime-building has been resisted as states 
historicaly resist such eforts at institutionalizing their foreign afairs. 
The Arctic region is unique in the sense that it encompases only the northern reaches 
of the eight sovereign states. As such the Arctic is characterized politicaly by extra-
regional variables which determine northern policy (Grifiths 1989:212). In addition, 
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the bulk of political activity relating to the Arctic is minimalist, reflecting the autonomy 
and self-interest of the eight Arctic states expressed more readily through unilateral and 
bilateral action, than through multilateral cooperation. Therefore the notion of the 
Arctic developing into an integrated political unit is problematic, but perhaps not as 
improbable as was once thought. 282 
Prior to the contemporary environmental impetus investigated in this study, the Arctic 
states had successfully managed to hold regional regime-building at bay by simply 
toying with ideas like an Arctic Region Council since it was first proposed in 1971. 283 
An Arctic Region Council, or Arctic Council as it is also called, is based on the 
premise that there is a need for a coordinating international body in the circumpolar 
region - a political forum (Slipchenko 1992:1). From Cohen's original proposal, the 
Canadians have taken this initiative to the greatest lengths. In 1990 the Canadian 
Government created an Arctic Council Panel to explore how such an organization 
might work and to develop government and public support for it (IASC 1992:3). The 
panel's work, which is funded by a private grant, is on-going but it will not be an easy 
task to sell the idea to the other states (Fenge, pers.comm). 
In seeking to find some common political ground on which to place the concept of an 
Arctic Council, it is difficult to reconcile the panoply of attitudes, given the suspicion 
surrounding the Russian Federation, and the peculiar psychology of US/Canadian 
relations and those between the Nordic countries. 284 
The attitude of the various Arctic states to the Council concept is indicative of the 
pervasive undercurrent of reticence when it comes to cooperative circumpolar politics. 
As a Canadian initiative, the concept of a Council evokes strong reactions from other 
Arctic bureaucrats, particularly those from the United States, who have taken a 
contradictory stance by sometimes supporting the idea and sometimes not. 285 
Simmering tensions between Canada and the United States must be considered serious 
in the sense that many Canadians in fact regard the United States as '...a principal 
threat to maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the Far North' 
(Young 1992:201). The electorates are sometimes confused and suspicious of both 
Governments.286 This is all the more serious when one considers that Canada has 
strong political and economic connections with the US. 
As a consequence of the traditional reluctance by Arctic states to holistically embrace 
regional political issues, there is no specific pan-Arctic institution which might be used 
as a template for the building of an Arctic ecosystem management regime. 
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4.2 	 Existing Legal Framework 
The existing Arctic legal framework further ilustrates the point that the types of 
cooperative relations have historicaly been minimalist, that is, bilateral, with some 
multilateral instruments, but few pan-Arctic-specific cooperative measures (See 
Appendices 4 and 5). 
Apart from the 1920 Treaty of Spitzbergen and the 1973 Polar Bear Convention, few 
new Arctic legal regimes have survived the test of time, or even the initial proposal 
stage.287 The problem has been, and stil is, that each Arctic state has its own peculiar 
set of characteristics which distinguishes it from the others, and they each, naturaly, 
wish to retain the kind of autonomy represented by not having pan-Arctic institutions, 
organizations, and regimes. In other words, they have chosen to perpetuate 
minimalist relationships, despite their commonwealth of problems and convergence of 
issue areas. Issue-specific areas like polar bear protection and organized management 
of scientific research have enabled a type of cooperation, but states are quick to point 
out that their mandate does not include more intense political issues which might 
require legal regulation. 
Because the Arctic Ocean is considered a semi-enclosed sea, the cardinal global legal 
instrument pertaining to the marine Arctic is the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. It 
is ironic, however, that when the LOSC entered into force in November 1994, the 
only Arctic state to have ratified it was Iceland (21.6.1985), albeit while making 
several declarations.288 Prior to the LOSC entering into force, al Arctic states except 
the US had signed it and Sweden had made a declaration. 
Part XI of LOSC elaborates general provisions for the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment, while specific Articles throughout the whole of LOSC deal 
with such issues as the continental shelf (Article 76); the 12-mile teritorial sea (Article 
3); the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (Article 57); ice-covered waters (Article 
234), cooperation of states bordering on enclosed or semi-enclosed seas (Article 123); 
and the high seas (Article 87). 
There are very few linkages between global legal instruments and the Arctic regional 
framework. The linkages which do exist are mostly of an insubstantial nature.289 
In summary, there is no integrated, comprehensive legal or institutional framework for 
protection of the Arctic environment. 
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The next section wil describe the processes which has culminated in a movement 
towards Arctic cooperation in the field of scientific research as the first step towards 
the development of an eco-management regime. In doing so, it wil atempt to explain 
why regime-building, traditionaly resisted by the Arctic states, has emerged. 
4.3 	 Arctic Scientific Cooperation 
Arctic scientific cooperation has undergone several quite distinct phases in its 
evolution, coresponding with the state of maturity of science in general; of prevailing 
global policies; and of Arctic science and politics in particular. These can be identified 
as an heroic age prior to the late 1870s, characterised by: i) the pursuit of national 
glory through polar discovery and exploration; i) the coordinated efort of the first 
International Polar Year of 1882-83, which established the infrastructure for on-going 
research initiatives and the modern ethics of shared information and peer review; and 
ii) the utilitarian phase of science as an economic problem-solving tool during the 
rapid developments of the last few decades. 
4.3.1 	 The Pursuit of Glory 
Like the Antarctic, the Arctic too witnessed an heroic age of exploration. The great 
exploits in contemporary terms occured in the late 1800s and early 1900s.290 Each 
venture exposed more of the Arctic and its pristine, vulnerable ecosystems. 
Importantly, this heroic age was characterized by scientific endeavour, initialy 
privately funded but later financed by state governments. 
4.3.2 	 The Organised Pursuit of Knowledge 
Karl Weyprecht coined the phrase, the 'international steeplechase to the 
North Pole' in reference to these largely uncoordinated atempts at glory represented 
in the heroic age of Arctic exploration (Roots 1984:11). Weyprecht, an Austrian 
physicist who was instrumental in the organization of the First International Polar Year 
(IPY) of 1882-3, considered then, rather hereticaly for his time, that 
nations must be able to take part in arctic research-'andthatreSUltS 
01011hibe'_freely shared without discrimination..' because  is 
not a territory for national possession_ .2.91 
Weyprecht's ideal had been to coordinate the steeplechase of polar exploration, to plan 
cooperative efort and to share observations, at the expense perhaps of some state 
prestige (Roots 1984:11). After much persuasion by Weyprecht and his disciples, an 
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International Polar Commission was established in 1879, principaly to coordinate the 
IPY. Although Weyprecht died prior to the IPY of 1882-3, its conduct rested on 
these principles he had first proposed. The Polar Commission was disbanded in 
1891 once its work had finished. 
Fortuitously, the volcanic island of Krakatau in the Indonesian archipelago erupted 
after the WY global observation stations had been established, thereby making it 
possible to track the atmospheric movement and distribution of Krakatau's volcanic 
dust clouds over the entire planet. This serendipitous event lent great credence to the 
concept of cooperative and coordinated scientific efort through such fora as the WY. 
It turned science from an exclusive, domestic pursuit into a commonwealth, helping to 
promote the open and frank peer review which characterises science today (Roots 
1984:13). 
Two subsequent international events - the 1932-3 International Polar Year and the 
1957-8 International Geophysical Year - were hailed as important examples of 
international cooperation in the field of scientific enterprise, the advancement of 
scientific knowledge and institution-building. 
As a direct result of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), for instance, the 
Scientific Commitee for Antarctic Research, SCAR, was created in 1958 as a non-
governmental body seemingly unencumbered by the politics of the formation of the 
Antarctic Treaty regime, which folowed one year later.292 The Arctic missed out on 
becoming a second 'A' in 'SCAR' because at the time of its formation, the scientific 
priorities of Arctic states had more of a unilateral than regional focus. Why the Arctic 
was not embraced by SCAR remains unclear; but apparently the existing Arctic state 
infrastructures were thought adequate and the Antarctic thought more deserving as a 
focus for such a coordinating body as SCAR at that time (Roots 1988:9). 
This is not to suggest that there was no unity in Arctic science. Other global scientific 
programmes were being undertaken in which Arctic scientists participated, including 
the International Hydrological Decade, the International Biological Programme, 
International Upper Mantle Study, International Year of the Quiet Sun and the 
International Magnetospheric Study. Al of these programs had a particular relevance 
for the Arctic (Roots 1988:10). 
4.3.3 	 Science as a Technical Problem-Solving Tool 
During the 1970s and 1980s the Arctic was characterised by many cooperative 
scientific agreements. For example, accords existed between US/Canada, US/USSR, 
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Canada/USSR, Norway/USSR and Finland/USSR (See Appendix 5). However, the 
changing economic and political climate of the Arctic during those decades had a direct 
efect on the nature of international cooperation in science. Science became a useful 
tool for the advancement of technology and industry, and was thus of economic 
importance to domestic policy.293 
Ostreng has analysed this reorientation. In a presentation to a 1984 conference in 
Svalbard, Ostreng noted that governments used taxes to support Arctic science for 
three reasons: i) strategic, military, and foreign policy; i) economic; and ii) 
teritorial. Further, he noted that science and policy were seen, in relation to these 
reasons, as being either: i) functional; i) pragmatic; or ii) idealistic.294 Speaking 
at that same conference, Roots commented that, with the exception of the Soviet 
Union, much more of the scientific activities in the Arctic were being sponsored by 
industry for economic reasons, in line with Ostreng's functional category, than by 
governments for any reason295 (Roots 1984:14). Therefore, according to Roots, 
government science agencies were losing their influence over the directions and 
freedom of science as the bureaucratic focus (and funding) shifted from scientific 
bodies, research councils and independent institutions to other agencies like energy 
and resource bureaux, which were more interested in the economic utility of scientific 
findings. 
While science was not necessarily poorer for this reorientation, and while 
acknowledging the domestic benefits of any Arctic science, the changes had important 
implications for scientific cooperation at an international level (Roots 1984:14 - 15). 
Such implications wil become more evident in the discussion on the formation of the 
International Arctic Science Commitee which is to folow. 
4.4 	 Towards a Regional Scientific Organization 
The scientific community was to play an important role in Arctic regime formation. 
Increasing industrialisation of the Arctic, and of Central Europe and North America, 
was identified as contributing to massive transboundary environmental problems in the 
northern polar region. Safe marine navigation, resource exploitation and 
transportation, and the efects of living in extreme climatic conditions were among 
many related issues which were contingent upon information supplied by the scientific 
community. Ecosystem management in general, incorporating the protection of 
wildlife and their habitats, was closely linked to both the production of scientific 
knowledge about the biosphere and the acknowledgment of the value of traditional 
indigenous experiences in harmonizing with their ecosystems. First, though, the 
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scientific community needed to be wel enough organized to investigate the 
fundamental nature of the ecosystems and then informed enough to make qualified 
judgments which would be useful in the policy process. 
There were, in essence, two dimensions to the problem of Arctic ecosystem 
management. One was the uncoordinated, ad hoc nature of scientific endeavour; the 
other was the increasingly obvious real or perceived threat of environmental damage. 
Accordingly, in the Arctic there has been a paralel development of both a scientific 
organization and an environmental regime. The later is seen as having been 
contingent upon the former, in the sense that without the confidence-building 
measures and without being able to readily and accurately identify environmental 
problems, formation of an ecosystem management regime may not have been 
possible. The first step in the regime-formation process was to coordinate Arctic 
science. 
4.4.1 	 The International Arctic Science Committee 
As ilustrated in the Legal Framework (Appendix 5), there were many bilateral 
scientific agreements between the ice states but litle in the way of pan-Arctic or even 
multilateral cooperation. The establishment of the International Arctic Science 
Commitee (IASC) broke the spel. 
IASC was established in 1990 as a non-governmental, circum-Arctic facilitator of 
cooperative scientific efort. It evolved folowing years of discussion about the role 
and importance of multilateral Arctic research and many failed atempts at organization-
building in the interests of Arctic science. 
The stated mission of IASC is to: 
_encourage, facilitate and promote basic and applied 
interdisciplinary research in or concerned with the Arctic at a 
circumarctic or international level; and to provide scientific 
advice on arctic issues. 
Its strategy is to: 
• respond to initiatives; 
• provide a forum; 
• provide infrastructure; 
• promote research; 
• safeguard and exchange results; 
• provide advice; 
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• promote access and sharing; and 
• provide for the freedom and ethical conduct of science. 
(IASC 1990) 
The desire to establish an al-encompassing organization for the coordination and 
planning of Arctic science was real and widespread, and although several such 
organizations had been established in the past (Roots 1984:25-6), IASC represents the 
newest inter-disciplinary atempt at organization formation with respect to Arctic 
science. However, no indication of its performance with regard to its stated mission 
and strategies can yet be given. This is further discussed in section 4.4.4 at p.187. 
4.4.2 	 A Chronology of Events 
Within the framework of the changing nature of science and state policy, many 
scientific fora vigorously discussed the future of coordinated regional research in the 
international context throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Joint Arctic research between 
Norway, Canada, the US and USSR was mooted early in 1972 at the initiative of 
Norway. Folowing the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 
1972, these four Arctic states assembled to discuss whether the recommendations 
from Stockholm which were pertinent to the Arctic could be implemented through an 
international mechanism. At the same time there was CHARLIE, the Commitee for 
High Arctic Research, Liaison and Information Exchange, which was an informal 
group of scientists frustrated by the lack of formal cooperative measures needed to 
activate multilateral projects not able to be undertaken unilateraly (Roots 1984:25). 
But neither of these proposals endured or facilitated a substantial organization. 
The Comite Arctique International (CM) was one group which fared beter. CAI was 
the result of intense negotiations folowing an International Symposium on the Polar 
Seas, hosted by Prince Rainier II of Monaco in 1979. With members from academe, 
industry and government, the Comites stated objective was: 
_to improve knowledge and understanding of Arctic areas and to 
that end promote research in different fields on an 
international and multidisciplinary basis. 
(Roots 1984:25) 
The Arctic Ocean Sciences Board was another organization which, although singularly 
marine in focus, advanced the drive for coordination in Arctic research. The AOSB 
was established in 1984 to provide a facilitating service for arctic and sub-arctic 
oceanographic research. It is, interestingly, an administrative service rather than a 
research entity per se (Roots 1984:26). 
176 
Of note is the fact that the USSR was not represented on either the Comite or the 
AOSB. Paradoxically it was largely through both Soviet intransigence and Soviet 
initiatives that the ball was set rolling towards the formation of IASC. 
The turning point came in October 1987. The then President Gorbachev of the Soviet 
Union, speaking in Murmansk, said, with reference to the global value of Arctic 
scientific exploration, 'We have a wealth of experience here and are 
prepared to share it' (Gorbachev 1988:72). With these simple words 
Gorbachev, like the scientists who had been canvassing for some time, recognised the 
fundamental benefits of a pooling of resources and expertise with regard to not only 
scientific endeavour but also resource development (Gorbachev 1988:72). The Soviet 
President openly supported a joint Arctic research council and offered Murmansk as 
the venue for a proposed 1988 conference. This was seen as presaging an 
'...important and rare institutionalization of circumpolar cooperative 
relations' (Archer undated:5). 
The Arctic states had already begun to address more seriously the need for a 
mechanism to facilitate Arctic cooperative science prior to receiving Gorbachev's 
official offer. They had held a preliminary international meeting in San Diego, USA, 
in June 1986. Then at the request of an informal consultative meeting held in Oslo in 
February of 1987, and attended this time by a representative from the USSR, a 
working group was formed to prepare a proposal for action. The group was composed 
of E Fred Roots (Canada), Odd Rogne (Norway) and Jorgen Taagholt (Denmark) and 
detailed its findings in a report dated November of that year. 296 
Drawing on the paradox that 'Non-Arctic countries...may be in a better 
position to play a leading role in research on major arctic 
scientific problems than countries or agencies with specific 
national or political arctic responsibilities...', the Working Group's 
recommendations were premised on two fundamental needs: i) science research 
requirements, and ii) policy and administrative considerations (Roots et al 1987:9). 
In scrutinizing their conclusions about science research requirements, it is apparent 
that the Working Group considered the coordinated research of major scientific topics 
required stimulation; that institutionalization would help promote linkage and exchange 
of information; and that a multi-disciplinary review mechanism was necessary to 
ensure the good quality of Arctic sciences. In addition, the handling of data was seen 
to be a major concern, and it was recognised that Arctic data required specialization, 
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standardization and improved international and interdisciplinary accessibility (Roots et 
al 1987:9-11). 
Policy and administrative considerations, however, were thought to be more 
problematic and would require inter-state cooperation on unprecedented levels. The 
Working Group thus proposed a closer liaison between scientists and administrators 
of both Arctic and non-Arctic states, whose plans, programs and priorities would 
benefit from this intercourse. Similarly, they proposed the international review of the 
effectiveness and progress of independent state activities. 
The Working Group also perceived a need '...to develop a common approach to 
the relationship between scientific activities and the increasing 
use of polar regions for other purposes' (Roots et a 1987:12). 
Justification for this was based on the desirability of avoiding '...major differences 
between countries in their approach to scientific and non-scientific 
new activities in arctic regions...' in order to ensure minimum disruption to 
scientific studies or the environment. In other words, traditional uses of the Arctic 
should be dealt with 'in an organized way' (Roots et al 1987:13). 
Finally, the Working Group considered that shared concerns about environmental 
protection, geopolitical priorities, Arctic technological development and logistics gave 
rise to the desirability of maintaining international networking between administrators 
(Roots et al 1987:14). 
The conclusion of the Working Group was that in order to satisfactorily meet the 
needs of both the scientific community and the administrators with Arctic 
responsibilities, a non-governmental scientific committee should be established. It 
should be composed of state representatives serving in a personal rather than official 
capacity, and be modelled according to other regional committees of the International 
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), with which it may eventually seek affiliation. 
(Roots et al 1987:17). This organization would be supplemented by, but in no way 
related to, an intergovernmental forum on Arctic science issues, the organizational 
structure of which would be determined by the governmental authorities concerned. 
Major Arctic policy topics including relevant scientific studies; environmental 
protection and monitoring; resource development and exploitation; and the rights, 
responsibilities and involvement of indigenous Arctic people were envisaged as being 
the focus of this latter forum (Roots et al 1987:20). 
The next step was to take the Working Group's recommendations to the countries 
concerned: the Arctic 8, on a formal basis, and others, on an informal basis. A 
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meeting was convened in March 1988 in Stockholm to discuss the future of Arctic 
scientific inquiry. It was attended by high-ranking members of the Arctic countries' 
polar research bodies, bureaucrats and academics. The keynote speaker was a 
member of the Working Group, Dr E Fred Roots. In his address he resurrected the 
eminent profile of Karl Weyprecht to reinforce the view that Arctic science would 
again benefit from a coordinated effort at the international level and that Weyprecht's 
principles were still valid (Roots 1988). 
Perhaps the reason for this attitude was that Roots still perceived Arctic science as 
being so closely linked to state foreign policy and economic issues that governments 
might be reluctant to give strong support to developing international cooperation and 
coordination. This view was consistent with the large and continuing funding from 
industry which was being channelled into Arctic research. Significantly, Roots 
emphasized that the Arctic areas of different states often had more in common with 
each other than they had with the southern extremities within their individual state 
borders (Roots 1988:1). The migration routes of fauna, the weather, the sea and ice, 
magnetism and the aurora were all transboundwy in nature. Arctic research, therefore, 
was of domestic, international and global importance, and regional cooperation within 
and across disciplines would seem to be an obvious consequence of this 
interdependence. Roots thus gave tacit recognition to the concept of responsibility for 
the global ecosystem by virtue of his holistic view of the Arctic and the global 
implications for Arctic science. 
This Stockholm meeting agreed to form a working group to establish IASC, under the 
chairmanship of Dr Odd Rogne of Norway 297 (Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 
1988). The meeting also agreed to accept submissions from Nordic countries for the 
placement of a secretariat. Taking advantage of having so many eminent Arctic 
scientists on hand, the meeting also identified major scientific projects for international 
coordination and cooperation in Arctic research. 
Significantly, the Stockholm meeting accepted an invitation to Leningrad in December 
1988 for a 'Conference of Arctic Countries on Coordination of Research in the Arctic' 
and to work further on the concept of the IASC. 
Over 500 scientists and specialists attended the Leningrad meeting, which was 
conducted 'without prejudices in the spirit of new thinking', reported 
the General Summary.298 The Leningrad Conference was attended by representatives 
from both Arctic and non-Arctic countries which in itself indicated that a rather more 
expansive perception of the place of the Arctic in the global order was developing. 
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The conference further developed the ideas from Stockholm, including a provisional 
research agenda.29 The conference program was broadened to include discussion on 
development of the region's resources, '...providing for its balanced economic 
development and creating a system of international ecological 
safety. (Anon. Leningrad Document 1988:1). The utility of scientific information to 
both resource exploitation and geostrategic policy has always been a fundamental 
concept underpinning discusions of cooperative Arctic science and the Leningrad 
forum was no exception. 
The Leningrad Conference was considered another important step towards improving 
cooperation and strengthening communication.30 The Conference, the initiative for 
which was credited to President Gorbachev, was concluded with the comment that the 
participants desired on-going, regular meetings, hopefuly within the forum of the 
International Arctic Science Commitee (Anon. Leningrad Document 1988:5). 
A final preparatory meeting was held in Helsinki in May 1989 and the Founding 
Articles for the International Arctic Science Commitee were endorsed by 
representatives of the domestic scientific organizations of the Arctic 8 in Resolute Bay, 
Canada in August 1990 (IASC 1990:2). 
	
4.4.3 	 The Organizational Structure and Political 
Consequences of IASC 
According to the Founding Articles, the General Principles of IASC are represented as 
folows: 
1 	 IASC is a non-governmental scientific organisation 
established to encourage and facilitate international 
consultation and cooperation for scientific research 
concerned with the Arctic. 
2 	 IASC, in carrying out its activities, will strive for the 
highest standards of excellence and be guided by the 
principle of scientific openness. 
3 	 IASC endeavours to cover all subjects and fields of 
science for the advancement of world science and for the 
benefit of the Arctic regions. 
4 	 IASC will take into account programmes and activities on 
Arctic research advanced by other scientific organisations 
and will cooperate with them whenever appropriate. 
5 	 IASC will not interfere with the scientific activities of 
any country or group of countries carrying out research in 
the Arctic, nor commit governments to support or approve 
programmes or activities. 
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6 	 The activities of IASC should be consistent with the regional interests of the Arctic countries. 
7 	 The activities of IASC will in no way affect the rights or 
obligations of countries under international law with 
respect to scientific research in areas within their 
jurisdiction. 
(IASC 1990:4) 
Principles 5 and 6 were obvious atempts to depoliticise Arctic science. Bureaucrats 
dealing with political and policy questions most probably needed the kind of 
reassurance captured in the phrasing of these two Principles, reafirming that IASC 
was not about to put pressure on governments to cooperate. What governments 
needed was motivation, not coercion (Rogne pers.comm). 
The similarities between IASC and SCAR - its southern polar counterpart - are 
obvious.301 IASC anticipates interaction with SCAR at working group level, with 
informal talks and a formal exchange of leters having taken place to this end. 
However at this stage it is not envisaged that IASC and SCAR wil merge, there being 
no mutual benefit in doing so.302 Bringing into IASC the very best of SCAR and 
leaving behind the worst should, in theory, make IASC a beter organization.303 
IASC is composed of a Council, a Regional Board and various working groups. 
• 	 IASC Council 
The Council is the primary functional organ of IASC. Its stated responsibilities, inter 
alia, are as folows: 
1 	 to develop policies and guidelines for cooperative 
scientific research concerned with the Arctic; 
2 	 to establish working groups, as needed, and determine the 
terms of reference for and participation in such groups; 
3 	 to endorse plans developed by working groups and recommend 
scientific programmes and projects; 
4 	 to recommend, in cooperation with the appropriate working 
groups, implementation plans for IASC programmes and 
activities; 
5 	 to develop plans and facilitate the coordination of 
logistics and operations for IASC programmes, projects and 
activities; 
6 	 to decide on the participation of representatives of 
national scientific organisations from the non-Arctic 
countries; and 
7 	 to organise Arctic Science Conferences. 
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Participation in IASC is open to representatives of the scientific organisations of the 
Arctic 8, alOngWith'...representatives of the scientific organisations of 
any other countries, during such time as those countries are engaged 
in significant Arctic research .304 In recognition of the problems 
encountered by the Antarctic Treaty System by the efect, more so than the actual 
wording, of its Treaty Article IX.2 regarding 'substantial scientific research 
activity' in the Antarctic as a basis for achieving Consultative Party status, this 
IASC caveat was redefined at the 1992 Meeting. Significant Arctic research now 
means '...systematic and organized enquiry or knowledge in any field or 
subj ect..' pertaining to the Arctic305 and including traditional knowledge, but 
specificaly'..in at least two major fields of enquiry, with published 
results in the international refereed science literature over a 
period of at least five years '306 There is no legal imperative on member 
states and al decisions relating to the nature of scientific enquiry are made by member 
governments. This situation naturaly softens the efect of IASC in law. 
The former USSR objected to the inclusion of non-Arctic states on the Council and 
wanted only the Arctic 8, although it did concede the appropriateness of the presence 
of other countries' representatives on working groups. The problem was essentialy a 
conflict between interests of strategic, environmental and economic import. Prominent 
non-Arctic States which were observers only at the Resolute Bay meeting in 1990 
were the UK, France, Germany, Japan and Poland. They applied for membership at 
the second IASC meeting in Oslo in January 1991 and along with the Netherlands, 
their membership was accepted at this meeting. The USSR eventualy relented and 
alowed these states - while they held significant Arctic research interests - to 
participate fuly in decision-making on the Council. This situation, however, would 
be open to review every few years (Archer undated). 
The decisions of the Council are based on consensus. 
• 	 IASC Regional Board 
The Regional Board is the quasi-political or controling organ of IASC and is 
composed of representatives from the Arctic 8 only. Its general mandate is to consider 
Arctic interests and to ensure that the activities of IASC are consistent with those 
interests (IASC 1990:6, emphasis added). The nature of these interests is unspecified. 
The Regional Board is the result of a compromise made during the establishment of 
IASC, when dealing with such politicaly sensitive dichotomies as international or 
global science and regional or domestic science, became dificult. The Cold War was 
stil foremost in the minds of many of the participants as they sat across the table from 
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each other and the Regional Board was formed as the medium through which balance 
and perspective would be retained in favour of the Arctic over non-Arctic states 
(Rogne pers.comm). 
The IASC Council is expected to take the Regional Board's recommendations into 
account. The Board's decisions are also consensual. 
• 	 IASC Working Groups 
In the structure of IASC, provision is made for the establishment of working groups 
to provide the main fora for the development of programs and activities; to exchange 
information, discuss problems, methods and research directions; and to identify 
opportunities for cooperation (IASC 1990:7). 
Many working groups are already in existence and deal with global change; a vast 
aray of polar scientific disciplines, including the human and social sciences; 
radioactive waste; and an important new initiative - the International Scientific Initiative 
in the Russian Arctic, established to facilitate cooperation in that state (IASC 1993). 
4.4.4 	 Measuring the Strength of IASC 
When thinking about the legitimacy of IASC, is it appropriate to apply the same 
parameters indicated in the template (on page 62) regarding who the actors are, are 
they representative of the rightful stakeholders and so on? One would think not, since 
IASC is a single-issue organization and hence its legitimacy is inherent in the very fact 
of its existence. The same might apply to accountability. Who should IASC be 
accountable to? As an advisory body only, and a forum for the development of 
scientific intelect, the organization need not be accountable to anyone but its members. 
However, perhaps it is necessary for IASC to account for its progress to each 
member's individual government which sponsors it financialy, and to the Norwegian 
Government which provides the Secretariat. 
What is less problematic to measure in terms of these analytical parameters, is 
efectiveness. IASC does have a set of clearly defined goals, that is, to 
'...encourage, facilitate and promote basic and applied 
interdisciplinary research in or concerned with the Arctic at a 
circumarctic or international level; and to provide scientific 
advice on arctic issues.' These can, at some point in the future, be measured 
against the output of IASC using such variables as changes in scientific program 
funding, output in peer-reviewed journals and the incorporation of IASC 
recommendations into government policies and laws. 
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IASC is immature as an organization and there is much work stil to be done, but 
certainly at this early stage IASC appears to have achieved a measure of credibility in 
keeping with its pioneering role as an Arctic organization. It wil be shown in the 
folowing discussion that this quasi-NGO scientific body has been responsible for 
stimulating a kind of confidence within the Arctic political community, which has 
enabled policy-makers to devise an environmental protection strategy for the region. 
IASC has subsequently played a key role in events by acting as auditor for one of the 
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy's programs, and this wil be discussed later 
in this work. 
This study now turns to the development of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy. In order to put the AEPS into context, it is first necessary to give some 
background information on the state of the Arctic environment. 
4.5 	 Common Environmental Problems in the Arctic 
The terms fragile and robust are often juxtaposed in descriptions of the polar 
environments. The image of fragility is largely emotive, emanating from the heroic 
ages of early polar exploration. Descriptions of the beauty and uniqueness of the 
regions have been further enhanced in contemporary terms by the development of a 
common guilt over the partial destruction of some wildlife populations, particularly 
strongly emotive animals like whales and seals. The image of robustness is a product 
of a vision of immensity of Antarctica, the vastness of the polar seas, huge icebergs 
and whales of leviathan proportions, so that the sheer volume of things polar evoke 
paralel images of sturdiness and strength. These views often overshadow a more 
pragmatic characteristic of both the Antarctic and the Arctic: their vulnerability. 
The Arctic environment is vulnerable for several reasons: 
• low temperatures retard the breakdown of contaminants; 
• short growing seasons, which are a product of cold temperatures, limited sunlight and cold soils, retard regeneration; 
• low biological diversity, a short food chain and high stock levels make species vulnerable to polution catastrophes; 
highly productive marine areas make the seas and rivers vulnerable to contamination; and 
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• 	 climatic conditions favour the deposition or concentration of airborne contaminants in certain Arctic areas. 
(Osherenko & Young 1989:111- 16) 
In general terms the same is true of the Antarctic. In addition to these general 
characteristics, polar ecosystems are enigmatic in the sense that litle is known about 
the true extent of interaction between some components. Polar ecosystems are 
dynamic (blooms and cycles); diverse and yet specialized (eg. localisation of 
productivity) and at times some species exist at the very limits of survival. 
Conditions are harsh when compared to temperate climates and many organisms may 
have evolved or made anatomical and behavioural changes to polar conditions to 
maximise species survival. 
The assumption is that most species wil survive providing their environments remain 
in the relative status quo to which they have become accustomed. If human impact, by 
way of unregulated fishing or polution for instance, alters this equilibrium, certain 
species wil no doubt be in peril. The exact point at which disequilibrium triggers 
ireversible mortality is problematic in most cases, and it is this which resource 
managers ponder at length.307 
Because of a lack of decisive scientific evidence, comprehensive ecosystem 
management is daunting. It is dificult, for instance, to determine the target level of 
recovery for an unbalanced ecosystem when too litle is known about optimum 
population levels. The data set is too short (only about 50 years or so) to make 
qualitative and quantitative judgements. Therefore proactive management objectives 
may remain elusive until more conclusive information on the optimum equilibrium of 
these dynamic polar ecosystems is available. However, this does not, and should not, 
preclude precautionary approaches to eco-management. 
Arctic conservation was being addressed as early as the 1950s. In the US, careful 
administration of wildlife was advocated for land use management in the Arctic region; 
the Soviets were gathering data on the protection of mammals and birds; Denmark was 
considering a protected area system for parts of Greenland; and the RJCN established 
a standing commitee to investigate problems of protecting Arctic fauna (Boardman 
1981:129-30). IUCN's Arctic Fauna Commitee and its foundation work were 
largely responsible for the impetus towards protection of polar bears (Boardman 
1981:130). 
However, many of the global environmental organizations, and indeed many regional 
ones as wel, were located wel south of the Arctic on the periphery of the problem — 
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not unlike the Governments which formulated Arctic policy (Osherenko & Young 
1989:119). Accordingly, they were, and probably still are, sometimes perceived by 
northern indigenous populations as '...another intrusive influence from the 
South' (Osherenko & Young 1989:119). Along with the IUCN, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) is another international environmental organization which 
has historically taken an active interest in Arctic eco-management. Northern 
populations have their own lobby groups, chief among them the ICC and the Makivik 
Corporation of northern Quebec. 
As discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to global environmental ethics, in the Arctic too 
there is sometimes little common ground between all of the stakeholders because of 
cross-cultural and political cleavages and differences in core ecological values. The 
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concept of wilderness is a case in point. As an essentially Western, patriarchal, urban 
construct, the concept of wilderness is totally irrelevant to many indigenous 
groups.308 This kind of dichotomy is not unique to the Arctic; it is the same the 
world over. 
With this in mind, the identification of ecosystem threats or harm in the Arctic has 
been a product of the progressive realization of both the region's inherent importance 
to global processes and its vulnerability to human impacts. The polar regions are 
zones of net radiation deficit and serve as major heat sinks. These heat sinks drive the 
primary circulation patterns in the atmosphere and oceans. It is known that polar 
regions have played a key role in climate changes in the past and it is also known that 
climate and ocean circulation patterns can shift very quickly. This may be directly and 
indirectly related to environmental changes in both polar and subpolar regions 
(Mayewski in AMAP 1993a:46). 
Perhaps the single most important factor which causes or threatens to cause harm to 
habitats is human impact through resource exploitation. Both onshore and offshore 
hydrocarbon extraction and its attendant activities like transport, noise and discarded 
equipment all contribute to actual or potential habitat disturbances. Minerals extraction 
and processing is particularly destructive as it involves the establishment of 
infrastructure like roads, mines and plants which cause long-term alteration to the 
immediate surroundings. The use of water for power generation is, likewise, an 
artificial alteration to the natural environment, changing the flow-rates and direction of 
watercourses and sometimes involving the relocation of indigenous groups.309 
Transportation of any sort also has the potential to be a major source of habitat 
disturbance. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System is one contentious issue which has 
received enormous public attention, despite its innovative technological safeguards 
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against spils and the melting of the permafrost which it overlays (Osherenko & Young 
1989:132). Similarly the Arctic Pilot Project of Petro-Canada discussed in Chapter 2 
was shelved despite its stringent transport safeguards, most probably because of the 
risk of accidents which nobody has yet determined how to regulate against. 
Furthermore, wildlife protection is always a contentious issue, more so when 
subsistence harvesting by indigenous people is involved. Much Arctic wildlife is a 
commons or shared resource and nowhere is the tragedy of the commons more 
poignant than in the Arctic.310 Commons resources are particularly dificult to 
manage, as fisheries regimes the world over have discovered. Commons resources 
harvested by indigenous groups, but revered by preservationists, presents a double 
jeopardy for resource managers. While some issues, particularly whaling and 
sealing, seem ireconcilable, others have atracted an extraordinary degree of 
consensus and commitment. The 1973 Polar Bear Convention is a case in point. 
4.5.1 	 The Polar Bear Convention 
Like the panda and the whale, the polar bear became an easily-identifiable icon to the 
international community of conservation-minded people. If the bears had been less-
enchanting, they most probably would not have atracted anywhere near the atention 
they did; it was essentialy their value as an economic resource for zoos rather than as 
a resource for traditional peoples per se, which brought their plight out into the open. 
In 1956 the Soviets decreed the polar bear to be wholy protected (Boardman 
1981:131). By 1965, the bear was an international symbol of conservation groups. 
The bears were known to range across Canada, Greenland, Spitzbergen, Russia and 
Alaska. As with al new environmental initiatives, a lack of scientific knowledge 
hampered the progress of individual state groups working towards a solution to the 
problem of protecting the species. Eventualy, a five year moratorium on hunting was 
put in place in 1970, during which time an updated convention, modeled on an earlier 
Soviet draft protocol, was circulated by IUCN. IUCN was instrumental in having this 
version finaly agreed to in 1973. 
The Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears31 contains general provisions 
prohibiting the taking of polar bears (Article I) except for bona fide scientific or 
conservation purposes, or by traditional hunters using traditional methods as permited 
under state laws (Article II). Importantly, each signatory is mandated to take action 
to preserve the ecosystems to which their polar bear populations belong (Article I). 
In addition, signatories are to investigate species management and conservation and to 
coordinate and exchange information to this end (Article VI). 
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As a regime to manage polar bears, this Agreement gained legitimacy by making a 
direct connection (although an indirect reference) to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), signed earlier that 
same year. Article V of the Agreement prohibits the import, export or trafic in bears, 
their parts or products taken in violation of the Agreement, and Article II.2 prohibits 
commercial trading in any bear or part thereof taken legaly. 
Despite the myriad of domestic regulations pertaining to environmental management, 
the Polar Bear Convention remains the only pan-Arctic resource management 
agreement in efect today. 
4.5.2 	 The Big Picture: the Arctic Environment and 
Global Implications 
A number of factors have combined to highlight the problem of Arctic environmental 
polution - actual or potential. The identification of the depletion of Antarctic 
stratospheric ozone was one incident which piqued the curiosity of northern scientists. 
When the scientific community looked at the Arctic they found a similar trend of ozone 
reduction, although not as severe as in the Antarctic (AMAP 1990:4). It became 
obvious that the efects of ozone-destroying chemicals could only be expected to 
continue in the high northern latitudes while those contaminants were being released 
into the atmosphere. Atendant to this was the world-wide scientific concern about 
global climate change. Together ozone depletion and global warming were considered 
the two most significant threats to the Arctic environment (AMAP 1990:4). 
Based on information from existing scientific research and anecdotal evidence, a 
picture of the status of the Arctic environment was constructed. Although generic in 
nature, statements like this about the Arctic environment paint a grim picture. 
The Arctic is one of the last areas of relatively pristine 
nature to remain on earth. However, pollution is becoming more 
apparent in this region. Measurements indicate that 
pollutants, such as persistent organics, heavy metals, 
acidifying gases, and radionuclides, originating from 
anthropogenic activities at mid-latitudes are transported to 
the Arctic by the atmosphere, rivers and ocean currents. The 
persistent organics accumulate in the Arctic food web, eg. 
pesticides such as DDT and lindane, and PCB-oils used in 
hydraulic systems and electrical transformers. Relatively high 
values of these pollutants have been detected in fish, birds, 
marine and terrestrial mammals and humans. Emissions of heavy 
metals and acidifying gases (S02 and N0x) south of the Arctic 
have been shown to have negative effects on the Arctic 
environment. However, emissions and discharges within the 
Arctic also contribute to negative impacts on vegetation and 
wildlife. The Arctic area has received radionuclides through 
the fallout from nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing plants 
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and nuclear accidents. In addition, radioactive wastes are 
stored on land or have been dumped into Arctic Seas. 
(AMAP 1993a) 
This scenario was described several years after the establishment of IASC but the pre-
existing legal and institutional framework of the Arctic had no coordinated mechanism 
for dealing with such threatening transboundary environmental issues as these. What 
the scientific community did, via IASC, was to concede the limits of their knowledge 
and to stress the absolute imperative of becoming much more informed very quickly 
so that they could provide a legitimate forum for disseminating information to the 
policy makers. The formation of a dedicated, coordinating scientific organization was 
thus both justified and timely. 
4.6 	 A New Era of Optimism 
With the establishment of IASC, regional cooperation had turned ful circle from the 
heady times of Weyprecht's First International Polar Year, through the political 
paranoia of the Cold War, to the glasnost and perestroika of a new-look Soviet 
Union.312 
The Finnish Government was known to be extremely anxious about the presence of 
the 'big bear' Russians next door, particularly in connection with the extent of 
transboundary polution originating from the industrial centres on the nearby Kola 
Peninsula. Finnish concerns that their environment needed urgent atention no doubt 
assisted in the creation of the historic multilateral declaration: the Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy. 
The process from which this declaration emanated became known as the Rovaniemi 
Initiative.313 It began with tentative discussions between the Finns and other Nordic 
and Arctic states in the Spring and Summer of 1987. It was reported then, however, 
that: '...the strategic situation at the time was not favourable for the 
launch of a formal Finnish invitation to the other governments of 
the Arctic 8 to consider cooperation on Arctic environmental 
protection.'314 One catalyst which altered this unfavourable strategic situation was 
the sentiments expressed by Soviet President Gorbachev in Murmansk in 1987. 
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4.6.1 	 The Gorbachev Factor 
President Gorbachev's message conveyed new optimism in the direction of not only 
East-West relations but also pan-Arctic cooperation.315 It is worthwhile pausing to 
consider his words, as this speech on the 70th anniversary of the Socialist Revolution 
has been proclaimed by many Arctic commentators as an incisive turning-point in 
circumpolar relations.316 
In an emotional tirade, Gorbachev informed the people of Murmansk about what 
restructuring meant: 'We are learning great lessons from 
life...truthfulness and openness...responsibility and discipline...wider 
democracy...internationalism and patriotism.'317 He also expressed 
profound dissatisfaction with the psychological stagnation of the Soviet people 
(p.59).318 While admiting that the road ahead had been fuly opened, though it 
would not be without its problems, he decried the squandering of resources and the 
inability to utilise their economic potential, citing many instances of mismanagement 
by the State as examples (pp.49-53). He appealed to the Soviet people to become 
more thrifty and cost-conscious, to be more democratic and to persist in sharing the 
Government's vision for the eventual success of the planned economic and social 
restructuring. 
Having put the domestic position into perspective, Gorbachev then castigated the anti-
Soviet confrontational bent evident in the words of top Western leaders. 'it 
confirms', hesaid, 'that we are dealing with yesterday's rhetoric, 
while real-life processes have been set into motion1(p64). That some 
in the West did not appear to take restructuring seriously did not derail Gorbachev 
from his mission of seling the new-look Soviet Union not only to his own people, but 
around the international conference table as wel. 
Importantly in the context of this study, his speech indicated a wilingness on the part 
of the Soviet Union to radicaly reform its foreign policy, to accord with '...a new 
democratic philosophy of international relations...'. 'The new mode of 
thinking with its humane, universal criteria and values is 
penetrating diverse strata. Its strength lies in the fact that it 
accords with people's common sense' (164). 
With sentiments such as these at their disposal, it is litle wonder the Finns then felt the 
time was right to resume contact with the other Arctic nations and to discuss important 
environmental questions which had been pending for some time. 
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As Gorbachev mentioned in 1987 and the Finnish Working Paper for the first 
Rovanierni meeting (dated 16.1.89) reiterated, the 1980s was a decade during which 
the adverse effects of human impact increased, exposing the Arctic to hitherto 
unknown dangers. In recognizing the fragility and vulnerability of the Arctic 
ecosystems, the three most important environmental threats were identified as climate 
change, marine pollution and resource exploitation. The attitude of the Soviet Union 
towards its Arctic neighbours was seen as crucial in addressing these threats. The 
willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to negotiate partial disarmament (pp.65- 
70) and nuclear test bans (pp.65-6) was good news for the Nordic countries, which 
were particularly susceptible, by virtue of their proximity, to nuclear fall-out and the 
consequences of a nuclear war. Gorbachev's message went so far as to suggest an 
Arctic 'zone of peace' (p.70), incorporating a nuclear-free Northern Europe and 
restricted naval activities. Joint resource development and the opening up of the 
previously restricted Northern Sea Route (pp.70-3) were welcomed as being of both 
strategic and economic utility. Importantly, Gorbachev recognised the immense 
significance of scientific exploration for the whole of mankind, and offered to share 
Soviet experience in exchange for cooperation with other countries (pp.70-3). This 
proved to be a major impetus towards the establishment of IASC, as discussed above. 
The consequences for the indigenous nations — their well-being, their traditions and 
cultures — were also of concern, though Gorbachev made no specific mention of how 
thedevelopment of ties between northern peoples' wouldbe achieved, nor 
what role they would, or indeed should, play in his new, open kind of diplomacy 
(p.73). 
With regard to the environment, Gorbachev made mention of the UNEP Regional 
Seas convention for the Baltic 319 as an example of an existing measure which should 
be expanded (p.73). Without being more explicit, he also proposed '...drawing up 
jointly an integrated, comprehensive plan for protecting the natural 
environment of the North' (p.73). 
In short, Gorbachev's Murmansk speech represented the Soviet Union's 'profound 
and certain' desire to see the Arctic as a 'genuine zone of peace and 
fruitful cooperation' (p.74). Whether this was to be accomplished by 
separating military from non-military issues, or by giving greater emphasis to the non-
military within the broader military agenda, is still the subject of speculation.320 
The passage towards circumpolar ecosystem responsibility, stimulated by 
Gorbachev's words and subsequently proposed by the Finns, was to be multi-faceted: 
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governmental and scientific cooperation to overcome the lack of cohesive and 
comprehensive regulation of human activity. 
4.6.2 	 Further Confidence-Building 
In the context of Gorbachev's speech and the Finnish concerns, those Arctic countries 
with bi-polar programs were also mindful of events occuring in the Antarctic at the 
time. Specificaly, the Antarctic Treaty states had come to agreement on a regime for 
the regulation of mineral resource activities. This represented the operationalizing of 
their perception of sustainable development of non-living resources (as discussed in 
Chapter 5). What the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA) provided was a program of planned and permited development 
which took into account the vulnerability of aspects of the Antarctic environment. As 
noted earlier, before any permits could be issued for proposed activities like 
exploration or development, a liability annex to the Convention was required to be 
formalized. In this way the Antarctic Treaty states had atempted to strike a balance 
between issues of environmental and developmental concern. The fact that 
sovereignty problems contributed to the failure of CRAMRA has been already 
discussed. However, in the context of the Arctic, sovereignty was not in doubt per se 
and would not have figured prominently in any CRAMRA-like agreement for the 
north. 
Some northern commentators considered that the quality of environmental protection 
ofered by CRAMRA was only sectoral (that is, relevant only to areas of proposed 
resource activity), a failing which was seen as leading to the push for a more 
comprehensive and wide-ranging environmental agreement (Bjorklund 1993:5). 
Therefore the failings of CRAMRA, and the later establishment of the comprehensive 
Madrid Protocol on environmental protection, may have served as stimuli to the bi-
polar Arctic states as they embarked on their journey towards multilateral ecosystem 
management. 
From a position of intransigence in the mid-1980s, the former Soviet Union's new 
openness represented a quite remarkable leap forward for prospective cooperative 
inter-state relationships.32I However, the establishment of IASC over a period of 
years and a series of meetings, both formal and informal, also highlighted the 
expansive time frame and political climate in which the development of confidence-
building measures was placed. Notwithstanding, each meeting, each new statement 
of afirmation by one country or another, served to build upon the tentative framework 
already laid down. This is not to suggest that the steps taken were always in a 
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forward direction, as political change was occuring at the same time which was not 
without a certain amount of confusion and chaos. 
Given al of the evidence presented above, the period during which IASC came into 
being heralded a new era of optimism in the Arctic which was to permeate eventualy 
through to the substantive issue of ecosystem management. 
4.7 	 The Rovaniemi Initiative 
The amicable trend towards cooperative discourse and increased confidence brought 
about by the establishment of IASC and Soviet glasnost, made the seeking of further 
cooperation in the field of environmental maters more of a probability for the Arctic 
states. 
Although IASC was issue-specific, that is, scientific, its establishment set a precedent 
as a contemporary model of Arctic cooperation, particularly since al of IASC's 
atendant problems and conflicts were known variables to al of the actors concerned. 
However, a broadening of the Arctic cooperative agenda to include the politicaly 
charged issue of ecosystem management stil presented many problems in terms of the 
constraints of sovereignty. 
The process of addressing the common problem of Arctic eco-management had 
already begun with bilateral accords between the Soviets and their near neighbours 
Finland, Sweden and Norway in 1988 and 1989. Furthermore, most of the Arctic 
states were also party to many of the global environmental instruments in force or 
agreed upon at the time (see Appendix 5), as wel as being involved with IASC. 
The first Arctic-specific environmental conference was held in September 1989 in 
Rovaniemi, Finland, folowing the circulation of a Finnish working paper. This 
consultative meeting was held at Ministerial level and was atended by representatives 
from Finland, USSR, Denmark (representing Greenland), Norway, Canada and 
Sweden. It is understood that Iceland and the US were invited but did not atend 
(Archer undated: 12). 
The meeting resolved to establish two standing commitees: a working group on the 
environment and another on legal materials. However, military operations and 
polution therefrom were excluded from explicit investigation, probably in order to 
facilitate cooperation and agreement while minimising conflict (Archer undated: 12). 
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The next round was held in April 1990 in Yellowknife, Canada. This further 
preparatory meeting was attended by all of the Arctic 8, plus observers from the 
Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference. Vital motivating support for the process was received from all 
delegations, and several fundamental themes in their presentations to the meeting are 
noteworthy: 
• research and monitoring are fundamental to understanding 
environmental problems in order that appropriate solutions be 
found; 
• unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions will all be 
required to resolve Arctic environmental problems; 
• a program of international ecological cooperation should be 
established for the Arctic region; 
• an Arctic Sustainable Development Strategy would be a clear 
expression of commitment; 
• existing legal instruments may be the basis for improved Arctic 
environmental protection through a strengthening and broader 
application. 
(AEPS 1990:2-3) 
In Yellowknife, the working groups established at Rovaniemi reported on their 
progress to date. Comprehensive reports were still in their formative stages but a 
clearer picture was emerging, which indicated that a great deal more information and 
monitoring were required before any substantial policy statements could be made. 
The report of the legal materials group highlighted the limitations of existing law, both 
regional and global, in environmental protection of the Arctic. The report concluded 
that each type of ecosystem damage required a unique legal response and while some 
laws were adequate, others were not. In any event, states were urged to accede to any 
international agreements with relevance to Arctic ecosystem protection. 
Both working groups were consequently mandated to continue their investigations. In 
addition, Canada submitted a draft Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) which was welcomed and discussed 
by the Meeting. Canada agreed to review the document (YIC/Doc.22) for the next 
meeting. 
Another draft document prepared by Sweden related to protection of the marine 
environment. Sweden's input was welcomed and further work plans were to be made 
towards presenting a new proposal once states had studied the draft. 
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An ad hoc group was formed at Yellowknife to draft an Arctic environmental 
protection strategy and to formulate a position on emergency prevention, preparedness 
and response. Specific principles to be included were: 'sus tainable/equi table 
development'and'stewardship by Arctic countries and Arctic peoples' 
(Archer undated: 13). 
At the diplomatic level at least, the ice states appeared to be on a path towards 
articulating explicit and definitive goals, along with strategies for achieving those 
goals. The regime-building process was in motion. However, a new problem had 
emerged. The Yellowknife forum was thought to be protectionist and there was an 
undercurrent of feeling against non-Arctic state participation. However, the meeting 
was shown that there were some very good reasons why non-Arctic states should 
participate in the Rovaniemi process: 
• the solutions to transboundary pollution required the involvement of 
industrialised nations (especially if they were the source); 
• migratory fauna were a shared resource (especially straddling fish stocks); and 
• the science programmes of some non-Arctic states, especially the UK, Germany 
and Poland, made a valuable contribution to the pool of Arctic scientific 
knowledge, especially since these states were members of IASC. 
In fact, as evidence of the legitimacy of non-Arctic state participation in the process, 
the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the UN Environment Programme and the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe were all invited as observers, along with Germany, 
Poland and the UK, after the inaugural 1989 meeting in Rovaniemi. 
Norway also presented a draft discussion paper at Yellowknife, proposing the 
formalization of Arctic monitoring. This subsequently led to a meeting of experts in 
Oslo in November 1990. With the next ministerial meeting of the Rovaniemi round 
set for June 1991 in its sights, the Oslo meeting produced a proposal for an Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) and sought input from all Arctic states. 
It was anticipated that an AMAP would provide information, back-up and coordination 
through the preparation of reports on the state of the environment; the development 
and approval of a protocol and coverage assessment; the determination of monitoring 
requirements; and the provision of advice on research and other resources necessary to 
undertake identified investigations (AMAP 1990:2). 
The next Rovaniemi Official's Meeting was held at Kiruna, Sweden in January 1991. 
This forum proved again just how tenuous the relationship was between Arctic and 
non-Arctic States and hence both the fragility of the process itself and the minimalist 
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perceptions of some states. It was Poland's first oficial atendance and their 
aggressive atitude was reported to have very nearly jeopardized the ground both the 
UK and Germany had gained in being accepted as external interested parties to the 
Arctic-specific initiative (Archer undated: 15-16). The Polish delegation at Kiruna was 
heavy-handed in their approach, demanding ful membership of the Rovaniemi 
Process on the grounds of concerns about transboundary environmental efects. This 
was said to be counter-productive to the soft approach to non-Arctic state participation 
favoured by the English and German delegations (Archer undated:15). 
Notwithstanding, the process continued its momentum and in June 1991 the Ministers 
again assembled in Rovaniemi, Finland. 
This time the list of observers had grown to include two more indigenous peoples' 
groups - the Nordic Sarni Council and the Association of Smal Peoples of the North. 
Together with the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, these groups provided circumarctic 
representation of native interests, thereby extending the legitimacy of the process, 
symbolicaly at least. 
The President of the newly-established IASC, Dr E Fred Roots, also atended and 
presented an overview of IASC to the meeting (IASC 1992:3). The Federal Republic 
of Germany, the UK and Poland were also in atendance as observers, obviously 
having reconciled their diferences since Kiruna. 
From the first Finnish initiative of September 1989, in the space of less than two years 
the ice states had built an impressive foundation of confidence for cooperative 
problem-solving in the field of the environment. This was rounded of with a 
Declaration on the Protection of the Arctic Environment and the release of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy at the gathering in Rovaniemi in 1991. 
4 . 8 	 Towards An Arctic Eco-Management Regime: The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy 
The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy322 and the Declaration on the Protection 
of the Arctic Environment are both soft law instruments. The participants who signed 
the Declaration were al Ministers or Deputy Ministers and one was an Ambassador. 
(The participation of the observers was not acknowledged in the Declaration.) Both 
documents can be considered statements of Government opinion and intent, but 
neither can be considered binding legal instruments. 
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The Declaration read, in part: 
We, the Representatives of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the United States of America; 
Meeting at Rovaniemi, Finland for the First Ministerial 
Conference on the Protection of the Arctic Environment; 
Deeply concerned with threats to the Arctic environment and the 
impact of pollution on fragile Arctic ecosystems; 
Acknowledging the growing national and international 
appreciation of the importance of Arctic ecosystems and an 
increasing knowledge of global pollution and resulting 
environmental threats; 
Resolving to pursue together in other international 
environmental fora those issues affecting the Arctic 
environment which require broad international cooperation; 
Emphasizing our responsibility to protect and preserve the 
Arctic environment and recognizing the special relationship of 
the indigenous peoples and local populations to the Arctic and 
their unique contribution to the protection of the Arctic 
Environment; 
Hereby adopt the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and 
commit ourselves to take steps towards its implementation and 
consider its further elaboration. 
(AEPS 1991b:1) 
The background work so far in this study has indicated the pervasive nature of the 
global environmental movement and the role of scientific investigation in informing the 
international community about ecosystem threats. Acknowledgment is also made in 
this Declaration of these bases for seeking a regime to manage the Arctic ecosystem. 
The Declaration thereafter became more demonstrative: 
We commit ourselves to a joint Action Plan of the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy which includes: 
- Cooperation in scientific research to specify sources, 
pathways, sinks and effects of pollution, in particular, oil, 
acidification, persistent organic contaminants, radioactivity, 
noise and heavy metals as well as sharing of these data; 
- Assessment of potential environmental impacts of development 
activities; 
- Full implementation and consideration of further measures to 
control pollutants and reduce their adverse effects to the 
Arctic environment. 
We intend to assess on a continuing basis the threats to the 
Arctic environment through the preparation and updating of 
reports on the state of the Arctic environment, in order to 
propose further cooperative action. 
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We also commit ourselves to implement the following measures of 
the Strategy: 
- Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) to monitor 
the levels of, and assess the effects of, anthropogenic 
pollutants in all components of the Arctic environment. To 
this end, an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Task Force will 
be established. Norway will provide for an AMAP secretariat. 
- Protection of the Marine Environment in the Arctic, to take 
preventative and other measures directly or through competent 
international organizations regarding marine pollution in the 
Arctic irrespective of origin; 
- Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, to provide a framework for future cooperation in 
responding to the threat of environmental emergencies; 
- Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, to facilitate the 
exchange of information and coordination of research on species 
and habitats of flora and fauna. 
(AEPS 1991b:2-3) 
Further actions were also declared: 
We agree to hold regular meetings to assess the progress made 
and to coordinate actions which will implement and further 
develop the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy. 
We agree to continue to promote cooperation with the Arctic 
indigenous peoples and to invite their organizations to future 
meetings as observers. 
(AEPS 1991b:3) 
The representatives agreed to meet in Nuuk, Greenland in 1993. The declaration then 
concluded with: 
_we, the undersigned Representatives of our respective 
Governments, recognizing its political significance and 
environmental importance, and intending to promote its results, 
have signed this Declaration. 
(AEPS 199 1b:3, emphasis added) 
It is interesting to note the political significance the parties attached to these statements. 
In light of this, the Declaration may be seen as an historic manifesto of the collective 
intent of the Arctic states to continue to pursue a cooperative arrangement for eco-
management. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, moreover, takes this 
positive affirmation many steps further by clearly articulating objectives, principles 
and proposed courses of action. 
Before analysing the content of AEPS, it is useful to discuss the expanded information 
data base on Arctic ecosystems. This brief review will give the Strategy background 
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meaning. Although beter placed earlier in the Chapter, this section is presented here 
to further reinforce how litle information there was regarding Arctic ecosystems, as in 
fact much of the information below has been gleaned since the establishment of IASC. 
4.8.1 	 Arctic Ecosystems in New Light 
In the context of the emerging Arctic regime for ecosystem management, the problems 
specific to the Arctic ecosystems were agreed upon and defined by the process leading 
to the Rovaniemi Initiative. They comprise six major components as folows: 
• Persistent Organic Compounds 
This category of polutants include PCBs, DDT, hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH), 
chlordane and toxaphene. They are particularly hazardous because of their high 
stability and persistence in the environment, potential for bioaccumulation and high 
chronic toxicity. Although the production of many of these compounds has been 
stopped or restricted, their use remains widespread. They have been released in large 
quantities into the environment and transported from the industrial centres of Asia, 
Europe and North America via rivers, the atmosphere and ocean curents to the Arctic. 
There is a direct pathway through the food chain from lipid-rich wildlife like bears, 
whales and seals to humans because of the tendency of these chlorinated organic 
compounds to bond with fat cels (AEPS 1991a). 
• Oil Polution 
As already mentioned, the climatic conditions of the Arctic retard the dispersal of 
polutants such as oil, thereby lengthening the period in which a spil could be harmful 
to wildlife. In addition, oil may become trapped by the ice. The Arctic conditions also 
inhibit quick and efective response to and clean-up of contaminated areas (AEPS 
1991a). 
• Heavy Metals and Other Destructive Elements 
The long-range atmospheric transportation of heavy metals adds to the accumulation of 
many naturaly occuring compounds and winds cary carbon dioxide, sulphurs, 
CFCs and pesticides from mid-latitudes into the Arctic. The likely contribution of 
increased carbon dioxide to ozone depletion has now been verified (Osherenko & 
Young 1989:122-3). Heavy metal contamination has been found throughout the 
Arctic ecosystem in the air, rain, ocean, soil, rivers, lakes and biota. In addition, local 
resource activity discharges polutants. One of the main concerns is the transportation 
of such compounds through the food chain to humans (AEPS 1991a). 
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• 	 Noise 
Noise polution may be particularly disturbing to marine mammals because of the 
importance of natural sounds to their echolocation. Fish stocks may also be afected. 
Similarly, low level overflights of terestrial fauna and seals on ice may cause short 
term disturbance to the populations (AEPS 1991a). 
• 	 Radioactivity 
A major source of wory is nuclear falout, and concerns have deepened since the 
Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in April 1986. With primary efects felt in 
Sweden, the Sarni reindeer herds were pronounced unfit for human consumption after 
radioactive iodine and caesium fel on their prime feeding lands (Osherenko & Young 
1989:127). This led directly and indirectly to the disturbance of habitats. Because 
reindeer and other game like elk could not be safely taken for the purposes of human 
consumption, there were fears about overgrazing due to increased stock numbers. 
The ecological efects of Arctic militarisation are something of an unknown variable 
simply because of the secrecy surounding such activities. It is expected that more 
wil become known with the passage of time. However, radioactive waste dumping 
by the Russians in the Barents and Kara Seas has been investigated and reported on by 
a number of sources.323 One British Government report's conclusion is noteworthy: 
By the conservative methods of risk estimation applicable to 
pollution issues such as these, there is a threat, albeit a 
minimal one in comparative terms, from the existing source term 
of anthropogenic radionuclide introduced into the Northern 
Seas. This is, however, not the worst problem, which is the 
enormous volume of waste to be disposed of as the Russian 
Northern Fleet decommissions a large number of nuclear 
submarines in the foreseeable future. 
(Ash 1994:47) 
The report noted that Russia was dealing with this situation, but that Western countries 
should ...demonstrate by example the standards appropriate to 
collective ecological security.' This could be achieved by agreeing to 
colaborate in the salvage of the largest portion of waste, a scutled submarine and 
other reactors with nuclear fuel stil on board (Ash 1994:47). Furthermore, the 
report's conclusion contained the warning that: 
Failure to make such a demonstration of intent could easily be 
interpreted as indifference, or worse, as a tacit 
acknowledgment that the materials disposed of so far have 
resulted in minimal injury and that further sea disposal would 
be both cheap and without political disadvantage. 
(Ash 1994:47) 
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Along with the dumping of radioactive waste and the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident 
mentioned above, the falout from atmospheric nuclear weapons testing is a major 
concern to Arctic nations. The long-lived radionuclides Strontium-90 and Caesium-
137 are eficiently retained by surface vegetation and are biologicaly recycled within 
the ecosystem. The link through the food chain to humans has been established, as 
humans consume caribou and reindeer which graze on this contaminated surface 
vegetation (AEPS 1991a). 
• 	 Acidification 
The sulphur and nitrogen compounds are the two most significant acidifying 
substances and have been discussed in Chapter 1. The air quality of the Arctic, 
particularly in winter, is severely afected by motor vehicle emissions, industrial 
activities and the coal- and oil-based power generating plants. These emissions are 
from both local and trans-frontier sources. Acid polutant aerosols contribute to the 
Arctic haze phenomena made famous by misty Fairbanks' skies. Further, a 
continuous excessive acid load leads to the mobilization of aluminium and heavy 
metals in the soil (AEPS 1991a). 
The Arctic countries are in agreement about the fact that problems exist but are 
cautious about the exact nature of such factors as critical loads, the rates of 
acidification and accumulation. Litle is known about the potential efects of 
chlorinated organic contaminants on the ecosystem, for instance. The available 
information on ambient oil polution in the Arctic is also scarce. The regime-builders 
are similarly unsure about the nature of noise disturbance. In short, while the 
problems are sometimes visibly obvious, the Arctic states admit that more monitoring 
and research is waranted (AEPS 1991a). 
4.8.2 	 Dedicated Regime Formation and its Legitimacy 
There was no Arctic regime in existence which was capable of dealing with these pan-
Arctic ecosystem threats or, prior to the establishment of IASC, of directing the further 
research that was indicated in order to butress wel-informed, comprehensive policy 
decisions. It was demonstrated that the problems were pan-Arctic in nature and that 
no single nation could solve them alone. 
The fragmented, ad hoc legal arangements were adequate in some areas, but there 
was no cohesive policy to support ful-scale comprehensive Arctic eco-management. 
The issue of persistent organic contaminants, for instance, is essentialy an out-of-area 
problem, further complicating the process by requiring cooperation with non-Arctic 
nations (AEPS 1991a:18). Oil polution was covered by no less than eight separate 
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international legal instruments, but the area of application of many of these 
arrangements did not extend adequately to the Arctic, nor did they accommodate its 
particularly difficult climatic conditions. In recommending strict standards for Arctic 
oil transportation, the AEPS endorsed liaison with the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) (AEPS 1991a:19). Heavy metals contamination was, to some 
extent, covered under the LRTAP Convention, which limited harmful atmospheric 
emissions, the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol. The marine environment 
was protected to some degree by both the Oslo and Paris Conventions. The LOSC too 
has provisions for protecting the marine environment (AEPS 1991a:20-1). There 
were, however, no noise pollution regulations in force in the Arctic. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and various bilateral agreements have the issue of 
radioactivity in hand, but demonstrate little effectiveness (AEPS 1991a:21-2). 
Similarly with the issue of acidification, there are regulatory mechanisms to control the 
sources which affect the Arctic but they were having little apparent effect (AEPS 
1991a:22). 
In summary, all of the six categories of Arctic ecosystem threats, with the exception of 
noise pollution, were covered in some way or another by existing legal instruments, 
but there were critical gaps which allowed the threats to continue. Therefore the Arctic 
nations considered that cooperative problem-solving was both crucial and urgent. 
In this sense, the Rovaniemi Initiative was both timely and essential. The process 
included all of the actors which were directly or indirectly affected by Arctic ecosystem 
threats. It accommodated to an unprecedented degree the input of indigenous peoples' 
groups by acknowledging that '...the cultures and the continued existence 
of the indigenous peoples have been built on the sound stewardship 
of nature and its resources' (AEPS 1991a:1-2). It allowed non-Arctic 
observers into the process, in acknowledgment of the transfrontier nature of some 
factors effecting the Arctic (AEPS 1991a:2). The benefits of a coordinated regional 
environmental protection strategy are seen as both regional and global because the 
Arctic exerts an important influence on the global environment (AEPS 1991a:2). 
Furthermore, the AEPS acknowledged the validity and utility of both soft and hard 
law. It made specific reference to safeguarding the environment for 'future 
generations' in a manner 'compatible with nature' (AEPS 1991a:2), taking on 
board the World Commission on Environment and Development's 'international 
call for action' (AEPS 1991a:1). In addition, it identified existing international, 
regional and bilateral arrangements pertinent to Arctic eco-management. It also 
acknowledged the pivotal role of state governments in the process. Importantly, it 
articulated a philosophy of ecological sustainability: '...this Strategy should 
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allow for sustainable economic development in the north so that such 
development does not have unacceptable ecological or cultural 
impacts' (AEPS 1991a:2). 
Each of the points noted above contribute to the legitimacy of the Rovaniemi Initiative 
and demonstrate the beginning of a commitment towards responsibility for the global 
ecosystem. There may be no accounting for the many serendipitous moments or the 
exercise of benevolent coercion to prompt less responsive actors towards accord, 
however the results are now on the table for the world to witness. The AEPS is not 
an Arctic Treaty and therefore contains no strict legal obligations, per se. There is, 
however, a publicly-declared commitment on the part of the eight ice states: t[This] 
vulnerability of the Arctic to pollution requires that action be 
taken now, or degradation may become irreversible'(AEPS 1991aq, 
emphasis added). Here we also see the beginning of a precautionary approach to 
ecosystem management. 
4.8.3 	 Conditions of Operation of the AEPS 
This emerging Arctic eco-management regime, represented by the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, is in its formative stages. Therefore analysis of its 
operations can only be superficial at this stage. 
The procedural and substantive devices it employs are premised on the articulation of 
three fundamental values: 0 protection of the Arctic environment; i) sustainable and 
equitable development; and ii) protection of the cultures of indigenous peoples 
(AEPS 1991a:2). This three-tiered objective wil be achieved through 'careful 
stewardship' by Arctic countries and people (AEPS 1991a:3). 
Particular phases can be identified in the conditions of operation of the regime. The 
broad direction in which the regime intends to move is contained within its Objectives 
which are as folows: 
i) To protect the Arctic ecosystem, including humans. 
ii) To provide for the protection, enhancement and 
restoration of environmental quality and the sustainable 
utilization of natural resources, including their use by 
local populations and indigenous peoples in the Arctic. 
iii) To recognize and, to the extent possible, seek to 
accommodate the traditional and cultural needs, values 
and practices of the indigenous peoples as determined by 
themselves, related to the protection of the Arctic 
environment. 
iv) To review regularly the state of the Arctic environment. 
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v) 	 To identify, reduce and, as a final goal, eliminate 
pollution. 
(AEPS 1991a:4) 
The first phase is the determination of core values. These are stated to be protection 
of the ecosystem, sustainable development and protection of indigenous peoples' 
integrity. Having proclaimed this, the next phase is to review the state of the 
environment. The third phase is to work on solving any problems identified. 
• 	 Substantive Devices Within the AEPS 
There are no substantive legal arangements atached to the AEPS. Rather there is a 
statement of principles to guide the actions of the Arctic states as both individuals and 
a colective, towards realization of their stated objectives, especialy the three core 
values. 
The principles are entreaties to the States to take into account the three core values in 
management, planning and development activities (Principle (i). There is a specific 
ecosystem bent within the directive to base the use and management of natural 
resourceson'..the value and interdependent nature of ecosystem 
components (Principle (i). While not expressly prohibiting activities which may 
significantly afect Arctic ecosystems, and while not specificaly directing the states to 
conduct environmental impact assessments, Principle (ii) urges, inter alia, that such 
activities be based on informed assessments of possible and cumulative impacts; that 
they maintain ecological systems and biodiversity; and that they respect the 
significance for and influence on global climate. The assumption is that such informed 
assessments would come from some kind of EIA process, as Principle (iv) specificaly 
asksth Winformation and knowledge concerning Arctic ecosystems and 
resources use will be developed and shared to support planning and 
should precede, accompany and follow development activities.' 
These procedures would necessarily be a state responsibility, initialy at least. 
Similarly the development of a protected area network may also be the responsibility 
of individual states in the first instance (Principle (vii). The fundamental value of 
international and mutual cooperation in fulfiling state and international responsibilities 
is acknowledged and 'shall be promoted and developed'. The use, transfer 
and/or trade of the most efective and appropriate technology to protect the 
environment underscores these cooperative eforts (Principles (ix) and (x). 
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• 	 Procedural Devices Within the AEPS 
In order to achieve these objectives and principles, the Rovaniemi Initiative adopted a 
structural configuration based on working groups. During the regime formation 
process, two standing working groups were established to deal with legal and 
environmental maters (titled the Working Group on the State of the Environment 
Reports and Monitoring and the Working Group to Review Legal Instruments 
Concerning the Protection of the Arctic Environment). These groups presented their 
initial reports to the Yelowknife Preparatory Meeting. An ad hoc working group was 
then convened at Yelowknife to draft both the AEPS and a proposal for emergency 
prevention, preparedness and response. These working groups continue their 
projects. 
The most significant structural arangement of the 1991 Rovaniemi Initiative is the 
establishment of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) (AEPS 
1991a:30-33). This programme is mandated to, inter alio, provide up to the minute 
reports on the status of the Arctic environment. Its preliminary and planned future 
phases of activity are identified in Figure 4 on the next page. 
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PHASES 	 WORK TO BE DONE 
Preliminary 
(1990-1991) 
Decision at 
Rovaniemi, 
June 1991 
Phase 1 
(1991-1994) 
* Design a framework and a plan for the organization and ideal content of 
AMAP. 
* Prepare an updated list of ongoing monitoring and research activities. 
* Prepare status reports on selected areas of concern, eg. acids, oil, heavy 
metals, underwater noise and radionuclides for the ministerial meeting in 
Rovaniemi, June 1991. 
* Decide whether the AMAP shal be initiated or not, and if initiated — 
* the work schedule for the implementation and the first status report by 
1996. 
* The establishment of an Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Task Force 
and a permanent secretariat. 
* Establish a number of expert groups to complete the work started in 
Oslo and assess proposals from the expert meeting. 
* Harmonize existing national, bilateral and international programmes on 
methodology, stations, sampling frequency, etc. 
* Perform joint monitoring of the parameters identified as our main 
concern. 
* Perform baseline-studies/research to fil gaps in knowledge. 
* Establish a directory/reference database for an overview of existing 
programmes and activities, and a system of exchange and presentation of 
data. 
* Prepare and present the first holistic status report for the Arctic 
environment regarding polution and climate changes. 
* Design and perform a revised AMAP based on the experience and 
results of the first status report. 
Phase 2 
(1991-1994) 
Phase 3 
(1997- ) 
* Preparation of status reports at fixed time intervals regarding levels and 
trends in polution and climate changes in the Arctic. 
Figure 4. Phased Implementation of AMAP and Necessary Tasks 
(Source: Reiersen 1991:399) 
The Rovaniemi Initiative did not make concrete rules or procedures or legal 
arangements binding on the participants. Apart from the establishment of AMAP and 
the on-going working group projects, the only other procedural device decided upon 
was to hold regular meetings on the Arctic environment (AEPS 1991a:44). 
It was decided that the procedure for meetings, including dates, venues, agendas and 
participation of observers would be agreed upon at each preceding meeting and 
communicated to interested parties in advance. 
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These meetings would have five objectives: 
• to identify and coordinate actions to implement and further 
develop the AEPS; 
• . to initiate cooperation in new fields relevant to the 
environmental protection of the Arctic; 
• to make necessary recommendations in order to protect the 
Arctic environment; 
• to improve existing environmental regimes relevant to the 
Arctic; and 
• to assess and report on progress on actions agreed upon. 
(AEPS 1991a:44-5) 
These objectives are very similar to those of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
4.8.4 	 Designated Courses of Action Within the AEPS 
The primary course of action indicated by the AEPS was to add information to the 
inadequate but growing Arctic data base. The phases of the AMAP shown in Figure 4 
above were to be one mechanism for achieving this. 
Notwithstanding, the process did identify the need to take immediate action regarding 
marine polution in the Arctic, irespective of origin. To this end, the Arctic countries 
agreed to apply any international environmental law principles contained in treaties to 
which they were a party, to their Arctic teritory.324 The Arctic states were also 
encouraged to ratify any instruments which would support the protection of the polar 
marine environment. Further, they agreed to undertake joint representation and 
actions in relevant international fora to enhance recognition of the '...particularly 
sensitive character of ice-covered parts of the Arctic Ocean (AEPS 
1991a:34). 
With respect to emergency prevention, preparedness and response, concern was 
expressed about the increased development and shipping activities within the Arctic, 
particularly since there was crucial information missing. For example, relative hazards 
and risks associated with diferent activities; the geographic distribution of high risk 
activities; and the mapping of particularly sensitive areas was either undocumented or 
unfinished (AEPS 1991a:36). Therefore the first designated course of action in this 
regard was to review existing regional arangements as a process of evaluating the 
adequacy of the geographical coverage of the Arctic by these marine arangements. 
The states would then convene a meeting of experts to consider response action, 
coordination and harmonization of policy, early notification systems and risk 
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assessment. These activities are expected to be coordinated with the activities of 
AMAP. Anticipated results include the development of contingency plans and training 
programs; the exchange of scientific, legislative and administrative information; and 
the establishment of mechanisms for public information and participation (AEPS 
1991a:36-8). 
The Canadian initiative to implement CAFF, the Conservation of Arctic Flora and 
Fauna, was a key concern, particularly since '[the flora and fauna] are an 
essential factor helping to define the culture and survival of the 
people living there (AEPS 1991a:39). The problems were considered to be 
inherently circumarctic and the Polar Bear Convention aside, there was no 
comprehensive protection of Arctic flora and fauna ofered through existing 
multilateral or bilateral agreements. Accordingly, the states agreed, inter alia, to 
cooperate by exchanging information and expertise, by developing joint ventures, and 
by designating a national agency to coordinate such actions. The role of IASC and 
other authorities was also recognised in this regard. The participants agreed to 
'establish a mechanism' for furthering CAFF (curently a Working Group), 
although they did not elaborate at this point (AEPS 1991a:42). 
Essentialy the onus rests with the Arctic state governments as the activities to achieve 
CAFF, along with their long-term funding, wil be subject to the laws, regulations 
and abilities of states (AEPS 1991a:43). 
4.8.5 	 Outcomes and Impacts of the AEPS 
It is too early to quantify outcomes or impacts of the AEPS. However, some trends 
have become evident. A Second Ministerial Conference of the Rovaniemi Initiative 
was held in September 1993 in Nuuk, Greenland. This forum had more observers - 
Chile, the Netherlands, the Nordic Council and the Northern Forum. It also had a 
broader perspective, recognising the importance of applying the results of the UNCED 
(Rio Earth Summit) process, which had occured in the interim, to the Arctic (AEPS 
1993). 
The Ministerial Declaration from Nuuk reiterated Rovaniemi's core values, but this 
time in much more confident and positive language.325 
The Declaration made reference to the Rio Earth Summit's application to the Arctic 
region and welcomed the eforts of the Arctic countries to implement, through the 
AEPS, Rio's relevant provisions. Specificaly cited were the Rio Declaration, Agenda 
21 and the Statement on Forest Principles. The Nuuk Declaration paraphrased the Rio 
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Declaration's Principle 2 (an affirmation of the 1972 Stockholm Principle 21) 
concerning the rights and obligations of states to exploit their own resources without 
jeopardizing other states' rights. It further affirmed Rio's Principle 22 relating to the 
value and role of indigenous people and their communities in the achievement of 
sustainable development (AEPS 1993:3-4). Item 10 of the Declaration urged early 
ratification of Rio's Biodiversity and Climate Change Conventions (AEPS 1993:5). 
Here is a stronger nexus between responsibility for the Arctic ecosystem and 
responsibility in a much broader context. 
Furthermore, two statements from the Nuuk Conference's Declaration are noteworthy 
in the context of the analytical template of this thesis, adding a measure of credibility to 
the emerging Arctic eco-management regime. They are Items 6 and 8 as follows: 
We believe that decisions relating to Arctic activities must be 
made in a transparent fashion and therefore undertake to 
facilitate, through national rules and legislation, appropriate 
access to information concerning such decisions, to 
participation in such decisions and to judicial and 
administrative proceedings. 
(Item 6, emphasis added) 
We believe that development in the Arctic must incorporate the 
application of precautionary approaches to development with 
environmental implications, including prior assessment and 
systematic observation of the impacts of such development. 
Therefore we shall maintain, as appropriate, or put into place 
as quickly as possible, an internationally transparent domestic 
process for the environmental impact assessment of proposed 
activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact 
on the Arctic environment and are subject to decisions by 
competent national authorities. To this end we support the 
implementation of the provisions of the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context. 326 
(Item 8, emphasis added) 
Lastly, the Conference made an undertaking to consider the development of regional 
instruments concerned with protection of the Arctic environment (AEPS 1993:5). 
This acknowledgment that the Arctic was being considered a region, rather than a 
physical location containing eight sovereign states, and further, one which required the 
force of law to support transboundary eco-management objectives, was indeed 
encouraging. 
The AMAP Task Force presented an updated report to the Ministers in Nuuk on issues 
of concern to the Arctic environment, including recommendations for action (AMAP 
1993a). While all of the AMAP recommendations were important, some deserve 
special mention: 
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It is (therefore] recommended that the eight Arctic countries 
undertake to support activities that will lead to the 
development of a formal protocol to control the emissions of 
heavy metals under the LRTAP Convention. 
(AMAP 1993a:7, emphasis added) 
Regarding radioactivity — 
It is recommended to: 
a) establish under the umbrella of AMAP reliable and 
comprehensive systems to identify and characterize 
present and potential sources and to monitor levels of 
radioactive contamination; 
b) ensure that nuclear installations that may affect the 
Arctic meet international standards established by the 
IAEA; 
c) initiate actions to prevent further increases in 
activity levels of anthropogenically-derived 
radionuclides irrespective of sources, and to reduce the 
levels, in order to keep the contamination as low as 
reasonably achievable, economic and social factors taken 
into account; 
d) initiate clean-up programmes for selected areas if 
needed. 
(AMAP 1993a:5-6, emphasis added) 
The Task Force was unable to provide the Ministers with comprehensive emissions 
and discharge data, a task originally assigned to them in 1991. They reported that this 
was due to the combination of a lack of data and restrictions on access to data imposed 
by various commercial and military authorities. Accordingly, they recommended that 
the Arctic 8, in cooperation with other appropriate organisations or under bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, undertake immediate efforts to: 
a) develop national emissions and discharge inventories of 
pollutants within the AMAP programme, including estimates 
of input due to ongoing operations and contamination due 
to current and decommissioned hazardous waste disposal 
sites; 
b) take immediate steps to reduce the most severe sources of 
emissions and discharges; 
c) take immediate steps to clean up severely contaminated 
environment areas (eg. waste and dumping sites). 
(AIVIAP 1993a:8, emphasis added) 
This was a significant step in the sense that the issues of radioactivity and emissions 
data are politically (and strategically) sensitive. Also to this end, it was recommended 
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that the participating AEPS states coordinate activities and, as appropriate, contribute 
the resources required to enable Russia to undertake necessary activities in three areas: 
i) atendance at meetings and workshops; i) fulfilment of its state implementation 
plan; and 	 addressing of significant discharge, emission and waste site problems. 
The report noted Sweden's proposal that point ii) be 'put in brackets', indicating 
perhaps that Sweden was not interested in providing resources to help the Russians in 
this area (AMAP 1993a:9). 
There is litle doubt that this later issue regarding Russia is essentialy one of a 
compromise to the poluter pays principle. Indeed such a compromise would have 
been seen as necessary in order to assist the poluter to clean up, particularly since the 
entreaty necessarily involved financial as wel as technical resources because in this 
case the poluter simply could not pay. 
The next AEPS Ministerial meeting wil be held in Canada in 1996. 
4 . 9 	 Questions of Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Accountability: Early Assessments 
From the information presented in this chapter, it is clear that the Arctic nations are 
building a regime for management of the Arctic ecosystem. The actors involved in the 
Rovaniemi Initiative were representative of al the rightful stakeholders: indigenous 
groups, the Arctic 8 and interested, non-Arctic parties. The boundaries of scope of the 
regime wil eventualy embrace both the essence and the periphery of the problem, 
although in its formative stages the regime is stil coming to terms with the actual 
extent of the problem. Much is known about potential ecosystem threats, but much 
more information is required. However, if rhetoric is anything to judge by, the intent 
of the regime is to provide comprehensive pan-Arctic ecosystem protection through 
carefuly coordinated state management. 
In the global sense, the regime is showing a considerable measure of legitimacy as it 
respects and responds to linkages with other components of the international order 
which have a bearing on the objectives of the regime. 
With regard to efectiveness, the regime's objectives at this early stage appear to be 
rather more generic than specific. However, with increasing information and 
confidence, the Ministerial Conferences have progressively shown a greater degree of 
commitment by using much stronger language and accepting recommendations from 
its monitoring and assessment task force. The appropriateness of the objectives to the 
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solution of the problem will become clearer with the passage of time. The anticipated 
phases of progress towards the stated goals were clearly outlined in the Figure 4 on 
p.210. 
It is premature at this point in time to attempt to quantify outcomes. However the 
AMAP has been subjected to an independent audit of its first implementation plans and 
it did not fare particularly well. The audit was conducted by IASC, in collaboration 
with the International Council for Exploration of the Seas (ICES) (AMAP 1993b). 
The audit recommended, inter alia, that AMAP's plans should contain at least 
approximate information on the human and financial resources required, in order to 
provide a basis for rational decision-making by governments. Further, the audit 
exposed a need for some member states to be assisted in helping to fulfil the 
programme's objectives. This particularly applied to the Russian Federation (AMAP 
1993b). 
In addition to suggesting that the goals of AMAP were broad and somewhat 
ambitious, the audit criticised some of its specific projects. For instance, the link to 
state programs was thought to be very weak; the emphasis on monitoring rather than 
assessment was a failing; and because of these shortcomings, the first phase of AMAP 
was considered unrealistic (AMAP 1993b). 
What the audit appears to indicate is that the Arctic states still have a huge agenda to be 
worked through. This is not surprising when you consider that the Antarctic Treaty 
Parties have taken over 30 years of cooperation to achieve a comprehensive 
environmental protocol, and they have done this largely by virtue of the entrapment of 
the issue of sovereignty in Article IV of the Treaty. The response by AMAP to this 
audit is not known. 
In terms of accountability, the regime fares little better. The reporting procedures and 
transparency articulated in the Nuuk Declaration are positive signs of the regime's 
accountability. Unfortunately, compliance and enforcement mechanisms are totally 
absent and there are no regulations governing liability for harm. In fact there are no 
regulatory mechanisms at all. Because the regime does not have legally binding rules, 
the issues of compliance, enforcement and liability all become the province of state 
governments. The Arctic is comprised of eight sovereign states with varying Arctic 
interests, particularly in security matters, and with a varying propensity to take on 
board the enormous obligations imposed upon them by the AEPS. These factors were 
principal dimensions in the under-development of Arctic cooperation in the past. 
However, lack of accountability seems inherent in environmental law generally, so 
the Arctic is no different in this regard. 
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4.10 	 The AEPS and Responsibility for the Global Ecosystem 
In terms of responsibility for the global ecosystem, the early rhetoric is encouraging. 
As indicated throughout the text, there is explicit acknowledgement of some of its key 
concepts. For example, acceptance of the new Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of LOSC by Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Sweden and the United States implies tacit acceptance of the common heritage of 
mankind concept which has legitimate standing within this Agreement. Furthermore, 
throughout the discussion presented above, direct references to both future generations 
and precautionary behaviour have been noted. 
What is missing, and in fact what has turned out to be one of the most significant 
problems to date, has been the principle of the poluter paying. In many cases, the 
poluter is either the near-bankrupt Russian state or some unknown or unspecified out-
of-area poluters whose actions have efects which are cumulative, widespread, 
indiscriminate and perhaps even unforseen. There is litle that can be done to redress 
this in terms of past environmental practice and at present the best that the Arctic states 
can do is to jointly clean up areas which directly afect them as individuals. The future 
can be brighter, however, with general obligations imposed upon al states to become 
parties to other international agreements with a bearing on the state of the Arctic 
ecosystem. These agreements include the Espoo Convention on environmental impact 
assessment (see endnote 326). 
The AEPS has been criticised for its failure to adequately address non-environmental 
interests. This is most likely a legacy of the Cold War, stil fresh in the minds of 
Arctic diplomats. One perspective of Gorbachev's Soviet policy was that it was 
indicative of '...a growing awareness that a number of issues can be dealt 
with internationally without affecting vital security concerns' 
(0streng in Stokke 1992:227). It is not known at this stage how much the new 
Russian aliance with NATO's partnerships for peace might enhance Gorbachev's 
policy of trust and optimism. In any case, two diferent approaches can be taken. 
One is that the AEPS was not the appropriate forum for addressing non-environmental 
issues and perhaps this should be more the province of the proposed Arctic Council. 
Or conversely it can be argued that there is almost no issue that can be considered non-
environmental if, as this study suggests, there is an interdependence based on 
security, economics and the environment. 
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Notwithstanding, the regime's reluctance to impose strict regulatory mechanisms in its 
formative stages has also atracted criticism. One commentator noted for instance that 
attempts to introduce regulative elements into the strategy 
document failed in Rovaniemi' (Stokke 1992:226). But this reluctance to rush 
headlong into a legaly binding regime may be seen as a vital part of the regime-
building process in the Arctic, as states tread cautiously in their new-found roles as 
cooperative partners. One of the inherent values of soft law which is particularly 
pertinent to Arctic relations is its role as a bridging mechanism which gives the 
participants valuable time to reorientate themselves into a more cooperative frame of 
mind. 
On a more positive note, there is an encouraging process occuring within IASC 
which may have important political ramifications for the AEPS. IASC, at its 1994 
meeting, constituted the program 'Sustainable Development in the Arctic'. This was 
added to the IASC Science Agenda, and is to be one of four program elements in the 
forthcoming IASC Arctic Science Planning Conference.327 One of IASC's specific 
objectives regarding this initiative is to link the science and the policy communities, 
both of which have an interest in the subject of sustainable development. 
This initiative is not the first in this issue area; it wil stand alongside a number of other 
projects, including the AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development, the Mackenzie 
Basin Impact Study and the Efects of Human Activity on High Latitude Biodiversity 
(1-11LBIO) project.328 
Significantly, this Sustainable Development project aims at increasing IASC's 
knowledge about the Arctic by undertaking comparative research into such issues as 
the environmental and social impacts of diferent industries; of diferent Government 
economic and political systems and their policy-making processes; and of diferent 
northern communities and their industrial development. It may be that the greater 
theme of responsibility for the global ecosystem through efective regional ecosystem 
management wil be found in a combination of the forces of both IASC and the AEPS. 
4.11 	 Conclusions 
The Arctic has been the theatre for superpower posturing and activity since the end of 
World War H. Within this climate of international tension, each state atempted to 
maintain its sovereign integrity, security and economic prosperity: a classic display of 
the minimalist approach to sovereignty. The notion of the Arctic ecosystem as a 
functional unit did not atract a high political profile until the Cold War no longer 
presented a barier to cooperation. 
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When efforts to establish an integrated science management organization began there 
was still characteristic reticence to cooperate among the Arctic states. But gradually 
the enmity was replaced by a perceived need to act in concert. This was due in some 
measure to the recognition that there were many potential or actual transboundary 
environmental problems which required, in the first instance, further knowledge. It 
was acknowledged that the best way to acquire this information was to cooperate with 
others who also had a stake in the future of the Arctic as sovereign territory, as a 
homeland, as a laboratory, and as both a market and a resource. In terms of Arctic 
regime formation, the scientific communities were principle facilitators. Neither the 
United Nations nor environmentalists played a significant role in this part of the 
process. 
Addressing the problem of integrating the scientific information into policy choice so 
as to create an effective environmental protection regime for the Arctic proved to be 
more difficult, however. The Polar Bear Convention aside, states had traditionally 
acted unilaterally, or at best bilaterally, on issues concerned with environmental 
management. With the AEPS they were still not able to step outside the traditional 
minimalist approach to sovereignty by creating legally-binding rules for ecosystem 
protection. But this is understandable given the historical primacy of the issue of 
sovereign integrity to the Arctic states. Notwithstanding, the fact that the AEPS does 
exist means that the first part of the process — that is, recognizing and defining the 
problems and setting broad goals and principles — has been completed. The onus on 
states to be responsible for implementing the AEPS is little different to the onus 
contained within the legally-binding rules of the Antarctic Treaty System, where 
compliance is also voluntary and based on flag-state jurisdiction. 
The AEPS is an emerging pan-Arctic ecosystem management regime. Because it is 
immature and untested, there is plenty of scope for the regime to grow and achieve 
higher levels of effectiveness and accountability than it promises at the moment. 
The formation of both IASC and the AEPS will no doubt enhance the picture of the 
Arctic as a region of inter-state cooperation and a region which is composed of 
divergent communities and governments all interconnected by common or overlapping 
ecosystems. Together they will undoubtedly be successful in stimulating meaningful 
cooperation on Arctic environmental issues in the future. But there is also plenty of 
unfinished business to attend to. 
These issues will be addressed in the final chapter of this study, which will look 
towards the future of both the Arctic and Antarctic eco-management regimes. In 
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particular the concluding chapter will investigate outstanding matters like a Liability 
Annex for the Antarctic Treaty System and an Arctic Treaty or an Arctic Council for 
this evolving Arctic regime. In addition, the final chapter will investigate how the two 
case study areas deal with controversy and conflict; how they prioritise or reconcile the 
issues; and whether there is convergence or divergence in their perceptions of and 
methods for dealing with polar eco-management. 
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5 
Comparative Analysis and 
Conclusions 
Introduction 
In the Introduction to this study, the Research Objective was stated to be the 
identification of factors which enhance or inhibit the ability of polar states to make 
effective environmental policy and law for their polar regions. It was further proposed 
that this particular analytical approach might be useful in illustrating the thesis that 
global ecological interdependence will require a re-examination of the traditional 
notions of sovereignty, to induce a more fundamental sensitivity to the ecological 
common good. This would be likely to place the ecological common good higher up 
the scale of political priority, thereby increasing the likelihood of more effective 
problem-solving through enhanced international cooperation and laws. 
Chapter 1 developed the notion that there is a new paradigm of responsibility for the 
global ecosystem developing which embraces such concepts as behaving in a 
precautionary manner, having due regard for all humanity including future 
generations, developing resources in a sustainable manner, and having the polluter 
rather than the community held accountable for pollution. It was also suggested that 
such responsibility would not be the province of independent states alone, but would 
require international cooperation, as many problems are transboundary in nature. 
Therefore international regimes were considered to be the intervening variables 
between unilateral state action and the imposition of some kind of world governance. 
International regimes necessarily involve international cooperation and diplomacy. 
They contribute to the re-shaping of traditional notions of state sovereignty, promoting 
a permeability through state borders without unacceptable impost on sovereign 
statehood. 
Chapter 2 elaborated on the contextual background of the polar regions, describing the 
historical partitioning of Antarctica and the emergence of sovereign statehood in the 
Arctic. It indicated that the conflict over who discovered Antarctica and had rights to 
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claim territory (and hence its resources) was part of the driving force behind the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The Treaty suspended the notion of state sovereignty in 
favour of the common good in the Antarctic. The Treaty did not dismiss sovereign 
claims, but rather made provision for a workable compromise which facilitated the 
conduct of scientific activity in the whole of the continent. Chapter 2 also showed 
however, that in the Arctic the pursuit of sovereign autonomy has been paramount. 
The existence of military alliances, of strategic military locations and ultimately of 
superpower rivalry and the Cold War meant that the Arctic nations displayed classic 
minimalist behaviour towards each other. Consequently the notion of the Arctic as a 
region existed at best only in the minds of trans-border indigenous nations like the 
Sarni and the Inuit. Little in the way of pan-regional law or political infrastructure 
existed. 
The two case studies contained in Chapters 3 and 4 have provided lengthy descriptions 
of how the polar regions have developed to their current level of environmental 
management, and the nature of such legal obligations that exist. Building on the 
information from Chapter 2, both case studies showed that cooperation in the field of 
science has been instrumental as a confidence-building measure. In fact, it appears to 
have been the crucial nature of polar sciences which has enabled the polar regimes to 
make strong environmental law and policy. However, while the eco-management 
regime of the Antarctic is contained within a legally binding Protocol to the Antarctic 
Treaty, no such legal obligations have yet emerged in the Arctic, although the 
foundations are there. This means that the level of responsibility evidenced by 
Antarctic states is far above that of Arctic states. This Chapter will discuss the reasons 
why this is so. 
It will begin by analysing the differences and similarities between the polar regions 
and regimes in order to show how these variables are shaping polar environmental 
law-making. The Chapter will then determine whether the polar states have re-
examined the issue of sovereignty and thus whether de facto internationalization is 
occurring. The comparative analysis concludes with a preview of polar management 
regimes in the future and a commentary on their agenda of unfinished business. 
The thesis is concluded with some observations about the lessons of experience in the 
global context. It is noted that in the Introduction caution was expressed about using 
the polar regimes as models for the kind of new international strategic, economic, 
ecological and political order prescribed by the UNCED process. That caution is re-
stated here. 
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5.1 	 Regional Idiosyncrasies and Polar Environmental Law-Making 
It has been documented throughout this study that the polar regions are opposites in 
more ways than just geographicaly. Some of the more salient regional idiosyncrasies 
which influence the nature of environmental law-making and regime dynamics are 
examined below. 
5.1.1 	 The Geographic Dimension 
The relative proximity of the Arctic to Europe, Asia and North America means that it is 
vulnerable to human impacts through tourism, resource exploitation and 
transboundary polution. This also means that emergency responses to catastrophes 
are marginaly easier to deal with, with cooperation sometimes being a bigger 
inhibiting factor than location. However, these factors are only useful in the context 
of their relationship to the situation in the Antarctic. 
The Antarctic is either a long sea voyage or a long plane trip away from major centres. 
While this afords the southern continent a greater degree of protection, it also makes 
emergency response that much more dificult and hazardous. Cooperation, or lack of 
it, is not so much of an issue in the Antarctic, compared to the logistics of finding 
environmental polution and restoration or clean-up activities. 
Accordingly, both polar regimes have acknowledged this issue of proximity by 
formulating, or providing for the formulation of, emergency preparedness and 
response strategies and regulations. 
5.1.2 	 The Peripheral Locus of Decision-Making 
The study has also ilustrated that the locus of decision-making is peripheral to both 
polar regions. This has had interesting repercussions for the Antarctic because the 
states which make Antarctic laws (with the possible exception of the claimant states) 
are far removed from the object of their policies, both physicaly and in some senses, 
politicaly. This factor has enhanced the ability of the Antarctic Treaty Parties to make 
environmental law. Their motivation to make laws and the application of those laws 
have very litle direct afect on the populations of Antarctic Treaty states; the economic 
policies of those states;329 or in many cases strategic security.330 The Antarctic 
Treaty Parties can thus aford to negotiate more stringent environmental safeguards 
than they possibly have in domestic law. But the same cannot be said for the Arctic. 
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The peripheral locus of decision-making has been more disadvantageous in the Arctic 
because there are people involved: people who vote; people who have lived in the 
region for generations and yet have largely been excluded from the making of 
decisions which may have a profound effect on their lives and livelihood. 331 This not 
only applies to government decisions, but to those decisions of the environmental 
advocacy as well. 
The environmental advocacy's encroachment upon traditional cultures (for example, 
the urging of Greenlandic whalers not to hunt whales, or of Canadian Indian fur 
trappers not to trap, because these practices are anachronistic to some people's 20th 
century values) is seen as an insult and an absurdity by many indigenous communities. 
Arctic people find themselves in a dilemma, having grown accustomed to 20th century 
benefits like transport, communication, health and education services, yet being 
harassed into defending their traditional ways of life. The solution is for them is to 
participate in the making of decisions which directly affect their communities. 
The indigenous groups have been granted observer status within the AEPS, yet they 
remain separate from it by choice. The Inuit, for instance, declined a place on the 
official Canadian delegation to the AEPS because they felt it would compromise their 
fight for self-determination (Reimer, pers.comm). The AEPS does make many 
explicit references to the role of indigenous people in formulating Arctic eco-
management philosophy and policy, but it remains to be seen whether the native 
people of the Arctic are content with their level of participation. 
If the Arctic governments, located well outside the physical parameters of the Arctic 
regions are to make effective, appropriate ecosystem policies, indigenous communities 
must become active participants in the processes. To this end, the ICC has produced a 
two-volume appeal to the Canadian Government Department of Indian and Northern 
Affairs, titled 'The Participation of Indigenous Peoples and the Application of their 
Environmental and Ecological Knowledge in the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy'. 332 In this appeal it is reported for example, that one of the barriers to 
indigenous peoples' participation is science, specifically the traditional indigenous 
perspective that: '...the findings and opinions of scientists are important 
parts of southern decision making' (Brooke 1993:17, emphasis added). 
Essentially Arctic sciences are being conducted on Arctic people (and ecosystems), and 
not by Arctic people. They believe there is potential for a greater margin for errors of 
fact through misinterpretation or deliberate mischief on the part of the subjects being 
studied. 333 This kind of opinion leads to wider issues of community involvement and 
community education, and is compatible with the Rio Earth Summit's proposals on the 
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empowerment and capacity-building of indigenous nations generaly (United Nations 
1992:Ch.26). 
Arctic indigenous people wil continue to lobby for greater participation in Arctic 
policy- and law-making. The values of indigenous tradition and experience are 
acknowledged within the AEPS, but a mutualy respected intercourse between Arctic 
oficials and indigenous groups wil be required to keep the rhetoric alive and 
meaningful. 
	
5.1.3 	 The Demographic Dimension 
The most salient diference between the Antarctic and the Arctic, therefore, is that 
while the northern polar region is primarily a home to the population, the south is 
primarily a workplace. Arctic environmental policy exhibits a humanitarian 
dimension, and policy-making both acknowledges indigenous interests and includes 
indigenous groups in the negotiation process. This is demonstrated in the AEPS in 
terms of both its rhetoric and the make-up of its membership. By contrast, Antarctic 
policy can aford to be, and is in fact, more utilitarian in its focus and purpose. 
Both polar regimes address the protection of ecosystems, but whereas the AEPS 
defines the Arctic ecosystem to explicitly include humans, the Madrid Protocol does 
not; rather it provides protection for human uses, with priority given to scientific 
research. 
Two fundamental elements are hereby acknowledged: first, that any successful Arctic 
ecosystem management regime wil both acknowledge the presence of indigenous 
people and seek their participation; and second, the divergent uses of the Arctic and the 
Antarctic are a law-making variable of considerable importance. 
5.1.4 	 Permitted Uses of the Polar Regions, including 
Resource Exploitation 
The Arctic polar region is partly high seas, where use is both directed and protected by 
international law. Although the sector principle has been applied to sections of the 
Arctic Ocean to the North Pole, it remains unenforced oficialy. Regulation of human 
activity is extraordinarily dificult because the onus is on Arctic rim states as 
sovereigns to regulate the kinds of activities permited in their polar teritory. 
Accordingly, standards and permited uses vary between the states. Further, because 
resource exploitation, tourism, fishing, military and other activities are wel- 
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established, attempting to regulate use after the fact has been the single most vexing 
problem facing the Arctic states. 
The permitted uses of the Antarctic, on the other hand, are encoded into the original 
Antarctic Treaty, which deems that the continent must be used for peaceful purposes 
only, specifically scientific endeavour. Each legal regime additional to the original 
Treaty has attempted to further regulate aspects of human activity. That this was 
achievable is largely because the scale of activity was, and still is, modest by 
comparison with the Arctic. In fact, not only is Antarctic activity modest, but it is not 
of great economic importance, and to western economies, generally unprofitable. 
This study has illustrated that while a symbiotic relationship between the ecosystem 
and development is desirable, it is a particularly problematic objective in the Arctic 
because of the existence of unrestricted use patterns. The Antarctic, on the other hand, 
is in a much more advantageous position in this regard because its use patterns are 
regulated and formally codified. The Arctic has large-scale, varied and profitable 
resource exploitation, therefore environmental policies must take account of both the 
industrial stakeholders and the economic priorities of state governments. Accordingly 
the AEPS sought, as an explicit objective, the sustainable utilization of natural 
resources. The Antarctic supports only a small-scale tourism industry and a Southern 
Ocean fishery, both of which come under the aegis of state governments, with varying 
degrees of obligation to the legal regimes within the Antarctic Treaty System and 
outside it. The Madrid Protocol does not expressly refer to the sustainable utilization 
of natural resources, but this is implicit through its direct relationship to other 
components of the Antarctic Treaty System, particularly CCAMLR, which does 
express this sentiment. 334 
The problem in the Arctic is that resource exploitation is a fact and the Arctic states 
have had to reshape their relationships with each other in order to achieve cooperation 
on environmental matters relating to resource use. 335 The AEPS is a beginning, but 
the process is neither near completion nor without its problems. For example, one 
commentator has noted that: '...in most of the projects where Russia has 
begun to change its ways, Norway or other Western states have 
promised to pay a considerable part of the bill' (Stokke 1994:22). The 
polluter pays principle, one of the key concepts identified earlier in this work, is being 
invalidated because the polluter — Russia — cannot pay. 
The Antarctic Treaty Parties too, have had to re-evaluate their relationships in light of 
the failure of the Minerals Convention. They have done this successfully by 
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establishing the Madrid Protocol, which places a prohibition on mineral resource 
activities, and maintaining the status quo regarding claims to sovereignty. 
	
5.1.5 	 Transport 
The Arctic Ocean is a major shipping route. In addition there are trans-polar air 
routes. The volume of sea and air transport through the region is restricted somewhat 
by weather conditions. However, in peak times the transport volume is high enough 
to cause problems with regard to such incidents as rescue and potential polution 
catastrophes, of which an Exxon Valdez -type disaster is a prime example. The 
opening of the Northern Sea Route has the potential to further exacerbate the problem 
and it has been suggested that this issue be dealt with under a separate legal regime 
(Timchenko 1994:199). Despite concern over the NSR in particular, in general there 
are existing legal regulations governing sea and air transport which are applicable and 
have been acknowledged in the AEPS. However, these were not considered 
adequate. 
In the Antarctic, vessels and aircraft in the vicinity are either logistic support for 
scientific bases or smal tourism ventures. The Antarctic Treaty, and its connections 
with other relevant international law, provide adequate regulation for the smal volume 
of shipping and air trafic in the region. The Madrid Protocol's Annex IV on the 
prevention of marine polution is closely linked to MARPOL, which has now 
designated the Antarctic a Special Area under its Annex 11.336 In addition, it was 
noted earlier in this work that the Basel Convention expressly prohibits the export of 
hazardous wastes to the Antarctic. Such regulation that does exist cannot prevent 
accidents in either region, however, and both polar regimes have in place, or anticipate 
the adoption of emergency plans for such a contingency. 
5.1.6 	 Fauna and Flora Protection 
The Arctic has substantial terestrial floral communities, and faunal populations which 
in many cases migrate across politicaly-defined borders. Their protection, including 
maintaining the viability of habitats, has an added dimension in that much of the fauna 
is hunted by subsistence indigenous hunters, often traveling in communities alongside 
their herds or folowing migratory routes. The regions where the herds, feeding 
grounds and hunters are located require careful and thoughtful management, taking 
into account traditional use while at the same time respecting other uses. Imposing 
artificial restrictions on one element of the ecosystem, say for instance by applying a 
quota on a particular species, may have repercussions further along the ecosystem. It 
is known for instance that the Finnish government induced some of the Sarni reindeer 
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herders to establish farms and become viable economic businesses. To help achieve 
this the Sarni were provided with al-terain vehicles - snowmobiles - with which to 
muster their herds. The use of these vehicles has had the unforeseen impact of adding 
to the destruction of fragile wilderness areas. The Norwegian Government, on the 
other hand, has closed down many Satni-run reindeer farms because they were not 
economicaly viable. Because the farmers have no other skils, they are now 
unemployed and some have remained unemployable. (He'ander, pers.conun). 
The comprehensive protection of Arctic flora and fauna is stil in an embryonic stage, 
with that elusive balance stil to be determined. The only real success story in the 
Arctic has been the protection of Polar Bears. 
In the Antarctic, the protection of fauna and flora has achieved more formal expression 
within the Antarctic Treaty System. Through the legal regimes of the Agreed 
Measures, CCAS, CCAMLR and the Madrid Protocol (which includes a specialy 
protected and managed area network), species and habitat protection is 
comprehensive. However, the degree to which it is efective is another mater.337 
5.1.7 	 Ecosystem Policies, Cooperation and 
Responsibility 
Like any other areas of the world, the polar regions have sufered from the failure of 
governments to take an holistic, ecological view of their environments. While use 
paterns have been modest, impacts have remained smal. While cumulative and 
transboundary efects have remained below the risk threshold, governments have felt 
complacent about them. Complacency has often been a product of ignorance. In 
earlier times, scientific information on the creeping impacts of ecosystem harm was 
just not available, and to a certain extent consequences and significance are stil 
unknown variables today. But with the increasingly popular invocation of the 
precautionary approach, ignorance is no longer an acceptable excuse for complacency. 
The Arctic nations have traditionaly responded to obvious or potential ecological 
problems with a range of agreements, mainly bilateral in nature. However, this 
approach has proven to be totaly insuficient for ecosystem protection. Overarching 
holistic management has been restrained, primarily because inter-state relationships 
were based on the Cold War brinkmanship which subsumed most issues under the 
more formidable ones of sovereignty and security. Furthermore, the kinds of 
structural changes required to address the problem of ecosystem management were 
beyond the reach of even the most wel-intentioned Arctic nation on its own. That is, 
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until the confidence building measures provided by President Gorbachev's Murmansk 
speech and the establishment of the International Arctic Science Commitee. 
These two events endowed the ice states with the assurance that pan-Arctic 
cooperation was atainable. However, reaching accord on cooperative management of 
Arctic ecosystems was a far cry from the more innocuous agreement to cooperate in 
the coordination of scientific endeavour. The later did not involve any abrogation of 
sovereignty; it required litle in the way of extra financial input; and it had the potential 
to bestow enormous benefits on the participants. In short, there was very litle risk 
atached to participation in the IASC. Notwithstanding, the Arctic states have come to 
agreement on the AEPS and have begun a process towards more comprehensive 
protection of the Arctic environment than would have even been thought possible a 
decade ago. This is surely an optimistic sign that inter-state relationships might be 
recast in favour of an enhanced emphasis on the common good and hence a greater 
degree of responsibility. This last comment is made cautiously, however, in 
acknowledgement of the enormous amount of ground stil to cover with regard to 
formalizing and codifying the guidelines contained within the AEPS. 
While the problem of eco-management is common to both polar areas, only the 
Antarctic had a suitable infrastructure in existence to deal substantively with the issue. 
The infrastructure proved to be extremely useful in constructing the Madrid Protocol 
because much of the ground work had already been completed in earlier atempts at 
issue-specific resource management. Furthermore, there were valuable lessons of 
experience for the Treaty Parties from those atempts like CRAMRA which did not 
succeed. 
The mechanisms already in place within the Antarctic Treaty System meant that states 
simply had to consolidate al of the environmental principles and objectives scatered 
throughout the existing legal regimes and to reach consensus on such new elements as 
the mining prohibition and the EIA process. This they were able to do, in the 
astoundingly quick time of just two years. This is why they wil be seen as exhibiting 
a greater degree of responsibility than the Arctic states. 
5.2 	 The Re-examination of Sovereignty: Some Conclusions 
Has this study provided evidence to support the re-examination of traditional 
approaches to sovereignty in the polar regions, and can it be said that de facto 
internationalization is occuring? 
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Both polar regimes have been able, to a degree, to reconcile development with the 
ecosystem by mobilizing in tandem the principles of resource exploitation and 
environmental protection. Both regimes have existing development projects (if the 
Antarctic science programs could be considered developmental) and mechanisms 
through which attempts are made to mitigate any environmentally-unfriendly impacts. 
New projects, however, will have to undergo more stringent environmental impact 
assessment procedures. This is formally codified through the Madrid Protocol, and 
urged through the AEPS and its reference to the Espoo Convention. Furthermore, 
each regime expresses its desire to maintain biodiversity, and to protect ecosystems, 
natural resources, cultural and heritage values. The principal difference between the 
regions is that the rules will be legally binding on all Antarctic Treaty Parties once the 
Protocol enters into force, and possibly on third parties through the evolution of 
customary international law; but in the Arctic, no such legal obligations exist in the 
present form of the AEPS. While the principles are fundamentally the same, the 
degrees of accountability and liability are not. 
Therefore, with regard to sovereignty and the common good, the regions show quite 
distinct differences which are then reflected in regime nature and dynamics. 
Sovereignty is generally undisputed in the Arctic, with only some outstanding issues 
being related to maritime boundaries. In its treatment of the question of sovereignty, 
the AEPS advanced from being protectionist and elitist in its early days, towards being 
more broad in its interpretation of Arctic interests. However the fact remains that the 
AEPS has a core of decision-makers representing the eight rim states only. The 
sovereign integrity of the Arctic 8 has thus been given priority. Further evidence of 
this can be found in the fact that in this early stage of the development of the AEPS the 
Arctic states were unwilling to negotiate legally binding rules. 
However, the fact that the eight Arctic states managed to sit at the conference table 
together and, in the first instance, establish a cooperative scientific organization and 
then articulate their regional protection strategy, leads to the tentative impression that at 
the very least the nature of cooperation is in transition. The scientific organization - 
IASC - has embraced interests outside the Arctic 8, albeit with observer status only. 
In so doing, it has opened the organization to both the scrutiny of, and to a limited 
extent the input of, outsiders. This relatively noble pursuit of cooperative, trans-state 
science is one thing, however; cooperation towards protection of the Arctic ecosystem 
is quite another. 
There is little evidence to suggest that a re-examination of the traditional minimalist 
approach to the coexistence of sovereign states in the Arctic is occurring. Nor is it 
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appropriate to conclude that de facto internationalization is occurring. It is true that 
the pretexts of communism and the Cold War diplomatic inhibitions no longer exist; 
that the Arctic States are using a soft law approach to eco-management, while they 
gather confidence and trust amongst themselves; and that their motivation in the 
making of Arctic environmental policy is not only in the state interest, but also in the 
interest of the Arctic as a region. In addition, it is certainly appropriate to propose that 
the Arctic has a stronger regional identity than has been apparent in its recent past, due 
in some measure to the higher profile of epistemic communities like IASC, the ICC 
and other regional entities. However, without the force of legally binding rules, or a 
treaty of some kind, the thesis is not supported in this instance. 
On the issue of de facto internationalization, it is too early to be sure, but the suspicion 
is that the same situation which would indicate a new approach to sovereignty would 
also herald a stronger international element of involvement in Arctic affairs. 
Internationalization would involve more states than just the eight rim states - an 
arrangement similar in fact to that which has occurred through the mechanism of the 
Antarctic Treaty System. 
It may be more appropriate to conclude, therefore, that building upon the momentum 
of IASC and the AEPS, the Arctic states will look towards a future in which there 
exists the first pan-Arctic treaty, embracing the essence of both of these arrangements. 
However, at the present such optimism is only a dull glow on the horizon. The Cold 
War is still fresh in the minds of Arctic governments and the barriers to effective 
ecosystem policy- and law-making are slowly being eroded, but they will not vanish 
overnight. (The next section of this Chapter looks at the case for an Arctic Treaty.) 
By way of contrast, Antarctic sovereignty has been described as a 'brain teaser' 
(Heap 1990b:182) which is essentially controlled under Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. Article IV reconciles sovereignty, in the sense that the seven claimant nations, 
along with the two which reserve their rights to claim, and any other Treaty 
Contracting Party for that matter, have had their positions suspended by the Article's 
provisions. Furthermore, each of the additions to the original Antarctic Treaty which 
make up the Antarctic Treaty System have been possible largely because of Article N. 
In the words of John Heap, Article IV has provided: '...precedents and 
mechanisms which allow states to be less strident about sovereignty 
and enable them to concentrate more easily on the real nature of 
their interests '338  Obviously these interests now concern the comprehensive 
protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems. 
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The System has been successful in achieving such a far-reaching instrument as the 
Madrid Protocol because the agreement did not come at a cost in economic terms, nor 
in terms of any further abrogation of sovereignty. Some sovereignty was surrendered 
initially when states expressed their consent to be bound by Article IV of the Treaty. 
A possible exception may be the case of the Protocol's ban on mineral resource 
activities. However, while that ban applies to all Antarctic Treaty Parties, irrespective 
of their status, and may in the future be applied to third states through customary law, 
it is a stalemate situation in which nobody wins but nobody loses either. 
In the case of the Antarctic, it is appropriate to conclude therefore that the issue of 
sovereignty has enhanced rather than inhibited the making of eco-management policy 
and law. Furthermore, de facto internationalization has been a feature of the ATS 
since the inception of the Antarctic Treaty, by virtue of the suspension of the 
sovereignty issue; by its invitation to any member of the United Nations to join; and 
by its desire to keep the continent free from discord for the benefit of all mankind. Of 
note, however, is the fact that the ATS does not have a permanent Secretariat and 
hence there is no symbolic central edifice on which to fly the flags of the 42 countries 
involved in Antarctic management. Rather, the services of a Secretariat are supplied 
by the government hosting the next meeting. In addition, the Government of the 
United States - as depositary - plays a centralizing role. The absence of a formal 
Secretariat may be a further inducement to cooperation, as some states are suspicious 
of the political functions of centralized administrations. 339 
While each polar regime pays homage to the collective good, sceptics would argue that 
these acknowledgments lack altruism. Mankind as a whole will benefit from the 
comprehensive protection of Antarctic environment and its dependent and associated 
ecosystems, and future generations will benefit from the safeguarding of the Arctic 
environment. Presumably these objectives will be accomplished through maintaining 
the ability of the scientific communities to continue their global impacts research in 
near-pristine, polar laboratories. Scientists have been accorded priority status in the 
Antarctic, while indigenous people have been granted a similar status within the 
AEPS. However, no rules exist to confer obligations on state governments to 
acknowledge the status of indigenous people in the Arctic. Moreover, the issue of 
sovereignty is overarching. The Arctic nations do not have the benefit of a closed 
option Antarctic Treaty Article IV to guide their behaviour. Therefore the AEPS 
represents a major policy shift for them, more so if legal obligations can be established 
in the future. 
The study has indicated that a growing feature of international environmental law 
involves promoting common problem-solving through cooperative treaty-making, 
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which necessarily implies some limitations on the traditional notion of sovereignty. It 
must be remembered, however, that the Arctic rim states are sovereign nations and the 
claims to Antarctic territory are legal facts. These issues have been tenuously 
reconciled in the Antarctic, but are still contentious in the Arctic. Unless the 
imperatives to put the minimalist approach to sovereignty on the back-burner in favour 
of a greater accommodation of the common good are maintained in the Arctic, the 
situation there could easily remain one of sovereign mismanagement of what many see 
as common resources. Legally binding regulations would then be required to replace 
the voluntary ones contained in the AEPS. 
This is where the issue of security comes into play. This study has argued that there is 
a trend towards redefining security from its traditional military orientation. This is 
largely a post Cold-War phenomenon in which the word security invokes not only 
strategic militarism but also the protection of resources vital to survival. The fact that 
these resources might be protected through military means is a moot point. A re-
examination of security not only involves the maintenance of sovereign jurisdiction 
over territory, but also the maintenance of the integrity of the ecosystems within that 
territory. There would seem to be a conflict between maintaining sovereignty and 
maintaining resource security. This is particularly so since resource security may be 
compromised by the actions of the sovereign state itself, as well as by neighbouring 
jurisdictions. Where a resource is subject to overlapping jurisdictions, the common 
good should prevail, although environmental law evidences many cases where this 
does not happen. International rivers and the corresponding riparian water rights and 
obligations are cases in point. 
The study also proposed that there would be a point at which each of these elements — 
the environment, development, the common good, sovereignty and resource security — 
might be in a theoretically desirable state of harmony. Given all the philosophy and 
the facts presented so far, it is acknowledged that this is an ambitious statement, to say 
the least, as any judgment is value-laden. In the context of the Antarctic, it is likely 
that once the Madrid Protocol is in operation, and providing its intent can be matched 
by practical application, such an equilibrium might be reached. Any proposed activity 
will be subjected to an environmental impact assessment. Any activity which proceeds 
will be judged by the Protocol to be acceptable. This means that the spirit and 
principles of Antarctic Treaty are vindicated, implying no compromise to either 
sovereign claims or the common good. It would also imply that resource security is 
maintained. Therefore a desirable state of harmony would be achieved. The same 
cannot be said for the Arctic, simply because there is, as yet, no legal obligation to 
conduct environmental impact assessments and no legal obligation to comply with 
fundamental principles. 
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In summary, using the original template, the overall performance rating to date of the 
polar eco-management regimes can be summarized thus in Figure 5: 
ANALYTICAL 
PARAMETERS 
ANTARCTIC 
MADRID PROTOCOL 
ARCTIC 
AEPS 
LEGITIMACY High 
Medium 
High 
Medium 
Medium-High 
Low 
Medium 
Medium 
at, ECTIVENES S 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
GLOBAL ECOSYSTEM 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Figure 5. Overall Performance Rating of Polar Eco-Management 
Regimes 
This Figure is to be read in conjunction with Figure 2 on p.62. With regard to 
legitimacy, both regimes score well because of the nature of regime formation, that is, 
they were negotiated by able, respected actors who acknowledged external factors 
likely to impinge upon the regime's objectives and function. In both regions there has 
been adequate external acceptance, although in the Arctic the indigenous groups are 
still concerned about their level of participation. Despite the activity of the common 
heritage protagonists with regard to the Antarctic, no state is precluded from entry into 
the regime. This represents the difference between a high and medium-high score. 
In terms of effectiveness, neither regime has a proven success rate, primarily because 
of the analytical difficulties with the notion of effectiveness discussed earlier. 
However, it is appropriate to give a higher score to the Antarctic regime because of 
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evidence of changes in actor behaviour brought about by the Madrid Protocol even 
prior to its entry into force. In addition, the actors can be seen to be attempting to meet 
the aims of the regime; they have proven their capacity to change; there is a reasonable 
measure of internal compliance; and external linkages and approval is strong. 
Accountability was stated to stem from both legitimacy and effectiveness and the 
measures of conformity and public transparency exhibited by a regime. In both cases 
the regimes score well, but the Antarctic regime more so because of its unprecedented 
inspection procedures, ETA processes and the public release of all documentation. The 
lower score for the AEPS is indicative of its immaturity as a regime. 
With regard to the notion of responsibility, while the Antarctic Treaty System has 
scored well in terms of regional responsibility through its comprehensive Madrid 
Protocol, the opposite is true of the Arctic. Its level of responsibility in a local context 
is low, primarily because the AEPS as an emerging regime does not yet contain legal 
obligations and its effectiveness is unknown. However, in a global sense both are 
addressing the analytical parameters described in Section 1.3, albeit cautiously. 
Neither concede directly the notion of common heritage, nor do they adequately 
address the polluter pays principle. But by giving the Madrid Protocol a possible life-
span of 50 years, some measure of respect for future generations is shown; and the 
Arctic states have addressed this concept openly in the AEPS. Furthermore, the 
conduct of environmental impact assessments is precautionary in nature, invoking the 
notion of sustainable development. However, while EIAs will be mandatory in 
Antarctica, no such obligations exists for Arctic states as this stage. 
In conclusion, with particular reference to the issue of sovereignty it is interesting to 
note that the states with bi-polar interests, that is Norway, Sweden, Russia, Canada, 
Denmark and the United States, have used the maintenance of their sovereignty as an 
excuse to resist pan-Arctic environmental law-making, whereas those same states have 
effectively eschewed sovereignty questions in the Antarctic. They have done this 
firstly by becoming members of the Antarctic Treaty and thereby subjecting 
themselves to the specific provisions of Article IV. For Sweden and Canada, this did 
not present a problem as they were not claimant states. But Norway has a substantial 
claim to Antarctic territory, and both Russia and the United States have reserved their 
rights to claim. The situation with regard to Denmark is somewhat different as they 
only represent Greenlandic foreign affairs. Secondly, all states were participants in 
the Madrid Protocol negotiating process. This underscores the argument that the 
traditional approach to sovereignty might be politically expedient: claimant states from 
the Arctic could very easily negotiate strict environmental controls on their behaviour 
in the Antarctic simply because it did not involve any further abrogation of 
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sovereignty; nor did it involve any strong financial commitment other than an 
environmentaly-acceptable re-evaluation of the processes of expedition and station 
management. These two variables would represent a financial expenditure of litle 
consequence considering that any one of these three states could scale down its 
Antarctic operations if necessary without jeopardizing its status within the ATS. 
Russia has, in fact, done this already. The same would not be true for their 
participation in the AEPS process, however, where there are real economic and 
security considerations - and by implication, the concerns of voters. 
5.3 	 The Future Agenda of Polar Ecosystem Management Regimes 
Having come this far, both polar regimes stil have many outstanding maters to 
address. For the Antarctic Treaty System, an issue which has the potential to be one 
of the most contentious since the mining ban was agreed to is the negotiation of a 
liability annex to the Madrid Protocol. The Arctic states may seriously address the 
notion of an Arctic Treaty at some point in the near future. Both of these issues, 
which wil be looked at briefly here, are bound up with the issue of sovereignty. In 
addition, both regimes must now accommodate individual obligations and rights 
according to the Law of the Sea within their approaches to polar management. 
5.3.1 	 A Liability Annex to the Madrid Protoco1340 
Article 16 of the Madrid Protocol reads as folows. 
Consistent with the objectives of this Protocol for the 
comprehensive protection of the Antarctic environment and 
dependent and associated ecosystems, the Parties undertake to 
elaborate rules and procedures relating to liability for damage 
arising from activities taking place in the Antarctic Treaty 
area and covered by this Protocol. Those rules and procedures 
shall be included in one or more Annexes to be adopted in 
accordance with Article 9(2). 
The Madrid Protocol has five Annexes which form an integral part of the Protocol, 
and other annexes like this one for liability are envisaged. As discussed earlier in this 
work, the issue of liability arose under CRAMRA and was incorporated into its Article 
8. The nuances were never put to the test, however, as the Protocol superseded 
CRAMRA before it entered into force. A much weaker provision was included as 
Protocol Article 16, and significantly — unlike CRAMRA — the operation of the 
Protocol was not made conditional upon the inclusion of liability provisions. Also 
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important is the fact that Article 16 does not specify a time frame within which the 
annex is to be concluded. 
These factors seem to indicate one of two things: either the Treaty Parties did not 
consider the issue of liability as important as they had under CRAMRA; or that the 
Parties had not been suficiently in agreement about liability at the time of concluding 
the Protocol to flesh out the details. Given the modern trend in international law-
making to conclude framework instruments which defer more contentious issues or 
details to a later date to be appended as annexures, the later assumption about liability 
seems the most likely one. In any case, liability is now firmly on the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (ATCM) agenda. 
The details which wil need to be given substance concern such legal choices as the 
standard of liability; what excuses or defences should be permited, if any; who would 
be the appropriate debtors and plaintifs; what kinds of remedies would be available; 
what forum would be suitable for adjudicating actions; and should there be limits on 
liability and compensation? 
In order to assist the Treaty Parties in making choices about the legal nature of 
liability, they first need to do two things: confirm their policy basis for taking such 
action; and define what they mean by damage. The fundamental policy basis wil 
likely rest on the poluter pays principle, as this is the essence of the legal meaning of 
liability. Once poluters know they can be held accountable, liability provisions wil 
be a deterence as wel. In addition, the provisions may be used as a legal mechanism 
for obtaining restitution and compensation for damage to the Antarctic environment. 
This wil require the elaboration of both a defmition of damage and conduct which wil 
atract liability. 
At the XVIlth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Venice in November, 1993, a 
meeting of legal experts (under the Chairmanship of Professor Rtidiger Wolfrum of 
Germany) was convened to deal with the Parties' obligations under Article 16. That 
group reported its progress to the XVIIth ATCM in Kyoto in April 1994. It was 
proposed that intercessional meetings be held to continue the work of the expert group 
and that they wil report again to the XVD(th ATCM in 1995 (ATCM 1994:10-11). 
5.3.2 	 An Arctic Treaty or Council? 
There are as many good reasons for proposing an Arctic Treaty as there were for 
proposing an Antarctic one. The botom line is that a treaty would give legal efect to 
the public policy of the Arctic states, particularly now that they have acknowledged the 
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transboundary efects of some polution and made a declaration of their desire to 
protect the Arctic environment. 
The issue of an Arctic Council was discussed in Chapter 4. An Arctic Treaty has 
been drafted, and is presented here as Appendix 6. Although caled an Arctic Treaty, 
the document reads more like a draft constitution than a treaty. It contains no legal 
obligations, per se, but mandates a Commission to '...decide on measures to 
fulfil the purposes of the Council...! (Draft Article 4.2). The assumption 
here is that this kind of provision would alow the Parties to make binding regulations 
as and when necessary. This is not unlike the mandate contained in the Antarctic 
Treaty's Article IX. 
In fact, a cursory glance at the Draft Arctic Treaty shows many similarities between it 
and the Antarctic Treaty. The Antarctic Treaty began as a rudimentary instrument 
containing some essential principles, the hub being Article IV. But because of the pre-
existence of sovereign states, the Arctic states cannot be expected to treat the issue of 
sovereignty in the same way. Therefore an Arctic Treaty would most likely have an 
emphasis on facilitating cooperation by designing a procedural mechanism to overlay 
but not necessarily pose a direct chalenge to the legal rights of these coexisting 
sovereignties. 
It seems likely that the Arctic states wil move towards the establishment of an Arctic 
Council; mostly it was the United States which stood firmly opposed to this 
proposition but it is believed that the US has changed its position recently. The 
establishment of the Council would certainly give enormous political impetus to the 
AEPS and this would be a positive step towards more legaly binding rules for such 
concepts as sustainable development of the Arctic region. 
5.3.3 	 The Law of the Sea Convention and the Polar 
Regions 
The issue of of-shore jurisdiction in the polar regions has not been dealt with 
separately in this study because the polar regimes (other than CCAS and CCAMLR) 
have not dealt with it as a separate issue. Rather, ofshore jurisdiction is an integral 
component of polar eco-management. Notwithstanding, the entry into force of LOSC 
on 16 November 1994 is one of the most significant events to occur in recent times, 
although much of the Convention was already a part of, or in the process of transition 
into, customary international law. 
The partitioning of the world's oceans into teritorial seas, and exclusive economic 
zones, and a deep sea bed which is now the common heritage of mankind, has 
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gradualy diminished the area of the high seas and altered the whole notion of 
ownership of the oceans. A prime example occurs in the semi-enclosed Arctic marine 
area, where six states (not including, in this instance, Sweden and Finland) are litoral 
states which assert jurisdiction over marine areas. 
Importantly, almost one-third of the LOSC has an environmental flavour, principaly 
contained within Part )CI. Hence, despite the fact that only Iceland has ratified the 
LOSC,341 it has become even more imperative that the Arctic nations coordinate their 
ecosystem policies, as the marine areas of the Arctic are now formaly subject to the 
provisions of the LOS C. 
There are many aspects of the LOSC with relevance to the polar regions, and one of 
the most salient is the expansion of ofshore jurisdiction through the declaration of 
exclusive economic zones (Part V). In the Arctic, terestrial sovereignty is not an 
issue, per se. Moreover, maintaining sovereignty over the myriad of ofshore islands 
ensures that Arctic states can extend their jurisdiction further by using those islands as 
baselines for delimitation of their exclusive economic zones. Jurisdictional issues in 
the Arctic are primarily complicated by conflict over certain maritime boundaries, and 
while the LOSC does not resolve these questions, it does provide another platform for 
negotiation towards their solution. 
In the Antarctic, the issue of extended jurisdiction is enveloped in the debate about 
whether, in law, there are any coastal states per se. This issue has been raised as a 
consequence of the existence of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty.342 Not only does 
Article IV suspend any action regarding claims, but it maintains the position that al 
states are free to either recognise or reject claims at their discretion without 
jeopardizing the status quo. As discussed earlier, the status of Antarctic claims, which 
are facts in law, has not been resolved. One clue which may help in this dilemma is 
contained within CCAMLR where Article P1.2(b) states that: 
2 	 Nothing in this Convention and no acts or activities 
taking place while the present Convention is in force shall: 
(b) 	 be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by 
any Contracting Party of, or as prejudicing, any right 
or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal state 
jurisdiction under international law within the area to 
which this Convention applies_ 
(emphasis added) 
This wording indicates that coastal states do exist in the Antarctic. But whereas EEZs 
have been declared of Antarctic island teritories, proclamations of continental 
teritory invite controversy.343 The Latin American states of Chile and Argentina have 
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both declared a 200 n mi 'patrimonial sea' which extends to the reaches of the 
Antarctic Peninsula. But Australia, in a rather contentious move, has now declared an 
EEZ off its Antarctic Territory, as a part of Australia's external territories to which its 
domestic enabling legislation applies. This action was taken as a general right under 
the LOSC, to which Australia is a party.344 
The declaration invites two perspectives: either Australia could be seen as having 
enlarged its Antarctic claim, contrary to Article IV of the Treaty; or Australia could be 
considered to have acted within its capacity as sovereign and within the parameters of 
Article N.2(b) of CCAMLR cited above. The dilemma for the Australian Government 
is that it must be seen to maintain its substantial claim to Antarctic Territory (42% of 
the continent) or run the risk — however remote — of jeopardizing that claim. The 
proclamation of an Antarctic EEZ has given validity to Australia's claim, along with all 
other actions it has taken with regard to its territory in the Antarctic, but it remains to 
be seen how this event will be perceived by the Antarctic community, and whether 
other continental claimants will follow suit. 
Surprisingly, Australia's legislation does not elaborate on the process of baseline 
determination. Because of the presence of ice, in many cases it will be impossible to 
distinguish a terrestrial low water mark from which to begin measuring the breadth of 
territorial seas. Ice shelves are permanent but they advance and retreat according to the 
seasons, which also makes it difficult to predict the precise location of the ice edge 
from season to season. Nevertheless, one solution to the delimitation problem might 
be found by specifically amending LOSC to allow for the unique situation of the polar 
ice-shelves by including the ice-edge as a valid baseline. 345 The amorphous nature of 
ice shelf edges is such that the baseline could be determined at a specific point in time, 
say the summer minimum extent of sea ice, or any other time to which the Parties 
agreed. A standard deviation of a designated distance would allow for normal 
seasonal advance and retreat of the ice. 
The issue is likely to be resolved once international law decides on the status of ice — 
whether, for instance, it is water or land. 346 One perspective is to consider that ice is 
water in an altered state; however there is also considerable scope to consider a 
physical analogy between ice shelves and land, because that they are both stable 
(except the seaward ice margin), exploitable, durable, permanent (to a degree) and 
capable of occupation. One conclusion might be, in this instance, that '...ice shelves 
functionally subsist as land' (Joyner 1991:227). But this perspective does 
not take account of the marine ice-shelves which float, nor of the legal status of water 
which flows beneath a floating ice-shelf. The counterfactual argument is that if you 
consider ice-shelves to be water, and thus high seas, you may not be able to exercise 
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the traditional freedoms and rights which attach to high seas (Joyner 1991:228). 
Neither the Antarctic Treaty System nor the LOSC are specific in their definitions of 
ice, and further research is required into this subject area. This author suggests that 
the classification of ice can be determined from a number of points including its origin, 
location, composition (eg. salinity), stability/mobility and whether or not it is accorded 
the usual geological status of a mineral. Classification, for the purposes of exercising 
sovereignty over the resource, may also, by necessity, include a temporal dimension. 
The overlap in jurisdiction between the Antarctic Treaty System and the LOSC may 
not be as controversial as it might appear. Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty states, in 
part, that 
_nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way 
affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any state 
under international law with regard to the high seas within 
that area [south of 60 0  South]... 
(emphasis added) 
Therefore the Antarctic Treaty acknowledges the freedoms of the high seas. States 
which are parties to both the Treaty and LOSC must take account of any overlapping 
rights or obligations, but one instrument cannot be invoked to affect or justify a breach 
of an obligation under the other. For example, states now party to the Madrid 
Protocol have unilaterally undertaken not to conduct mineral resource activities in the 
Antarctic Treaty Area, although they may be permitted to do so under the LOSC. 
CRAMRA foresaw deep sea bed mining and made provisions for it in Article 5, 
however the general prohibition on mineral resource activities now overrides 
CRAMRA, even though the Madrid Protocol does not make explicit reference to the 
deep sea bed in its area of application. 347 
States outside the jurisdiction of the legal regimes of the Antarctic Treaty System 
would not consider there to be an overlap in any case, and thus the onus — in the case 
of any conflict — would be on the ATS to prove its status as an objective regime 
applying to third states. 
With the LOSC in force, all states will be morally if not legally bound to coordinate 
protection of their common marine environment, as it will be difficult to ignore either 
their responsibilities or rights in this regard. In the Antarctic, the protection of the 
marine environment has been acknowledged by the Treaty Parties, who have included 
a dedicated annex to the Madrid Protocol (Annex IV) in their environmental regime. 
Annex IV is compatible both with Article VI of the Treaty (which protects the 
freedoms of the high seas) and the environmental principles in Part XII of the LOSC. 
The Arctic states are not as well endowed in this regard. The AEPS working group on 
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legal issues identified the fact that existing international law did not adequately deal 
with issues of marine pollution in the Arctic. Furthermore, it has been suggested that 
theIA)S(2%_has the potential to form the basis for a more integrated 
Arctic legal regime... 1 . 348 
The LOSC contains distinct advantages for Arctic littoral states because of the potential 
benefits associated with expanded territory. But these rights also attract corresponding 
responsibilities, not the least of which is environmental protection. Article 234 
expressly states: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, 
reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-
covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, 
where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence 
of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to 
or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance. Such 
laws and regulations shall have due regard to navigation and 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment based 
on the best available scientific evidence. 
(Article 234, emphasis added) 
Article 234, which empowers states to make environmental laws for their territorial 
seas, has been said to vindicate Canada's unilateral action of 1970 - its Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention Act (Rothwell & Kaye 1994:48). As Article 234 only applies to 
the limits of the EEZ, Article 194.1 must also be invoked to protect the remaining high 
seas: 
States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all 
measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to 
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment 
from any source, using for this purpose the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their 
capabilities, and they shall endeavour to harmonize their 
policies in this connection. 
(Article 194.1, emphasis added) 
Unfortunately, although this Article applies to the whole marine environment, the 
language is hardly conducive to comprehensive environmental protection: 
endeavouring to harmonize policies is not the same as being directed to harmonize 
them; nor is the issue of capabilities sufficiently strict. (The same lack of legal 
imperative is found in Article 123 of Part IX regarding the cooperation of states 
bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas.) However, Article 235 on responsibility 
and liability is quite clear with regard to legal obligation: 
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	1 	 States are responsible for the fulfilment of their 
international obligations concerning the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. They shall be liable 
in accordance with international law. 
(Article 235.1, emphasis added) 
In summary, the LOSC confers both rights and obligations on states with regard to the 
marine environment. Polar states are stil to grapple with a range of problems and 
conflicts which may arise under this Convention, but the issues are not 
insurmountable. 
5.4 	 Lessons of Experience 
From the narow parameters of the polar regions, it is now necessary to return to the 
global perspective. The study has indicated that the structural changes which wil be 
required by states in order to adequately address ecosystem responsibility in the 21st 
century are enormous, requiring long-term strategies and substantial political and 
financial commitment. What lessons of experience are there in the polar scenarios? 
Each case study represents a diferent stage of maturity of a regional ecosystem 
management regime. The Antarctic, for instance, is administered by the wel-
established, dynamic System which has been in operation for over 30 years now. Its 
custodial arangement comprises a group of 42 disparate nations with varying interests 
in Antarctic afairs. Importantly, the regime has evolved in response to changing 
needs and is supported by a substantial amount of international law. CCAMLR's 
ecosystem approach to those fisheries in the Southern Ocean covered by the 
Convention has been operating for over 10 years, with varying degrees of success. 
Moreover, the acceptance of a comprehensive environmental protection strategy for 
the region is a compendium of existing and new laws negotiated over the 30 year life 
of Antarctic Treaty System. The Madrid Protocol indicates to the global community 
an acknowledgement of environmental concerns and a commitment to protection of the 
region. But this has only come about because of the existence of the Antarctic 
Treaty's Article IV, which suspends questions of sovereignty in favour of 
cooperation. Whether this same scenario could translate to other regions of the globe 
is debatable and may wel be contingent upon a similar treatment of the traditional 
notions of sovereign autonomy. 
In the Arctic, on the other hand, the process of developing a pan-Arctic management 
regime has only just begun. The eight sovereign Arctic nations have shown concern 
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about the state of their common environment and accordingly have established such 
cooperative initiatives as an International Arctic Science Committee and the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy. The situation in the Arctic is a stimulating one to 
social scientists because the Arctic constitutes almost a microcosm of the discordant 
attributes common to many regions of the world: 
• questions of sovereignty v. the common good; 
• resource exploitation v. environmental preservation or 
conservation; 
• the contribution of both developed and developing countries 
to the contamination of the environment; 
• the region's value as a global resource (that is, by virtue of its importance to 
global climate processes); 
• the rights of indigenous people and human rights in general. 
In the Arctic, no Antarctic-like suspension of sovereignty was attempted and hence the 
states had to battle their way through the pre-existing characteristics of the independent 
Arctic state system. That they did manage a basic environmental accord is testament to 
their perseverance and their diplomatic talents. Any other region of the world in 
which sovereign states wish to formulate a cooperative eco-management strategy will 
most likely be faced with similar hurdles as those faced in the Arctic. With the 
political will to succeed and skilful negotiators, any region is capable of reaching such 
accord. 
Can the UNCED prescription of a global partnership for sustainable development be 
applied to the polar regions? In the case of the Antarctic, this has been applied to a 
certain degree, simply because development as such has largely been suspended; 
resource harvesting in part of the Southern Ocean is managed by CCAMLR; and 
tourism and scientific programs are regulated by the Madrid Protocol. In the case of 
the Arctic, and as a model for other regions, the short answer is 'yes' providing that 
the states have the political will, as everything stems from the decisions made by them 
in their capacity as sovereign governments. Only they can choose to tighten 
regulations on transnational corporations; to make and enforce realistic regional and 
domestic environmental laws; to empower their local communities to begin a bottom-
up process of environmental responsibility; and to give these communities the financial 
support and infrastructure to do the job. This study has shown that Antarctic states are 
more capable in this regard than the Arctic states because the Antarctic Treaty System 
is a proven mechanism which facilitates cooperation. 
What other lessons can be learnt from the idiosyncratic polar management that can be 
applied to other geographical regions? One should be cautious about using the polar 
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case studies as analogies because of their peculiar features. However, each region of 
the globe is unique for one reason or another and this is not a factor which should be 
used as an excuse. States involved in the management of any so-called commons area, 
or indeed any region which requires multilateral management, are faced with the same 
kinds of problems, whether the subject concerns ice, or desert, or tropical rainforest. 
The principal factor which allows states to make effective environmental law is their 
willingness to cooperate and the lengths to which they are prepared to bargain in order 
to achieve accord. The Antarctic Treaty states have a long history of cooperation, built 
on the firm foundation of the Antarctic Treaty. The Arctic states have not had the 
benefit of this kind of supporting infrastructure, yet they have still managed to begin a 
process which may well head in that general direction. The AEPS process, while slow 
and hard-fought, shows first and foremost the willingness of the Arctic states to 
cooperate through a bargaining process, until some general agreement emanates. 
Furthermore, outsiders who do not carry the burden of preconceived national 
prejudices cannot help but feel optimistic about the tenor of post Cold-War Arctic state 
relationships, although this optimism might prove to be premature. 
This study suggested that the reshaping of international cooperation was a precursor to 
effective eco-management. Because both regimes have been able to successfully 
negotiate environmental accords, in a sense they have both complied with what this 
study thought acceptable behaviour might entail. The fact that the AEPS is non-
binding does not detract from its value as a framework for a future ecosystem accord, 
and this is in keeping with current trends in international law. For that matter, the 
Madrid Protocol is not yet in force. However, some Antarctic states already 
acknowledge their obligations towards the Protocol's principles and objectives in the 
planning their scientific programmes, which is a positive sign. 
As both regimes are underpinned by the sovereign integrity of the rim states in the case 
of the Arctic, and the claimant states and Consultative Parties in the Antarctic, can it be 
argued that a new international environmental order, as distinct from a new strategic or 
political order, is emerging? The information in this study seems to suggest that in the 
polar regions at least, this appears not to be the case. Concerns over the environment 
cannot be divorced from political issues. This is borne out in the demise of CRAMRA 
and the genesis of the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty. Further, the study 
would seem to suggest that in the Arctic, the greater the ecological interdependence, 
the greater the struggle will be for states to retain their sovereign integrity. What holds 
true for the Arctic largely also holds true for other regions of the world. 
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5.5 	 Conclusions 
This study has been a preliminary investigation into issues of polar ecosystem 
management. Neither the AEPS nor the Madrid Protocol presently have the ful force 
of law behind them. It wil be an interesting exercise to folow the progress of these 
two agreements over the next five years to see how they have developed in a world 
order demanding enhanced responsibility for the global ecosystem and a re-
examination of the traditional minimalist approach to the coexistence of sovereign 
states in order to achieve comprehensive and efective environmental management. 
However, it is acknowledged that given the nature of international law, no 
environmental law or supporting organization is necessarily a benefit: the onus 
remains first and foremost with the states concerned. 
The absolute botom line is that global economic systems are totaly underpinned by 
global ecosystems. At the moment, international policy- and law-makers stil have 
choices about how they can balance environmental and developmental considerations. 
But if the right kinds of decisions are not taken now, it is surely not too fantastic to 
envisage a time in our future when those choices no longer exist. 
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END NOTES: 
This definition of ecosystem is that adopted by the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
signed in Rio de Janeiro on 05 June 1992, reprinted in 31 ELM 818 (1992). See Article 2, 
Use of Terms. Note that here and elsewhere the superiors 1 to 348 refer to the End Notes 
which begin on p.243. Note also that certain words throughout the text have been italicized 
for emphasis (with the exception of words and phrases of foreign origin) and direct quotations 
have been presented in a different font for ease of recognition. 
This study has largely been based on the works of Carson (1962); Falk (1971); Caldwell 
(1972); Hardin (1972) and (1985); Passmore (1974); Myers (1993a); the United Nations 
(Conference on the Human Environment) (1972); the WCED (World Commission on 
Environment and Development) (1990); and the United Nations (Conference on Environment 
and Development) (1992). 
This thesis was developed from the arguments by Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, 
"The International Politics of the Environment: An Introduction" in Hurrell & Kingsbury 
(1992), especially pp.1-6. 
See Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
These opinions can be found in Myers (1993a); Gleik (1993); Tuchman Mathews (1989); 
Ullman (1983); and Qing-Nan (1987). 
Lewis (1992:3). Lewis presents a detailed critique of eco-radicalism in defence of Promethian 
(mainstream) environmentalism. For the opposite view, see Fox (1990). 
See for example the accounts in Falk (1971); O'Riordan (1976); Hardin (1985); McCormick 
(1989); Nash (1990); Pearce (1991); and Lewis (1992). 
For instance among others, Carroll (1988); Porter & Brown (1991); and Hurrell & Kingsbury 
(1992). 
This phrase was from Myers (1993a:51) and refers to a situation '...where one factor is 
worsened by others, whereupon it supplies its own adverse impact in turn 
but with increased force: 
See Wall (1994:Ch.1) and McCormick (1989) in this regard. 
Quoted in Hurrell & Kingsbury (1992) from UN Doc.A/CONF.151/PC/38 dated 26 March 
1991. 
This is from The Club of Earth statement, 1988, quoted in Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990:18). 
Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990:9). 
See for example Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990:16-17); WCED (1990:74); and Hurrell & 
Kingsbury (1992) generally. 
This figure is from Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990:17), and does not accord with the calculations of 
Myers, who quotes a figure of at least 10 million environmental refugees, in line with latest 
estimates. Myers does suggest, however, that his figure is certainly on the low side and he 
envisages that, in a greenhouse-affected world, there may be as many as 150 million people 
who 'can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands...Wris 
(1993a:190-1) See also Switzer (1994:Ch.18). 
WCED (1990:Ch.4) generally. 
Synergistic stress is the phenomenon of synergism which arises when '...two or more 
environmental processes interact in such a manner that the joint product 
of their interactions is not merely additive but multiplicative; that is, 
their impacts operate in a mutually amplifying fashionWyers 1993a:205). For 
a fuller explanation of synergism, see also Myers (1993b). 
Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1990:27). Myers (1993a) gives some examples of primary resources 
which have been rendered unusable, or dangerous to human health. These include water in 
the Middle East (Ch.3) and the Indian Subcontinent (Ch.7); and land in Ethiopia (Ch.4), Sub-
Saharan Africa (Ch.5), Mexico (Ch.9) and the Philippines (Ch.6). For the affects of acid rain 
on tropical forests in southern China and elsewhere, see Myers (1993a:206-7). See also UN 
International Tropical Timber Agreement, done in Geneva on 26 January 1994, reprinted in 
33 am 1014 (1994) as an example of one response to this situation. 
Professor Stephen Schneider, ABC Radio National 27.3.94. 
See for example the work of Lunde (1992); Benedick (1991); and the articles in Choucri 
(1993). 
For one account of the possible effects of global warming and a discussion on the temperature 
rise figures see Woodwell (1990). These figures are also reported in WMO/UNEP (1992:4). 
For an interesting treatment of the ozone backlash, see Taubes (1993). 
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23 	 The law concerned is the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, adopted 
in Vienna on 22 March 1985 and entered into force on 22 September 1988. It has 
subsequently been revised several times, the first being the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, which was adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and 
entered into force in August 1992. At the second meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol in London in June 1990, an Interim Multilateral Fund (IMF) was established to 
help developing countries comply with a new agreement - the London Amendment. The 
IMF is jointly administered by the UN Environment Program, the UN Development 
Program and the World Bank. At the fourth Meeting of the Parties in Copenhagen late in 
1992, representatives from 74 states and the EC agreed to a complete phase-out of CFCs and 
carbon tetrachloride by January 1996 (UNEP 1991). 24 	 Porter & Brown (1991:7-8); Ehrlich & Ehrlich (1990:123-4). 25 	 LRTAP, concluded 13 November 1979, entered into force 16 March 1983; Protocol to the 
1979 LRTAP Convention on Further Reductions of Sulphur Emissions done in Oslo on 14 
June 1994, reprinted in 33 ILM 1540 (1994). See Bowman & Harris (1984). Al Arctic 
states are parties to this Convention (See Appendix 4). 
26 	 For further discussion see Myers (1993a:Ch.12). 27 	 See Endnote 1 above. 28 	 Article 1 of the Biodiversity Convention reads: 
The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its 
relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over 
those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate funding. 29 	 For example see, among others, the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
1946, reprinted in 161 UNTS 72; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 1973, reprinted in 12 ILM 1085; the Bonn Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1979, reprinted in 19 ILM 15 
(1980); the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especialy as 
Waterfowl Habitat 1971, reprinted in 11 ILM 963 (1972); and the Convention for the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 1358 (1972) 
30 
	
	 For an overview of this debate see Hurrel (1992). On a similar theme, the forests of the 
Philippines, see Myers (1993a:Ch.6). 31 	 Quoted in Brown (1992:96-7), emphasis added. 
32 	 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Article 1, (1936) reprinted in 135 
LNTS 19. See also Levine (1992:3) and Brownlie (1990:72-8). Brownlie stresses that these 
four criteria - teritory, population, government and independence - are not peremptory and 
form nothing more than a basis upon which to begin assessing the legal status of an 
assertion of statehood.(Brownlie 1990:72) There are, for instance, sub-groups of the fuly 
sovereign state like dependent states, internationalized teritory, condominia and non-self-
governing teritories, which do not meet al the requisite criteria of the Montivideo 
Convention because they have characteristics requiring unique definitional treatment. For 
further discussion refer to Brownlie (1990:Ch.3) and Hannum (1990:Ch.2). 33 	 For further information on the historical development of sovereignty see James (1986) and 
Morgenthau (1973). 34 	 Articles 27 and 46, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 35 	 UN Charter Article 2. See also Brownlie (1990:287). 36 	 See Porter and Brown (1991:Ch.1). 37 	 Dixon & McCorquodale (1991:130). It is appropriate at this point to make the distinction 
between the terms 'state' and 'nation' in the context of this study. State, as noted above, 
denotes - in a physical sense - teritory, people and government, and the concept of 
independence. Nation, on the other hand, denotes a particular group of people which 
considers itself a community by virtue of a sense of common identity (Hannum 1990:Ch.2; 
Brown 1992:5). The diference is that states can comprise more than one nation (eg. Canada, 
Spain) and similarly nationalities may range over several states (eg. the Sarni, Jews, 
Romanies). Therefore, in this study the terms state and nation are not used interchangeably, 
but in fact refer to two quite distinct entities. 38 	 UN Charter Article 4 reads: 
1. 	 Membership of the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving 
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, 
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in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out 
these obligations. 
2. 	 The admission of any such state to membership of the United Nations 
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. 
39 	 See particularly e Silva in Dupuy (1985:217-31) and McCormick (1989:Ch.5). 
40 	 Reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
41 	 Sand in Dupuy (1985:52) and Caldwel (1984:19-34). 
42 	 UNEP (1981); UNEP/GC.10/5/Add.2, Annex, ChM:1981. 43 	 'CITES', 1973, reprinted in 12 ILM 1085. 44 	 'Basel Convention', 1989, reprinted in 28 ILM 649. 
45 	 This was no doubt a popular phrase, being regurgitated by Sand in Dupuy (1985:52); Palmer 
(1992:260); and Plant in Churchil & Freestone (1991:167). 46 	 Reprinted in UNEP (1981). 47 	 The concept of the common heritage of mankind is discussed below at p.48. 48 	 This was restated in UN Res.45/53. 49 	 Birnie (1991:2-3). This is further discussed below at p.39. 50 	 These included four preparatory meetings: PrepCom 1 Nairobi, August 1990; PrepComs 2 
and 3 Geneva, March and August 1991; and PrepCom 4 New York, March 1992. There was 
also an Eminent Persons Meeting on Financing Environment and Development, Tokyo, 
April 1992; ministerial conferences of developing countries; International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank Development Commitee meetings; Global Environment Facility participants 
meetings; OECD and European Community Environment and Development Ministers 
meetings; Intergovernmental Meetings for the framework conventions on climate change and 
biodiversity; and national seminars in many countries to formulate both government and 
NGO input (Environment Institute of Australia, Special Issue, November 1992). 5 1 
	
	 See the works of Knecht & Cicin-Sain (1993:75); Choucri & North (1993:482); and the 
United Nations (1992:Ch.8). 52 	 Agenda 21  was divided into Section I - Social and Economic Dimensions: International 
cooperation, combating poverty, consumption, population, health, human setlements, 
integrating environment and development in decision-making; Section I - Conservation and 
Management of Resources: Atmosphere, land resources, deforestation, desertification and 
drought, mountain ecosystems, sustainable agriculture, biological diversity, biotechnology, 
oceans, fresh water, toxic chemicals, hazardous wastes, solid wastes, radioactive wastes; 
Section HI - Role of Major Groups: Women, youth, indigenous people, NG0s, local 
authorities, trade unions, business and industry, scientific community, farmers; and Section 
IV - Means of Implementation: Financial resources, technology transfer, science for 
sustainable development, education, public awareness and training, capacity-building, 
institutional arangements, legal instruments, information for decision-making. 53 	 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development reprinted in 31 ILM 874 (1992); 
Framework Climate Change Convention reprinted in 31 ILM 849 (1992). 54 	 The Instrument Establishing the Global Environment Facility, done in Geneva on 16 March 
1994, reprinted in 33 ILM 1273 (1994). See also United Nations (1992:Ch.33). For a 
discussion of the GEF's role in the Biodiversity Convention, see Puterman (1994). 55 	 NGOs from diverse backgrounds held a concurent assembly in Rio, caled the Global Forum, 
and produced their own set of documents or treaties as they were caled. (These documents are 
cited as 'Anon. "Global Forum Documents" (1992) "Alternative Treaties" 'in the 
Bibliography because the authors are unknown.) In addition, newspapers like the Earth 
Summit Times, Jornal do Brasil and Terra Viva held court daily over the oficial process and 
its progress. Together the alternative treaties and the newspapers provide useful sources of 
information on, and balance to, the oficial reports and negotiating positions of the 
participating countries and organizations. 56 	 For a generic coverage of the post World War H status of the world, see the works of 
Morgenthau (1973); Anel & Nygren (1980); Larschan & Brennan (1982); and Brown (1992). 5 7 	 See note 52 above. 58 	 For some discussion of the concept of a new world order see Chomsky (1991) and Evans 
(1991). 59 	 On this issue in general terms, see Underdal (1989). On the subject of polar science in 
particular, see Elzinga and Bohlin (1989). 60 	 This was the precursor to the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
(the Stockholm Conference) described earlier. 61 	 For further information on this Conference see McCormick (1989:89). 
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62 	 WMO Report #661, 1986:32, quoted in Lunde (1992:75). 63 	 For a discussion on the complexities of climate modeling techniques see Schneider (1990). 64 	 This Convention eventualy evolved through the UNCED negotiating process; the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change came into effect on 21 March 1994. See note 
53 above. 65 	 It has also been suggested, however, that the process lacked legitimacy. It was intended that 
IPCC reports be peer-reviewed but this was not always adhered to, thereby infering that the 
process was not taking ful account of the best scientific advice available (Arking, 
pers.comm). For further criticism of the IPCC process see World Climate Review 3 #1 Fal 
1994, 'Reviewing the Consensus: Two prominent scientists review IPCC report', pp.10-13. 66 
	
	 Although officialy the substance of this report is not known at this stage, it is envisaged 
that litle has changed since the 1992 assessment (Budd, pers.comm.). 67 	 For an interesting expose on this issue see Martin (1979). 68 	 This subject is explored by Yearley (1991). 69 	 The historical works of authors such as Passmore (1974); O'Riordan (1976); Ponting (1991); 
Nash (1990); and Wal (1994), among others, trace the history of environmentalism to 
modern times. 70 	 As a direct result of the publication of Silent Spring,  a US Presidential advisory panel on 
pesticides was convened (McCormick 1989:47). 71 	 See for example the descriptions by Aiken in Regan (1984:255); McCormick (1989:56); and 
Nash (1990:79-82). 72 	 See Ponting (1991:Ch.16) and Wal (1994). The theory that the Earth works as a single, 
self-sustaining unit was one banner of this early green movement. G2ea (or Gaia) is an 
hypothesis which posits that the planet reacts to any form of atmospheric change to restore 
the best balance for life via sophisticated global feedback mechanisms. From Lovelock, 
quoted in Wal (1994:78). See also Caldwel (1990:53-4). 73 	 McCormick (1989:48). McCormick noted six factors which particularly motivated the new 
environmentalism of the 1960s: i) the 1950s was a period of rapid and sustained economic 
growth and afluence, with concurent social and political changes; i) the falout from 
atmospheric nuclear testing became an issue because the public began to realise how litle 
was known about its potential danger. There was a direct political conflict, in the United 
States for example, between acknowledging public concerns about nuclear testing and the 
oficialy-perceived defence priorities of the Cold War; ii) Silent Spring. Carson's ability to 
reach the public inteligence level with an essentialy technical mater and the moral and 
ethical stand she took contributed, in McCormick's view, to her enduring success; iv) the 
wreck of the Torrey Canyon of the English coast in 1967 heightened alarm about oil spils. 
It was to be one of thousands of accidental contaminations to occur during that period. Death 
and disfigurement from Minamata Disease - mercury poisoning from fish caught in 
Minamata Bay in Japan - stimulated concerned groups to look at their neighbourhood 
waterways for signs of eutrophication and contamination; v) environmentalists began to 
realise that they needed scientific substantiation to enhance their claims and new ecological 
research projects were undertaken. The 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (covered 
further in the Antarctic case material) was the beginning of an efort to internationalize 
scientific research. It was folowed by many benchmark conferences during the 1970s and 
1980s, some of which are also described in this thesis; and vi) poverty, racism, anti-war and 
other civil rights movements occured in paralel and played the role of informing the 
environmentalists about the utility of mass action protests. (McCormick 1989:61-4) 74 	 For an expanded discussion of this phenomena, see McCormick (1989:Ch4) generaly. 75 	 Created by ex Siera Club executive, David Brower, in 1969, FoE was far more activist and 
representative of the new environmentalism than the conservationist Sierra Club. See 
McCormick (1989:143-4) and Pearce (1991:Ch.3). Greenpeace, the most wel known direct 
action environmental group, sprung from the Canadian Don't Make a Wave Commitee. 
This was a group concerned that a planned nuclear test on Amchitka Island might cause an 
earthquake to shater North America and a resulting tsunami to flood its shores. Apparently 
this group formed Greenpeace in 1971. The group's early executive was comprised of ex- 
Siera Club members and pacifist Quakers, among others. Accordingly they reformed the old 
Quaker protest doctrine of bearing personal witness into an entreaty to the world to bear 
witness to ecological degradation (Pearce 1991:19). 76 	 Governments of both the Netherlands and Norway have falen in parliamentary elections 
because of lack of concern over environmental issues; on the other hand, governments have 
also been elected or re-elected despite unpopular environmental values. See Caldwel 
(1990:Ch.5) generaly. 
246 
77 	 Brown (1992) developed these concepts from his earlier work for the Brookings Institution 
study on international commons regimes of 1976. Although the context of his discussion 
was international commons, such stages no doubt also occur with respect to many other 
examples involving shared ecological concern. See also Brown et al (1977). 78 	 OECD 'Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies', Recommendation C(72)128, adopted 26 May 1972, reprinted in 11 ILM 1172 
(1972). 79 	 Trail Smelter Arbitration  (US v Canada) (1941) 3 RIAA 1905. 
80 	 Document COM(91) 219 Final - SYN217, Brussels, 27 June 1991. 81 	 Ambiguity has largely issued from the use of the term 'needs'. See the discussions in Harden 
Jones (1994:148-9); 1UCN/UNEP/WWF (1990:10-11); and 1UCN/UNEP/WWF (1991:10). 82 	 Quoted in Thacher (1992:190); sourced from Annex I to UNEP Governing Council decision 
15/2, May 1989. Thacher conunents that: 'The sensitivity of sovereign states in 
relation to the need for freely exchanged environmental information and 
steps to guard against extraterritorial environmental impacts has been 
clear since the negotiation of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of 
Principles: 
83 	 UN Doc. A/6695 (1967). 84 	 In Weiss (1989:48-9), emphasis added. See also Joyner (1986:194); Larschan & Brennan 
(1982:319); and Zou (1991:174). 85 	 It was possible to bring into force the Law of the Sea Convention only after states had spent 
four years negotiating an amending agreement to it. The 'Agreement Relating to the 
Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982' (hereinafter 'Agreement') and its annex are recognized as integral to LOSC 
and overide any part of the original Part XI in the event of any inconsistency.(United 
Nations 1994 'Agreement' Article 2) The 'Agreement', done in New York on 28 July 1994, 
is reprinted in 33 ILM 1309 (1994). 86 	 The original Part XI of LOSC dealt with deep sea bed mining, to which the common heritage 
of mankind concept was most appropriately applied. However, a view has been expressed 
that the Agreement modifies the common heritage concept contained in the 1982 Convention 
(Mensah 1994). It is difficult to see how this can be so, since Article 311.6 of Part XVH of 
LOSC expressly forbids States party to the LOSC from being a party to any agreement 
which amends the basic principle relating to common heritage pursuant to Article 136. Even 
though the new Agreement overides the original Part XI, the obligation to not amend the 
common heritage concept is contained elsewhere in LOSC. 
87 	 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (1967) reprinted in 610 UNTS 205 
(1967), Article I. 88 	 United Nations Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and other 
Celestial Bodies (1979) UN Doc.A/34/664, Article 11; done on 5 December 1979, reprinted 
in 18 ILM 1434 (1979). This Agreement is not yet in force. 89 	 Global commons are areas beyond national jurisdiction which are terra nulius, owned by no- 
one and therefore capable of appropriation, or terra communis, owned by everyone and over 
liviliaCno single decision-making unit holds exclusive title.(Wijkman 
1982:512-13). 90 	 For a recent case in which this concept arose, see The Philippines : Supreme Court Decision 
in Minors Oposa  v. Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) 
(Deforestation; Environmental Damage; Intergenerational Equity) 30 June 1993, reprinted in 
33 mm 173 (1994). 
91 	 Approved by the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948. 
92 	 For a comprehensive list of international instruments see Weiss (1989:25) or (1993:338-9). 
93 	 Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary 
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa (1991)reprinted in 30 ILM 
773 (1991). 
94 	 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) done in 
Canbera on 20 May 1980, entered into force 7 April 1982, reprinted in 19 ILM 827 (1980). 
CCAMLR, Article 11.3 reads: 
Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this 
Convention applies shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of 
this Convention and with the following principles of conservation: 
(a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to 
levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For this 
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purpose its size should not be allowed to fall below a level close to 
that which ensures the greatest net annual increment; 
(b)maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, 
dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources 
and the restoration of depleted populations to the levels defined in 
sub-paragraph (a) above; and 
(c)prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the 
marine ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or 
three decades, taking into account the state of available knowledge of 
the direct and indirect impact of harvesting, the effect of the 
introduction of alien species, the effects of associated activities on 
the marine ecosystem and of the effects of environmental changes, with 
the aim of making possible the sustained conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources. 
There is a wel-argued case to support the contrary view that Article 3(a) and (b) only make 
sense if management decisions are to be based on quantitative data (Harden Jones 
pers.comm.). 95 	 For instance, neither of the above definitions elaborate on the legal nature of a regime or its 
rules. List and Ritberger have found a solution to this so-caled omission. They observe that 
a regime itself cannot atract legal personality. Rather this is achieved through the creation of 
an organization with that specific functional role within the regime it is atached to (List & 
Ritberger 1992:90). List & Ritberger adopt the later definition of ICrasner's and retain his 
four normative elements of principles, norms, rules and procedures. However, as a means of 
distinguishing between a regime as a social institution and a regime as a treaty with atached 
legal rights and obligations, they include another criterion: the observation of norm- and rule-
guided behaviour (List & Ritberger 1992:90). 96 	 Spontaneous regimes may also be what Dolman terms: 'abstract which, like the 
"hidden hand" and legal precedent, are no less powerful even though they 
lack a physical presence' (Dolman 1981:160). 97 	 For example, the structure of a regime to foster trade between two countries wil obviously 
be quite diferent from one intended to regulate the scaling-down of their nuclear arms 
capabilities. This in no way reflects the importance of the problem, per se, but rather 
indicates that a diferent approach is necessary because of the requirements dictated by an 
envisaged or agreed pathway towards the solution. 98 	 Consider here too, systems theory, which is said to contain two essential elements. The first 
is that interconnections exist within a system, so that changes to some parts wil induce 
changes to other parts as wel. This is analogous to interdependency. The second element 
relates to colective behaviour: 'the collective behaviour of the system as a whole 
differs from the expectations and priorities of the individual units that 
make it up' (Gaddis 1987:218). The logic of this argument would seem to be that the 
behaviour of states as individuals in the negotiating process of regime formation may be 
diferent to the behaviour of states as a colective part of an established regime. Further, the 
stability (an element of success) of the regime may be greater than the sum of the stability 
(or instability) of its constituent states. To ilustrate this point, consider that the British and 
Argentinian representatives sat at the same table for an Antarctic Treaty Meeting during the 
Falkland Islands war. Similarly, the United States and Soviet representatives were active 
participants in Treaty meetings during the Cold War, without any apparent or overt efects on 
the functioning of the Antarctic Treaty System. 99 	 See for example the comments of Krasner (1982:190); and the works of Strange (1982) and 
Spanier (1992). 100 	 There is ample discussion in the Arctic case study, presented here as Chapter 4, on the nature 
of transboundary problems and their likely efects across the Arctic. 101 	 The unpublished PhD Thesis 'The Polar Regions and Development of International Law' by 
Donald R Rothwel, Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, 1994, is one recently completed 
study in this field. 102 	 The reference to the Antarctic is contained in Agenda 21, Chapter 17, at point 105. It urges 
states carying out research activities in the region to continue to share that information with 
the international community. 103 	 See for example the work of Beck (1989b); Franckx (1992); Champ et al (1992); and 
Rothwel (1994b). 104 	 The Antarctic Convergence is described and its approximate coordinates given in the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) Articles 
1.1 and 1.4. This and the folowing physical descriptions are from Walton (1987). 
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105 	 The Antarctic's isolation is a major contributing factor to its near-pristine environment which 
thus enhances its role in scientific research. 106 	 The southern reaches of the South Pacific, South Atlantic and Indian Oceans, which meld 
into the circum-Antarctic water mass are known colectively as the Southern Ocean. 107 	 The South Orkneys and South Shetland Islands (UK) are the best known of the Antarctic 
islands south of 60° South. Other wel-known landforms such as Macquarie, Heard and 
McDonald Islands (Australia), Campbel Islands and Auckland Island (New Zealand) and Iles 
Crozet and Kerguelen (France) are sub-Antarctic, that is, north of 60° South. 108 	 That is, the permanent ice-shelves, the largest of which are the Ross and the Ronne. 109 	 For example, in reference to the marine ecosystem and the Antarctic Convergence. It is 
possible to put an exact location on the Antarctic Convergence only at a particular point in 
time because it is a dynamic biogeographic area. 
110 	 Some direct quotes cited in this text use the term Antarctica to refer to the whole of the 
region (which I have refered to as 'the Antarctic'). For the sake of authenticity, these quotes 
have not been altered. 
111 	 Approximately 10% of the surface of the earth is covered by ice, and about 89% of this is 
found in the Antarctic, both continental and marine. 112 	 A record low of -89.6°C was registered at Russia's Vostok Station in the Australian Antarctic 
Teritory in 1983. 113 	 This is a moot point since many countries do not recognise any of these partitioned claims. 114 	 Ice cores extracted by driling through the ice cap have revealed the sequential layering of ice 
over hundreds of thousands of years. Analysis of the ice, of the impurities in it and of air 
trapped in minute bubbles within its crystaline structure, have enabled records to be made of 
environmental changes over this time. This is one of the essential sciences carried out in the 
Antarctic which helps put together the big puzzle of world climate variability. 115 
	
	 Note that the polar Circles are 23°28' from the poles, representing a distance of about 2,600 
km. 116 	 For example, the Canadian Government uses both 'north of 60° North' and the 'southern limit 
of permafrost' to determine the physical operational area of its Department of Indian Afairs 
and Northern Development. (G.Bangay, pers.comm.) 117 	 This is particularly so in relation to the operation of submarines, and poses substantial risks 
of accidents, despite also being, in a strategic sense, 'favourable...for nuclear-powered 
submarines carrying sea-launched ballistic missiles2(Young1991175). 
118 	 Whether ice should be treated as a separate entity in the legal regime of the Arctic is an 
unresolved issue, as ice has not been dealt with adequately in international law to date. See 
LOSC Article 234; Joyner (1991); and Machowski (1992). See also further discussion in 
Chapter 5 of this study. 
119 	 The term 'geopolitics' can be found in late 19th century literature where it was used to 
describe'the science that conceives the state not as an inanimate body, but 
as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space...states compete with 
one another for scarce space, and the laws of natural selection, which 
favour the most biologically fit, apply equally to nations as to species: 
Its more modern usage draws the connection between state security and environmental 
degradation.(Switzer 1994:357-8) 120 	 The publication by the University of Alaska - the Proceedings of an International Conference 
on the Role of the Polar Regions in Global Change, Vols. I and 11 (1990), is particularly 
useful for demonstrating the range of scientific disciplines involved and the varying opinions 
available at that time regarding this issue. See for example the contributions by Waddhams 
pp.4-12; Parkinson pp.17-21; Belchansky and Pichugin pp.47-57; Lorius pp.570-575; 
Hogan, et al pp.681-686; and Borisenkov pp.687-692 in University of Alaska (1990). 121 	 That is, the land between 90° and 150° West. For a description of the claims, see 
Appendix 1. 122 	 Magelan did not survive the voyage; he was kiled in the Philippines. 123 	 Reader's Digest i1985) provides accurate and enjoyable reading. For further information on 
the Antarctic's diverse history, see also the works of Swan (1961); Bush (1982); Quigg 
(1983); Walton (1987) and Joyner (1992). 124 	 See for example Plot (1969) and Burke (1994). 125 	 Quoted in Quigg (1983:29). 126 	 This sector coresponded with what is now Elsworth Land and the top third of Marie Byrd 
Land. 127 	 Queen Maud Land is also known as Dronning Maud Land. 
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128 	 The previously lauded scientific work of the Germans was being damaged by their unpopular 
expansionist policies in Europe. 129 	 This is an interesting yet largely ignored controversy which deserves further investigation. 
The basic documentation in Bush (1982) Vol. I - ifi reproduces the diplomatic corespondence 
between the governments of Britain, France and Australia. Further, though limited, 
comment can be found in Swan (1961); Lovering and Prescot (1979); and Beck (1986b), 
among others. 130 	 See Appendix 1 for coordinates of claims. 131 	 The manager of the Compania Argentina de Pesca SA was the Norwegian C A Larsen, and 
the manager of the Chilean Sociedad Belernera de Magalanes was another Norwegian, A A 
Andresen. 132 	 See for example the works of Gratan (1963); Tonnessen & Johnsen (1982); and Hal (1986) 
and (1994). 133 	 The most successful atempt to regulate Antarctic marine living resources is CCAMLR, 
which wil be discussed further in Chapter 3. 134 	 This assumes that the relationship between whales and their food sources like plankton and 
kril can be considered 'predatory'. 135 	 The 'Special' in SCAR was later changed to 'Scientific'. 136 	 It could also be argued, of course, that their cooperative participation in the IGY was 
symptomatic of the Cold War brinkmanship between them and did not in fact represent 
anything quite as noble as the reprioritization of science over politics. 137 	 Reprinted in 2 RIAA 829 (1928). 138 	 Reprinted in 26 AJIL 390 (1932). 139 	 Reprinted in PCIJ SerA/B, #53 (1933). 140 	 For a comprehensive discussion of these three cases see Dixon & McCorquodale (1991) pages 
239, 233 and 232 respectively. 141 	 The Argentinian name for the Falkland Islands is the Malvinas. 142 	 Refer to the International Court of Justice Pleadings, Antarctic Cases (United Kingdom v. 
Argentina : United Kingdom v. Chile) Orders of March 16, 1956: Removal From the List. 
For further discussion see Hal (1994:100-101). 143 	 The Rio Treaty, signed in Rio de Janeiro 02 September 1947, reprinted in Grenvile (1974). 144 	 This does not include the atempts by Britain at judicial arbitration on the overlapping 
Peninsula claims (see note 142 above). Had a setlement been reached, it would have 
accounted for only part of the problem in any case. For a useful historical analysis of why a 
regime did not materialise at this time see Peterson (1988), especialy Chapter 4, in which 
she discusses why Antarctica had a low political salience and the nature of difering national 
priorities leading to coalitions which efectively blocked constructive negotiation. 145 	 Beck (1986b:40). On this mater see also Hal (1994:77-8) and Plot (1969) generaly. 146 	 Hal (1994:79-80). See also p.102 re Franz Josef Land. 147 	 Informal negotiations were temporarily diverted when, early in 1956, India raised the issue of 
the Antarctic as a possible item for inclusion on the Agenda of the 11th UN General 
Assembly. The Indian request was later withdrawn prior to the UNGA due to lack of support 
(Hal 1994:122). 148 	 Hitchins and Liander (1990:297-316). They cite Ostreng at p.312, in the context of the 
linkage between the military and scientific fields. Ostreng notes that the hegemonic 
competition made few or no distinctions between the two areas. This is no doubt also true of 
cooperation over environmental maters, especialy in the sense that sovereignty was closely 
guarded during the Cold War. 149 	 Evidence of the earlier existence of regionalism can be found in the number of bilateral 
accords between the Arctic states. See Appendix 5. 150 	 'Internal Waters' are as described by the LOSC, Article 8. 151 	 See Rothwel (1994a:4-5). 152 	 For the facts of this case, see p.45 above. 153 	 Stoldce & Castberg (1993:21) quote from the work of Waever & Joenniemi (1992). Stokke 
& Castberg's article describes the regionalization in the Barents Sea area, in which they 
suggest that the Barents region would form a hybrid of the trans- and inter-state spheres of 
cooperation. It is this author's suggestion that regionalism occurs at the intra-state level as 
wel, as the Sarni homelands in the north of each Nordic country are being treated as 
politicaly different, especialy by the Sarni themselves. The existence of the Sarni 
Parliament confirms this thought; so too does the suggestion that the Sarni homelands 
should become an autonomous trading region in the EU (Helander, pers.comm.). 
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154 	 CARC (1988:5). There is a large amount of information on the development of the northern 
Canadian teritory and its segmentation into autonomous regional political areas. See for 
instance Bekale (1990) and Dickerson (1992). 155 	 In this sense, 'Arctic' is used in the context of the wider geographic location, as described on 
p.70. 156 	 The interests of states like Japan and South Korea outside the 'Arctic' per se are not dealt with 
in this work, except in the cases where they have directly participated in the regime 
negotiation process. Their legitimacy as stakeholders (in the sense that they are involved in 
economic exploitation and hence decisions taken wil have an efect on them) is confirmed by 
Friedheim (1988:494). 157 	 Government of the United States (1992a:5). See also Government of Canada (1980). 158 	 Government of Canada (1980) and (1990). For a description of the Sector Principle see 
p.108. 159 	 This study does not atempt to analyse the implications of the situation with regard to the 
other former members of the Soviet Union, as Russia is the only 'Arctic' republic. Russia's 
recent incursions into the Muslim republic of Chechnya to dampen the separatist rebelion 
there, and international criticism of Boris Yeltsin's leadership, makes casual analysis of the 
tenuous situation in the former Soviet republics premature and unwise. 160 	 The cumbersome title of Greenland/Denmark wil not be used in this study, however 
Denmark's role in Greenlandic foreign afairs is implicit. This study acknowledges the 
special status of Greenland and its inclusion in the 'Arctic 8' is meant to imply nothing more 
than the kind of quasi-independence which is accorded to Greenland by the international 
community in the context of the Arctic afairs studied in this thesis. 161 	 Norway, Greenland and the Faroe Islands are also members of this break-away body. 162 	 Sugden (1982) devotes Chapter 8 to a discussion of the evolution, population and setlement 
of the Arctic. His work is particularly useful for descriptions of the Ice Age cultures like the 
Arctic Smal Tool and Thule Traditions. For a more recent discussion of this topic, which 
argues against the view that Palaeo-Eskimo cultures of the eastern Arctic derive directly from 
the Alaskan Smal Tool Tradition, see Stewart (1989). 163 	 Beringia was the intermitent bridge across the Bering Strait linking Asia and North America. 164 	 There were Danish Vikings (the Great Army), Norwegian Vikings and Swedish Vikings. 165 	 Note that the climate at this time was several degrees wanner than it is today (Sugden 
1982:Ch7). 
166 	 The folowing accounts draw heavily on the work of Baird (1964:Ch.2) and Kinder and 
Hilgemann Vol. I and I (1978) unless otherwise indicated. 167 	 This is also known as the Northern Sea Route, although there are subtle diferences between 
the two. 168 	 Solie (1989:16). For a history of the Northern Sea Route see also Armstrong (1992). 169 	 Russia's big rivers play an extremely prominent role today in the transportation of polutants 
from the industrial areas and military sites into the Arctic Ocean. 170 	 Incidentaly, it has been said that Tsar Peter I was greatly influenced by French and German 
scientific thought and established the Academy of Sciences in the capital, St Petersburg, in 
1725 (Armstrong 1992:35). 171 	 The United States purchased Alaska from the Russians in 1867. 172 	 In fact it is notable that the names of many Arctic explorers like Cook, Davis, Ross, Byrd, 
Nordenslciold and Amundsen, crop up in Antarctic history as wel. These were truly polar 
explorers. 173 	 His nephew, James Clark Ross, gained valuable Arctic experience with his uncle and later 
was prominent in Antarctic exploration. 174 	 Nobile's second atempt on the pole in 1928 met with disaster when his airship was forced to 
land on the ice. Amundsen set out by air from Tromso to find him but his party never 
returned. Nobile's expedition was eventualy rescued by a Russian ice-breaker, the Krasin. 
175 	 This principle of contiguity afirms that coastal states have rights to adjacent marine 
teritory, and in the case of a state claiming teritorial possession of islands, those islands too 
have contiguous belts of sea. See Brownlie (1990:Ch.9) generaly. 176 	 Named after US President Truman, the Truman Doctrine was an appeal for international 
resistance to communist aggression, with a guarantee of American aid to any free nation 
which resisted communist propaganda or sabotage. 
177 	 The Marshal Plan was an extension of the Truman Doctrine, proposing that the war-damaged 
nations of Europe join a program of mutual aid for economic recovery. The administration 
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body, Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was the forerunner of the 
present-day OECD. 178 	 The term 'cold war' is thought to have originated during the 1930s to describe Nazi 
Germany's propensity for conquering other states with litle fighting. 179 	 NATO was signed on 4 April 1949 by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States. 
Greece and Turkey signed in 1951 and West Germany in 1954. 180 	 The communist states of Eastern Europe, under unified military command, included alongside 
Russia, Albania (withdrew 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland 
and Romania. China did not sign the Pact but rather, pledged its support for Warsaw Pact 
countries. 181 	 This short-hand history is drawn from Kinder and Hilgemann (1978 Vol. I) and SBS (1994). 182 	 The northern part of Schleswig voted in favour of a return to Danish sovereignty in 1920. 183 	 The political history of the Svalbard Islands (caled Spitzbergen til 1925) is vaguely 
analogous to the Antarctic in the sense that Svalbard was considered terra nulius and terra 
communis. The international regime established by the 1920 Svalbard Treaty demonstrates 
how an area of vital strategic, economic and aesthetic interest can be managed appropriately. 
The Treaty gave Norway sovereignty over Svalbard; the islands are administered by a 
Governor; and Norwegian criminal and civil law, and legislation for the administration of 
justice, prevail. The Mining Ordinance permits any private person or company from a 
country which has signed the Treaty to prospect for minerals. In this sense any mineral 
reserves are indeed international, and for example, Svalbard's extensive coal reserves are being 
exploited by both Norway and Russia (which is also a Party to the Svalbard Treaty). 
Importantly, more than half of Svalbard consists of protected areas with strict environmental 
controls and tourism regulations (Government of Norway 1990, 1993). For a comprehensive 
overview of Norway's principles and objectives with regard to Svalbard see the Royal 
Ministry of Justice Report #40 to the Norwegian Storting Concerning Svalbard (1985-86, 
unoficial translation). Leonid Timchenko's (1992) critique of the book Politics in High 
latitudes: The Svalbard Archipelago by Wily Ostreng gives an interesting, although brief, 
insight into the Russian version of Svalbard's history. 184 	 See, for example, Geddie (1882); Seton-Watson (1967); Almedingen (1971); and Dmytryshyn 
(1974). 185 	 The city of Mirny in the province of Sakha (formerly Yakutia), for example, produces nearly 
99% of Russia's diamonds. This represents nearly 25% of total global diamond production. 186 	 See Brigham (1991) for an examination of the Soviet use of the maritime Arctic. 187 	 The Regulations, which entered into force on 1 July 1991, are reprinted in translated form in 
International Chalenges 12 #1(1992) pp121-6 by the Government of the USSR, Ministry 
of Defence. 188 	 For a comprehensive coverage of the Northern Sea Route issue, see International Chalenges 
12 #11992 Special Issue, and Timchenko (1994). 189 	 This was reported in the Hobart daily newspaper, The Mercury, 7.1.94, p.13. 190 	 The former USSR did make a formal declaration of a national sector in 1926. For 
information regarding this see Joyner (1992) at pp.56-58 and pp.72-73. 191 	 The US, Canada, Russia, Greenland, Norway, and Iceland. 192 	 For example, the related Alaskan and Siberian Inuit, although separated by only a 50 mile 
stretch of water, are subject to the laws of two diferent states and were prohibited visiting 
rights until recently. They may be considered 'straddling cultures', analogous to 'straddling 
fish stocks'. 193 	 For example, 64% of the Canadian North West Teritory labour force were not born in the 
NWT (Alen 1990:31). 194 	 This can occur when traditional grazing grounds are declared national parks with atached 
limited rights for the Sarni reindeer herders. It has also occured as a result of the 
contamination from the Chernobyl falout. 195 	 See p.161. 196 	 The Canadian James Bay Project, Great Whale River component, is a case in point. Not 
only are the indigenous people at odds with both the Quebec and Federal governments, but 
this is also one instance in which there is a conflict of values between indigenous groups 
themselves — the Inuit and the Cree First Nation tribe. For the Cree perspective, see 
Diamond (1990); for a general overview of the James Bay Project see Switzer (1994:328-9). 
197 The Inuit Homelands include the Canadian regions of the North West Territories, the District 
of Franklin, northern Quebec and Newfoundland and the coastal regions of Hudson Bay. For 
further information see map titled "Indian and Inuit Communities and Languages" (ref. 
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MCR4001) The National Atlas of Canada produced by the Department of Energy, Mines and 
Resources, Otawa. 198 	 Brantenberg (1991:78). See also Nyst0 (1990). 199 	 Article 27 says that in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shal not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own 
religion, or to use their own language (Smith 1990:123). For comment on the relevance of 
the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to the Sarni, see Smith (1990) and Silanpaa 
(1990). 200 	 The Canadian indigenous group, Assembly of First Nations (formerly the National Indian 
Brotherhood), is also a founding member of WCIP. 201 	 BeIlona was apparently sponsored by the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Afairs to 
travel to Moscow with the aim of mobilizing green groups there. This was felt to be a 
useful method for bringing Russian environmental problems out into the open from inside 
rather than outside the state (Skagestad pers.comm.). 202 	 Under the operating procedures of the London Convention, NGOs can submit documents for 
discussion; can actively participate in discussions; can lobby delegations during breaks; and 
can participate in commitees, working groups and drafting groups. For further information 
see Peet (1994). 203 	 From information contained in Greenpeace International (1993c). 204 	 Peet (1994:7). Note that the author of this comment represents Friends of the Earth at IMO, 
LC and IWC meetings. 205 	 Greenpeace International (1994). 206 	 Note, however, that the IWC is not as lenient in its acceptance of environmental NGOs as 
the London Convention. After payment of a registration fee to the IWC, observers are 
permited to submit a brief opening statement on paper, which is circulated among the 
delegations. They are also permited to talk to delegates during breaks. However, none of 
the IWC observers are permited to take an active role in discussions (Peet 1994:4). 207 
	
	 Norwegian whalers defend their hunting as part of traditional culture. Although economicaly 
whaling may be an insignificant proportion of Norwegian GNP, it is far from insignificant 
to the economies of traditional whaling vilages. Minke whales, the subject of the hunt and 
a resource which the Norwegians consider is in abundance, are also considered by them to be 
the rats of the sea, scavenging fish from fishermen and food from other whale species which 
are endangered. The irony is that Norway expressed this concern over the devastation Minke 
whales caused to other species, thereby contributing to their near-extinction, without 
acknowledgement that Norwegian traditional whalers had themselves partly contributed to 
that same destructive process. See Greenpeace International (1992); for Norway's oficial 
position on whaling, see Holst (1993); for Norway's indigenous perspective, see Blichfeldt 
(1992). 208 	 Greenpeace International (1993e). 209 	 Greenpeace International has consultative status within ECOSOC and observer status or the 
right to atend the meetings of, among others, the Basel, Berne, Bonn and Barcelona 
Conventions; the Biodiversity Convention; CITES; the FAO; the IAEA Standing 
Commitee on Nuclear Liability of the IAEA; the IMO; the IPCC and the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Commitee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change; the IWC; the 
London Convention; the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol; the Oslo Convention; 
and the UNEP Governing Council and Regional Seas Programme (Greenpeace International 
Document dated 24.10.94). 210 	 Friedheim (1988:497) and Osherenko & Young (1989:49). 211 	 For summaries of two similar case studies, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the James 
Bay Project, see Switzer (1994:Ch.16). 212 	 Government of Canada, Federal Environmental Assessment Review Ofice, undated 'Report 
of Environment Assessment Panel, APP Northern Component':93. 213 	 The review process has been described by Dryden as '...one of the longest and most 
intensive, costly, and circuitous environmental reviews that any project 
has had to endure.' See Dryden (1990:103-138). 214 	 Petro-Canada (1983:5). This, and similar references below, refer to Petro-Canada's Annual 
Reports; their coresponding years and page numbers are cited where appropriate. 
215 	 The four tiers were the National Energy Board, the Federal Departments of Transport and the 
Environment (Environmental Assessment and Review Process), as noted above, but also 
including at a later date, the Federal Teritorial Waters Board. 216 	 'NAFTA', done in December 1992, reprinted in 32 ILM 605 (1993). 
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217 	 That is, the movement of goods, services, capital and persons. 218 	 This is not meant to detract from the policy-making abilities of the regional governments in 
Canadian teritories, nor the Nordic regional associations. 219 	 That is, without the active and legitimate participation of the indigenous people, whose 
cultures and lifestyles may be directly afected by environmental laws. 220 	 Subjecting polar scientists, expeclitioners and program planners to regulations on their 
behaviour is not considered a direct physical impact on the sponsoring states. This is 
because such laws afect only a very smal percentage of the total state population and have 
no appreciable economic cost. For example, it is impossible to predict the cost to industry 
of being unable to mine possible mineral resources in the Antarctic (where such action is 
prohibited). Furthermore, until a Liability Annex is negotiated, the cost of responsible 
environmental behaviour must be considered to be a normal operating cost in the Antarctic. 
Until proven sovereign title is granted to the claimant nations, or until a Liability Annex 
clarifies the issue, it remains unclear whether states can claim environmental harm to their 
claimed teritory. 221 	 Coincidentaly the UNCED process occured during the time of the disintegration of the 
former Soviet Union and its hegemonic rein over the Eastern Bloc countries. 222 	 The very recent discovery of a ruptured oil pipeline spiling its contents into the Russian 
Arctic is a prime example of this degradation. This is only one of the myriad of 
environmental problems having been discovered since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
For further discussion see for example 'Who's minding the Arctic?' by Tery Fenge, The 
Globe & Mail, 3 November 1994. 223 	 This is taken from Recommendation V111 of Meeting I, 1961, emphasis added. See Heap 
(1990a:2402). Heap (1990a) lists al Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting 
Recommendations, which serves as a good primary source of the history of environmental 
concern in the Antarctic. 224 	 The Antarctic Treaty System was described similarly in Article 2.1 of CRAMRA. 225 	 The third tier of law, domestic legislation, is unique to the constitutional processes of each 
Party to the Treaty. In Australia's case, a total of more than 120 separate pieces of domestic 
legislation are in some way or another applicable to Australia's Antarctic Teritory. See 
Australian Government, House of Representatives, Standing Commitee on Legal and 
Constitutional Afairs, 'Legal Regimes of Australia's External Teritories' 1991. 226 
	
	 Done in Washington, 1 December 1959; entered into force 23 June 1961; reprinted in 402 
UNTS 71 (1959). 227 	 'Agreed Measures', Recommendation ru-8, 1964; reprinted in Heap (1990) pp2403-6. 228 	 'CCAS', done in London, 1 June 1972; entered into force 11 March 1978; reprinted in 11 
ILM 251 (1972). 229 	 Hereinafter 'CCAMLR'. 
230 	 'Madrid Protocol', done in Madrid, 04 October 1991; reprinted in 30 ILM 1455 (1991). In 
the context of this study, the Madrid Protocol is considered a component of the wider 
Antarctic Treaty System, although at the time of writing, this regime had not yet entered into 
force. 231 	 'CRAMRA', done in Welington, 2 June 1988; reprinted in 27 ILM 868 (1988). 232 	 Although inactive and thus not strictly speaking a component of the System as defined above 
by the Parties themselves, this Convention is included in the discussion for several reasons. 
First, it contains valuable insight into the philosophy of the Antarctic Treaty Parties with 
regard to the contentious issue of mineral resource exploitation. And second, the rejection of 
this Minerals Convention led directly to the adoption of the Madrid Protocol. 233 	 For the text of the Treaty see Appendix 3. A list of its signatories and their status is included 
as Appendix 2. 234 	 Basel Convention, Article 4.6. The Basel Convention is discussed in Kummer (1992). 235 	 The London Dumping Convention title was changed to the London Convention in 1992. 236 	 This may not be strictly true since there is quite a degree of support for the idea that parts of 
the LOSC, for instance, have evolved into customary law. At a recent seminar on the Law 
of the Sea, Dr Thomas Mensah, Director of the Law of the Sea Institute in Hawai, 
commented that even if the LOSC had not entered into force, many of the rights, obligations 
and disputes would have been dealt with under customary international law (Mensah 1994). 237 	 States notify the United States, as Depositary, of their acceptance of a Meeting 
Recommendation. Of the nearly 200 Recommendations to date, almost two-thirds have been 
accepted in this manner. However, these figures cannot be used as an accurate guide to 
effectiveness for a number of reasons: i) it is not necessary for al Parties to have agreed on 
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an action (for example, the date of a meeting) for that action to proceed; i) some 
Recommendations may supersede earlier ones, or may be embodied in legaly-binding 
instruments; and ii) some Recommendations may not be relevant to some Parties and thus 
would not require their formal acceptance (Jackson, pers.conun). 238 	 This became a particularly prominent issue for discussion during the UN 'Question of 
Antarctica' in the 1980s. Peter Beck has reviewed the UN agenda with regard to the Antarctic 
each year from 1984 to 1994. His articles are published annualy in Polar Record. 
239 'Discord' is most probably interpreted to mean activities like wars or military hostilities, 
although this author has argued elsewhere that the UN chalenge to the Treaty System's 
legitimacy waged during the 1980s was potentialy 'international discord' (Green 1991). 
Further discussion of this UN chalenge can be found at the end of this Chapter. 240 	 See Figure 3, p127. 241 	 It is not known why the Seals Convention took six years to ratify. It is suggested that this 
was perhaps because the resource was already depleted and hence there was litle urgency in 
the mater. This suggestion is made in light of the fact that CCAMLR (described in the next 
section) took only two years to enter into force. In this instance, the protection of kril 
stocks before major harvesting began, was seen as a priority. The Contracting Parties to the 
Seals Convention are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, (former )USSR, UK, USA, Poland, Germany, Canada, Brazil and 
Italy. 242 	 See Figure 3 (p.127) which indicates the nexus between CCAS and the International Legal 
System. 243 	 The Madrid Protocol later sought the banning of dogs in Antarctica and they have since been 
removed from the continent. 244 	 For the relationship between this program and CCAMLR see El-Sayed (1994:8). 245 	 Figure 3 on p.127 indicates that, like CCAS, CCAMLR is linked to the global legal order. 
The only CCAMLR signatory which is not a party to the Antarctic Treaty is the European 
Economic Community. 246 	 SCAR is not an organisation, per se, of the Antarctic Treaty System but an organ of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) and has an advisory function only within 
the Treaty System. 247 	 Brownlie (1990:58). For a discussion of the concept of legal personality, see Brownlie 
(1990:58 and 681-2). This means CCAMLR is, or has: 
• a permanent association of states, with lawful objects, equipped with organs; 
• a distinction, in terms of legal powers and purposes, between the organisation and 
its member states; and 
• the existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and not solely 
within the national systems of one or more states. 248 	 The Scientific Commitee now publishes a journal titled CCAMLR Science (Vol. 11994). 249 	 This terminology is emphasized to denote the widely difering opinions on actual kril 
biomass. For example, estimates of lcril numbers have ranged from 135 milion metric 
tonnes to 1.35 thousand milion metric tonnes - one order of magnitude diference. 
Furthermore, it is now thought that kril live for at least 5 years, while initialy it was 
thought more likely to be only 2 years. This later discrepancy has major implications for 
the maturation age of kril and hence for conservation policy. The paucity of basic 
knowledge about hil makes effective resource management almost impossible. For 
explanatory papers see (Miler 1991) and Nichol & de la Mare (1993). 250 	 This terminology 'greatest net annual increase' presumably refers to numbers. 251 	 Article XV. On the issue of current perception of ecosystem management within the 
particular purview of fisheries, see Harden Jones (1994:53-7). 252 	 This was also restated in CRAMRA Article 9(b). 253 	 While there was, at this stage, hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic, the Arctic is a quite 
different environment to the Antarctic. Proximity to inhabited areas, smaler bergs, milder 
weather, major shipping routes, among other factors, are important distinctions between the 
polar regions. Wolfrum (1986) and Vicuna (1988) discuss the economic potential of the 
Antarctic. 254 	 In this regard, see Bilder (1985); Beck (1989c); Beeby (1989); Blay & Tsamenyi (1990); and 
Bergin (1990). 255 	 Joyner, for one, does not necessarily agree with this perception. In fact, he considers that 
parts of CRAMRA live on in the Madrid Protocol. See Joyner (1994) for an interesting 
treatment of this issue. 
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256 	 One perspective on the legality of mining in the Antarctic can be found in Blay and 
Piotrowicz (1991). 257 	 Note that Joyner's definition of legitimacy accords roughly with the definition used by this 
study. For further elaboration on this theme see Joyner (1995). 258 	 For the chronology and discussion of this event see Bergin (1990); Burgess (1990); and Beck 
(1992a). The joint Franco-Australian statement is cited as Hawke and Rocard (1989). 259 	 This is probably due in part to the large amount of background work already completed and 
contained in other components of the System, especialy CRAMRA. The similarity in 
language between the two instruments is notable. 260 	 For a comprehensive evaluation of two environmental NGOs and their Antarctic campaigns, 
see Wiliams (1993). For a more general overview, see Rothwel (1990). 261 	 For an overview of ACF and its Antarctic program, see Mosely (1989). 262 	 Wiliams notes that Greenpeace may have tried to atract Consultative Party status within the 
Treaty System by establishing the base and conducting scientific programs. However, the 
Antarctic Treaty System is closed to al but states, with the exception of CCAMLR which 
invited regional groups of states with an economic interest to accede to it. 263 	 The Parties to the Protocol and their dates of ratification can be found in Appendix 2. 264 	 For Australia's treatment of its obligations under this Article, see Blay and Green (1994). 265 	 It seems oddly unnecessary to have to repeat such an emphasis on cooperation, however this 
may have been directed at Parties previously less than environmentaly-friendly in terms of 
the conduct of their national scientific programs or uncooperative with regard to their 
inspection obligations under Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty. 266 	 In the meantime, representatives from SCAR (including its Group of Specialists on 
Environmental Afairs and Conservation (GOSEAC), CCAMLR, and the Council of the 
Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) (including the joint SCAR/COMNAP 
Standing Commitee on Logistics and Operations (SCALOP) are al expected to participate 
in the detailed work of TEWG to provide expert advice as requested or required (ATCM 1994). 267 	 It is interesting to note that Greenpeace, as an organization, is not able to be a party to the 
Antarctic Treaty. Greenpeace was, therefore, operating a base in the Antarctic outside the 
Antarctic Treaty System. However, Greenpeace has always maintained their compliance with 
the spirit and intent of the Treaty, and indeed this IEE is evidence of their respect for the 
Protocol as wel. 268 	 Annex IV on Prevention of Marine Polution prohibits the discharge at sea within the 
Antarctic Treaty Area of dirty balast water. It is implied that dirty balast water is that 
which is contaminated by oil or oily substances. Nothing in the Protocol deals with 
microorganisms that may reside in clean balast and which, if discharged, may have a 
deleterious efect on the Antarctic marine ecosystem. However Article IX of the Agreed 
Measures prohibits the introduction of non-indigenous species into the Antarctic Treaty Area. 
Litle work has been done on this topic, which has the potential to be of major importance 
particularly in light of the recent declaration by Australia of an EEZ of its Antarctic 
Territory. For an indication of the issues involved, see J Johanson (1992). 269 	 For discussion of the notion of the ATS as an objective regime, see Birnie (1985) and 
Wyrozumska (1993). 270 	 The Greenpeace World Park Base was established in 1986-87; a renegade expedition by 
Pakistan in 1990-91 established Jinnah station; and another renegade UN-sponsored 
expedition to establish an Antarctic station was scrapped in 1991. While these events may 
have been minor iritants to the Antarctic Treaty States, they were never seen as a serious 
chalenge to the System, in the sense that nothing was done to atempt to stop them or 
remove them, despite Greenpeace's reliance on emergency support from the nearby US and 
NZ bases (Wiliams 1993:62). 271 	 Theoreticaly it may be possible to obtain information from any Antarctic Treaty Party on 
the Madrid Protocol. If, for example, an international environmental agency was pursuing a 
Treaty Party for a suspected breach of environmental regulations, and the documentation 
could not be obtained from that country, it might be possible to obtain it from another more 
liberal country like Australia because each Treaty Party receives copies of al documentation 
before they became public. This issue is complicated by several factors, including whether 
the agency has standing in Australia; whether the information sought is actualy held; and 
whether that information has been made available for public release by the Treaty Parties 
(Jackson, pers.comm). 272 	 See the discussion regarding CRAMRA's liability provisions on p.142. See also Blay & 
Green (1995) for a comprehensive overview of liability with regard to the Madrid Protocol. 273 	 For a list of the ratifying Parties and dates, see Appendix 2. 
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274 	 For comments on alternate interpretations of the status of the Antarctic see Goldsworthy 
(1989); Law (1989); Rothwel (1990); and Suter (1991). 275 	 Kimbal (1990) and Beeby (1990). 276 	 For a range of opinions on this issue, see Her et al (1990) generaly. 277 	 That is, the area south of the Antarctic Convergence and south of 60° South. 278 	 For one perspective of some negative aspects of the Madrid Protocol, see Vicuna (1994). 279 	 For a useful treatment of this notion with regard to the politics of science, see Elzinga and 
Bohlin (1989). 280 	 Benedick (1991) has described what he terms a new kind of multilateral diplomacy which 
became apparent during the Montreal Protocol negotiations, when States were faced with 
what appeared to be an insurmountable problem of the regulation of CFCs. According to 
Benedick, the fact that the participants succeeded in negotiating a ground-breaking accord like 
the Montreal Protocol gives added incentive and confidence to diplomats the world over to try 
this fresh approach to problem-solving. 281 	 Here a distinction must be made between pan-Arctic as opposed to teritorial or municipal 
regimes. The work ilustrated earlier the existence of such organizations as the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Council, the Nordic Sarni Parliament, the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council, the Northern Forum and others, which do not embrace the whole of the 
Arctic. On the subject of trade and cooperation in the Euro-Barents region, see Skagestad 
(1993). 282 	 Grifiths (1989) uses the terms minimal, co-ordinate and integration regions. For a 
discussion of the definitions and the minimal categorization of the Arctic, see Grifiths 
(1989:213-222). 283 	 For discussions on the concept of an Arctic Region Council, see Pharand (1992); Slipchenko 
(1992) and Government of Canada (1992). This issue is discussed further in Chapter 5 on 
p.238. 284 	 Russia has given its support for the Arctic Council proposal via its 'Declaration of 
Friendship and Cooperation' with Canada, dated 1 February 1992, and further supported by 
'The Canada-Russia Arctic Cooperation Agreement' dated 19 June 1992. 285 	 A statement by Canadian Foreign Afairs Minister Andre Ouelet, dated 30 April 1994, 
reported that the US Secretary of State Waren Christopher had 'responded positively' to 
Ouelet's request for US support for the creation of an Arctic Council (Ouelet 1994:4). This 
was the opposite of the previously stated US position. 286 	 One recent example is the fact that when in opposition, the curent Chretian Liberal 
Government of Canada condemned the testing of US military hardware on Canadian soil and 
vowed to have it stopped once in ofice. But as the curent serving government they have 
just renewed the US contract for missile testing for another year (ABC Radio News 4.2.94). 287 
	
	 For example, the long running 1911 Treaty on Northern Fur Seals finaly broke down in 
1984 when the US declined to extend the life of the Treaty through a protocol. 288 	 On the question of reservations and declarations to LOSC generaly, see Blay et al (1991). 289 	 For example, the Polar Bear Convention and CITES were signed in the same year, and the 
Polar Bear Convention invokes but does not acknowledge CITES directly. For further 
discussion on this link, see p.191. The Nordic Convention on the Protection of the 
Environment (done in Stockholm on 19 February 1974, reprinted in 13 ILM 591 (1974), in 
force 5 October 1976) recognises the possibility of links: 'The Convention shall not 
apply insofar as environmentally harmful activities are regulated by a 
special agreement between two or more of the Contracting Parties'(Article 1.2). 
The Helsinki Convention (on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area, done in Helsinki on 3 May 1980, reprinted in 19 ILM 835 (1980) does make direct 
reference to its relationship with other conventions: 'The provisions of the present 
Convention shall be without prejudice to the rights and obligations of the 
Contracting Parties under treaties concluded previously as well as under 
treaties which may be concluded in the future, furthering and developing 
the general principles of the Law of the Sea that the present Convention 
is based upon and in particular provisions concerning the prevention of 
pollution of the marine environment.0kaide20. SimilarlytheLondon 
Convention is linked to LOSC, while the Paris Convention is linked to the Oslo 
Convention through its Preamble. 290 	 These have been described in Chapter 2 and include the drift journey of Nansen in the Fram, 
1893-96; Amundsen's voyage through the North West Passage, 1903-06; Peary's landing in 
the vicinity of the north pole in 1909; the 1921-24 Thule expedition of Rasmussen from 
Greenland to the Bering Strait; the 1926 flight by Byrd from Spitzbergen, over the north pole 
257 
and return; and the 1926 transpolar flight by Nobile, Amundsen and Elsworth from 
Spitzbergen to Alaska. 291 	 These quotes were cited in Roots (1984:11). 292 	 For a more comprehensive discussion on the role the IGY played in Antarctic regime- 
building, refer to Chapter 3. 293 	 Science, of course, was always a useful tool for the advancement of technology and industry, 
but this period represented a fundamental shift in focus, concurent with increasing activity in 
Arctic resource exploration and extraction. 294 	 This was quoted in Roots (1984). (The original Ostreng paper apparently no longer exists.) 
295 	 That is, functional in the sense: 'learn what we need to know then use that 
knowledge to advance toward our objectives or defend our position'(Roots 
1984:14). 296 	 The report from this Working Group, Roots et al (1987) is now widely quoted in the context 
of Arctic scientific cooperation. 297 	 Dr Rogne had valuable credentials through his association with SCAR, his membership of 
the original working group and as Director of the Norwegian Polar Institute. 298 	 Document: 'Conference of Arctic Countries on Coordination of Research in the Arctic, 
Leningrad, December 12-15, 1988, General Summary', in English:5 (Hereinafter 'Anon. 
Leningrad Document (1988)'). 299 	 This provisional scientific research agenda comprised projects on the upper atmosphere and 
near space, Arctic ecosystems, the interactions between ocean and atmosphere, Arctic climate 
change, geophysical studies, environmental conservation and many social and cultural issues. 
300 	 Confidence building measures were already established through the various global 
programmes in operation like the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, UNESCO's 
Man in the Biosphere Programme and the World Climate Programme. 301 	 In fact, many of the people active in the establishment of IASC had SCAR backgrounds, and 
to some extent used their experiences to model IASC. 'When we saw a system, which 
was known to polar scientists, that worked well, then we used it..but we 
also saw that in some areas we couldn't use it...therefore it [IASC] is 
slightly different' (Rogne pers.comm). 302 	 Interestingly, there are areas where mutual benefit is obvious, as evidenced by the fact that 
the Chairman of both the SCAR and the IASC Working Groups on Global Change is the 
same person, Dr Gunter Weler (Rogne pers.comm). 303 	 For example, SCAR has been criticised in the past for degenerating into merely a reporting 
facility, rather than a mechanism for coordinating and facilitating scientific endeavour. The 
Members of IASC, being aware of this, would no doubt take steps to ensure this did not 
happen in their institution (Rogne pers.comm). 304 	 IASC (1990:5), emphasis added. 305 	 In this context the Arctic has an unspecified southern boundary. 306 	 This definition can be found in IASC (1992) Appendix IX 1.2-1.3. The rationale for this 
clarification of the meaning of significant Arctic research' was based on the 
perception that a scientific definition was more appropriate and less ambiguous than a 
logistical one like the common interpretation of Article IX.2 of the Antarctic Treaty. This is 
because scientific quality was thought to be more important than simply evidence of a 
presence on the ice (Rogne pers.comm). 307 	 For discussion of the nature and vulnerability of polar ecosystems see Walton (1987) and 
Stonehouse (1990). 308 	 The Sarni people of Finland, for example, see themselves as living inside nature: '...what is 
wild to Western people is home to [the Saila (Alaraudanjoki, pers.comm). Klein 
(1994) discusses this issue in relation to Arctic indigenous people generaly. 309 	 Osherenko & Young (1989:131). The planned reversal of the great Russian rivers from their 
natural northerly flow would have had unprecedented and immeasurable ecological impacts 
had it not been shelved in 1986 (Osherenko & Young 1989:131; Rogne pers.comm). 310 	 The "tragedy of the commons", as described by Garet Hardin in Science (162:1243-1248), 
is the situation that develops when an individual atempts to maximise gain in a world of 
finite resources and thus at the expense of society as a whole. The nucleus of the concept is 
the unlimited use of the commons by an increasing population, to the point where the 
commons are ruined. 
311 	 The 'Polar Bear Convention' reprinted in 13 ILM 13 (1974) is an agreement between Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, the former Soviet Union and the United States. Three ratifications 
(Norway, Canada and the former USSR) brought the Convention into force in 1976 (as per 
Article X.4). 
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312 	 One perspective of this new era can be found in Butler (1990). 313 	 Rovaniemi is a town in northern Finland, wel-known as the gateway to Lapland (the home 
of the Finnish Sarni people). 314 	 This was reported by the Royal Institute of International Afairs (1990:1). 315 	 Ironicaly, Gorbachev's speech began by recaling the level of cooperation between Soviet, 
British and American sailors during the second World War in breaking through a German 
blockade to bring convoys of weapons and equipment to Murmansk. 316 	 For a variety of responses to Gorbachev's speech see Grifiths (1989:Ch.12); Archer (1989); 
Hitchins and Liander (1990); and Jalonen (1991). 317 	 Gorbachev (1988:45). Each of the folowing quotes is from the publication Gorbachev 
(1988), although it is noted that his speech was actualy delivered in 1987. For ease of 
reading, the references have been shortened to page numbers only. 318 	 Giving a tantalizing insight into one aspect of the breakdown of the Soviet social fabric, 
President Gorbachev refered to the statistic that the war on drunkenness had achieved a 
decline in sales of alcoholic beverages by a staggering 10.7 thousand milion rubles in 1986 
(Gorbachev 1988:47-52). Geddie wrote, in 1882: 	 cannot be said that we know 
Russia and its people thoroughly, or even well. It is so colossal and so 
complicated a phenomenon that is presented to us, that it is not easy to 
fix an adequate picture of it in the mind' (Geddie 1882:18). Over 100 years later, 
perhaps the same can stil be said. 319 	 The Helsinki Convention (see note 289 above). 320 	 On this issue compare, for example Stokke (1992:227) with Bjorklund (1993:10). 
321 	 For example, prior to glasnost the former USSR had refused British scientists permission to 
study the progress of caesium emanating from its own Selafield plant into the Soviet EEZ 
water-column in 1985. See Archer (undated:4). 322 	 The AEPS, reprinted in 30 ILM 1624 (1991). 323 	 The Royal Navy contracted a report which was conducted by Ash and published in 1994. The 
US Government similarly conducted its own investigation, cited as Government of the 
United States (1992b). 324 	 This included the environmental provisions of the LOSC not then in force. As mentioned 
above, Iceland is the only Arctic state to have ratified the LOSC. However, this study has 
ilustrated several instances in which elements of the LOSC have been adopted as customary 
law by Arctic states (the declarations of EEZs, for example). 325 	 For example: 'We will cooperate to conserve, protect and, as appropriate, 
restore the ecosystems of the Arctic...' (AEPS 1993:4, emphasis added). 326 	 This is a UN Convention, done at Espoo, Finland on 25 February 1991, reprinted in 30 ILM 
800 (1991). Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Russia (after the former USSR), the United 
States, Norway and Sweden had al signed the Convention by 11 June 1991. Importantly 
too, the European Economic Community is also a signatory to this Convention, which aims 
to minimize transboundary polution through the application of environmental impact 
assessments. 
327 	 The IASC Arctic Science Planning Conference wil be held in Hanover, USA, in December 
1995. 328 	 This information was passed on from Dr Oran Young, in a document titled 'Sustainable 
Development Report', 1994. It was a personal electronic mail transmission. 329 	 However, the Australian Mining Industry Council, supporting Australia's initial signing of 
CRAMRA, expressed in general terms the view that the AMIC does not like to see any 
region of the world 'locked up' to the possibility of mineral resources exploitation. See 
Bergin (1990). 330 	 Of course, the exception is the on-going dispute between Chile, Argentina and Britain 
concerning their overlapping claims. In this instance, any Antarctic policies of the three 
countries, environmental or otherwise, have strong political connotations. 331 	 It was noted earlier, for instance, that the pan-Sami associations sprang up in response to the 
neglect by their governments of Sami issues. 332 	 Cited as Brooke (1993). 333 	 See the anecdotal evidence presented in Brooke (1993:17-23). 334 	 CCAMLR Article 2.3(c) reads, in part '...the aim of making possible the sustained 
conservation of Antarctic marine living resources'. 335 	 The bilateral environmental relationship between Norway and the Russian Federation, for 
example, is a tenuous arangement which invokes questions of sovereignty, resource 
exploitation, standards, transboundary polution and economic imperatives. This situation is 
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succinctly described by Stokke, in which he argues that: 	 is quite convenient for 
Russia that its wealthy, small Nordic neighbours are highly interested in 
helping to solve some of the environmental problems close to own borders' 
(Stoklce 1994:13). 336 	 For the background to this designation see Rothwel and Kaye (1994). 337 	 It is known, for instance, that CCAMLR has established a new working group on Ecosystem 
Monitoring and Management to replace two separate existing working groups, Kril and 
CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program (CEMP). Although, as mentioned earlier, 
CCAMLR represents a regime for the rational use of Antarctic marine living resources, it 
does contain provisions to ensure that harvests are sustainable and that harvested populations 
do not fal below recoverable levels. The primary reason for this reorientation of the working 
groups into one was that the work of both existing groups was diverging rather than 
converging, with the consequence that the actual information gained was becoming less 
important than questions of methodology and modeling (Nicol:pers.comm.). See also 
CCAMLR Newsleter #16, December 1994:5. 338 	 Heap (1990b:186). Heap cites CCAMLR and CRAMRA as two prime examples of how the 
issue of sovereignty has actualy been beneficial to the Antarctic. 339 	 The Treaty System has been unable to resolve the issue of establishing a permanent 
Secretariat, despite the topic being on every recent agenda of the Treaty Meetings. The report 
from the XVIIth Meeting in Kyoto in April 1994 noted that a working group was tackling 
the legal aspects of the establishment of a permanent Secretariat and the meeting, while 
acknowledging that further work was necessary, urged the Consultative Parties to prepare for 
the earliest possible resolution of this issue (ATCM/WP 37:Item 8). In the meantime, each 
state has a 'national contact point' for the dissemination of information. 340 	 This work draws heavily on Blay and Green (1994). 341 	 Al of the Arctic 8 except Norway and Russia have signed the Agreement relating to Part XI. 342 	 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see Joyner (1994), especialy Ch 3. 343 	 This does not refer to those sub-Antarctic islands like Prince Edward and Marion Islands 
(RSA), Kerguelen and Crozet Islands (France), the South Sandwich Islands (Britain), and 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands (Australia) over which sovereignty is not in dispute and 
thus the declaration of extended maritime jurisdiction is not an issue. Norway has exempted 
Bouvet Island from its general declaration of EEZs and New Zealand has specificaly excluded 
the Ross Dependency. Australia declared a 200 n mi 'Australian Fishing Zone' in 1979 but 
at the time this expressly excluded the Australian Antarctic Teritory. 344 	 Australia ratified the Law of the Sea Convention on 5 October 1994. Federal legislation to 
give effect to the declaration of EEZs came into force on 1 August 1994. See Government of 
Australia (1994a). An Australian Geological Survey Organisation (AGSO) map, reproduced 
in Hobart's daily newspaper, The Mercury on 3.10.94, p.11, clearly depicts a shaded EEZ of 
the two separate sectors of the Australian Antarctic Teritory (Government of Australia 
1994b). A copy of the map was later received by facsimile transmission from AGSO; it 
confirmed that the newspaper had reproduced the AGSO map accurately. 345 	 The Russians have used 'the edge of stationary coastal ice' in their 1911 Imperial Decree as 
one parameter in the measurement of teritorial water baseline determination (Joyner 
1994:81). See also Joyner (1991:227-30). 346 	 For the purposes of legislating a prohibition on mineral resource activity in the Antarctic, 
the United States Government has deemed that ice (along with water and snow) is not to be 
considered a 'mineral' (Government of the United States 1993:§3 (9)1 - Definitions). 347 	 The Madrid Protocol defines its area of application as the 'Antarctic Treaty area', which, 
according to Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty, includes the high seas south of 60° South. 
Therefore it is assumed that the high seas include the deep sea bed and subsoil. On this point 
see Rothwel and Kaye (1994). 348 	 Rothwel and Kaye (1994:42). Here Rothwel and Kaye list authors who have made such a 
suggestion. 
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APPENDIX 1 
CLAIMS TO ANTARCTIC TERRITORY 
(Source: Beck 1986b:119-23) 
The area between 90° and 150° W remains unclaimed. 
Argentina (Antartida Argentina) 
Claim 	 25° W - 74° W (formerly 68°34' W) south of 600 South, including Antarctic continent and such islands as the South Orkneys. 
Area 	 550,000 sq miles 
Date 	 Defined 1943-47; South Orkneys 1925, FTD 1937. 
Basis 'Argentine sovereignty over the territory is based on deep-rooted historical rights - maintained firmly in every circumstance by the 
Argentine governments - which are spiritualy identified with the feelings of the entire people of the nation; on the superior geographical position of the Republic; on the geological contiguity of its land with the Antarctic territories; on the climatological influence which the neighbouring polar zones exercise on its territories; on the rights of first occupation; on the necessary diplomatic action and finaly on its uninterupted activities in the Antarctic teritory itself". "Efective and 
continuous occupation has gone on since 1904 (South Orkneys). .our country is the only one which (in 1940) has lived there for 37 years. .Argentina's rights are not solely dependent upon the principal fact of this occupation.' 
Australia (Australian Antarctic Territory - AAT) 
Claim 	 450  E - 160° E (excluding Adelie Land between 136° E - 142° E), south of 60° South, including 'al islands and teritories'. 
Area 	 2.4 milion sq miles 
Date 	 1933 and 1936 
Basis 	 'Australia's claim to sovereignty over the AAT is based on acts of discovery and exploration by British and Australian navigators going back to the time of Captain Cook, and subsequent continuous occupation, administration and control.' 
Chile (Territorio Chileno Antartico) 
Claim 	 53° W - 90° W to the South Pole, but with no northern boundary. 
Area 	 500,000 sq miles approximately, because no northern definition. 
Date 	 1940 (folowing up a 1906 announcement of intent to define and claim) 
Basis 	 bur country holds the oldest rights to sovereignty on 
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this territory; as established in the first place by 
Spain and then later throughout our life as a Republic 
by successive acts of our Government and the 
uninterrupted exercise of such sovereignty.' "The boundaries of Chile in said polar region. .constitute a natural prolongation of the national soil. .(and are based on) historical data (eg. acts and discoveries by Spain)..geographic continuity of the Chilean Antarctic as regards the southern end of the American Continent. .geographic contiguity (eg. geological links). .scientific factors (eg. climatic and glaciological influences). .sector theory..diferent manifestations of sovereignty represented by the acts of occupation realised throughout our history.. diplomatic facts..administrative antecedents.' 
France (Adelie Land) 
Claim 	 136° E - 142° E, south of 60° South 
Area 	 150,000 sq miles 
Date 	 1924, defined 1933-38 
Basis 	 'Sovereignty over Adelie Land, discovered in 1840 by Dumont d'Urvile..explored by Charcot, crossed in recent years by the French polar expeditions rests on solid foundations. The French government 
is proud, in addition to having indisputable historical claims, to be able to rely on a permanent occupation.' 
New Zealand (Ross Dependency) 
Claim 	 160° E - 150° W, south of 60° South. 
Area 	 175,000 sq miles 
Date 	 1923 
Basis 	 'New Zealand's claim to the Ross Dependency rests on. .discovery by a British explorer (ie. Ross), certain government actions connected 
with territorial rights in the Ross Sea area (eg. the issue of special postage stamps for the 1907-09 Shackleton expedition). .annexation - 
Order in Council of 1923, subsequent exploration, certain acts of occupation upon the assumption of sovereignty, the exaction and receipt of revenue, in particular from individuals other than British subjects (ie. Norwegian whalers). .paper acts of sovereignty.' 
Norway (Dronning Maud Land) 
Claim 	 20° W - 45° E including 'that part of the mainland coast in the Antarctic extending from Falkland Islands Dependency to the AAT with the land lying within this coast and the environing sea.' No northern or southern limits defined. 
Area 	 Unknown (see definition above) 
Date 	 1939 
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Basis 	 'Norway's right to bring the said unclaimed land under her dominion is founded on the geographical exploration work done by Norwegians in this region, in which work they have been alone.' 
United Kingdom (British Antarctic Territory) 
Claim 	 20° W - 800 W, south of 60° South, including the mainland sector centred on Graham Land, the South Orkneys and South Shetlands (included in the Falkland Island Dependencies until 1962) 
Area 	 700,000 sq miles 
Date 	 1908 and 1917 
Basis 	 'The root of the United Kingdom's title to the islands and teritories comprising the BAT lies in British acts of discovery between 1819 and 1843, accompanied by formal claims in the name of the British Crown. British sovereignty over these islands and teritories was formaly confirmed and defined by the Crown in Leters Patent in 1908 (as amended by further Leters Patent in 1917). Since then there has been in regard to the islands and teritories now comprising the BAT a continuous display of British sovereignty and activity appropriate to the circumstances.' 
(NB: Readers are refered to Beck 1986b:119-22 for the source of the quotations used in this Appendix.) 
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APPENDIX 2 ANTARCTIC STATES 
ANTARCTIC TREATY 
PARTIES 	 Date Ratified/Acceded and Status 
MADRID PROTOCOL 
Signed/Ratified 
Argentina 23.06.61 ATCP 	 OSI/C S, R 28.10.93 Australia 23.06.61 ATCP 	 OS/ C S, R 06.04.94 
Austria 25.08.87 Acceding State 
Belgium 26.07.60 ATCP 	 OS Brazil 16.05.75 ATCP 12.09.83 
Bulgaria 11.09.78 Acceding State 
Canada 04.05.88 Acceding State 
Chile 23.06.61 ATCP 	 OS/C China 08.06.83 ATCP 07.10.85 S, R 02.08.94 
Colombia 31.01.89 Acceding State 
Cuba 16.08.84 Acceding State Czech Republic 14.06.62 Succeeding State2 
DPR Korea 21.01.87 Acceding State 
Denmark 20.05.65 Acceding State 
Ecuador 15.09.87 ATCP 19.11.90 S, R 04.01.93 
Finland 15.05.84 ATCP 09.10.89 
France 16.09.60 ATCP 	 OS/C S, R 05.02.93 
Germany3 05.02.79 ATCP 03.03.81 S, R 25.11.94 
Greece 08.01.87 Acceding State 
Guatemala 31.07.91 Acceding State Hungary 27.01.84 Acceding State 
India 19.08.83 ATCP 12.09.83 
Italy 18.03.81 ATCP 05.10.87 
Japan 04.08.60 ATCP 	 OS 
Netherlands 30.03.67 ATCP 19.11.90 S, R 14.04.94 
New Zealand 01.11.60 ATCP 	 OS/C 
Norway 24.08.60 ATCP 	 OS/C S, R 16.06.93 
Papua New Guinea 16.03.81 Acceding State Peru 10.04.81 ATCP 09.10.89 S, R 08.03.93 
Poland 08.06.61 ATCP 29.07.77 
Republic of Korea 28.11.86 ATCP 09.10.89 Romania 15.09.71 Acceding State 
Russia 02.11.60 Succeeding State4 ATCP South Africa 21.06.60 ATCP 	 OS 
Spain 31.03.82 ATCP 21.09.88 S. R 01.07.92 Sweden 24.04.84 Acceding State S, R 30.03.94 
Switzerland 15.11.90 Acceding State 
United Kingdom 31.05.60 ATCP 	 OS/C 
United States 18.08.60 ATCP 	 OS 
Uruguay 11.01.80 ATCP 07.10.85 Ukraine 28.10.92 Succeeding State5 ?S 30 November 1994 
1 	 KEY: ATCP = 	 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party 
OS 	 = 	 Original Signatory 
Claimant State 
• Signed Madrid Protocol 
• Ratified Madrid Protocol 2 	 The Czech and Slovak Republics inherited Czechoslovakia's obligations as a Non- 
Consultative Party with efect from 1 January 1993, the date of their succession to the Treaty 3 The German Democratic Republic was united with the Federal Republic of Germany on 
02.10.90. GDR acceded to the Treaty on 19.11.74 and was recognised as an ATCP on 
05.10.87. 4 	 Folowing the dissolution of the USSR, Russia assumed the rights and obligations of being 
a party to the Treaty. The USSR had been an original signatory to the Treaty. 5 	 Ukraine has asserted that it has succeeded to the Treaty folowing the dissolution of the 
USSR and thus should be entitled to ATCP status. However, it is understood that the other 
ATCPs have not accepted Ukraine's assertion, primarily because Ukraine does not have an 
Antarctic scientific research program (Fletcher, pers.comm.). 
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APPENDIX 3 
ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America; 
Recognising that it is in the interest of al mankind that Antarctica shal continue forever to 
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shal not become the scene or object of international 
discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from 
international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development 
of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of al 
mankind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance of international harmony in Antarctica wil further the purposes and principles embodied 
in the Charter of the United Nations; 
Have agreed as folows: 
Article 
1 	 Antarctica shal be used for peaceful purposes only. There shal be prohibited, inter alia, any 
measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the 
carying out of military manoeuvers, as wel as the testing of any type of weapons. 
2 	 The present Treaty shal not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purpose. 
Article H 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during the 
International Geophysical Year, shal continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty. 
Article III 
1 	 In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as 
provided for in Article I of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest extent 
feasible and practicable: 
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shal be exchanged to 
permit maximum economy and eficiency of operations; 
(b) scientific personnel shal be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations; 
(c) scientific observations and results from Antarctica shal be exchanged and made freely 
available. 
2 	 In implementing this Article, every encouragement shal be given to the establishment of 
cooperative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and other 
international organizations having a scientific or technical interest in Antarctica. 
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Article IV 
1 	 Nothing contained in the present Treaty shal be interpreted as:- 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to 
teritorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to teritorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of 
its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty 
in Antarctica. 
2 	 No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shal constitute a basis 
for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to teritorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights 
of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shal be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
Article V 
1 	 Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shal 
be prohibited. 
2 	 In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear 
energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which al of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shal apply in Antarctica. 
Article VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shal apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including al 
ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shal prejudice or in any way afect the rights, or the 
exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within that 
area. 
Article VII 
1 	 In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present 
Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings refered 
to in Article IX of the Treaty shal have the right to designate observers to cary out any inspection 
provided for by the present Article. Observers shal be nationals of the Contracting Parties which 
designate them. The names of observers shal be communicated to every other Contracting Party 
having the right to designate observers, and like notice shal be given of the termination of the 
appointment. 
2 	 Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shal 
have complete freedom of access at any time to any or al areas of Antarctica. 
3 	 Al areas of Antarctica, including al stations, instalations and equipment within those areas, 
and al ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, 
shal be open at al times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
this Article. 
4 	 Aerial observation may be caried out at any time over any or al areas of Antarctica by any of 
the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
5 	 Each Contracting Party shal, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, 
inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shal given them notice in advance, of: 
Appendix 3 	 Antarctic Treaty 	 i 
(a) al expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and al 
expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its teritory; 
(b) al stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject 
to the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. 
Article VIII 
1 	 In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over al other 
persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VI and scientific personnel 
exchanged under subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of the Treaty, and members of the stafs 
accompanying any such persons, shal be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of 
which they are nationals in respect of al acts or omissions occuring while they are in Antarctica for 
the purpose of exercising their functions. 
2 	 Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption 
of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any 
case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shal immediately consult 
together with a view to reaching a mutualy acceptable solution. 
Article IX 
1 	 Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty shal 
meet at the City of Canbera within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and 
thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting 
together on maters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives of the 
Treaty, including measures regarding: 
use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; 
facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VI of the 
Treaty; 
questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; 
preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 
2 	 Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession under 
Article XII shal be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings refered to in 
paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest 
in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a 
scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition. 
3 	 Reports from the observers refered to in Article VI of the present Treaty shal be transmited 
to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings refered to in paragraph 1 
of the present Article. 
4 	 The measures refered to in paragraph 1 of this Article shal become efective when approved 
by al the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to 
consider those measures. 
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5 	 Any or al of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from the date of 
entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights have 
been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article. 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate eforts, consistent with the Charter of 
the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the 
principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
Article XI 
1 	 If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shal consult among 
themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial setlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2 	 Any dispute of this character not so resolved shal, with the consent, in each case, of al 
parties to the dispute, be refered to the International Court of Justice for setlement; but failure to 
reach agreement on reference to the International Court shal not absolve parties to the dispute from 
the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means refered to 
in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article XII 
1(a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under 
Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shal enter into force when the depositary 
Government has received notice from al such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
1(b) Such modification or amendment shal thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting 
Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from 
the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provisions of 
subparagraph 1(a) of this Article shal be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the 
date of the expiration of such period. 
2(a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, 
any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary Government, 
a Conference of al the Contracting Parties shal be held as soon as practicable to review the operation 
of the Treaty. 
2(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a Conference 
by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX, shal be 
communicated by the depositary Government to al the Contracting Parties immediately after the 
termination of the Conference and shal enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1 of the present Article. 
2(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its 
communication to al the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the 
expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present 
Treaty; and such withdrawal shal take efect two years after the receipt of the notice by the depositary 
Government. 
Article XIII 
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1 	 The present Treaty shal be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shal be open 
for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which may 
be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of al the Contracting Parties whose representatives 
are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article ix of the Treaty. 
2 	 Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shal be efected by each State in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. 
3 	 Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shal be deposited with the 
Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 
4 	 The depositary Government shal inform al signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty and 
of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5 	 Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by al the signatory States, the present Treaty 
shal enter into force for those States and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. 
Thereafter the Treaty shal enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its instruments 
of accession. 
6 	 The present Treaty shal be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 
of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in English, French, Russian, and Spanish languages, each version being 
equaly authentic, shal be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of 
America, which shal transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and 
acceding States. 
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, have signed the present Treaty. 
Done at Washington this first day of December one thousand nine hundred and fifty nine. 
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STATUS OF THE 'ARCTIC 8' IN SELECTED TREATIES, CONVENTIONS and AGREEMENTS 
KEY: 	 • 	 Ratified 
o 	 Signed, but not ratified Not a party 
	
2 	 3 	 4 	 5 	 6 	 7 	 8 	 9 	 10 	 11 	 12 	 13 
Norway 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 
Sweden 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 	 o 
Finland 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 	 o 
Canada 	 • 	 • 	 x 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 
Iceland 	 x 	 x 	 x 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 x 	 x 	 • 	 x 	 • 
Greenland 	 • 	 x 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 	 • 	 • 	 o 
United States 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 	 • 	 o 	 • 	 • 	 x 
Russia 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 • 	 o 	 • 	 • 	 o 
1 	 Antarctic Treaty, 1 December I959,Washington, in force 23 June 1961. 2 	 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 20 May 1980, Canberra, in force 7 April 1982. 
5 	 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Polution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mater, 29 December 1972, London, Mexico City, Moscow, Washington DC, in force 30 September 1975. 6 	 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Polution Damage, 29 November 1969, Brussels, in force 19 June 1975. 
13 	 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, Montego Bay, in force 16 November 1994. 
3 	 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 2 December 1946, Washington, in force 10 November 1948. 4 	 International Convention for the Prevention of Polution from Ships, 2 November 1973, London, in force 2 October 1983. 
7 	 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Polution, 13 November 1979, in force 16 March 1983. 8 	 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 22 March 1989, Basel, in force 5 May 1992. 9 	 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 22 March 1985, Vienna, in force 22 September 1988. 10 	 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 3 March 1973, Washington, in force 1 July 1975. I 	 Convention on Biological Diversity, 5 June 1992, Rio de Janeiro, not yet in force. 12 	 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 23 November 1972, Paris, in force 17 December 1975. 
APPENDIX 5 
ARCTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
(Sources: American Society of International Law (Various), 
Brigham (1991:Appendix IV)} 
1 	 SELECTED BILATERAL REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, CONVENTIONS, 
TREATIES AND PROTOCOLS 
Commerce, 
1826 
1826 
1826 
1924 
1927 
1927 
1948 
1953 
1963 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1975 
1976 
1976 
1980 
1984 
1985 
1984 
1988 
Diplomatic 
1925 
1926 
1926 
1930 
1930 
1948 
1971 
1973 
1973 
1983 
Trade and Transport (Navigation) 
Denmark/Sweden Commerce and Navigation Treaty 
Iceland/Norway Commerce and Navigation Treaty 
Iceland/ Sweden Commerce and Navigation Treaty 
USSR/Sweden agreement on trade 
Finland/Iceland agreement on trade 
USSR/Iceland agreement on commerce and navigation 
Denmark/Iceland agreement on trade 
USSR/Iceland agreement on trade and payments (+ 1975 Protocol) 
Finland/Iceland agreement on navigation 
US/USSR Cooperative agreement on prevention of incidents at sea 
US/USSR agreement on agricultural cooperation 
US/USSR agreement on transportation 
US/USSR convention on taxation 
US/USSR protocol on cooperation in air trafic 
USSR/Sweden navigation agreement 
US/USSR trade and shipping agreements 
USSR/Sweden agreement on long-term trade 
USSR/Canada extension of existing trade agreement for further 5 years 
USSR/Iceland Protocol on exchange of goods 
Denmark (Greenland)/Sweden agreement on trade 
USSR/Sweden agreement on border trade (+ Protocol on Credits) 
USSR/Finland trade agreement 
Norway/USSR updated accord on search and rescue in Barents Sea 
Relations 
Norway/Sweden convention on peaceful setlement of disputes 
Denmark/Sweden agreement on peaceful setlement of disputes 
Finland/Iceland convention on peaceful setlement of disputes (amended 1953) 
Denmark/Iceland agreement on peaceful setlement of disputes 
Iceland/Norway agreement on peaceful setlement of disputes 
USSR/Finland Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance 
US/Canada Protocol on consultations (re important international problems of mutual 
interest) 
US/USSR protocol on the establishment of a Soviet trade mission in Washington and a 
US commercial bureau in Moscow 
USSR/US agreement relating to the consideration of claims resulting from damage to 
fishing vessels or gear and measures to prevent fishing conflicts 
Iceland/Sweden agreement on the peaceful setlement of disputes 
Cooperation 
1961 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1972 
1972 
1973 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1976 
1977 
in Economics, Industry, Science and Technology 
USSR/Iceland agreement on cooperation in culture, science and technology 
USSR/Sweden agreement on economic, technical and scientific cooperation 
USSR/Finland Treaty on economic, technical and industrial cooperation 
US/USSR Cooperative agreement on medicine and public health 
US/USSR Cooperative agreement on space 
US/USSR Cooperative agreement on science and technology 
US/USSR agreement on studies of the world's oceans 
US/USSR agreement (six year) on cultural and scientific exchanges 
US/USSR agreement to facilitate economic, industrial and technical cooperation 
USSR/Denmark agreement on economic, industrial and technological cooperation 
USSR/Canada 10 year agreement to facilitate economic, industrial, scientific and 
technical cooperation 
Canada/USSR agreement on fisheries relations 
US/USSR agreement on cooperation in science and technology 
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1977 	 USSR/Iceland agreement on science and technology in fisheries and living resources of 
the sea 
1978 	 USSR/Finland agreement on culture 
1979 	 USSR/Finland agreement on education 
1980 	 Denmark/Sweden agreement on cooperation in the field of natural gas 
1981 	 Norway/Sweden agreement on economic cooperation 
1981 	 USSR/Finland Arctic Technology Commitee 
1982 	 USSR/Iceland agreement on economic cooperation 
1983 	 Norway/Sweden agreement on cooperation in the operation of communication satelites 
1984 	 USSR/Canada protocol of consultations on the development of a program of scientific and technical cooperation in the Arctic and the north (+ 1987 extension) 
1985 	 USSR/US general agreement on contracts, exchanges, and cooperation in scientific, 
technical, educational, cultural and other fields 
1985 	 US/USSR program of cooperation and exchanges for 1986-1988 
1988 	 Norway/USSR agreement on scientific and technical cooperation on problems of the 
study of the Arctic and of the north for 1988-1992 
Strategic Military Issues 
1951 	 Iceland/US defence agreement 
1951 	 Greenland(Denmark)/US defence agreement 
1958 	 US/Canada NORAD defence cooperation agreement 
1963 	 US/USSR "Hot Line" agreement on direct communication in the event of a nuclear 
explosion or threat by a third party (+ amendments in 1971, 1984 and 1985) 
1970 	 USSR/Sweden agreement on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes 
1972 	 US/USSR treaty on limitation of anti-balistic missile systems (+ interim agreements, 
SALT!) 1973 	 US/USSR agreement on the basic principles of negotiation on the further limitation of 
strategic offensive arms 
1973 	 US/USSR agreement on the prevention of nuclear war 
1973 	 US/USSR agreement (10 year) on scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy 
1974 	 US/USSR treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests 
1976 	 US/USSR treaty on limitation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes 
1979 	 US/USSR strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT I) 
1987 	 US/USSR agreement to establish a crisis control centre for accidental threats of a military 
nature 
1987 	 US/USSR treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (INF 
Treaty) 
1990 	 USSR/US agreement on troop reductions in Europe 
1990 	 USSR/US agreement on early destruction of part of chemical weapons arsenals 
1990 	 USSR/US START agreement on inspection of warheads 
1993 	 USSR/US START I ratified 
Sovereign Jurisdiction 
1957 	 USSR/Norway sea boundary demarcation agreements (+ 1973) 
1967 	 Norway/Sweden declaration on Sweden's and Norway's maritime teritory in the NE 
Skagerak 
1979 	 USSR/Finland boundary maintenance 
1981 	 Iceland/Norway agreement on the continental shelf in the area between Iceland and Jan 
Mayen 
Ecosystem Management 
1972 	 US/USSR cooperative agreement on environmental protection 
1988 	 Norway/USSR agreement on environmental cooperation 
1988 	 Finland/USSR cooperation on environmental & scientific maters 
1989 	 USSR/Sweden agreement on Baltic polution 
2. 	 MULTILATERAL REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
Wildlife Protection 
1911 	 Northern Fur Seal (Great Britain for Canada, US, USSR and Japan) regime for protection of 
seals. (Replaced by 1957 agreement below) 
1957 	 Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals {Canada, Japan, USSR, 
USA, adopted 7.5.1976, amended 1963, 1969, 1976, 1980 but US failed to ratify 1984 
protocol extending life of regime.) 
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1973 	 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears (13 ILM 13, Canada, Denmark, Germany, 
Norway, USA, USSR, in force 26.5.1976) 
Fisheries 
1959 	 Agreement Concerning Measures for Protection of the Stocks of Deep Sea Prawns, 
European Lobsters and Crabs (Denmark, Norway and Sweden, in force 26.1.1953, 
amended 14.10.1959) 
1973 	 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and 
the Belts (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden, USSR, in force 28.7.1974) 
1974 	 Regulation of the Fishing of North-East Arctic Cod (USSR withdrew 1974) 
Sovereignty/Security 
1872 	 Agreement on Spitzbergen (Russia, Sweden-Norway) defined Svalbard as terra communis 
1920 	 Treaty on the Status of Spitzbergen 
1985 	 Japan/US/USSR Air Trafic Control Agreement 
Ecosystem Management 
1972 	 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Polution by Dumping from Ships & Aircraft 
('Oslo Convention', in force 07.04.1974) 
1974 	 The Nordic Environmental Protection Convention (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
in force 5.10.76) 
1974 	 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 
Convention'; Denmark, Finland, Germany, Poland, Sweden, USSR, in force 
2.5.1980) 
1974 	 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Polution from Land-Based Sources ('Paris 
Convention'; Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, EEC, 
in force 06.05.1978) 
1979 	 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Polution ('LRTAP'; Sweden, Ukraine, 
USSR, in force 17.11.1979) 
1982 	 Northern Sciences Network - exchange information, facilitate cooperation between 
countries in planning, conducting and reviewing UNESCO's Man in the Biosphere 
program activities in the Northern areas. 
3. 	 GLOBAL 
1946 	 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (in force 10.11.1948, amended 
4.5.1959) 
1951 	 International Plant Protection Convention (control of pests & diseases & preventing 
spread across boundaries, in force 3.4.1952) 
1956 	 Treaty Establishing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
1958 	 Convention on the Continental Shelf (in force 10.6.1964) 
1963 	 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 
(in force 10.10.1963) 
1964 	 Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (amended, + 
Protocols 1970, 1975, in force 22.7.1968) 
1971 	 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of 
Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (in force 
18.5.1972) 
1972 	 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, and on their Destruction (in force 
26.3.1975) 
1972 	 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Colisions ('COLREG'; 
applies to al vessels on the high seas, in force 15.07.1977) 
1972 	 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Polution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Mater ('London Convention'; in force 30.08.1975) 
1973 	 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (in 
force 1.7.1975) 
1973 	 Convention for the Prevention of Polution from Ships ('MARPOL'), + 1978 Protocol (in 
force 02.10.1983) 
1980 	 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea ('SOLAS'; First edition 1914, 
updated 1974, in force 25.05.1980) (see esp. Chapter 5 relating to polar regions) 
1982 	 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ('LOSC'; in force 16.11.94) 
1985 	 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer + 
1989  Montreal Protocol (to reduce CFCs) + 
1990  London Revision of Montreal Protocol (total CFC phase-out) 
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4 . 	 UNILATERAL REGIONAL & MISCELLANEOUS 
1970 	 Canadian Arctic Waters Polution Prevention Act (establishing a NW Passage 100-mile 
polution prevention zone) 
1978 	 International Atomic Energy Agency Statement on Revised Definition and 
Recommendations Concerning the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes and Other Maters 
(reprinted in 18 LLM 822, May 1979} 
1991 	 USSR Regulations for Navigation on the Seaways of the Northern Sea Route (published in 
Notices to Mariners and reprinted in translated form in International Chalenges 12 #1 
(1992) pp121-6) 
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APPENDIX 6 
DRAFT ARCTIC TREATY 
(Source: Pharand 1992:190-5) 
Preamble 
The governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the Russian Republic and 
the United States of America; 
Recognizing the increasing concern of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic Region for the 
deterioration of their environment and their traditional way of life; 
Realizing the vulnerability of the Arctic Region to climatic and environmental change that 
can afect the wel-being of al Northern States; 
Noting that, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Article 123), 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea have an obligation to endeavour directly or through 
an appropriate regional organization, to coordinate their activities related to scientific research, the 
protection of the marine environment and the conservation of the living resources of the sea; 
Noting also that their obligation includes the invitation of other interested States or 
international organizations to cooperate with them in relation to those activities; 
Believing that regional cooperation should lead to the use of the Arctic Region for peaceful 
purposes only; 
Afirming that such peaceful uses are in the interest of al humanity and in furtherance of the 
first purpose of the United Nations, which is to maintain international peace and security; 
1 Area of Application 
For the purposes of the present Treaty, the 'Arctic Region' means the area north of 600 North Latitude, 
including the Aleutian Islands, Labrador and the region of northern Quebec known as 'Nunavik'. 
2 Purposes 
The main purposes of the Arctic Region Council (hereinafter refered to as 'Council') are: 
(1) to facilitate regional cooperation generaly among its Members; (2) to insure the taking of measures for the protection of the environment; 
(3) to promote the coordination of scientific research; (4) to encourage the conservation and appropriate management of living resources; 
(5) to foster sustainable economic development; (6) to further the health and social wel-being of the indigenous and other inhabitants of the 
Arctic Region; 
(7) to promote the use of the Arctic Region exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
3 Membership 
The founding Members of the Council shal be the eight States whose territory projects north of the 
Arctic Circle : Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States of 
America. 
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4 Organs of the Council 
The Council shal be composed of an Assembly and a Commission, as the two main organs, and a 
Secretariat as a subsidiary organ. 
(1) The Assembly The Assembly shal consist of al Members of the Council. 
The Assembly may discuss al questions relating to the purposes of the Council and shal 
establish general policies for the coordination of the activities of the Council and its Members. It 
may make recommendations to the Members or to the Commission on measures to be taken for the 
fulfilment of the purposes of the Council. 
The Assembly shal elect the four non-permanent Members of the Commission and appoint 
the Secretary of the Council. It may establish such subsidiary organs as are required to exercise its 
functions. 
A majority of Members of the Assembly shal constitute a quorum and its resolutions shal 
be adopted by consensus. In the absence of a consensus, resolutions shal be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority. The Assembly shal adopt its own rules of procedure and elect its President. 
(2) The Commission 
The Commission shal consist of twelve Members, of which the founding Members shal be 
permanent. The four non-permanent members shal be elected by the Assembly, on the basis of an 
equitable representation of the admited Members. The non-permanent Members shal be elected for 
four years, except for the first election when two shal be elected for two years only. 
The Commission shal decide on measures to fulfil the purposes of the Council and on the 
implementation of such measures. It may establish subsidiary organs required to exercise its 
functions. 
The Commission shal adopt its resolutions by consensus or, in the absence of consensus, by 
a vote of eight members. The Commission shal establish its own rules of procedure and elect its 
President. 
(3) The Secretariat The Secretariat shal be located on the teritory of one of the founding Members. It shal 
comprise a Secretary and such staf as may be required. The Secretary shal be the administrative 
oficer of the Council and shal be appointed by the Assembly on the recommendation of the 
Commission. The Secretary shal act in that capacity at al meetings of the Assembly and of the 
Commission. The Secretary shal make reports to the Assembly on the work of the Council at its 
regular meetings. 
5 Meetings 
Regular meetings of the Assembly and of the Commission shal be held every other year. 
Special meetings may be held at such other time and place as each organ may decide. 
Regular meetings shal be held in the Arctic Region and under the auspices of one of the founding 
Members in rotation. 
6 Expenses 
Each Member shal bear its own expenses, unless otherwise agreed. The expenses of the Secretariat 
shal be born by the Member on whose teritory it is located. 
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7 Settlement of Disputes 
Any dispute as to the interpretation or application of this Treaty shal be resolved by negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial setlement or other peaceful means to which the 
parties to the dispute agree. 
8 Entry into Force, Amendments and Review 
(1) Entry into Force The present Treaty shal enter into force upon signature (or after ratification) by al of the 
eight founding Arctic States. It shal come into force for each of the other Members at the time of 
their signature (or after their ratification/accession). 
(2) Amendments 
Amendments to the Treaty shal be adopted by the Assembly on the recommendation of the 
Commission. Such adoption shal be made by consensus, or failing that, by a vote of two-thirds. 
Amendments shal enter into force upon signature (or after ratification) by two-thirds of the 
members. 
(3) Review Conference After the Treaty has been in force for twenty-five years, any Member may request a 
Conference to review the operation of the Treaty. 
Such Conference shal be held on the recommendation of the Commission and approved by 
the Assembly, either by consensus or a vote of two-thirds. Any amendment adopted by the 
Conference shal enter into force after signature (or ratification) by al Members. 
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